Posts about: "Route 4" [Posts: 113 Page: 6 of 6]¶

In my ( European) world Procedures are written down and yes they can be altered with a pilot request and controller approval. but it is adherence first .
Taking a road procedure similarity : . at a crossroad you can have a stop sign or a triangle giving priority , or nothing
The written procedures are : at a stop sign you must stop even if there is no traffic.

:Transposing this to DCA route 4 map l the procedure should have been in Europe at least ;
1) hold ay golf balls until you get a clearance to proceed . (so that in case of loss of comms , blocked freq, etc.. you can't proceed ).
2) pilot or controller can request visual separation if all t he following conditions re met : typically VMC, and in daylight and traffic is in sight and maintained in sight and both aircrfat pilots are informed. of each other position
3) lateral deviations by the helicopters to fly over built up areas of the city at 200ft will; not be permitted.

Big differences .

Now a pilot can request visual separation at any time but Controller can refuse at any time to .. To my knowledge requesting visual a night using NVG is not covered in the definition of " visual acquisition " in ICAO, so legally it could be challenged I guess . Same as when a pilot reports "visual" on his TCAS display . It is not valid , and for good reasons .
But KDCA is not in Europe, and ICAO SARPs do not apply to military aircrfat , so the outcome of all this is quite uncertain .In fact i would not be surprised if nothing dramatic changes as far as procedures are concerned, Route 4 will be permanently removed I guess, but other than that ? business a usual with visual separations at night ? .

Yeah, "scheduled" was probably the wrong word. I meant that DCA ATC "instructed to fly that segment of the route", with ATC responsible for separation.
It occurs to me that this procedure creates extra work for air traffic control. DCA organisation accounted for it by having a controller position dedicated to controlling helicopters, but they did not have the staffing level to fill that seat at all times when it was needed. A process that may have been safe with adequate staffing stopped being safe when staffing levels fell. At that time, management needed to recognize this (the data was there!) and restructure the airspace to require less work, possibly at the cost of reducing the capacity of the airport/airspace.

Hopefully he knows more about aircraft rules than maritime rules. In maritime parlance (to adopt his analogy), the CRJ would be the "stand-on" vessel (expected to maintain course and speed); the Blackhawk would be the "burdened vessel", responsible for taking avoiding action (giving way).

Thank you, I am a professional pilot so I do understand the difference in meaning. 'Height' is the correct term here as the route was defined with reference to the surface and the pilots were using the (badly named...) radalt as their height reference.

Why do I think the IFR ACS might be relevant? Because it specifies the accuracy the FAA requires of skilled pilots when separation is to be achieved by procedural means. The fact that the "designed" separation between the 33 approach slope and the top of Route 4 was less than the allowable error for skilled pilots could be used to rebut an allegation of negligent flying as the cause of the accident. The Army no doubt has its own standards document, but I'd be surprised if it was radically different. Building the argument off the FAA's own document forces the focus onto its route design and visual separation procedures.

As to why this might be relevant to VFR flying - is it your opinion that parameters should be flown more accurately in VFR than in IFR? In any case, I have now dug further into the ACS and the same tolerance is prescribed for commercial VFR helicopter operations (see CH.VII.A.S8).

Route 4 wasn't restricted to use by military helicopters, so it should be possible to argue the unsafe design point based purely on the FAA's own specification. As to expectations that the Army pilots should have flown the route to tighter tolerances, even a tolerance of plus zero would have been grossly unsafe on a procedural basis: altimeter errors alone would take up most of the 50-odd foot "separation", and variances in airliner approach slope angle the rest. Besides, "plus zero" is an impossible tolerance to achieve when maintaining an altitude or height. The only way of flying that route not above 200 feet on a "IFR-esque" procedural basis with an achievable tolerance would be to fly 150 feet plus or minus 50 feet, which would demand total focus on height keeping via radalt (it would be hopelessly unsafe to attempt to fly that low on barometric instruments).

