Posts about: "Preliminary Report" [Posts: 24 Page: 2 of 2]¶

Thank you, I'd missed that. And on re-reading the preliminary report, I see that the NTSB described the routes using amsl. So I stand corrected on the route definition. That brings altimetry errors into play for erosion of the "designed" separation margin, which makes the design even more unsafe. But the point remains that PAT25's 78 foot deviation above the route maximum altitude is within the FAA's tolerance for commercial and instrument flying accuracy by helicopter pilots.

Nothing I'm saying in this post is meant to exonerate FAA or deflect responsibility away from it.

That being said, even though the FAA published a certain tolerance, and the helicopter's 78 foot deviation was within that tolerance, I think it is quite likely (if not certain) that on this particular subpart of the overall factual record, the plaintiffs will argue that the Army knew or should have known that despite the deviation being within the tolerance, such a deviation nonetheless was significantly unsafe and therefore negligent on the Army's part. It would be argued that the Army had a legal duty independent of what FAA published to operate its helicopters safely. The acts and omissions of more than one actor in a given situation can be oustide the established duties of care and therefore negligent. (I'm imagining that military aviators may disagree insofar as it may be an article of faith as well as military regulation that the FAA is absolutely the one responsible party for civil controlled airspace, but as a legal point I think plaintiffs will attack it.)

NTSB:
It is true that if the -only- change was using ADS-B Out on the helicopter, this accident would still have happened.

The CRJ was equipped with TCAS, which may or may not have been applicable at this low altitude as it is suppressed at 400 ft. The preliminary report does not indicate the helicopter having a TCAS or having an operating one. It did have the ability to produce ADS-B Out. Neither aircraft is reported to have had ADS-B In.

Since many operators seem to loath spending money on ADS-B In, the recommendation from the NTSB was to (1) stop simultaneous flight path use and (2) go elsewhere when the approaches were in use. The FAA agreed.

Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-001 the FAA did what was recommended about simultaneous use.
Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-002 the FAA made a satisfactory response concerning planning the alternate route(s)

This legislation is the exact opposite of that recommendation.

No doubt the anger isn't just that the NTSB has yet again been ignored, it's that the FAA agreements to safety measures are targeted for destruction in a way that recreates the circumstance of the tragic event.

I said at first, on seeing this collision a few hours after the event, that I felt rage that so many safety measures are available and yet none of them was actually used.

This section, 373, is what I consider an intentional sabotage of the safe operations around DCA.

The FAA literally had advertising videos showing the use of ADS-B In on helicopters for this exact purpose, to give situational awareness to the pilots long before there would be a need to deconflict with other traffic (see end) . No sudden swerves as TCAS attempts to make a last moment save of a terrible situation. TCAS alone cannot be the solution as TCAS gets shut off to avoid nuisance complaints about the terrain the plane is intentionally going to run into or other proximate planes waiting for takeoff.

ADS-B In is for noting where everyone else is in the neighborhood of the aircraft. Had the helicopter been equipped with ADS-B In they would have known the speed and direction of the CRJ and seen it was on a collision course.

As usual it appears there is no name attached nor meeting notes about who submitted what became Section 373. There is certainly no justification paper that will see the light of day.

If those exist, please, someone, prove me wrong.


duplicate:

I cannot find it on YouTube.

An actual user who avoided a mid-air using ADS-B In (Trent Palmer, if anyone wants to avoid him; not everyone is liked):

Re: AirScotia and the summary in the recent post:

"The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed."

I'm not certain the first sentence above is correct. The letter from the NTSB Chair regarding Section 373 states: "The NTSB has, for decades, advocated for ADS-B In and Out and its substantial contribution to safety, especially near airports."

The NTSB on March 7 issued a pre-preliminary report of sorts, specifically urging immediate action to shut down helicopter route 4 when Runway 33/15 is in use (for landings and departures, respectively). There is no reference to ADS-B in the March 7 urgent recommendation document.

I cannot say how it was that FAA and DoD agreed to start ADS-B Out use by military aircraft in the relevant airspace. But it did not result from the same urgent recommendations, at least insofar as those recommendations were stated in writing on March 7, which led to the closure of helicopter route 4. (I would note that the Preliminary Report by the Board was issued a few days later, on March 11.)

Regarding Section 373's legistative history, to use a term it perhaps does not deserve, there is less mystery than your summation suggests. There certainly are staff of one or both Armed Services Committees, and/or staff of Members serving on one or both of the those Committees, and/or the Representatives and/or Senators who run those Committees, who originated the language, and agreed upon the version that ended up in the legislation (it obviously would have gone through a series of revisions).

So the question is why was their action done without consulting the same people (Committee staff, House/Senate members' staff, and the legislators themselves) whose routine committee work has jurisdiction for civil aviation.

And there's another level also. Where within the defense bureaucracy or some other place in the interagency or executive branch did the impetus for the provision originate? I can see that the post pointing out that the provision, if enacted, would not help the Army in court, is probably correct. What other reason the Army may have had to sponsor the provision (and to do so quietly) I can't say. Which leaves, can it really be that difficult to devise a system for how and when military aircraft with significant emergency or classified operations (as compared to essentially routine operations) need different handling in the airspace?