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| island_airphoto
January 31, 2025, 12:58:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818178 |
Funny, I’m hearing a lot of
professional
pilots here say exactly that, one way or another.
I don’t like saying this, but reading your posts, my gut feeling is you may be part of the problem. It’s well-known that modern airliners are specifically designed to be flown safely by the average pilot, not the cream. If ATC procedures aren’t designed and operated in a similar vein, does it need, a) a professional pilot to infer increased risk, or b) plain common sense? I would much rather be on the flight that refuses to accept a night visual separation than hope my pilot is above average. Why? Because hope is a poor hedge (if you like gambling analogies). Subjects
ATC
DCA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| island_airphoto
January 31, 2025, 13:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818186 |
It is really like that? Yes, I have seen the map but honestly I don't know how it works in real life. Do they really just fly bellow aircraft on final with vertical separation like 100-200 ft or they have to avoid them, let's say cross behind. What is too close in this case?
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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| Lascaille
January 31, 2025, 13:14:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818191 |
I doubt the helo pilot deliberately flew into the jet so he must have had something in sight and was confident he was avoiding it. Arguably they're more to blame as their movement is less constrained than the jet (in transit vs landing, plus inherent maneuverability characteristics of their aircraft.) Assigning blame is rarely helpful though. Especially to the deceased. Subjects
Close Calls
Separation (ALL)
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| Luc Lion
January 31, 2025, 13:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818194 |
Rarife
, the planned separation is more like 0-100 ft than 100-200 ft.
When overflying the eastern side of the Potomac, the planes aligned with RW33 are between 220 and 270 ft MSL Basically, route RT4 is designed to place the helicopters at the same height as planes approaching to land on RW33. I believe that this corridor altitude was rather planned to avoid conflicts with RW01 approaches. And, in my view, this corridor is incompatible with approaches to RW33. By the way, the situation with approach to RW19 is marginally better: approaching planes are overflying the helicopter corridor RT1 up to the Franklin Roosevelt memorial where their paths diverge and, at that point, the planes are supposed to be at 420 ft and the helicopters at or below 200 ft. The CNN article mentions several near-misses that happened with approaches to RW19. I think that the RT1 between Memorial Bridge and Hains Point and the RT4 between Haines Point and Wilson Bridge should be operated by ATC as roads crossing 2 bascule bridges and the bridges open to let respectively approaches RW19 and approaches RW33 pass through. Last edited by Luc Lion; 31st January 2025 at 13:34 . Subjects
ATC
CNN
Separation (ALL)
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| Jetstream67
January 31, 2025, 13:31:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818201 |
But that isn't the first communication that mentions the CRJ. The heli had previously been told the exact location, altitude, type and which runway the CRJ was positioning for. The heli crew replied that they were visual. It is only later that the controller refers to the CRJ in isolation (with no position) but he is simply querying 'are you still visual with the aircraft that you literally just told me you were visual with?'. There is no need for any night ID skills and even if you don't have a clue what a CRJ looks like, that entire combination of calls still make sense. I agree that if the heli had been made more aware of how proximate the CRJ was then that might have resolved an incorrect SA picture, but the heli had repeatedly told the controller that he was visual. If a procedure is designed that allows a heli to correctly pass under another aircraft by 100-200 feet, at night, is the controller really supposed to be able to judge from the tower whether they are extremely close (as would appear to be the case if they were both on the correct path) or if they were on a collision course?
..... Last edited by Jetstream67; 31st January 2025 at 13:37 . Reason: clarity Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
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| Rarife
January 31, 2025, 13:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818203 |
Rarife
, the planned separation is more like 0-100 ft than 100-200 ft.
When overflying the eastern side of the Potomac, the planes aligned with RW33 are between 220 and 270 ft MSL Basically, route RT4 is designed to place the helicopters at the same height as planes approaching to land on RW33. I believe that this corridor altitude was rather planned to avoid conflicts with RW01 approaches. And, in my view, this corridor is incompatible with approaches to RW33. By the way, the situation with approach to RW19 is marginally better: approaching planes are overflying the helicopter corridor RT1 up to the Franklin Roosevelt memorial where their paths diverge and, at that point, the planes are supposed to be at 420 ft and the helicopters at or below 200 ft. The CNN article mentions several near-misses that happened with approaches to RW19. So even if the helicopter stays in its route 4, bellow 200 ft MSL, they just can't fly directly bellow the approaching aircraft. Subjects
CNN
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
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| Kenny
January 31, 2025, 13:34:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818206 |
Rarife
, the planned separation is more like 0-100 ft than 100-200 ft.
