January 30, 2025, 06:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11816907
My extra prayer, other than for the victims' families, and possibly for a truly despondent ATC controller
, is that No children were on the CRJ.
All of my flights into DCA (1985-2017) --mostly DC-9, MD-88, 717 --were on the profiles over the Potomac River, to land on Rwy 19, or for Rwy 01, flying the ILS or a charted visual while going north over the river.
We Never were required to use "see-and-avoid" to maintain safe separation from helicopters or any fixed-wing aircraft iirc.
Was the ATC controller so Busy watching Other aircraft on his radar that he could not clear the helicopter to fly a southeast (ie 150 *) heading--- to keep it well east of the final approach for Rwy 33, until the CRJ was clearly west of the heli, on final approach?
Or a similar separation?
, is that No children were on the CRJ.
All of my flights into DCA (1985-2017) --mostly DC-9, MD-88, 717 --were on the profiles over the Potomac River, to land on Rwy 19, or for Rwy 01, flying the ILS or a charted visual while going north over the river.
We Never were required to use "see-and-avoid" to maintain safe separation from helicopters or any fixed-wing aircraft iirc.
Was the ATC controller so Busy watching Other aircraft on his radar that he could not clear the helicopter to fly a southeast (ie 150 *) heading--- to keep it well east of the final approach for Rwy 33, until the CRJ was clearly west of the heli, on final approach?
Or a similar separation?
Last edited by Ignition Override; 30th January 2025 at 06:25 .
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
Radar
Separation (ALL)
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January 30, 2025, 09:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817027
Helicopter Low Level Routes are standardized through out the DC area.
Military Operations are 24/7/365 due to National Security issues.
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3851p....,0.268,0.125,0
Military Operations are 24/7/365 due to National Security issues.
https://www.loc.gov/resource/g3851p....,0.268,0.125,0
I have never flown there but if there's regular helicopter traffic 150ft below an ILS or circling approach airline crews familiar with the airport might tend to disregard TCAS proximate traffic, etc. as normal backdrop chatter.
Even when flying behind similar aircraft on an ILS in daylight and good visibility it takes quite some time to see that preceding traffic is slowing down as it only starts to "grow" at an alarming rate when quite close. I have witnessed that twice, once caused by self and another time caused by mismatched speed instructions from ATC. I have resolved to never accept visual separation to preceding traffic at night and while the European aversion to visual approaches might be excessive, high density night ops based on visual separation don't seem to be a good idea even without that crash.
Subjects
ATC
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
Radar
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
Visual Separation
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January 30, 2025, 10:04:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817076
As a regular tourist to Alexandria, I have often watched the DCA traffic and the helos transiting along the Potomac shoreline north of the Wilson Bridge on Route 4. In this tragic instance, the Blackhawk [PAT25} not only seems to be higher than the published procedure but also further west [ie over the river]. And according to that radar plot [post 80] , in the last moments it seems to rurn right [ie further west] exacerbating the situation.
MPN11, former Mil ATCO
MPN11, former Mil ATCO
Subjects
ATCO
Blackhawk (H-60)
DCA
PAT25
Radar
Route 4
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January 30, 2025, 10:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817091
Unlikely that they mistook the CRJ, It's landing lights were pointing right at them. More likely they weren't sure where they were in relation to the plane and where it was going. From the radar plot they are head on, then the CRJ turns final to 33 and the Blackhawk turns right to avoid them. Too high and in the wrong spot.
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
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January 30, 2025, 14:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817272
The helicopter\x92s right turn was directly over a golf course, not a residential neighborhood. It was probably done for noise abatement reasons, because it then turned left and proceeded down more directly over the river.
The golf course is on a peninsula in the river, so the helicopter was flying over water before and after it made the two turns.
The golf course is on a peninsula in the river, so the helicopter was flying over water before and after it made the two turns.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
Radar
Route 4
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January 30, 2025, 14:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817282
The track in your image is not an accurate representation of PAT25s actual flight path. The leaked ATC radar track
here
and the VASAviation recreation
here
are more representative. There was no sharp RH turn to cross over the Potomac Park golf courses, it was a gentle RH turn to follow the published Route 1 to Route 4 helicopter transition around DCA.
You could contact them if you want and tell them it\x92s wrong. No offense intended.
Even if it wasn\x92t a sharp turn, it was done over a golf course and their flight path was probably dictated by noise abatement reasons, as are those flown by jets flying into DCA.
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ATC
DCA
Radar
Route 4
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January 30, 2025, 15:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817315
Looking at the leaked radar plot a CA was flashing for both aircraft for approximately 20 seconds, then stopped for around 10 seconds, then started again up to the point of impact.
I suppose this is what you'll get if you routinely direct aircraft onto a collision course with each other, and therefore ignoring the CA will also become routine because you expect the pilots to sort it out. At 300' while lining up on short final, or looking into an environment full of lights. Normalisation of Deviation.
I suppose this is what you'll get if you routinely direct aircraft onto a collision course with each other, and therefore ignoring the CA will also become routine because you expect the pilots to sort it out. At 300' while lining up on short final, or looking into an environment full of lights. Normalisation of Deviation.
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Radar
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January 30, 2025, 15:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817322
Looking at the leaked radar plot a CA was flashing for both aircraft for approximately 20 seconds, then stopped for around 10 seconds, then started again up to the point of impact.
I suppose this is what you'll get if you routinely direct aircraft onto a collision course with each other, and therefore ignoring the CA will also become routine because you expect the pilots to sort it out. At 300' while lining up on short final, or looking into an environment full of lights. Normalisation of Deviation.
I suppose this is what you'll get if you routinely direct aircraft onto a collision course with each other, and therefore ignoring the CA will also become routine because you expect the pilots to sort it out. At 300' while lining up on short final, or looking into an environment full of lights. Normalisation of Deviation.
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Radar
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January 30, 2025, 17:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817417
Originally Posted by
SASless
Was the CRJ Crew using Glide Slope information as part of their VFR Approach procedure for the designated runway?
I couldn't find any NOTAM that would have signaled a non-functioning PAPI and, in a clear night, any trained pilot would follow the PAPI indication out of force of habit.
Originally Posted by
SASless
The other question is at what point would the CRJ Crew have benefit of visual glide slope lighting for the RWY 33?
starting at the Visual Guidance Fix (VGF) IDTEK which is overhead of the motorway I-295 (if I am not mistaken).
I think that it is reasonable to assume that the pilot would have aimed at passing overhead IDTEK at 490 feet MSL as specified in the RNAV procedure.
IDTEK is about at 1.4 nm or 8500 ft from the threshold or about 9600 ft from the TDZ.
With a published PAPI glideslope of 3.00\xb0, the glideslope path is at about 500 ft MSL at IDTEK
Originally Posted by
SASless
Can one derive a reasonable height above ground for the collision point....and/or a distance from the Touchdown Point of RWY33 for comparison to what seems to be the height and distance from the TD point?
And the distance TDZ - threshold is about 330 m for this runway.
With some trigonometric calculation, you end up with a height between 229 and 263 feet above runway TDZ, under the assumption that the plane was spot on the glide.
Subjects
CRJ
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
Radar
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 19:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817562
ATC in the tower would be unable to visually verify separation at that distance.
The earlier radar replay, if confirmed real, raises the question of whether it was monitored by anybody able to warn in time
The earlier radar replay, if confirmed real, raises the question of whether it was monitored by anybody able to warn in time
Subjects
ATC
Radar
Separation (ALL)
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January 30, 2025, 20:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817632
Stop night visual separation in Class B airspace, and accidents such as this will not happen. Sure, other accidents might, but this one was and should be avoidable. Radar control is required.
Ideally in daytime ops too. Visual separation is hazardous in congested airspace at all times.
Ideally in daytime ops too. Visual separation is hazardous in congested airspace at all times.
