Posts about: "Separation (ALL)" [Posts: 462 Page: 23 of 24]ΒΆ

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WillowRun 6-3
January 28, 2026, 03:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12028338
"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path."

The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination.

A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation.
WillowRun 6-3

Subjects ATC  DCA  FAA  Findings  Helicopter Working Group  Hot Spots  NTSB  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy  Probable Cause  Separation (ALL)  Vertical Separation

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artee
January 28, 2026, 03:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12028339
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path."

The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination.

A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation.
WillowRun 6-3
I find it interesting that the actions of the crew of PSA5342 were not included as Probable Cause. How do you think this will affect the lawsuit against them?

Subjects ATC  DCA  FAA  Findings  Helicopter Working Group  Hot Spots  NTSB  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy  Probable Cause  Separation (ALL)  Vertical Separation

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Musician
January 29, 2026, 13:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12029155
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
weird that they don’t even mention the Blackhawk PF’s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn’t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)
It's in the findings.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx
31. Due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter’s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter’s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.
.
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
that recreation is incredible, kudos to NTSB I don’t know why they chose to create it from the IP’s (RHS)’s point of view though, the PF was LHS and arguably had a better view of the CRJ the entire time
I'm guessing because the IP reported the aircraft in sight, the PF didn't.
27. The PAT25 instructor pilot did not positively identify flight 5342 at the time of the initial traffic advisory despite his statement that he had the traffic in sight and his request for visual separation.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  Findings  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Easy Street
January 30, 2026, 09:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12029574
Originally Posted by Musician
I'm guessing because the IP reported the aircraft in sight, the PF didn't.
27. The PAT25 instructor pilot did not positively identify flight 5342 at the time of the initial traffic advisory despite his statement that he had the traffic in sight and his request for visual separation.
As some won't follow the link and read all of the findings, I think it's only fair to the IP to quote the next finding as well, which speaks to concerns over the inherent (un)safety of visual separation at night in dynamic traffic environments:

28. With several other targets located directly in front of the helicopter represented by points of light with no other features by which to identify aircraft type, and without additional position information from the controller, the instructor pilot likely identified the wrong target.

Subjects ATC  Findings  PAT25  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Musician
January 30, 2026, 12:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12029671
Originally Posted by Easy Street
As some won't follow the link and read all of the findings, I think it's only fair to the IP to quote the next finding as well, which speaks to concerns over the inherent (un)safety of visual separation at night in dynamic traffic environments:

28. With several other targets located directly in front of the helicopter represented by points of light with no other features by which to identify aircraft type, and without additional position information from the controller, the instructor pilot likely identified the wrong target.
Yes. That is also apparent from the NTSB visibility study that we've been commenting on in this exchange.
The question was why the NTSB chose the right seat of the helicopter, and that was because the instructor assumed responsibility for the visual separation. There is no cockpit communication about the identification, so the PF wasn't involved in that.

One problem the helicopter had was that the CRJ was flying a turn. Flying straight, you know you're going to collide with something (even if it is just a dot of light) if it doesn't move visually. The CRJ's lights were moving left, so that would've looked like it was safely passing the helicopter by. The crew needed the situational awareness that the CRJ was going to turn towards them as it lined up for runway 33, but they didn't have it. ATC did, but didn't share, for reasons also addressed in the findings.

Subjects ATC  CRJ  Findings  NTSB  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  Visual Separation

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missy
January 31, 2026, 05:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12030060
flyingformoney777 provides a summary of the NTSB Board Meeting.
Runs 25 minutes.

I would argue that both NTSB and Flying for Money used complacency when the term Normalization of deviance,

The process in which deviance from correct or proper behavior or rule becomes culturally normalized.

American sociologist Diane Vaughan defines the process where a clearly unsafe practice becomes considered normal if it does not immediately cause a catastrophe: "a long incubation period [before a final disaster] with early warning signs that were either misinterpreted, ignored or missed completely".
Flying for Money articulates that the cost of admission into the airspace for VFR traffic was pilot initiated visual separation.

I don't understand why the helicopter routes do not have a lateral dimension i.e. track via XXX, remain EAST of a line XXX to XXX. Defined lateral dimensions then allows lateral separation applied to be based on a thinner line, rather than a broad line as per the current charting.