The 78 feet deviation by the Mil Heli is not the cause of this accident . I hope the lawyers during the trial do not focus on that and minimize the rest .

Bit of historical background : when designing this route decades ago they must have followed basic ICAO/ FAA principles . separation IFR-VFR is 500 feet . allowed deviation then was 100 ft either way , so even if one a/c is 100ft above and the other 100ft too low , there would still be 300 ft separation preventing a collision ,
When that was introduced decades ago I bet you a bottle of (real) Champagne that the procedure was use of that route 4 was restricted during RWY 33 arrivals and RWY 15 departures. It was one or the other but not both simultaneously .
How , when and why , over time , did it degraded to the point that this restriction could be disregarded would be interested to investigate and unveil . The why I think we know, i.e. enabling to move more and more traffic, but when and by who we don't. How and on who's pressure did the numerous previous incidents got disregarded is another question worth asking . Not why the Heli pilot was flying 78 ft too high .

Throwing the Heli pilot (and perhaps also the controller on duty) "under the bus" as you say in your country, would be so wrong as it would prevent getting to the truth and learn the real lessons of this accident .

Agreed.

If the helicopter hadn't called "traffic in sight," they would've been instructed to hold until the CRJ was clear. In general, a VFR aircraft saying "traffic in sight" is effectively exempt from such procedures.

The process "to investigate and unveil" the key facts about simultaneous use of Route 4 during RWY 33 arrivals and RWY 15 departures will more likely be the NTSB investigation and not the pre-trial discovery activities, pre-trial motions, and trial in the lawsuit. The object of the lawsuit, despite what my esteemed colleagues in the legal profession may insist, is not "getting to the truth" or "learn[ing] the real lessons of this accident." (In the first season of the t.v. series N.Y.P.D. Blue (circa late 1993 early '94), one of New York City's Finest was charged with homicide. In a talk with her big-time defense attorney, he reminded her that a "trial" and "the truth" have about as much to do with one another as a "hot dog" and a "warm puppy.")

Unless all the possible plaintiffs intend to proceed with the same lawyers who already have filed a Complaint in federal court, other complaints with perhaps different approaches to the facts and the law are to be expected. But at this time, I think there's pretty strong reason to understand the Complaint which was filed as pitching the ATCO and one or more of the helicopter pilots directly toward a large Greyhound. If, after finding time (and attitude) sufficient to read every single word on every single page of the Complaint very closely, I realize that plaintiffs' counsel have not done so in the current Complaint, I'll frame some correcting post.

As a somewhat related point, and without intending to be a flame-thrower, what about the airline pilots in this matter? Imagine being one of their immediate family. The passengers and cabin crew will be part of the overall group of plaintiffs. With the allegations in the current Complaint, the pilots are being alleged to have operated the flight negligently - is this not a fair and accurate reading of the Complaint? But if this accident was caused - in the sense of the actual realities of flight operations and airspace and all the other actual aviating facts - by the airspace design and operation, and the wrong time and place flight of the helicopter - why aren't the families of the pilots entitled to their day in court as well? And I don't mean day in court just to defend their actions against allegations as in the Complaint, I mean in claims against the FAA and possibly the Army....... oh sure, sue the United States? I'm guessing the airline corporate entities which are defendants probably would not think that would be a good idea. And neither would airline industry trade groups - but maybe this is something for former New Hampshire Governor Chris Sununu to tackle in his new role as CEO of Airlines4America. Something that seems to be part of this is that the airline corporate entities are well-insured. But what good does that do for the families of the two pilots? - answer, it doesn't do any good for them, other than a probable off-ramp for the entire case at some point down the litigation timeline. And still without the families of the two pilots having their day in court to claim rights and remedies against the real causal agents of the accident. End of rant. For now anyway. (See perhaps Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re: permissive intervention)

I've been reading this thread for many months, and there were people in it (pilots and ATC) saying nothing would have changed if ADS-B Out was enabled in the helo. Isn't that what the House bill is trying to require? Politicians (and senior staff of federal agencies are certainly politicians) will produce all kinds of videos about all kinds of things, but does anyone in the industry think this matters? From what I have read, the problem was the lack of vertical separation between helo route 4 and the descent into 033, not the lack of data exchange. This feels like "we are going to do something" theatre.