Subjects
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 30, 2025, 22:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817700
See and avoid in airline operations simply does not work. High workload, human factors, visual limitations, high closing speeds simply make it unreliable.
There have been countless similar cases of near misses. Near airports, crossing traffic, especially helicopters is a real issue, as is the totally inappropriate see and avoid principle with commercial traffic. In my view we need a complete rule change and rethink around lack of radar separation between IFR and VFR traffic.
All too frequently ATC allow IFR and VFR far too close on approach and are permitted to just inform the VFR traffic to visually manoeuvre themselves all too close to IFR traffic. The book 'The Naked Pilot' years ago established that see and avoid does not work, simple as that.
Class D airspace whilst not necessarily involved here often causes such issues. Pilot's wrongly believe ATC separates IFR and VFR. Frequently ATC allow conflicts to develop on the basis of law, rather than duty of care. We need to get back to common sense, and that is ATC must stop VFR traffic getting anywhere near airliners on final approach or from crossing the go around track. Either lateral or vertical separation needs to be enforced or repeats of this type of accident will definitely repeat.
Lessons have not been learned previous to this accident. I fear we will see a repeat, and low level near airport ATC separation needs to improve.
We need the industry to wake up and realise, see and avoid is unreliable, and air law does not protect IFR traffic from VFR traffic enough.
There have been countless similar cases of near misses. Near airports, crossing traffic, especially helicopters is a real issue, as is the totally inappropriate see and avoid principle with commercial traffic. In my view we need a complete rule change and rethink around lack of radar separation between IFR and VFR traffic.
All too frequently ATC allow IFR and VFR far too close on approach and are permitted to just inform the VFR traffic to visually manoeuvre themselves all too close to IFR traffic. The book 'The Naked Pilot' years ago established that see and avoid does not work, simple as that.
Class D airspace whilst not necessarily involved here often causes such issues. Pilot's wrongly believe ATC separates IFR and VFR. Frequently ATC allow conflicts to develop on the basis of law, rather than duty of care. We need to get back to common sense, and that is ATC must stop VFR traffic getting anywhere near airliners on final approach or from crossing the go around track. Either lateral or vertical separation needs to be enforced or repeats of this type of accident will definitely repeat.
Lessons have not been learned previous to this accident. I fear we will see a repeat, and low level near airport ATC separation needs to improve.
We need the industry to wake up and realise, see and avoid is unreliable, and air law does not protect IFR traffic from VFR traffic enough.
Subjects
ATC
Close Calls
IFR
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Vertical Separation
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January 30, 2025, 22:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817705
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 22:35:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817716
OK so what's your interpretation of the rules here then?
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
CRJ
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 23:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817745
a good test of that principle is what happens if the crew go around having commenced a visual approach. They are expected to fly the MAP and not go off script.
In Europe, the radar service can be terminated on an instrument approach once descending into uncontrolled airspace. But the a/c is still IFR.
In Europe, the radar service can be terminated on an instrument approach once descending into uncontrolled airspace. But the a/c is still IFR.
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ATC
IFR
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January 30, 2025, 23:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817756
OK so what's your interpretation of the rules here then?
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
"Radar useless as the aircraft are too low." - It seems there's valid radar returns from both aircraft. the FAA has a good diagram of the Potomac TRACON radar sites, about 10 different radars, and having visited the TRACON several times, they readily explain there's another nearly facility that is a duplicate of their radar feed, but for national security. I assume there's coverage till the river service for security to prevent someone from sneaking up the river with bad ideas
"Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. " - I fly in the area and in my experience everyone is on the same VHF, they might be also duped to UHF and can hear everybody on my handheld. You hear AF-1 all the time on freq.
"The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic" - Most of the area NE of the airfield in a prohibited area, and there's a lot of military installations within 5 miles of DC that they are shuttling around, so that path seems perfectly acceptable given the numerous constraints. there's nothing wrong with a helo corridor as long as you stay within it and maintain the prescribed altitude. Also, it's not like KDCA is some secret place, the flight paths are pretty well known if that's where you work. It's popular to sit in parks on both ends and watch the planes, there's literally millions of local people that know exactly the planes are coming and going on both directions. so if you're a helo there, you know where the hot spots are. Likewise, its not just any helo in that area, everyone is vetted, fingerprinted in the inner FRZ.
" on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone" - The UH-60 was not going to DCA, the assumption was it was using the helo route 4 corridor. All the UH-60Ls I've seen have full glass with moving map and I'm assuming a magenta line for the helo corridor.
Fun Fact - Calling it "Reagan" will get you tarred and feathered in the area. Folks refuse to utter the name and for years (decades) the Metro refused to rename the station until legally forced.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 31st January 2025 at 00:05 . Reason: Prescribed/proscribed
Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
DCA
FAA
Hot Spots
IFR
KDCA
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Route 4
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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January 31, 2025, 01:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817827
OK so what's your interpretation of the rules here then?
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
It's eerily similar to the P-63/B-17 midair- a blind collision that was instantly apparent how flawed the basic plan was, even though it had worked before.
Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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January 31, 2025, 10:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818101
Quote from an NTSB report
\x94 The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flight crew to comply with the provisions of a maintain visual separation clearance including the requirement to inform the controller when they no longer had the other aircraft in sight.
Contributing to the accident were the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures to separate two aircraft on potentially conflicting tracks when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical radar separation to either aircraft. \x93
That was of course PSA 182 I\x92m not entirely sure that after a lengthy investigation the report won\x92t say something similar.
\x94 The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flight crew to comply with the provisions of a maintain visual separation clearance including the requirement to inform the controller when they no longer had the other aircraft in sight.
Contributing to the accident were the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures to separate two aircraft on potentially conflicting tracks when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical radar separation to either aircraft. \x93
That was of course PSA 182 I\x92m not entirely sure that after a lengthy investigation the report won\x92t say something similar.
Subjects
ATC
NTSB
Probable Cause
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 14:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818235
Well unlike the Korean accident I think we know what happened here. The solution when it comes wil depend on the level of risk those in authority are prepared to accept in order that business can continue. In my opinion
A minimal response might be to review staffing policies in the tower; if radar equipped it would help to have someone solely responsible for the heli lane situationally aware of inbound traffic to the airport. If more change is acceptable then the heli routes should be examined and probably redesigned and traffic levels at Reagan at least examined.
I can see no reason to close the airport. Yes it is constrained and has short runways but many airports are similar. around the world. London City here is examining whether it can accept Airbus 320 neo aircraft with a 4965 foot runway and steep approaches in a very built up area.
There are wider issues - why do so many controllers sound like disk jockeys in the US whereas here they do their very best to sound calm.
I do believe some changes will come - just as line up and wait was introduced I believe the current clear to land will be replaced by continue approach and then clear to land only where it means that - the runway is clear and I know of no conflict to affect your landing. With this, some clearances still need to be conditional - At KDCA clearance to and 33 might be conditional on 01 traffic. Bit overall it is just clearer - and can be accommodated by most tower controllers given what thy have to deal with AFAICS.
Finally the suitability of see and avoid to night time operations will have to be examined.
A minimal response might be to review staffing policies in the tower; if radar equipped it would help to have someone solely responsible for the heli lane situationally aware of inbound traffic to the airport. If more change is acceptable then the heli routes should be examined and probably redesigned and traffic levels at Reagan at least examined.
I can see no reason to close the airport. Yes it is constrained and has short runways but many airports are similar. around the world. London City here is examining whether it can accept Airbus 320 neo aircraft with a 4965 foot runway and steep approaches in a very built up area.
There are wider issues - why do so many controllers sound like disk jockeys in the US whereas here they do their very best to sound calm.