When overflying the eastern side of the Potomac, the planes aligned with RW33 are between 220 and 270 ft MSL I had issues with the approach at the time, as it simply didn’t meet our stabilised approach criteria and could be challenging for a new or below average FO. Subjects
DCA
Separation (ALL)
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| henra
January 31, 2025, 13:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818215 |
It is really like that? Yes, I have seen the map but honestly I don't know how it works in real life. Do they really just fly bellow aircraft on final with vertical separation like 100-200 ft or they have to avoid them, let's say cross behind. What is too close in this case?
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
DCA
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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| Jetstream67
January 31, 2025, 14:00:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818231 |
The airspace procedures are to blame, you have an inherent conflict / near miss scenario where a helo route almost perfectly intersects an approach and a very minimal altitude differential (~150ft between the helo route ceiling and approximate altitude of the approach path at the intersection point) ensures separation.
I doubt the helo pilot deliberately flew into the jet so he must have had something in sight and was confident he was avoiding it. Arguably they're more to blame as their movement is less constrained than the jet (in transit vs landing, plus inherent maneuverability characteristics of their aircraft.) Assigning blame is rarely helpful though. Especially to the deceased. - but equally describing a fast developing potential collision situation in terms referencing local bridges (was the pilot local ?) is (at least with hindsight) inadequate and something 'far more alarming' could have been said in time. Subjects
Close Calls
Separation (ALL)
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| Chesty Morgan
January 31, 2025, 14:31:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818253 |
Talk of it being difficult to pick out aircraft nav lights is a red herring. The heli was, initially, several hundred feet below the CRJ and should have been able to easily see the lights against the night sky.
Blaming the airspace design is also a non starter. Are we really going to say that just because the airspace is poorly designed then I'm just going to fly in to that regional jet over there? First rule of airmanship anyone? Keep a good lookout. Seems like the helicopter crew failed to do so having been given their requested visual separation. Should have had eyes on stalks. Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Capn Bloggs
January 31, 2025, 14:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818262 |
Originally Posted by
slfool
I assume that means the "apparently static head on approaching light" factor can be discounted.
Originally Posted by
slfool
I also assume that still doesn't mean the helo pilot would have seen the jet
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| NIBEX2A
January 31, 2025, 14:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818263 |
Interestingly, if the SMS works in the US the same as everywhere else in the world, procedures should be audited on a regular basis, with a focus on any changes which may have invalidated the original assumptions made about the frequency of hazards and associated risks. These procedure reviews would also take place after receipt of any safety reports where the procedure could have been a contributing factor.
The NASA ASRS database contains safety reports raised over the US. A quick search with the term “helicopter” produced 40+ reports with the highlights shown below.. (apologies, to save time these are all copy and pasted) There are more, but I appreciate that most of us have annual eye examinations to pass so didn’t want to overdo it! 1. While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a “monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the “clear of conflict” the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead. 2. ATC delayed switch from Approach to Tower led to TA and resulting altitude deviation causing a GPWS Caution. Tower then issued a low altitude alert. Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. By the time Tower responded we had a RA to descend which led to a GPWS and low altitude alert from Tower. We confirmed traffic in sight and maneuvered back on coarse to correct the deviation, in judgement the safety of flight was not compromised as such we continued the approach to landing on Runway 19. As I believe a go-around would have exacerbated the situation and led to further problems. 3. I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time]. I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X, approved the request and issued the altimeter. Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land. Note. My standard practice for helicopter s flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopter s pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge. Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopter s over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic. Once Aircraft Y landed, he asked about the flight of three helicopter s off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X. Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y. I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers. 4 Our flight] into DCA was in a NMAC. We were supposed to circle from the visual Runway 1 to instead land on 33. We followed the [company] station bulletin procedures exactly as planned and came within very close contact of another aircraft. This occurred about 400 feet off the ground to the point where the pilot monitoring had to take the controls to make a correction in order to prevent it from becoming a midair collision. After there was action taken to make a correction from the close call, we were then informed by DCA tower of close traffic although at that point it would have been too late. I have flown with people who for the purpose of having a better chance of a stabilized approach would have had a wider circle to land procedure which I'm sure would have almost definitely ended in the collision of two aircraft over the turn to final for 33 in DCA. There was an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower to [our flight] or DCA Tower to the associated helicopter who did not ever pop up on TCAS which I'm assuming is due to a lack of an operating transponder. No TCAS RA was associated with this event. This occurred due to an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower and [our flight] or DCA Tower and the associated helicopter . Otherwise the other reason this may have happened is because of an unclear idea of where aircraft should be located during Runway 33 circle to land operations. I believe I was on track with what the [company] guidelines are for that particular procedure but there is a possibility that the other traffic operating around that area may not be aware of where exactly we are located or maybe they don't have a specific guideline to keep the arriving traffic separated from the low flying helicopter s. 5 I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have. 6 We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final. when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have happened. Number one, he said that the helicopter s operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a second because they would never expect those helicopter s to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the helicopter , and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot. Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions. 7 It was the end of a long day and the events were happening very quickly during a high workload portion of the flight. As all pilots know, the River Visual is a very demanding approach during the best of circumstances. It is very labor intensive when done at night during periods of high traffic volume. The advertised approach in use at DCA was the LDA 19 with VASI being out of service. During the initial approach, Potomac asked if we would accept the charted River Visual approach (VASI back working) and we did. At approximately the 7 DME point we were in the end process of configuring the airplane for landing and the First Officer was accomplishing the Landing Checklist. The radio chatter was considerable and the Tower at some point advised us of helicopter traffic ahead and to the left (I believe he said 10 to 11 o'clock) and he was going to pass from left to right, below us and he "HAS US IN SIGHT." It has to be noted that these traffic calls and helicopter s have unfortunately become background noise. There are always numerous military and government helicopter s running up and down that river at all times of the day and night. Because of this, what would normally be alarming at any other airport in the country has become commonplace at DCA. The FAA allows these aircraft to operate in this environment and we have no choice, but to accept it and deal with it. Therefore, the helicopter s being very close are not out of the norm. As you can imagine, I was concentrating on the approach and doing the required gyrations to stay over the river and not violate the White House prohibited airspace, and to keep the aircraft on the proper vertical profile. The Runway 19 visual was loaded in the FMGC and I was using it as a backup to my eyes. I was 'dead on' the donut and everything looked normal. I was at or very slightly above the recommended altitudes at each DME point. As I was approaching 4 DME, I caught a glimpse of the