The NTSB has not said, and Chairwoman Homendy's letter does not say, that lack of ADS-B Out was the central cause of the accident. Without going through the whole thread again, as far as I recall no one has even argued, let alone persuasively asserted, that lack of ADS-B Out caused the accident. Any even mostly attentive reading of the thread would lead one to conclude that there were several big problems with the "situation" on the night of the accident. Just picking the one easiest for a non-aircrew to comprehend, the difficulty of discerning different objects, in the air and on the ground, at night and at low altitudes, particularly against the background of city lights, was a factor. No one has claimed lack of ADS-B Out made it a factor nor has anyone claimed that having ADS-B Out would remove it as a factor in given situations.

The argument that the NTSB Chair and the Congressional people who are opposed have heard some imperative to "don't just sit there, do something" is a straw man, imo.

But taking it with more credence than it seems to deserve, how do you explain the absence of much, or really any, opposition to the NTSB's recommendation issued shortly after the accident? Too much heat in the aftermath of the tragedy to state the opposition at that time, instead wait until things died down?

NTSB:
It is true that if the -only- change was using ADS-B Out on the helicopter, this accident would still have happened.

The CRJ was equipped with TCAS, which may or may not have been applicable at this low altitude as it is suppressed at 400 ft. The preliminary report does not indicate the helicopter having a TCAS or having an operating one. It did have the ability to produce ADS-B Out. Neither aircraft is reported to have had ADS-B In.

Since many operators seem to loath spending money on ADS-B In, the recommendation from the NTSB was to (1) stop simultaneous flight path use and (2) go elsewhere when the approaches were in use. The FAA agreed.

Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-001 the FAA did what was recommended about simultaneous use.
Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-002 the FAA made a satisfactory response concerning planning the alternate route(s)

This legislation is the exact opposite of that recommendation.

No doubt the anger isn't just that the NTSB has yet again been ignored, it's that the FAA agreements to safety measures are targeted for destruction in a way that recreates the circumstance of the tragic event.

I said at first, on seeing this collision a few hours after the event, that I felt rage that so many safety measures are available and yet none of them was actually used.

This section, 373, is what I consider an intentional sabotage of the safe operations around DCA.

The FAA literally had advertising videos showing the use of ADS-B In on helicopters for this exact purpose, to give situational awareness to the pilots long before there would be a need to deconflict with other traffic (see end) . No sudden swerves as TCAS attempts to make a last moment save of a terrible situation. TCAS alone cannot be the solution as TCAS gets shut off to avoid nuisance complaints about the terrain the plane is intentionally going to run into or other proximate planes waiting for takeoff.

ADS-B In is for noting where everyone else is in the neighborhood of the aircraft. Had the helicopter been equipped with ADS-B In they would have known the speed and direction of the CRJ and seen it was on a collision course.

As usual it appears there is no name attached nor meeting notes about who submitted what became Section 373. There is certainly no justification paper that will see the light of day.

If those exist, please, someone, prove me wrong.


duplicate:

I cannot find it on YouTube.

An actual user who avoided a mid-air using ADS-B In (Trent Palmer, if anyone wants to avoid him; not everyone is liked):

Re: AirScotia and the summary in the recent post:

"The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed."

I'm not certain the first sentence above is correct. The letter from the NTSB Chair regarding Section 373 states: "The NTSB has, for decades, advocated for ADS-B In and Out and its substantial contribution to safety, especially near airports."