I do believe some changes will come - just as line up and wait was introduced I believe the current clear to land will be replaced by continue approach and then clear to land only where it means that - the runway is clear and I know of no conflict to affect your landing. With this, some clearances still need to be conditional - At KDCA clearance to and 33 might be conditional on 01 traffic. Bit overall it is just clearer - and can be accommodated by most tower controllers given what thy have to deal with AFAICS.
Finally the suitability of see and avoid to night time operations will have to be examined.
Subjects
KDCA
Radar
See and Avoid
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January 31, 2025, 14:47:00 GMT
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Interestingly, if the SMS works in the US the same as everywhere else in the world, procedures should be audited on a regular basis, with a focus on any changes which may have invalidated the original assumptions made about the frequency of hazards and associated risks. These procedure reviews would also take place after receipt of any safety reports where the procedure could have been a contributing factor.
The NASA ASRS database contains safety reports raised over the US. A quick search with the term “helicopter” produced 40+ reports with the highlights shown below.. (apologies, to save time these are all copy and pasted) There are more, but I appreciate that most of us have annual eye examinations to pass so didn’t want to overdo it!
1. While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a “monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the “clear of conflict” the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead.
2. ATC delayed switch from Approach to Tower led to TA and resulting altitude deviation causing a GPWS Caution. Tower then issued a low altitude alert. Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. By the time Tower responded we had a RA to descend which led to a GPWS and low altitude alert from Tower. We confirmed traffic in sight and maneuvered back on coarse to correct the deviation, in judgement the safety of flight was not compromised as such we continued the approach to landing on Runway 19. As I believe a go-around would have exacerbated the situation and led to further problems.
3. I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].
I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X, approved the request and issued the altimeter.
Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.
Note. My standard practice for helicopter s flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopter s pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.
Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopter s over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.
Once Aircraft Y landed, he asked about the flight of three helicopter s off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.
Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.
I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.
4
Our flight] into DCA was in a NMAC. We were supposed to circle from the visual Runway 1 to instead land on 33. We followed the [company] station bulletin procedures exactly as planned and came within very close contact of another aircraft. This occurred about 400 feet off the ground to the point where the pilot monitoring had to take the controls to make a correction in order to prevent it from becoming a midair collision. After there was action taken to make a correction from the close call, we were then informed by DCA tower of close traffic although at that point it would have been too late. I have flown with people who for the purpose of having a better chance of a stabilized approach would have had a wider circle to land procedure which I'm sure would have almost definitely ended in the collision of two aircraft over the turn to final for 33 in DCA. There was an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower to [our flight] or DCA Tower to the associated helicopter who did not ever pop up on TCAS which I'm assuming is due to a lack of an operating transponder. No TCAS RA was associated with this event.
This occurred due to an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower and [our flight] or DCA Tower and the associated helicopter . Otherwise the other reason this may have happened is because of an unclear idea of where aircraft should be located during Runway 33 circle to land operations. I believe I was on track with what the [company] guidelines are for that particular procedure but there is a possibility that the other traffic operating around that area may not be aware of where exactly we are located or maybe they don't have a specific guideline to keep the arriving traffic separated from the low flying helicopter s.
5
I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have.
6
We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in
sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final.
when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around
regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a
turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed
on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an
explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have
happened. Number one, he said that the helicopter s operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter
was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a
second because they would never expect those helicopter s to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've
never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the
helicopter , and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot.
Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions.
7
It was the end of a long day and the events were happening very quickly during a high workload portion of the flight. As all pilots know, the River Visual is a very demanding approach during the best of circumstances. It is very labor intensive when done at night during periods of high traffic volume. The advertised approach in use at DCA was the LDA 19 with VASI being out of service. During the initial approach, Potomac asked if we would accept the charted River Visual approach (VASI back working) and we did. At approximately the 7 DME point we were in the end process of configuring the airplane for landing and the First Officer was accomplishing the Landing Checklist. The radio chatter was considerable and the Tower at some point advised us of helicopter traffic ahead and to the left (I believe he said 10 to 11 o'clock) and he was going to pass from left to right, below us and he "HAS US IN SIGHT." It has to be noted that these traffic calls and helicopter s have unfortunately become background noise. There are always numerous military and government helicopter s running up and down that river at all times of the day and night. Because of this, what would normally be alarming at any other airport in the country has become commonplace at DCA. The FAA allows these aircraft to operate in this environment and we have no choice, but to accept it and deal with it. Therefore, the helicopter s being very close are not out of the norm. As you can imagine, I was concentrating on the approach and doing the required gyrations to stay over the river and not violate the White House prohibited airspace, and to keep the aircraft on the proper vertical profile. The Runway 19 visual was loaded in the FMGC and I was using it as a backup to my eyes. I was 'dead on' the donut and everything looked normal. I was at or very slightly above the recommended altitudes at each DME point. As I was approaching 4 DME, I caught a glimpse of the helicopter out of my left window and he did look higher than I expected to see him. I asked the First Officer to confirm if he was going to cross from north to south. He confirmed, however I directed him to ask the Tower and confirm it with them because it did not look right. The First Officer could not get a word in with the Tower. It was at that point, we got a TCAS "TRAFFIC" call. Again, this is not out of the 'norm' for DCA. I was getting ready to take possible evasive action because it was getting uncomfortable; all this while trying to fly the demanding profile. Within seconds, we got a TCAS alert, "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED." I complied with the TCAS alert and was thinking of going around but it all happened so very quickly that the point was moot. The helicopter passed 200 FT (MAX) below us. We were at 900 FT, slightly above the path. The Tower never called out the traffic beyond the first notification. The landing was uneventful. Due to the workload, we asked the Ground Controller for the Tower number and I called when I got to my vehicle. I called the Tower and spoke with the Controller in charge. At first it was it was obvious he was somewhat on the defensive and I had to press the point and ask very specific questions about the standard helicopter operations in the area. After some prodding, he admitted that it was a military helicopter flying from/to Ft. Meade and that he was at 700 FT and was "a little higher than normal." I asked what altitude was he supposed to be at and he replied, "three to four hundred feet." In addition, he did admit that the Tower version of collision avoidance did go to alarm but before they had a chance to react, the event was over. I cannot imagine what business is so pressing that these helicopter s are allowed to cross the path of airliners carrying hundreds of people! I do not understand why they are not crossed IN-BETWEEN arrivals. They have at least 4 miles between these arriving aircraft and it seems that would be more prudent.
8
We were on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach to Washington National Airport, and the Tower instructed us to circle to land on Runway 33. While we made our approach to Runway 33, Tower advised a helicopter was maneuvering at our 12 o'clock position. As we continued our approach, Tower instructed the helicopter to "make a right 360 for a jet on a 2 mile final for Runway 33, and to report him in sight" (referring to our aircraft.)
The Tower then asked the helicopter if he had us in sight. He replied "yes", and the Tower told him to maintain visual separation. As we began our turn from base to final, the helicopter made what looked like a right turn directly into our flight path. The Captain, the pilot flying, made a hard right turn and executed a missed approach to avoid a collision. I'm not sure how close we came to the helicopter since it was on the left side of the aircraft, but I would guess it was only a few hundred feet.