Subjects NTSB  Normalization of Deviance  Separation (ALL)  VFR  Visual Separation

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sunnySA
January 31, 2026, 06:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12030070
Originally Posted by missy
I don't understand why the helicopter routes do not have a lateral dimension i.e. track via XXX, remain EAST of a line XXX to XXX. Defined lateral dimensions then allows lateral separation applied to be based on a thinner line, rather than a broad line as per the current charting.
FWIW, I don't understand why NTSB didn't recommend re-transmit.
Relevant recommendations are
9. Conduct a comprehensive evaluation, in conjunction with local operators, to determine the overall safety benefits and risks to requiring all aircraft to use the same frequency when the helicopter and local positions are combined in the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport air traffic control tower.
10. Implement anti-blocking technology that will alert controllers and/or flight crews to potentially blocked transmission when simultaneous broadcasting occurs.
From experience, switching aircraft between frequencies will be time consuming, and make the splitting of positions more difficult and make the handover / takeover process much slower and take a longer period of time.

Current Voice Switching Systems allow multiple frequencies and provide re-transmit options, and as such provide instantaneous splitting of frequencies to seperate control positions.

Subjects NTSB  Separation (ALL)

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Easy Street
January 31, 2026, 09:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12030100
Originally Posted by missy
I don't understand why the helicopter routes do not have a lateral dimension i.e. track via XXX, remain EAST of a line XXX to XXX. Defined lateral dimensions then allows lateral separation applied to be based on a thinner line, rather than a broad line as per the current charting.
Because even if the route had been defined so tightly as to force helicopters to fly precisely along the eastern riverbank, there still would have been insufficient vertical or lateral separation between helicopters and traffic on final to 33 (after taking into account altimetry errors, pilot handling accuracy tolerances, and approach path variability) for the route to be operated without additional controls: either procedural separation (i.e. holding helicopter traffic or suspending 33 approaches), radar separation, or as fatefully applied here, visual separation. As one of those additional types of separation would always be needed, there was nothing to be gained by defining the route more tightly.

Relatedly, the 200 foot maximum altitude might have given the impression that procedural separation was built in to the route design. Beyond 2.5 miles from the airport, it could perhaps have been used to establish procedural separation against traffic on a 3 degree glideslope (probably in conjunction with stepped descent minima for that traffic). But so close to the airport, route parameters could never have provided separation on their own.

Subjects Radar  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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missy
January 31, 2026, 11:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12030143
Originally Posted by Easy Street
Because even if the route had been defined so tightly as to force helicopters to fly precisely along the eastern riverbank, there still would have been insufficient vertical or lateral separation between helicopters and traffic on final to 33 (after taking into account altimetry errors, pilot handling accuracy tolerances, and approach path variability) for the route to be operated without additional controls: either procedural separation (i.e. holding helicopter traffic or suspending 33 approaches), radar separation, or as fatefully applied here, visual separation. As one of those additional types of separation would always be needed, there was nothing to be gained by defining the route more tightly.

Relatedly, the 200 foot maximum altitude might have given the impression that procedural separation was built in to the route design. Beyond 2.5 miles from the airport, it could perhaps have been used to establish procedural separation against traffic on a 3 degree glideslope (probably in conjunction with stepped descent minima for that traffic). But so close to the airport, route parameters could never have provided separation on their own.
Sorry, I wasn't arguing that a thinner line would've provided separation, but rather a general comment based on experience of helicopter routes being defined in text.

Subjects Radar  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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MechEngr
February 18, 2026, 02:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12038935
Originally Posted by Musician
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
They requested visual separation and gave affirmation they had the other aircraft in sight. Failing to check the altimeter to a known datum was the least contributor.



Subjects Altimeter (All)  Final Report  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 18, 2026, 02:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12038946
Originally Posted by MechEngr
They requested visual separation and gave affirmation they had the other aircraft in sight. Failing to check the altimeter to a known datum was the least contributor.
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.

You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Someone Somewhere
February 18, 2026, 05:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12038980
Originally Posted by Musician
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.

You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?
I thought an instrument check was normally part of a pre-flight?

