Posts about: "See and Avoid" [Posts: 45 Page: 3 of 3]ΒΆ

visibility3miles
April 20, 2025, 18:01:00 GMT
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Post: 11870642
Originally Posted by island_airphoto
The entire thread is devoted to that!
The airplane was not in IMC, it was a clear night. They were on a visual approach to 33 and got hit by a helicopter. The helicopter said they had the traffic in sight and obviously didn't. That is the short version.
This is a photo of Washington, DC, at night on the approach to National. Lots of lights. You might mistake automobile headlights for the plane you say you have in sight, or, as mentioned before, they might have fixated on the plane behind the plane they were supposed to see and avoid.

https://media.istockphoto.com/id/125...gcSoTmRDpMdzk=

Subjects See and Avoid  Traffic in Sight

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Hot 'n' High
August 12, 2025, 12:19:00 GMT
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Post: 11937225
Originally Posted by Capn Bloggs
......... Re "normalised deviation", I'm not sure this applies here. Normalised deviation means deviating from published (perportedly safe) procedures, with no adverse consequences, so the deviations continue. In this case, it's pretty obvious that the "published procedures" were flawed in the first place.
Hiya Capt B , true but I sort of see 2 related issues - (a) airspace design and (b) how things are conducted within that airspace.

If the airspace design had been used with positive control (ie holding traffic off R4 while 33 was in use or even holding R4 traffic at bridges or somewhere clear of 33 while it was in use) that would work.

Using that same airspace design with "see and avoid" was far less safe and, as reported, led to quite a few incidents of TA's before this fateful day.

But, as the "see and avoid" system was seen by the users at the coal face at least to work, despite the TA's, the operational use of the design became "normalised" to use "see and avoid".

Sadly, no-one (such as DCA management) seems to have studied the extra issues so this more dangerous way of using the design has became "normalised", particularly where ATC is busy.

That's just my take on it.

Subjects ATC  DCA  See and Avoid

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layman54
December 18, 2025, 03:41:00 GMT
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Post: 12007246
The summary of the admission of liability was:

"GENERAL ADMISSION OF LIABILITY The United States admits that it owed a duty of care to Plaintiffs, which it breached, thereby proximately causing the tragic accident on January 29, 2025, as specifically set forth below. The United States admits that it, among other tortfeasors, is liable to a Plaintiff who is legally eligible to recover monetary damages, as permitted by the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. \xa7\xa7 1346(b), 2671\x9680, in an amount yet to be determined and apportioned among other tortfeasors."

The admission is based on the failure of the helicopter pilots to see and avoid traffic. The US also accepts that the air traffic controller failed to comply with a regulation but denies that this was a proximate cause of the accident and therefore that this incurred legal liability. The US briefly makes reference to the policy and political questions exemption with reference to some of the plaintiff's broader claims. The US also appears to be claiming that the jet pilots also had a duty to see and avoid traffic and so that the US is not solely liable.

Subjects ATC  Accountability/Liability  See and Avoid

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WillowRun 6-3
December 18, 2025, 18:05:00 GMT
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Post: 12007605
Some reactions and at least attempts at valid observations.

FAA and ATCOs. Did the Department of Justice's Answer to the Complaint throw the controller(s) "under the bus?" Yes, and no. In brief, the Answer does not state that the controllers' acts or omissions were a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the accident.

The Complaint alleges a long list of allegedly negligent acts by the controller(s) in Paragraph 250, which starts on page 158 and runs on to 164 (in the Answer). Without having studied the pleadings for hours upon hours (as one might do in actual practice) perhaps I've missed something -- but I think the only admission made by DOJ with regard to the controllers is that a very specifically cited FAA rule or procedure of some sort was not followed: "the DCA local controller did not comply with \xb6 7-2-1(a)(2)(d) of FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, chg. 3, Air Traffic Control (Sept. 5, 2024)." This specific admission is made recurrently in the Answer, amidst many other denials of (again, unless I missed something) everything else in the massive and detailed Paragraph 250 of the Complaint.