9
WE WERE EXECUTING AN ILS IN IMC. AS MY FO ANNOUNCED 'APCHING MINIMUMS, RWY IN SIGHT,' I BEGAN MY TRANSITION FROM FLT DIRECTOR REF TO VISUAL REF FOR A HAND FLOWN LNDG. MY AIRSPD WAS PROBABLY AROUND 130-135 KIAS. AS I WAS TRANSITIONING I SUDDENLY SAW A DARK COLORED MIL HELI ON MY APCH PATH. HE BLENDED IN VISUALLY WITH THE DISMAL WX CONDITIONS. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY ACFT LIGHTING. AS I SAW HIM, SO DID THE DCA TWR CTLR. THE CTLR ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE AND FORCEFUL ATC INSTRUCTION TO THE HELI. THE HELI EXECUTED AN ABRUPT EVASIVE MANEUVER AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE FOG. I LANDED SAFELY. THIS ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 3-4 SECONDS. MY ACFT (BOEING 757) CONFIGN WAS GEAR DOWN, FULL 30 DEG FLAPS, ON SPD, ON COURSE, ON GLIDE PATH. EVASIVE MANEUVERING CAPABILITY IS LIMITED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MY ALT WAS ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE POTOMAC RIVER. ARPT TERMINALS AND CTL TWR WERE TO MY L, PROHIBITED AREA P-56 WAS TO MY R, AND THE HELI IN QUESTION WAS IN THE WX IN FRONT OF ME SOMEWHERE. I DIDN'T FEEL I COULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH WITH THAT ACFT IN THE FOG IN FRONT OF ME. WE WERE STILL ON LNDG PROFILE AND I DECIDED LNDG WAS THE SAFEST COURSE AVAILABLE. WE MADE A NORMAL EXIT FROM THE RWY TO THE L WITH MUCH LNDG ROOM LEFT ON RWY 36. TAXIED TO THE GATE AND PARKED. MADE AN IMMEDIATE PHONE CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AND RPTED THE INCIDENT. THEN CALLED MY AIRLINE FLT MGMNT SUPVRS AND RPTED THE INCIDENT AND MADE A WRITTEN RPT TO THE AIRLINE SAFETY DEPT UPON ARR AT MY BASE THAT NIGHT. I AM GLAD THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE CTLR TO SEE THE HELI IN TIME TO TAKE ACTION. IF THE VISIBILITY HAD BEEN ANY LESS HE WOULDN'T HAVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT DURING HIS SPEAKING WITH THE TWR FACILITY AT DCA, A CTLR IN TRAINING WAS HANDLING THE MIL TFC AT THE N END OF THE ARPT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER, MORE EXPERIENCED, CTLR. THE SECOND CTLR IS THE ONE THAT TOOK OVER THE MIKE AND ORDERED THE HELI TO LEAVE THE APCH ENVIRONMENT OF THE LNDG TFC. THE RPTR STATES THAT HIS TRAINING WOULD NORMALLY CAUSE HIM TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BUT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ENCOUNTER WITH THE SAME ACFT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD POSSIBILITY AND SO DECIDED THAT LNDG WAS THE SAFEST PATH TO FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT THE PHONE CONVERSATION REVEALED THAT EXTENSIVE TRAINING FOR A MIL EXERCISE OR OP WAS IN PROGRESS AND WAS BEING STAGED FROM THE N PART OF THE DCA COMPLEX. THE RPTR DOESN'T KNOW WHETHER THE HELI PLT MISUNDERSTOOD HIS INSTRUCTIONS OR WHETHER THE CTLR ISSUED SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE.
10
WE WERE ON THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. THERE WAS A MIL HELI OPERATING A TRAINING FLT FLYING N TO S OVER THE RIVER AT 500 FT MSL. WE APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST 80 KTS FASTER (WHILE IN OUR LNDG CONFIGN) THAN THE HELI. TWR ADVISED US OF THE HELI AND THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND HE WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. WE OVERTOOK ALMOST DIRECTLY ABOVE THE HELI AT ABOUT 3.5 DME AND 1100 FT MSL, RIGHT AT THE TURN IN THE RIVER THAT IS REQUIRED ON THE APCH. WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM OUR TCASII AT 1100 FT. WE FLEW AS FAR TO THE E SIDE OF THE RIVER AS WE COULD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON THE HELI ON THE W SIDE OF THE RIVER. WINDS WERE OUT OF THE SW AT 15-20 KTS. THE TCASII INDICATED CLR OF CONFLICT. WE STARTED TO DSND AGAIN AND AT 900 FT AGL, RECEIVED ANOTHER RA FROM OUR TCASII. AT THAT POINT IN THE APCH, THE RIVER TURNED BACK TO THE SSW. AS WE MADE OUR R TURN WE REGAINED VISUAL WITH THE HELI AND CONTINUED TO DSND. TCASII GAVE US 'CLR OF CONFLICT' AND WE FINISHED THE APCH AND LANDED. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND HE LISTENED AND SAID THIS WAS NORMAL. I HAVE FLOWN THIS APCH AT LEAST 15 TIMES AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THIS APCH PUSHING THE ENVELOPE FOR SAFETY, WITH THE AMOUNT OF ATTN I HAD TO GIVE TO THE HELI WHILE FOLLOWING THE RIVER AND DSNDING IN A XWIND AND AT A HIGH LNDG WT. THE TWR NEVER MADE IT CLR TO US WHERE THE HELI WAS GOING. ON THE PHONE THE SUPVR SAID THEY TRAIN FLYING N TO S AND BACK AT 500 FT. APPARENTLY, THEY DO THIS FROM 2 DME N TO 10 DME, BASICALLY UNDER THE WHOLE APCH. WHY CAN'T THEY DO THIS AFTER 10 O'CLOCK PM OR DURING LOW TFC FLOW PERIODS? AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ACFT SHOULD BE SPACED BETTER SO AS NOT TO FLY SO CLOSE TO THE HELI WHILE ON THE APCH. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED HELIS PREVIOUSLY WHILE SHOOTING THIS APCH, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALWAYS CLOSER IN SPD TO US AND THEREFORE WE WOULD NOT OVERTAKE THEM AS FAST, OR WE WERE SPACED BETTER. ALSO, THEY ALWAYS HAD A DEST THAT WE WERE ADVISED OF. I'M SENDING IN THIS RPT BECAUSE I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LEVEL OF SAFETY INVOLVED WITH FLYING WITHIN 400 FT VERTLY OF A HELI AND THAT IS CONSIDERED A NORMAL OP.
11
DURING ILS APCH, SBOUND, HELI COMING DOWN POTOMAC RIVER ABOUT 500 FT MSL, TFC CALLED BY TWR, WE DIDN'T SEE IT. WE GOT AN RA ON TCASII -- HAD TO FOLLOW RA INSTRUCTIONS. THEN WE WERE HIGH ABOVE GS, HAD TO DSND MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE WANTED TO IN ORDER TO LAND. THIS HELI CONFLICT AROUND DCA IS A DAILY PROB! GOING TO TA ONLY ON TCASII WOULD DEFEAT PURPOSE OF TCASII. LNDG ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE HELI'S. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
12
I WAS TURNING FINAL FOR STOL LNDG RWY 21 DCA. I SAW A HELI APCHING ON CONFLICTING FLT PATH. IT WAS APPROX 400 FT BELOW US, BUT WE WERE DSNDING FOR LNDG. I ADVISED DCA TWR OF TFC. HE SAID 'TFC LOW LEVEL, 200 FT.' JUST AS I WAS GOING TO MANEUVER TO AVOID, THE CHOPPER MADE A STEEP TURN AWAY FROM US. AT THIS POINT WE WERE WITHIN 100 FT VERTICALLY AND 1000 FT HORIZLY. BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING A STOL LNDG AT DCA, MY TURN TO AVOID HIM WOULD ALSO CAUSE A GAR. TWR HAD PUT US ON RWY 21 WHILE THE ARPT WAS IN A 'N' OP (ALL OTHER TFC LNDG ON RWY 36). I RECEIVED NO WARNING FROM TWR OF HELI TFC AND I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF CHOPPER PLT HAD US IN SIGHT (UNTIL HE MADE THE EVASIVE TURN). THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME OF SUCH AN OCCURRENCE AT DCA. I HAVE HAD MANY CONFLICTS WITH CHOPPERS, BOTH ON LNDG AND TKOF AT DCA. I HAVE TALKED TO TWR SEVERAL TIMES (INCLUDING THIS TIME) AND HAVE RECEIVED APOLOGIES AND ADMITTING OF ERRORS BUT THE PROB CONTINUES. THE HELI IS A VERY MANEUVERABLE ACFT. IF THE CHOPPER PLTS WOULD JUST GIVE US MORE SEPARATION, THE PROB WOULD BE SOLVED. WHEN THEY SEE US THEY COULD SLOW OR HOVER, TURN, ETC. CONFLICTS OCCUR WHEN TWR FORGETS TO ADVISE ME THAT CHOPPER HAS ME IN SIGHT AND THE CHOPPER MAINTAINS HIS 'TRAJECTORY' WHICH CONFLICTS WITH MY LIMITED ARR OR DEP AIRSPACE.