I am not sure checking that the altimeter matches field elevation while stationary on the pad would help, as it sounds like the issue is the altimeter reading changing when the rotor is loaded.

In either case, calling ~100ft 'vertical separation' is basically false.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Separation (ALL)  Vertical Separation  Visual Separation

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ATC Watcher
February 18, 2026, 16:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039242
The 100ft in the altimeter is within IFR tolerance , not really the point here , yes you should check against elevation airfield before start , but we learn there is a small discrepancy when on the ground and when the rotor blows over the static holes, and ATC will check again in flight the alt against mode C, it is mandatory on first contact with ATC , but mode C is calibrated on 1013 not QNH , anyway not the major cause here, just another hole on the cheese that night .

As to the lack of experience of the PF , I think 56 h of flying visual and manual an helicopter is significantly more important experience wise that the same number on say, a 747 .I also do not think this was factor.
The reasons and direct causes of this accident are within the 50 NTSB recommendations , not in the altimeter or experience of the PF , unless she had a couple of close calls herself doing visual separation at night before and did not learn from that.
Last edited by ATC Watcher; 18th February 2026 at 16:35 .

Subjects ATC  Altimeter (All)  Close Calls  IFR  NTSB  QNH  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Lonewolf_50
February 18, 2026, 17:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039290
For Chiefttp:
The question of currency, proficiency, and recency fairly leap off of the page, yes.
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
At the height the collision occurred, there would never have been a TCAS RA.
Inconvenient facts never stopped a lawyer from bringing a case to court, though.
Originally Posted by Musician
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
No, it does not.
Originally Posted by Musician
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.
Wrong. Visual lookout is a responsibility for all members of the crew. That's a shared responsibility, and briefed before every flight. Note that in a Blackhawk, there are a variety of zones where the pilots are effectively blind (starting at about the four o'clock position and reaching to about 8 o'clock position) but the forward quarter isn't usually one of those. (Won't comment on the goggle issue here...)
Originally Posted by Musician
You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?
Not just pre-flight checks.
I am not sure how much low level, over water, at night flying that you have done, but I have done quite a bit of that. If you are flying in such a regime, and there is a substantial mismatch between your radalt, and your baralt, and you have a hard altitude limit, you don't ignore your radalt.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Blackhawk (H-60)  Final Report  Radio Altimeter  Separation (ALL)  TCAS (All)  TCAS RA  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 18, 2026, 19:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039332
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
Wrong. Visual lookout is a responsibility for all members of the crew. That's a shared responsibility, and briefed before every flight.
The PIC reported 'traffic in sight' when he clearly hadn't, he should never have asked for visual separation (normalisation of deviance).
We don't know of any gestures, if any pilot pointed at lights, but there is nothing in the CVR transcript that indicates the PF was aware of the traffic, or that the PIC pointed the traffic out to her; the PF certainly did not factor in the decision to request visual separation.

So when the PIC transmitted,
20:46:07.9 RDO-1 PAT two five has the traffic in sight request visual separation .
what would you have the PF do? Ask the instructor where it is? Or trust the instructor, and concentrate on flying?
or did the PF know that neither of them could identify the traffic, but accepted it as normal?

Subjects CVR  Normalization of Deviance  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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island_airphoto
February 19, 2026, 04:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039465
Originally Posted by Musician
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.

You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?
I check my altimeter every time I fly, I think pretty much everyone does. An instructor is of course responsible for what his student does, so there is that.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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island_airphoto
February 19, 2026, 04:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039466
Originally Posted by Musician
The PIC reported 'traffic in sight' when he clearly hadn't, he should never have asked for visual separation (normalisation of deviance).
We don't know of any gestures, if any pilot pointed at lights, but there is nothing in the CVR transcript that indicates the PF was aware of the traffic, or that the PIC pointed the traffic out to her; the PF certainly did not factor in the decision to request visual separation.

So when the PIC transmitted,
20:46:07.9 RDO-1 PAT two five has the traffic in sight request visual separation .
what would you have the PF do? Ask the instructor where it is? Or trust the instructor, and concentrate on flying?
or did the PF know that neither of them could identify the traffic, but accepted it as normal?
Any student flying in some scenario where they don't have good vision themselves like wearing NVG gear or foggles puts an enormous amount of trust in their instructor.

