Posts about: "Separation (ALL)" [Posts: 462 Page: 24 of 24]¶

Pages 238 and 253-254 deal with this:

• "The speed of the accident IP\x92s reply suggests a rote response that occurred without positively identifying flight 5342. This also seems likely because the IP never pointed out or discussed the traffic with the pilot" (p238)
• "requesting and receiving approval for visual separation was normal practice" (p253)
• "An Army standardization instructor pilot stated in a post accident interview that he sometimes responded to traffic advisories before visually acquiring the traffic if he knew that it was far away and was not an imminent threat. The accident IP\x92s significant experience flying on the DC helicopter routes and the speed of his reply to the controller\x92s traffic advisory support the likelihood that he 253 Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 had also developed this habit." (p253-254)

My experience is in two-seat fast jets, but when acting as PIC/PF I would absolutely not expect PNF or WSO to seek my approval before requesting routine clearances from ATC. It's abundantly clear that "visual separation" was routine here, and although it seems likely to have been a rote response in this instance, in my opinion it would have been perfectly in order for PNF to make the request without consulting PIC if he had positively identified the traffic.

Clearly, he hadn't. I'm impressed with the NTSB's reporting on this aspect: the difficulties of using NVG to identify and visually separate from other aircraft are very well described in the narrative, and the photographs through NVG from representative vantage points illustrate them superbly for the uninitiated.

Legislation

From House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee website 19 February 2026

Washington, DC \x96 The comprehensive legislative response to the various aviation safety issues raised by the tragic 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a UH-60 Army Black Hawk helicopter at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) was released today by the bipartisan leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.
The Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act of 2026 addresses all 50 safety related recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which concluded its thorough investigation and issued its final report on February 17, 2026.

The ALERT Act considers all of the NTSB\x92s findings of probable cause that contributed to the accident and responds to each of the NTSB\x92s 50 safety recommendations to provide a thorough and holistic legislative solution to improve U.S. aviation safety. Critical safety issues the bill addresses include:

Establishing requirements for equipping collision mitigation, avoidance, and alerting technologies and systems for civil fixed-wing and rotorcraft;
Improving helicopter route design, guidance, and separation;
Preventing loss of separation (near-miss) incidents;
Addressing deficiencies in the FAA\x92s safety culture;
Enhancing air traffic control training and procedures, particularly during high traffic;
Strengthening the safety of the DCA airspace \x96 one of the nation\x92s busiest and most congested airspaces;
Repealing section 373(a) of the last National Defense Authorization Act; and more.
The ALERT Act is led by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).

[Quotes from Congressmen omitted]

Link to the text of the ALERT Act: https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/r.aspx?ID=486957-71714618

Link to a section by section summary of the ALERT Act:
https://transportation.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=RFS3V7AWS4PPNV2MA2XZXHULM4