13
DURING RIVER VISUAL APCH DCA (LNDG RWY 18), 3 HELIS CROSSED OUR FLT PATH. THE FIRST CAUSED AN RA ON TCASII WITH A 0-300 FT CLB (WHICH WE FOLLOWED). THE HELI WENT DIRECTLY UNDER OUR ACFT WITH LESS THAN 300 FT SEPARATION. THE NEXT 2 HELIS CAUSED MONITOR VERT DSCNT ON THE TCASII. ALL 3 HELIS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 1 MI. THE TWR NEVER CALLED ANY TFC, UNTIL WE CALLED THE FIRST HELI IN SIGHT. THEN HE SAID 3 HELIS WERE XING THE RIVER. WITHOUT THE RA WE WOULD HAVE COME EVEN CLOSER THAN 300 FT TO THE FIRST HELI.
14
WASHINGTON APCH CTL CLRED ACR X FOR THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH. AT THE WILSON BRIDGE THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND STOL ON RWY 33. I TURNED OFF THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH ONTO A L BASE LEG FOR RWY 33. THE PATTERN FLOWN WAS SQUARE. I TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1/2 MI S OF THE E BANK OF THE POTOMAC RIVER. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED OF A HELI IN OUR AREA AND WE DID NOT HEAR THE TWR TALKING TO A HELI ON 119.1 (1-WAY OR 2-WAY COM). WE DID NOT SEE A HELI DURING OUR APCH. THE SKY WAS HAZY AND THE SUN WAS OFF THE L SIDE. IT WAS DAYLIGHT. LINED UP ON FINAL AND STABILIZED FOR A STOL LNDG, I SUDDENLY CAUGHT SIGHT OF A PRESIDENTIAL TYPE HELI XING OUR FLT PATH, APPROX 50-100 FT BELOW AND 100 FT IN FRONT OF US AT OUR 11:30 POS, AS WE PASSED THROUGH 600 FT MSL. THE HELI WAS MOVING L TO R AT A GOOD SPD, BUT I DETERMINED A COLLISION WAS POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED PWR, PULLED UP AND CALLED 'GAR' TO THE FO. AS WE PULLED UP I CALLED OUT THE HELI TO THE FO WHO THEN SAW IT CLOSE AND BELOW AS IT PASSED OFF THE R SIDE. THE GAR WAS UNEVENTFUL AND COMPLIED WITH TWR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN AFTER WE CALLED WITH GAR AND NEAR MISS. THE TWR'S RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER AND UNDERSTAND' ONLY. THE HELI IN QUESTION DID NOT APPEAR TO ALTER COURSE OR FLT PATH UNTIL DSNDING AND LNDG AT ANACOSTRA. ON THE GND I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE TWR ON LANDLINE BUT KEPT GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL (3 ATTEMPTS). SINCE I WAS DUE BACK OUT IN 10 MINS FOR MY NEXT FLT, I RETURNED TO MY ACFT AND CONTINUED ON MY SCHEDULE. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE TWR KNEW OF OR HAD TALKED TO THE HELI IN QUESTION. MANY TIMES THE TWR TALKS TO HELIS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ, BUT YOU CAN HEAR THE TWR'S COM TO THEM ON 119.1. THEY WILL USUALLY POINT OUT HELI TFC TO US AND COMMENT THAT THE HELI IS AT SUCH AND SUCH AN ALT, DIRECTION AND THAT THEY (THE HELI) HAVE US IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT WAS 'VERY' CLOSE AND FAR FROM THE NORM I'VE EXPERIENCED IN 15 YRS OF FLYING INTO AND OUT OF DCA.
15
HOT, HAZY AFTERNOON IN WASHINGTON (HAZE DID RESTRICT VISIBILITY) FLYING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA, CREW IS DCA BASED SO WE ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. AT ABOUT 4-5 DME, TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD LAND ON RWY 15, I DECLINED AND SAID THAT I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE FOR RWY 18. TWR THEN ADVISED US THERE WOULD BE 2 HELIS COMING OUT OF THE TIDAL BASIN AREA. (IT IS NOT AT ALL UNCOMMON TO SEE HELIS XING OUR FLT PATH WHEN WE ARE TAKING OFF TO THE N AND CLBING). I COULD SEE A CONTACT ON OUR TCASII SCREEN -- JUST ONE TARGET -- AND BTWN 600 AND 500 FT ON FINAL, WE GOT AN RA THAT COMMANDED CLB. I HAD THE FO LEVEL OFF AT 500 FT, THE TARGET SHOWED 200 FT BELOW ON THE TCASII AND VERY CLOSE ABEAM ME (ON 5 NM SCALE) AND I NEVER DID SEE EITHER HELI. WE STARTED BACK DOWN WHEN THE TCASII SHOWED WE WERE PASSED THEM, WE WERE HIGH AS WE ROLLED WINGS LEVEL ON FINAL BUT, WE WERE STILL ABLE TO SAFELY COMPLETE THE APCH. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS APCH AT DCA FOR 7 1/2 YRS, AND THIS ONE REALLY GOT MY ATTN. TWR IS NOT CTLING THE HELIS, I CAN'T BE SURE THE HELIS HAVE ME IN SIGHT, I KNOW THE SECOND HELI IS LOOKING AT HIS LEAD -- THEREFORE, I KNOW HE IS NOT LOOKING AT ME, AND I AM DSNDING INTO HIM WHILE ON FINAL ON A CHALLENGING APCH. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE A MIDAIR, AND UNFORTUNATELY, PROBABLY IS CONSIDERED ROUTINE OPS BY DCA TWR.
16
MANEUVERING IN GOOD VMC FOR LNDG ON RWY 21 AT DCA (CLRED FOR VIS APCH, MONITORING TWR FREQ FOR LNDG CLRNC). TWR ADVISED OF HELI TFC BELOW AND AHEAD. THIS TFC WAS SPOTTED FLYING SW WHERE ANACOSTIA RIVER MEETS POTOMAC. NO CONFLICT, INITIALLY. THE HELI, A MIL TYPE, THEN TURNED NW UP THE POTOMAC RIVER. THIS NOW BECAME AN IMMEDIATELY INCREASING TFC CONFLICT. CONVERGING FLT PATHS. I ASKED TWR TO PROVIDE SEP, HOPING HE WOULD STOP, SLOW OR TURN THE HELI. HE RESPONDED WITH, "MAINTAIN VIS SEP." MANEUVERING IN CLOSE FOR A STOL LNDG ALLOWS FOR VERY LITTLE LEEWAY FROM THE DESIRED FLT PATH. A GAR FROM THIS POS IS ALSO DANGEROUS. THERE WAS NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO TWR AND THE HELI WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. I CONTINUED AND LANDED VERY CAUTIOUSLY WHEN I REALIZED WE WOULD MISS TFC. HOWEVER, WE ONLY MISSED BY APPROX 300'. I FEEL THAT ATC (TWR) IGNORED ITS BASIC OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING SEP. THE HELI COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN SLOWED, STOPPED OR TURNED AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING AN IMPENDING COLLISION. TWR CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF BOTH ACFT'S FLT PATHS. I HOPE THEY (TWR) DO NOT THINK 200-300' IS A SAFE AMOUNT OF TFC SEP. THIS HELI CONFLICT, AND POOR ATC SEP OF IT, AT DCA IS AN ONGOING PROB. HERE IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
The NASA ASRS database contains safety reports raised over the US. A quick search with the term “helicopter” produced 40+ reports with the highlights shown below.. (apologies, to save time these are all copy and pasted) There are more, but I appreciate that most of us have annual eye examinations to pass so didn’t want to overdo it!