Subjects CVR  Night Vision Goggles (NVG)  Normalization of Deviance  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 19, 2026, 16:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039774
Originally Posted by Chiefttp
Island Airphoto,
NVG\x92s are vision enhancers, by multiples at night. Also, This was an evaluation flight/checkride, so the other pilot was performing EP duties, not IP duties. She wasn\x92t a student on this flight, She was to act as the PIC\x85.
Then why did the PNF decide to request visual separation?

Subjects Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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punkalouver
February 19, 2026, 17:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039783
Originally Posted by Musician
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.

You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?
When the altimeter setting is placed in the aircraft on the ground, the pilot should take note of how much difference there is from actual field elevation and then consider what should be done for compensation for any error. On most VFR flights, a 100' error does not have much relevance. On the other hand, if you were to know that you are going to pass extremely close to something that you do not want to be close to, then it can become significant. An example might be for the people who like to fly 100 feet vertically from airspace that they are not allowed to enter. This situation might be another example where good airmanship can make a difference(specifically to compensating for an altimeter error).

I have not read this report, as I am deep into many other ones these days but I did take a quick glance on page 242 that was referenced and it talks about altimeter additive errors. The report states: "The allowable tolerances are additive, with the total error having the potential of exceeding 100 ft.". The report also states: "The NTSB concludes that, due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter\x92s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter\x92s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4".

My question to other people on this thread is: Did the NTSB do some sort of evaluation of this particular helicopter in order to come to a reasonable conclusion that all errors were in such a way that they were all in the direction of resulting in the helicopter being higher than indicated as opposed to errors potentially cancelling each other out(or partially so)?

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  VFR  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 19, 2026, 18:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039831
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
repeatedly in the CVR transcript of the Blackhawk the instructor tells the PF they are straying from their clearance
Once only, not repeatedly. She's following the river when they come out of the side arm, but in the wrong direction. My understanding is that the PNF is supposed to be navigating, though.
the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I’ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would’ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would’ve been even more taxing for the instructor
The landing at the helipad where she abandoned because the wind made the helicopter hard to control, and she lost sight of the landing zone? and then the instructor calls "go around", possibly because of some deer?
I don’t know how anyone can pretend these things didn’t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.

if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ’s flatboats occurred within the PF’s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly.

the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably
I don't think the handling played a part at all.

What I do see is that when the instructor is flying, he's having some altitude excursions as well.

There's also a visual separation while the instructor is flying, and it plays out like this:
20:00:11.0 APR-P PAT two five if you hear Potomac acknowledge with an IDENT. traffic at your nine to ten o'clock in two miles eastbound one thousand eight hundred indicated its a helicopter.

INT-2 [trainee] do you see him?
INT-1 [instructor] nope.

INT-2 do you see him?
INT-1 no. nine to ten o'clock. *.

20:00:22.7 RDO-2 * * traffic

INT-1 yeah. I got it. tally. coming left.
INT-1 alright you want me to keep chasing this number one needle or-
INT-2 yeah. just avoid traffic at this point.
INT-1 yup. I got the traffic out the right door
.
and only then does she call 'traffic in sight maintaining visual separation'.

For the CRJ, the instructor calls 'traffic in sight' without ascertaining that the PF sees it. When the tower cautions them again, the CRJ still hasn't turned, so while it's visible, it doesn't appear a threat. I think both pilots expect the CRJ to be to their right, because that's where the bridge is when ATC tells them where the CRJ is initially, and because the instructor thinks that ATC wants them to move left. They don't understand that the CRJ is on their left and will be turning onto the runway heading.

I imagine, based on that, that the PF believed the instructor has the CRJ in sight on his side. If she did see the CRJ, it would've been well above and on a diverging course, except for the final 6 seconds or so; it wouldn't have appeared to be a threat.

With his radio call, the instructor put himself in the position of being responsible for avoiding AA5342, but he didn't actually know where it was (maybe he thought he did).
There are a lot of factors contributing to that, but that's the big hole here for me.
Last edited by Musician; 19th February 2026 at 18:47 .

Subjects AA5342  ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  CVR  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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