Page Links: First Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next Last Index Page
| Someone Somewhere
February 07, 2025, 18:15:00 GMT permalink Post: 11823828 |
This page, section "Separation minima based on ATS surveillance systems" quotes ICAO as saying that even in terminal space with good radar, separation should not go below 1,000ft vertically or 3Nm (2.5Nm if established on the same final approach in sequence within 10Nm of the runway). We're already blithely discussing half those standards as being impossible to meet. Subjects
ADSB (All)
ICAO
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| West Coast
February 07, 2025, 18:22:00 GMT permalink Post: 11823829 |
Radar can absolutely fly two planes directly into each other. You have to put a number on how far apart they should be. If you call it "controller's judgement" then all you've done is change who's responsible, given that aircraft are never going to stick exactly to their assigned altitude and heading, and neither radar nor ADS-B gives exactly accurate positions, speeds, or headings.
This page, section "Separation minima based on ATS surveillance systems" quotes ICAO as saying that even in terminal space with good radar, separation should not go below 1,000ft vertically or 3Nm (2.5Nm if established on the same final approach in sequence within 10Nm of the runway). We're already blithely discussing half those standards as being impossible to meet. Subjects
ADSB (All)
ICAO
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| Someone Somewhere
February 07, 2025, 21:37:00 GMT permalink Post: 11823944 |
The guiding document in the US is the controller handbook, FAA order 7110.65AA. There, it is clear that visual separation is an approved form of separation in Class B airspace. Not defending the application of it specific to this crash, just pointing it out so the discussion revolves around existing FAA separation standards and not what folks in the thread wish it to be, believe it to be or what it is in their country.
This is following on from #960-964, discussing what would happen if the PAT flight(s) refused visual separation. It seems like it would throw a spanner in ATC's arrivals and they would probably get a response similar to that Lufthansa A380: Buzz off somewhere else. Subjects
ATC
FAA
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| West Coast
February 07, 2025, 22:59:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824002 |
To be specific, para 7.9.4b of the handbook, here:
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies. Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded \x91not visual yet, looking\x92 or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great \x97maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo. This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it. However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it\x92s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace\x97 helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky. Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
IFR
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| SINGAPURCANAC
February 08, 2025, 06:22:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824114 |
To be specific, para 7.9.4b of the handbook, here:
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies. Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded \x91not visual yet, looking\x92 or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great \x97maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo. This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it. However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it\x92s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace\x97 helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky. Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes. He is not radar qualified- so no headings or radar measurment distances applicable. Where is prescribed what point is 1,5 Nm away from visual app for rwy 33? ( Note : Atco must achive required separation before that point) or At what point should be givem climb instruction for He to be 500' above arriving a/c before compromising 1,5Nm. If rate of climb is 1000 ft/min Helicopet need to climb for 40-50 seconds with the speed 180km/h it is 2 Nm or so - it means that instruction to climb should be given no latter than 4Nm from crossing point. What is possibikity to spot particular aircraft for visual separation at distances more than 4Nm from crosssing points, duting the night and in bussy traffic enviroment? Yes , I know it is Burund.... Subjects
ATC
ATCO
CRJ
IFR
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| Stagformation
February 08, 2025, 11:52:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824286 |
In this case though the aircraft lights were rapidly converging, the radar repeater was flashing \x91CA\x92 but the helo has already requested and been given responsibility for collision responsibility. Crazy tragic situation. Subjects
ATC
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| DaveJ75
February 08, 2025, 14:30:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824387 |
I would love to see it tried - obviously it would have to be over the desert in aircraft with no pax aboard! How would it work - do you just yell " Bloggs, left a bit " over the RT if all looks a bit close? Subjects
ATC
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| West Coast
February 08, 2025, 16:17:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824431 |
I keep re-reading this and it doesn't get any less amazing! To hell with the radar, I'll just look out of the window!
I would love to see it tried - obviously it would have to be over the desert in aircraft with no pax aboard! How would it work - do you just yell " Bloggs, left a bit " over the RT if all looks a bit close? Subjects
ATC
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| West Coast
February 08, 2025, 16:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824433 |
Could someone explain, how Twr ATCO in that particular enviroment, achieve required separation?
He is not radar qualified- so no headings or radar measurment distances applicable. Where is prescribed what point is 1,5 Nm away from visual app for rwy 33? ( Note : Atco must achive required separation before that point) or At what point should be givem climb instruction for He to be 500' above arriving a/c before compromising 1,5Nm. If rate of climb is 1000 ft/min Helicopet need to climb for 40-50 seconds with the speed 180km/h it is 2 Nm or so - it means that instruction to climb should be given no latter than 4Nm from crossing point. What is possibikity to spot particular aircraft for visual separation at distances more than 4Nm from crosssing points, duting the night and in bussy traffic enviroment? Yes , I know it is Burund.... Subjects
ATC
ATCO
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| Stagformation
February 08, 2025, 16:34:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824442 |
I keep re-reading this and it doesn't get any less amazing! To hell with the radar, I'll just look out of the window!