1. While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a “monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the “clear of conflict” the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead.
2. ATC delayed switch from Approach to Tower led to TA and resulting altitude deviation causing a GPWS Caution. Tower then issued a low altitude alert. Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. By the time Tower responded we had a RA to descend which led to a GPWS and low altitude alert from Tower. We confirmed traffic in sight and maneuvered back on coarse to correct the deviation, in judgement the safety of flight was not compromised as such we continued the approach to landing on Runway 19. As I believe a go-around would have exacerbated the situation and led to further problems.
3. I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].
I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X, approved the request and issued the altimeter.
Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.
Note. My standard practice for helicopter s flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopter s pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.
Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopter s over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.
Once Aircraft Y landed, he asked about the flight of three helicopter s off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.
Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.
I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.
4
Our flight] into DCA was in a NMAC. We were supposed to circle from the visual Runway 1 to instead land on 33. We followed the [company] station bulletin procedures exactly as planned and came within very close contact of another aircraft. This occurred about 400 feet off the ground to the point where the pilot monitoring had to take the controls to make a correction in order to prevent it from becoming a midair collision. After there was action taken to make a correction from the close call, we were then informed by DCA tower of close traffic although at that point it would have been too late. I have flown with people who for the purpose of having a better chance of a stabilized approach would have had a wider circle to land procedure which I'm sure would have almost definitely ended in the collision of two aircraft over the turn to final for 33 in DCA. There was an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower to [our flight] or DCA Tower to the associated helicopter who did not ever pop up on TCAS which I'm assuming is due to a lack of an operating transponder. No TCAS RA was associated with this event.
This occurred due to an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower and [our flight] or DCA Tower and the associated helicopter . Otherwise the other reason this may have happened is because of an unclear idea of where aircraft should be located during Runway 33 circle to land operations. I believe I was on track with what the [company] guidelines are for that particular procedure but there is a possibility that the other traffic operating around that area may not be aware of where exactly we are located or maybe they don't have a specific guideline to keep the arriving traffic separated from the low flying helicopter s.
5
I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have.
6
We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in
sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final.
when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around
regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a
turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed
on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an
explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have
happened. Number one, he said that the helicopter s operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter
was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a
second because they would never expect those helicopter s to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've
never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the
helicopter , and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot.
Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions.
7
It was the end of a long day and the events were happening very quickly during a high workload portion of the flight. As all pilots know, the River Visual is a very demanding approach during the best of circumstances. It is very labor intensive when done at night during periods of high traffic volume. The advertised approach in use at DCA was the LDA 19 with VASI being out of service. During the initial approach, Potomac asked if we would accept the charted River Visual approach (VASI back working) and we did. At approximately the 7 DME point we were in the end process of configuring the airplane for landing and the First Officer was accomplishing the Landing Checklist. The radio chatter was considerable and the Tower at some point advised us of helicopter traffic ahead and to the left (I believe he said 10 to 11 o'clock) and he was going to pass from left to right, below us and he "HAS US IN SIGHT." It has to be noted that these traffic calls and helicopter s have unfortunately become background noise. There are always numerous military and government helicopter s running up and down that river at all times of the day and night. Because of this, what would normally be alarming at any other airport in the country has become commonplace at DCA. The FAA allows these aircraft to operate in this environment and we have no choice, but to accept it and deal with it. Therefore, the helicopter s being very close are not out of the norm. As you can imagine, I was concentrating on the approach and doing the required gyrations to stay over the river and not violate the White House prohibited airspace, and to keep the aircraft on the proper vertical profile. The Runway 19 visual was loaded in the FMGC and I was using it as a backup to my eyes. I was 'dead on' the donut and everything looked normal. I was at or very slightly above the recommended altitudes at each DME point. As I was approaching 4 DME, I caught a glimpse of the helicopter out of my left window and he did look higher than I expected to see him. I asked the First Officer to confirm if he was going to cross from north to south. He confirmed, however I directed him to ask the Tower and confirm it with them because it did not look right. The First Officer could not get a word in with the Tower. It was at that point, we got a TCAS "TRAFFIC" call. Again, this is not out of the 'norm' for DCA. I was getting ready to take possible evasive action because it was getting uncomfortable; all this while trying to fly the demanding profile. Within seconds, we got a TCAS alert, "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED." I complied with the TCAS alert and was thinking of going around but it all happened so very quickly that the point was moot. The helicopter passed 200 FT (MAX) below us. We were at 900 FT, slightly above the path. The Tower never called out the traffic beyond the first notification. The landing was uneventful. Due to the workload, we asked the Ground Controller for the Tower number and I called when I got to my vehicle. I called the Tower and spoke with the Controller in charge. At first it was it was obvious he was somewhat on the defensive and I had to press the point and ask very specific questions about the standard helicopter operations in the area. After some prodding, he admitted that it was a military helicopter flying from/to Ft. Meade and that he was at 700 FT and was "a little higher than normal." I asked what altitude was he supposed to be at and he replied, "three to four hundred feet." In addition, he did admit that the Tower version of collision avoidance did go to alarm but before they had a chance to react, the event was over. I cannot imagine what business is so pressing that these helicopter s are allowed to cross the path of airliners carrying hundreds of people! I do not understand why they are not crossed IN-BETWEEN arrivals. They have at least 4 miles between these arriving aircraft and it seems that would be more prudent.
8
We were on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach to Washington National Airport, and the Tower instructed us to circle to land on Runway 33. While we made our approach to Runway 33, Tower advised a helicopter was maneuvering at our 12 o'clock position. As we continued our approach, Tower instructed the helicopter to "make a right 360 for a jet on a 2 mile final for Runway 33, and to report him in sight" (referring to our aircraft.)
The Tower then asked the helicopter if he had us in sight. He replied "yes", and the Tower told him to maintain visual separation. As we began our turn from base to final, the helicopter made what looked like a right turn directly into our flight path. The Captain, the pilot flying, made a hard right turn and executed a missed approach to avoid a collision. I'm not sure how close we came to the helicopter since it was on the left side of the aircraft, but I would guess it was only a few hundred feet.