Edit [forgot to include]: the Complaint alleges generally the following about FAA and the ATCOs.
"the Federal Aviation Administration\x92s air traffic controllers failed in their two most important priorities, namely to separate aircraft in airspace and issue Safety Alerts when aircraft are in an unsafe proximity to one another; that the air traffic controllers on duty failed to abide by numerous other policies and procedures, including that air traffic control failed to provide traffic advisories to both aircraft and air traffic control failed to resolve an aural and visual Conflict Alert that advised air traffic control that the two aircraft were on an unsafe and converging collision course; and that the air traffic controllers failed in their duties concerning the \x93tower team concept\x94 within an air traffic control facility so that all controllers assist each other to prevent, amongst other things, a mid-air collision. The Defendants\x92 [meaning, both the U.S. and the airlines] collective failures (for which they are jointly and severally liable) caused, and/or contributed to this senseless and entirely avoidable tragedy."

So, "no", because the DOJ does not admit ATC was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause (both needed for liability, if I recall 1-L) but yes, first, specifically with regard to the FAA Order, and second, for all of the reasons ATC Watcher invokes. Whether those several factors would ever be considered for inclusion in an Answer to a big tort case such as this is doubtful . . .BUT especially after the fireworks over Section 373, watch for the NTSB report to lay it all out. (And incidentally, the Complaint now includes several excerpts from NTSB hearing and docket - not sure if these were part of the original Complaint. The Answer is the first pleading in response to the Complaint and it has become the Master Complaint, as I understand it, because it is the pleading on behalf of all the plaintiffs, regardless of whether they are represented by the attorneys who filed the very first Complaint in the case. Further, according to press reports (WSJ print edition today) both the airline companies filed motions to dismiss. Thankfully, or maybe not, my Pacer account is acting up, so, no comment....)

2. The airline and its parent company. The Complaint paints a very negative picture about the acts and omissions of the airline companies and the two pilots of 5342. The Answer was filed only on behalf of the United States (FAA and Army) and so the DOJ does not address the specific allegations forming the claims against the airline - this is standard practice. Still, I found this in the Answer (re: Para. 174): "The United States admits that the AE5342 pilots failied to maintain vigilance and to see and avoid PAT25".

I am refraining from trying to summarize or comment on the many aspects of the story about the airline pilots and airline companies alleged in the Complaint. It is a very detailed story. It probably if not certainly will outrage people in the industry writ large. I've not practiced tort law, either suing or defending, but that won't stop me from saying that it seems pretty clear that the trial lawyers are gunning for the airline company deep pockets, the availability of punitive damages when those are not awardable against the Federal Government, the availability of a jury trial, and insurance policies. To state the obvious.

As for the Army, Para. 253 starts on page 168 and runs to 176; the DOJ admits some but not all of the many specifically alleged negligent acts and omissions by the Army and those pilots.

One other little item caught my attention. In paragraph 106, reference is made to "risk assessment" stuff the Army aviation unit conducted or did not conduct. "Risk Assessment", that wouldn't be the same thing as showed up in Section 373, by chance?

(For information, the case number in federal district court in D.C. is 1:25-cv-03382-ACR.)


Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 18th December 2025 at 18:58 .

Subjects ATC  Accountability/Liability  DCA  FAA  NTSB  NTSB Docket  PAT25  Section 373 of the FY26 NDAA  See and Avoid

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 23:09:00 GMT
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Post: 12028272
Probable Cause Statement:

The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path.

Their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a mid-air collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, as well as the air traffic system's overreliance on visual separation.

In order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see and avoid concept.

Also causal was the lack of effective pilot applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a mid-air collision.

Additional causal factors were were the tower team's loss of situational awareness and degraded performance due to a high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions, and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real time operational risk factors, which resulted in miss prioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisory advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews.

Also causal was the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of air tolerances on barometric altimeter in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude.

Contributing factors include the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crew's.

An unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strain the DCA Atct workforce and degraded safety over time.

The Army's lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, D.C. Helicopter routes.

The FAA's failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Ads-b in and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risk that were known to management and the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA aircraft operators and other relevant organizations.

Subjects Barometric Altimeter  DCA  FAA  NTSB  Probable Cause  Route Altitude  See and Avoid  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  Visual Separation

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