The NTSB on March 7 issued a pre-preliminary report of sorts, specifically urging immediate action to shut down helicopter route 4 when Runway 33/15 is in use (for landings and departures, respectively). There is no reference to ADS-B in the March 7 urgent recommendation document.

I cannot say how it was that FAA and DoD agreed to start ADS-B Out use by military aircraft in the relevant airspace. But it did not result from the same urgent recommendations, at least insofar as those recommendations were stated in writing on March 7, which led to the closure of helicopter route 4. (I would note that the Preliminary Report by the Board was issued a few days later, on March 11.)

Regarding Section 373's legistative history, to use a term it perhaps does not deserve, there is less mystery than your summation suggests. There certainly are staff of one or both Armed Services Committees, and/or staff of Members serving on one or both of the those Committees, and/or the Representatives and/or Senators who run those Committees, who originated the language, and agreed upon the version that ended up in the legislation (it obviously would have gone through a series of revisions).

So the question is why was their action done without consulting the same people (Committee staff, House/Senate members' staff, and the legislators themselves) whose routine committee work has jurisdiction for civil aviation.

And there's another level also. Where within the defense bureaucracy or some other place in the interagency or executive branch did the impetus for the provision originate? I can see that the post pointing out that the provision, if enacted, would not help the Army in court, is probably correct. What other reason the Army may have had to sponsor the provision (and to do so quietly) I can't say. Which leaves, can it really be that difficult to devise a system for how and when military aircraft with significant emergency or classified operations (as compared to essentially routine operations) need different handling in the airspace?

From FAA website (verbatim):
Trump\x92s Transportation Secretary Formalizes Permanent Restrictions for Aircraft in Reagan National Airport Airspace

Thursday, January 22, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. \x97 U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy today announced that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is formalizing permanent restrictions for helicopters and powered-lift from operating in certain areas near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), unless these aircraft are conducting essential operations. These restrictions were put in place immediately following the American Airlines 5342 crash and supported by the NTSB\x92s preliminary recommendations.

\x93After that horrific night in January, this Administration made a promise to do whatever it takes to secure the skies over our nation\x92s capital and ensure such a tragedy would never happen again. Today\x92s announcement reaffirms that commitment,\x94 said U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy. \x93The safety of the American people will always be our top priority. I look forward to continuing to collaborate with the NTSB on any additional actions.\x94

The FAA published an Interim Final Rule (IFR) that will significantly reduce midair-collision risks and implement a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation to prohibit certain helicopter operations when Runways 15 and 33 at DCA are in use.

\x93We took decisive action immediately following the January 2025 midair collision to reduce risk in the airspace,\x94 said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford. \x93This is a key step toward ensuring these improvements remain permanent and we\x92re continuing to work with the NTSB to ensure an accident like this never happens again.\x94

While the interim final rule goes into effect tomorrow, the public is invited to submit written comments, which the FAA will consider before issuing a final rule.

Additional Information:

The FAA took immediate action to restrict mixed traffic around DCA and made permanent helicopter route changes after the NTSB recommendations. U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy and the FAA didn\x92t stop there \x96 taking additional actions for DCA to address operations, procedures, and personnel, including:

Established procedures to eliminate helicopter and fixed-wing mixed traffic near the airport
Closed Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge
Revised agreements with the military to require ADS-B Out broadcasting
Discontinued take offs from the Pentagon until the FAA and Department of War updated procedures and fixed technical issues at the Pentagon Heliport
Eliminated the use of visual separation within 5 nautical miles of DCA
Published modifications to helicopter zones and routes moving them farther away from DCA flight paths
Increased support, oversight and staffing at DCA
In October 2025, the FAA updated Helicopter routes and zones at DCA, Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) and Baltimore/ Washington International Airport (BWI).

The FAA previously implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFR) around DCA. To make the restrictions contained in the TFRs permanent, the FAA issued an IFR which is set to publish on January 23, 2026, and will take effect immediately. The public is invited to submit comments on the IFR and the FAA will later publish a Final Rule in response to those comments.