9
WE WERE EXECUTING AN ILS IN IMC. AS MY FO ANNOUNCED 'APCHING MINIMUMS, RWY IN SIGHT,' I BEGAN MY TRANSITION FROM FLT DIRECTOR REF TO VISUAL REF FOR A HAND FLOWN LNDG. MY AIRSPD WAS PROBABLY AROUND 130-135 KIAS. AS I WAS TRANSITIONING I SUDDENLY SAW A DARK COLORED MIL HELI ON MY APCH PATH. HE BLENDED IN VISUALLY WITH THE DISMAL WX CONDITIONS. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY ACFT LIGHTING. AS I SAW HIM, SO DID THE DCA TWR CTLR. THE CTLR ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE AND FORCEFUL ATC INSTRUCTION TO THE HELI. THE HELI EXECUTED AN ABRUPT EVASIVE MANEUVER AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE FOG. I LANDED SAFELY. THIS ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 3-4 SECONDS. MY ACFT (BOEING 757) CONFIGN WAS GEAR DOWN, FULL 30 DEG FLAPS, ON SPD, ON COURSE, ON GLIDE PATH. EVASIVE MANEUVERING CAPABILITY IS LIMITED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MY ALT WAS ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE POTOMAC RIVER. ARPT TERMINALS AND CTL TWR WERE TO MY L, PROHIBITED AREA P-56 WAS TO MY R, AND THE HELI IN QUESTION WAS IN THE WX IN FRONT OF ME SOMEWHERE. I DIDN'T FEEL I COULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH WITH THAT ACFT IN THE FOG IN FRONT OF ME. WE WERE STILL ON LNDG PROFILE AND I DECIDED LNDG WAS THE SAFEST COURSE AVAILABLE. WE MADE A NORMAL EXIT FROM THE RWY TO THE L WITH MUCH LNDG ROOM LEFT ON RWY 36. TAXIED TO THE GATE AND PARKED. MADE AN IMMEDIATE PHONE CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AND RPTED THE INCIDENT. THEN CALLED MY AIRLINE FLT MGMNT SUPVRS AND RPTED THE INCIDENT AND MADE A WRITTEN RPT TO THE AIRLINE SAFETY DEPT UPON ARR AT MY BASE THAT NIGHT. I AM GLAD THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE CTLR TO SEE THE HELI IN TIME TO TAKE ACTION. IF THE VISIBILITY HAD BEEN ANY LESS HE WOULDN'T HAVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT DURING HIS SPEAKING WITH THE TWR FACILITY AT DCA, A CTLR IN TRAINING WAS HANDLING THE MIL TFC AT THE N END OF THE ARPT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER, MORE EXPERIENCED, CTLR. THE SECOND CTLR IS THE ONE THAT TOOK OVER THE MIKE AND ORDERED THE HELI TO LEAVE THE APCH ENVIRONMENT OF THE LNDG TFC. THE RPTR STATES THAT HIS TRAINING WOULD NORMALLY CAUSE HIM TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BUT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ENCOUNTER WITH THE SAME ACFT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD POSSIBILITY AND SO DECIDED THAT LNDG WAS THE SAFEST PATH TO FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT THE PHONE CONVERSATION REVEALED THAT EXTENSIVE TRAINING FOR A MIL EXERCISE OR OP WAS IN PROGRESS AND WAS BEING STAGED FROM THE N PART OF THE DCA COMPLEX. THE RPTR DOESN'T KNOW WHETHER THE HELI PLT MISUNDERSTOOD HIS INSTRUCTIONS OR WHETHER THE CTLR ISSUED SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE.
10
WE WERE ON THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. THERE WAS A MIL HELI OPERATING A TRAINING FLT FLYING N TO S OVER THE RIVER AT 500 FT MSL. WE APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST 80 KTS FASTER (WHILE IN OUR LNDG CONFIGN) THAN THE HELI. TWR ADVISED US OF THE HELI AND THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND HE WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. WE OVERTOOK ALMOST DIRECTLY ABOVE THE HELI AT ABOUT 3.5 DME AND 1100 FT MSL, RIGHT AT THE TURN IN THE RIVER THAT IS REQUIRED ON THE APCH. WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM OUR TCASII AT 1100 FT. WE FLEW AS FAR TO THE E SIDE OF THE RIVER AS WE COULD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON THE HELI ON THE W SIDE OF THE RIVER. WINDS WERE OUT OF THE SW AT 15-20 KTS. THE TCASII INDICATED CLR OF CONFLICT. WE STARTED TO DSND AGAIN AND AT 900 FT AGL, RECEIVED ANOTHER RA FROM OUR TCASII. AT THAT POINT IN THE APCH, THE RIVER TURNED BACK TO THE SSW. AS WE MADE OUR R TURN WE REGAINED VISUAL WITH THE HELI AND CONTINUED TO DSND. TCASII GAVE US 'CLR OF CONFLICT' AND WE FINISHED THE APCH AND LANDED. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND HE LISTENED AND SAID THIS WAS NORMAL. I HAVE FLOWN THIS APCH AT LEAST 15 TIMES AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THIS APCH PUSHING THE ENVELOPE FOR SAFETY, WITH THE AMOUNT OF ATTN I HAD TO GIVE TO THE HELI WHILE FOLLOWING THE RIVER AND DSNDING IN A XWIND AND AT A HIGH LNDG WT. THE TWR NEVER MADE IT CLR TO US WHERE THE HELI WAS GOING. ON THE PHONE THE SUPVR SAID THEY TRAIN FLYING N TO S AND BACK AT 500 FT. APPARENTLY, THEY DO THIS FROM 2 DME N TO 10 DME, BASICALLY UNDER THE WHOLE APCH. WHY CAN'T THEY DO THIS AFTER 10 O'CLOCK PM OR DURING LOW TFC FLOW PERIODS? AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ACFT SHOULD BE SPACED BETTER SO AS NOT TO FLY SO CLOSE TO THE HELI WHILE ON THE APCH. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED HELIS PREVIOUSLY WHILE SHOOTING THIS APCH, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALWAYS CLOSER IN SPD TO US AND THEREFORE WE WOULD NOT OVERTAKE THEM AS FAST, OR WE WERE SPACED BETTER. ALSO, THEY ALWAYS HAD A DEST THAT WE WERE ADVISED OF. I'M SENDING IN THIS RPT BECAUSE I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LEVEL OF SAFETY INVOLVED WITH FLYING WITHIN 400 FT VERTLY OF A HELI AND THAT IS CONSIDERED A NORMAL OP.
11
DURING ILS APCH, SBOUND, HELI COMING DOWN POTOMAC RIVER ABOUT 500 FT MSL, TFC CALLED BY TWR, WE DIDN'T SEE IT. WE GOT AN RA ON TCASII -- HAD TO FOLLOW RA INSTRUCTIONS. THEN WE WERE HIGH ABOVE GS, HAD TO DSND MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE WANTED TO IN ORDER TO LAND. THIS HELI CONFLICT AROUND DCA IS A DAILY PROB! GOING TO TA ONLY ON TCASII WOULD DEFEAT PURPOSE OF TCASII. LNDG ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE HELI'S. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
12
I WAS TURNING FINAL FOR STOL LNDG RWY 21 DCA. I SAW A HELI APCHING ON CONFLICTING FLT PATH. IT WAS APPROX 400 FT BELOW US, BUT WE WERE DSNDING FOR LNDG. I ADVISED DCA TWR OF TFC. HE SAID 'TFC LOW LEVEL, 200 FT.' JUST AS I WAS GOING TO MANEUVER TO AVOID, THE CHOPPER MADE A STEEP TURN AWAY FROM US. AT THIS POINT WE WERE WITHIN 100 FT VERTICALLY AND 1000 FT HORIZLY. BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING A STOL LNDG AT DCA, MY TURN TO AVOID HIM WOULD ALSO CAUSE A GAR. TWR HAD PUT US ON RWY 21 WHILE THE ARPT WAS IN A 'N' OP (ALL OTHER TFC LNDG ON RWY 36). I RECEIVED NO WARNING FROM TWR OF HELI TFC AND I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF CHOPPER PLT HAD US IN SIGHT (UNTIL HE MADE THE EVASIVE TURN). THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME OF SUCH AN OCCURRENCE AT DCA. I HAVE HAD MANY CONFLICTS WITH CHOPPERS, BOTH ON LNDG AND TKOF AT DCA. I HAVE TALKED TO TWR SEVERAL TIMES (INCLUDING THIS TIME) AND HAVE RECEIVED APOLOGIES AND ADMITTING OF ERRORS BUT THE PROB CONTINUES. THE HELI IS A VERY MANEUVERABLE ACFT. IF THE CHOPPER PLTS WOULD JUST GIVE US MORE SEPARATION, THE PROB WOULD BE SOLVED. WHEN THEY SEE US THEY COULD SLOW OR HOVER, TURN, ETC. CONFLICTS OCCUR WHEN TWR FORGETS TO ADVISE ME THAT CHOPPER HAS ME IN SIGHT AND THE CHOPPER MAINTAINS HIS 'TRAJECTORY' WHICH CONFLICTS WITH MY LIMITED ARR OR DEP AIRSPACE.