I would love to see it tried - obviously it would have to be over the desert in aircraft with no pax aboard! How would it work - do you just yell " Bloggs, left a bit " over the RT if all looks a bit close? It happens all day long at airfields. Controller sees and gives clearances, eg remain dead side, go around, hold short of the active, expedite etc. Subjects
ATC
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| island_airphoto
February 08, 2025, 16:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824451 |
Here you go: Read All About It.
https://www.avweb.com/flight-safety/tower-brites/ This explains the different phraseology between a tower using a BRITE to help out vs. the phraseology of tower certified and equipped for full radar separation. It also explains LOAs for airspace. Where I learned to fly at KMLB the tower only owned up to about 1800 feet IIRC and approach had above that. In those pre-BRITE days it helped a lot for handling IFR traffic. ( I sometimes flew a Bell 47 helicopter there and the tower managed to organize it such that I never came close to any airplanes) Subjects
IFR
Phraseology (ATC)
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| SINGAPURCANAC
February 08, 2025, 21:34:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824590 |
there is no word IDENTIFIED b efore any other instruction. It is esential basic for radar/ surveilance. How the hell you could give vectors for non identified aircraft? And the above post of island_photo gives exact link with explanation that is officially valid in USA. No full radar service if it is not " radar contact"( or identified) It is so logic and simple to remember and to apply. Last edited by SINGAPURCANAC; 8th February 2025 at 21:45 . Subjects
ATC
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| Awol57
February 08, 2025, 22:30:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824606 |
I would assume the US wouldn't be hugely dissimilar to to the USA in this regards, but a tower controller can
"Correlate an observed radar position symbol with manoeuvres currently executed by a departing aircraft which acknowledged instructions to that effect, provided that identification is established within 3 NM of the radar sensor." So identified on departure, and the usual transfer of Identification occurs for inbound. So no problems using a radar provided we meet the other requirements (MVA and the like). However the whole point of a tower controller is that we can use less than the radar standard and visually separate aircraft in visual conditions. Subjects
ATC
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| West Coast
February 09, 2025, 01:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824686 |
I would assume the US wouldn't be hugely dissimilar to to the USA in this regards, but a tower controller can
"Correlate an observed radar position symbol with manoeuvres currently executed by a departing aircraft which acknowledged instructions to that effect, provided that identification is established within 3 NM of the radar sensor." So identified on departure, and the usual transfer of Identification occurs for inbound. So no problems using a radar provided we meet the other requirements (MVA and the like). However the whole point of a tower controller is that we can use less than the radar standard and visually separate aircraft in visual conditions. Subjects
ATC
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| West Coast
February 09, 2025, 01:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824687 |
there is no word
IDENTIFIED b
efore any other instruction.
It is esential basic for radar/ surveilance. How the hell you could give vectors for non identified aircraft? And the above post of island_photo gives exact link with explanation that is officially valid in USA. No full radar service if it is not " radar contact"( or identified) It is so logic and simple to remember and to apply. BTW, in the US, it’s not “identified” but rather radar contact. Last edited by West Coast; 9th February 2025 at 02:49 . Reason: Spelling Subjects
ATC
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| cbradio
February 09, 2025, 11:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 11824877 |
Subjects
ATC
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 09, 2025, 17:01:00 GMT permalink Post: 11825026 |
Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.
To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight " The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot . Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident.. Subjects
ATC
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| deltafox44
February 09, 2025, 18:15:00 GMT permalink Post: 11825063 |
Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.
To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight " The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot . Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident.. cf FAA Order JO 7110.65AA 7.2.1.a.2 Pilot-applied visual separation
(d) If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
(e)Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge. Last edited by deltafox44; 9th February 2025 at 19:04 . Reason: adding source Subjects
ATC
FAA
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| island_airphoto
February 09, 2025, 19:15:00 GMT permalink Post: 11825080 |
Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.
To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight " The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot . Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident.. The specific one only applies to DCA, so unless you fly there for your job or want to fill out 1001 forms to get your own airplane in there, no worries, no one else does crazy stuff like that with helos. The general one for me so far is how easy it is to see the wrong traffic at night and the next "do you see X" I get at night I am going to be triple-redundant sure and then some before saying I do. Subjects
ATC
DCA
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| YRP
February 09, 2025, 20:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11825106 |
Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.
To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight " The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot . Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident.. A second controller -might- have had more time to observe the conflict. They -might- have twigged and second guessed the helo's separation. But they very well might not have. The spacing might have been close enough to the every day occurances that the controller might not have been able to tell. Having the helicopters on a separate frequency from the fixed wing would certainly not have helped anyone's situational awareness. Subjects
ATC
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
Page Links: First Previous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Next Last Index Page