13
DURING RIVER VISUAL APCH DCA (LNDG RWY 18), 3 HELIS CROSSED OUR FLT PATH. THE FIRST CAUSED AN RA ON TCASII WITH A 0-300 FT CLB (WHICH WE FOLLOWED). THE HELI WENT DIRECTLY UNDER OUR ACFT WITH LESS THAN 300 FT SEPARATION. THE NEXT 2 HELIS CAUSED MONITOR VERT DSCNT ON THE TCASII. ALL 3 HELIS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 1 MI. THE TWR NEVER CALLED ANY TFC, UNTIL WE CALLED THE FIRST HELI IN SIGHT. THEN HE SAID 3 HELIS WERE XING THE RIVER. WITHOUT THE RA WE WOULD HAVE COME EVEN CLOSER THAN 300 FT TO THE FIRST HELI.
14
WASHINGTON APCH CTL CLRED ACR X FOR THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH. AT THE WILSON BRIDGE THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND STOL ON RWY 33. I TURNED OFF THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH ONTO A L BASE LEG FOR RWY 33. THE PATTERN FLOWN WAS SQUARE. I TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1/2 MI S OF THE E BANK OF THE POTOMAC RIVER. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED OF A HELI IN OUR AREA AND WE DID NOT HEAR THE TWR TALKING TO A HELI ON 119.1 (1-WAY OR 2-WAY COM). WE DID NOT SEE A HELI DURING OUR APCH. THE SKY WAS HAZY AND THE SUN WAS OFF THE L SIDE. IT WAS DAYLIGHT. LINED UP ON FINAL AND STABILIZED FOR A STOL LNDG, I SUDDENLY CAUGHT SIGHT OF A PRESIDENTIAL TYPE HELI XING OUR FLT PATH, APPROX 50-100 FT BELOW AND 100 FT IN FRONT OF US AT OUR 11:30 POS, AS WE PASSED THROUGH 600 FT MSL. THE HELI WAS MOVING L TO R AT A GOOD SPD, BUT I DETERMINED A COLLISION WAS POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED PWR, PULLED UP AND CALLED 'GAR' TO THE FO. AS WE PULLED UP I CALLED OUT THE HELI TO THE FO WHO THEN SAW IT CLOSE AND BELOW AS IT PASSED OFF THE R SIDE. THE GAR WAS UNEVENTFUL AND COMPLIED WITH TWR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN AFTER WE CALLED WITH GAR AND NEAR MISS. THE TWR'S RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER AND UNDERSTAND' ONLY. THE HELI IN QUESTION DID NOT APPEAR TO ALTER COURSE OR FLT PATH UNTIL DSNDING AND LNDG AT ANACOSTRA. ON THE GND I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE TWR ON LANDLINE BUT KEPT GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL (3 ATTEMPTS). SINCE I WAS DUE BACK OUT IN 10 MINS FOR MY NEXT FLT, I RETURNED TO MY ACFT AND CONTINUED ON MY SCHEDULE. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE TWR KNEW OF OR HAD TALKED TO THE HELI IN QUESTION. MANY TIMES THE TWR TALKS TO HELIS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ, BUT YOU CAN HEAR THE TWR'S COM TO THEM ON 119.1. THEY WILL USUALLY POINT OUT HELI TFC TO US AND COMMENT THAT THE HELI IS AT SUCH AND SUCH AN ALT, DIRECTION AND THAT THEY (THE HELI) HAVE US IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT WAS 'VERY' CLOSE AND FAR FROM THE NORM I'VE EXPERIENCED IN 15 YRS OF FLYING INTO AND OUT OF DCA.
15
HOT, HAZY AFTERNOON IN WASHINGTON (HAZE DID RESTRICT VISIBILITY) FLYING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA, CREW IS DCA BASED SO WE ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. AT ABOUT 4-5 DME, TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD LAND ON RWY 15, I DECLINED AND SAID THAT I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE FOR RWY 18. TWR THEN ADVISED US THERE WOULD BE 2 HELIS COMING OUT OF THE TIDAL BASIN AREA. (IT IS NOT AT ALL UNCOMMON TO SEE HELIS XING OUR FLT PATH WHEN WE ARE TAKING OFF TO THE N AND CLBING). I COULD SEE A CONTACT ON OUR TCASII SCREEN -- JUST ONE TARGET -- AND BTWN 600 AND 500 FT ON FINAL, WE GOT AN RA THAT COMMANDED CLB. I HAD THE FO LEVEL OFF AT 500 FT, THE TARGET SHOWED 200 FT BELOW ON THE TCASII AND VERY CLOSE ABEAM ME (ON 5 NM SCALE) AND I NEVER DID SEE EITHER HELI. WE STARTED BACK DOWN WHEN THE TCASII SHOWED WE WERE PASSED THEM, WE WERE HIGH AS WE ROLLED WINGS LEVEL ON FINAL BUT, WE WERE STILL ABLE TO SAFELY COMPLETE THE APCH. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS APCH AT DCA FOR 7 1/2 YRS, AND THIS ONE REALLY GOT MY ATTN. TWR IS NOT CTLING THE HELIS, I CAN'T BE SURE THE HELIS HAVE ME IN SIGHT, I KNOW THE SECOND HELI IS LOOKING AT HIS LEAD -- THEREFORE, I KNOW HE IS NOT LOOKING AT ME, AND I AM DSNDING INTO HIM WHILE ON FINAL ON A CHALLENGING APCH. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE A MIDAIR, AND UNFORTUNATELY, PROBABLY IS CONSIDERED ROUTINE OPS BY DCA TWR.
16
MANEUVERING IN GOOD VMC FOR LNDG ON RWY 21 AT DCA (CLRED FOR VIS APCH, MONITORING TWR FREQ FOR LNDG CLRNC). TWR ADVISED OF HELI TFC BELOW AND AHEAD. THIS TFC WAS SPOTTED FLYING SW WHERE ANACOSTIA RIVER MEETS POTOMAC. NO CONFLICT, INITIALLY. THE HELI, A MIL TYPE, THEN TURNED NW UP THE POTOMAC RIVER. THIS NOW BECAME AN IMMEDIATELY INCREASING TFC CONFLICT. CONVERGING FLT PATHS. I ASKED TWR TO PROVIDE SEP, HOPING HE WOULD STOP, SLOW OR TURN THE HELI. HE RESPONDED WITH, "MAINTAIN VIS SEP." MANEUVERING IN CLOSE FOR A STOL LNDG ALLOWS FOR VERY LITTLE LEEWAY FROM THE DESIRED FLT PATH. A GAR FROM THIS POS IS ALSO DANGEROUS. THERE WAS NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO TWR AND THE HELI WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. I CONTINUED AND LANDED VERY CAUTIOUSLY WHEN I REALIZED WE WOULD MISS TFC. HOWEVER, WE ONLY MISSED BY APPROX 300'. I FEEL THAT ATC (TWR) IGNORED ITS BASIC OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING SEP. THE HELI COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN SLOWED, STOPPED OR TURNED AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING AN IMPENDING COLLISION. TWR CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF BOTH ACFT'S FLT PATHS. I HOPE THEY (TWR) DO NOT THINK 200-300' IS A SAFE AMOUNT OF TFC SEP. THIS HELI CONFLICT, AND POOR ATC SEP OF IT, AT DCA IS AN ONGOING PROB. HERE IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
Subjects
ATC
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
Close Calls
DCA
FAA
Frequency 119.1
Radar
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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