helicopter out of my left window and he did look higher than I expected to see him. I asked the First Officer to confirm if he was going to cross from north to south. He confirmed, however I directed him to ask the Tower and confirm it with them because it did not look right. The First Officer could not get a word in with the Tower. It was at that point, we got a TCAS "TRAFFIC" call. Again, this is not out of the 'norm' for DCA. I was getting ready to take possible evasive action because it was getting uncomfortable; all this while trying to fly the demanding profile. Within seconds, we got a TCAS alert, "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED." I complied with the TCAS alert and was thinking of going around but it all happened so very quickly that the point was moot. The helicopter passed 200 FT (MAX) below us. We were at 900 FT, slightly above the path. The Tower never called out the traffic beyond the first notification. The landing was uneventful. Due to the workload, we asked the Ground Controller for the Tower number and I called when I got to my vehicle. I called the Tower and spoke with the Controller in charge. At first it was it was obvious he was somewhat on the defensive and I had to press the point and ask very specific questions about the standard helicopter operations in the area. After some prodding, he admitted that it was a military helicopter flying from/to Ft. Meade and that he was at 700 FT and was "a little higher than normal." I asked what altitude was he supposed to be at and he replied, "three to four hundred feet." In addition, he did admit that the Tower version of collision avoidance did go to alarm but before they had a chance to react, the event was over. I cannot imagine what business is so pressing that these helicopter s are allowed to cross the path of airliners carrying hundreds of people! I do not understand why they are not crossed IN-BETWEEN arrivals. They have at least 4 miles between these arriving aircraft and it seems that would be more prudent. 8 We were on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach to Washington National Airport, and the Tower instructed us to circle to land on Runway 33. While we made our approach to Runway 33, Tower advised a helicopter was maneuvering at our 12 o'clock position. As we continued our approach, Tower instructed the helicopter to "make a right 360 for a jet on a 2 mile final for Runway 33, and to report him in sight" (referring to our aircraft.) The Tower then asked the helicopter if he had us in sight. He replied "yes", and the Tower told him to maintain visual separation. As we began our turn from base to final, the helicopter made what looked like a right turn directly into our flight path. The Captain, the pilot flying, made a hard right turn and executed a missed approach to avoid a collision. I'm not sure how close we came to the helicopter since it was on the left side of the aircraft, but I would guess it was only a few hundred feet. 9 WE WERE EXECUTING AN ILS IN IMC. AS MY FO ANNOUNCED 'APCHING MINIMUMS, RWY IN SIGHT,' I BEGAN MY TRANSITION FROM FLT DIRECTOR REF TO VISUAL REF FOR A HAND FLOWN LNDG. MY AIRSPD WAS PROBABLY AROUND 130-135 KIAS. AS I WAS TRANSITIONING I SUDDENLY SAW A DARK COLORED MIL HELI ON MY APCH PATH. HE BLENDED IN VISUALLY WITH THE DISMAL WX CONDITIONS. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY ACFT LIGHTING. AS I SAW HIM, SO DID THE DCA TWR CTLR. THE CTLR ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE AND FORCEFUL ATC INSTRUCTION TO THE HELI. THE HELI EXECUTED AN ABRUPT EVASIVE MANEUVER AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE FOG. I LANDED SAFELY. THIS ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 3-4 SECONDS. MY ACFT (BOEING 757) CONFIGN WAS GEAR DOWN, FULL 30 DEG FLAPS, ON SPD, ON COURSE, ON GLIDE PATH. EVASIVE MANEUVERING CAPABILITY IS LIMITED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MY ALT WAS ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE POTOMAC RIVER. ARPT TERMINALS AND CTL TWR WERE TO MY L, PROHIBITED AREA P-56 WAS TO MY R, AND THE HELI IN QUESTION WAS IN THE WX IN FRONT OF ME SOMEWHERE. I DIDN'T FEEL I COULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH WITH THAT ACFT IN THE FOG IN FRONT OF ME. WE WERE STILL ON LNDG PROFILE AND I DECIDED LNDG WAS THE SAFEST COURSE AVAILABLE. WE MADE A NORMAL EXIT FROM THE RWY TO THE L WITH MUCH LNDG ROOM LEFT ON RWY 36. TAXIED TO THE GATE AND PARKED. MADE AN IMMEDIATE PHONE CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AND RPTED THE INCIDENT. THEN CALLED MY AIRLINE FLT MGMNT SUPVRS AND RPTED THE INCIDENT AND MADE A WRITTEN RPT TO THE AIRLINE SAFETY DEPT UPON ARR AT MY BASE THAT NIGHT. I AM GLAD THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE CTLR TO SEE THE HELI IN TIME TO TAKE ACTION. IF THE VISIBILITY HAD BEEN ANY LESS HE WOULDN'T HAVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT DURING HIS SPEAKING WITH THE TWR FACILITY AT DCA, A CTLR IN TRAINING WAS HANDLING THE MIL TFC AT THE N END OF THE ARPT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER, MORE EXPERIENCED, CTLR. THE SECOND CTLR IS THE ONE THAT TOOK OVER THE MIKE AND ORDERED THE HELI TO LEAVE THE APCH ENVIRONMENT OF THE LNDG TFC. THE RPTR STATES THAT HIS TRAINING WOULD NORMALLY CAUSE HIM TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BUT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ENCOUNTER WITH THE SAME ACFT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD POSSIBILITY AND SO DECIDED THAT LNDG WAS THE SAFEST PATH TO FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT THE PHONE CONVERSATION REVEALED THAT EXTENSIVE TRAINING FOR A MIL EXERCISE OR OP WAS IN PROGRESS AND WAS BEING STAGED FROM THE N PART OF THE DCA COMPLEX. THE RPTR DOESN'T KNOW WHETHER THE HELI PLT MISUNDERSTOOD HIS INSTRUCTIONS OR WHETHER THE CTLR ISSUED SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE. 10 WE WERE ON THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. THERE WAS A MIL HELI OPERATING A TRAINING FLT FLYING N TO S OVER THE RIVER AT 500 FT MSL. WE APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST 80 KTS FASTER (WHILE IN OUR LNDG CONFIGN) THAN THE HELI. TWR ADVISED US OF THE HELI AND THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND HE WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. WE OVERTOOK ALMOST DIRECTLY ABOVE THE HELI AT ABOUT 3.5 DME AND 1100 FT MSL, RIGHT AT THE TURN IN THE RIVER THAT IS REQUIRED ON THE APCH. WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM OUR TCASII AT 1100 FT. WE FLEW AS FAR TO THE E SIDE OF THE RIVER AS WE COULD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON THE HELI ON THE W SIDE OF THE RIVER. WINDS WERE OUT OF THE SW AT 15-20 KTS. THE TCASII INDICATED CLR OF CONFLICT. WE STARTED TO DSND AGAIN AND AT 900 FT AGL, RECEIVED ANOTHER RA FROM OUR TCASII. AT THAT POINT IN THE APCH, THE RIVER TURNED BACK TO THE SSW. AS WE MADE OUR R TURN WE REGAINED VISUAL WITH THE HELI AND CONTINUED TO DSND. TCASII GAVE US 'CLR OF CONFLICT' AND WE FINISHED THE APCH AND LANDED. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND HE LISTENED AND SAID THIS WAS NORMAL. I HAVE FLOWN THIS APCH AT LEAST 15 TIMES AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THIS APCH PUSHING THE ENVELOPE FOR SAFETY, WITH THE AMOUNT OF ATTN I HAD TO GIVE TO THE HELI WHILE FOLLOWING THE RIVER AND DSNDING IN A XWIND AND AT A HIGH LNDG WT. THE TWR NEVER MADE IT CLR TO US WHERE THE HELI WAS GOING. ON THE PHONE THE SUPVR SAID THEY TRAIN FLYING N TO S AND BACK AT 500 FT. APPARENTLY, THEY DO THIS FROM 2 DME N TO 10 DME, BASICALLY UNDER THE WHOLE APCH. WHY CAN'T THEY DO THIS AFTER 10 O'CLOCK PM OR DURING LOW TFC FLOW PERIODS? AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ACFT SHOULD BE SPACED BETTER SO AS NOT TO FLY SO CLOSE TO THE HELI WHILE ON THE APCH. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED HELIS PREVIOUSLY WHILE SHOOTING THIS APCH, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALWAYS CLOSER IN SPD TO US AND THEREFORE WE WOULD NOT OVERTAKE THEM AS FAST, OR WE WERE SPACED BETTER. ALSO, THEY ALWAYS HAD A DEST THAT WE WERE ADVISED OF. I'M SENDING IN THIS RPT BECAUSE I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LEVEL OF SAFETY INVOLVED WITH FLYING WITHIN 400 FT VERTLY OF A HELI AND THAT IS CONSIDERED A NORMAL OP. 11 DURING ILS APCH, SBOUND, HELI COMING DOWN POTOMAC RIVER ABOUT 500 FT MSL, TFC CALLED BY TWR, WE DIDN'T SEE IT. WE GOT AN RA ON TCASII -- HAD TO FOLLOW RA INSTRUCTIONS. THEN WE WERE HIGH ABOVE GS, HAD TO DSND MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE WANTED TO IN ORDER TO LAND. THIS HELI CONFLICT AROUND DCA IS A DAILY PROB! GOING TO TA ONLY ON TCASII WOULD DEFEAT PURPOSE OF TCASII. LNDG ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE HELI'S. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. 12 I WAS TURNING FINAL FOR STOL LNDG RWY 21 DCA. I SAW A HELI APCHING ON CONFLICTING FLT PATH. IT WAS APPROX 400 FT BELOW US, BUT WE WERE DSNDING FOR LNDG. I ADVISED DCA TWR OF TFC. HE SAID 'TFC LOW LEVEL, 200 FT.' JUST AS I WAS GOING TO MANEUVER TO AVOID, THE CHOPPER MADE A STEEP TURN AWAY FROM US. AT THIS POINT WE WERE WITHIN 100 FT VERTICALLY AND 1000 FT HORIZLY. BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING A STOL LNDG AT DCA, MY TURN TO AVOID HIM WOULD ALSO CAUSE A GAR. TWR HAD PUT US ON RWY 21 WHILE THE ARPT WAS IN A 'N' OP (ALL OTHER TFC LNDG ON RWY 36). I RECEIVED NO WARNING FROM TWR OF HELI TFC AND I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF CHOPPER PLT HAD US IN SIGHT (UNTIL HE MADE THE EVASIVE TURN). THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME OF SUCH AN OCCURRENCE AT DCA. I HAVE HAD MANY CONFLICTS WITH CHOPPERS, BOTH ON LNDG AND TKOF AT DCA. I HAVE TALKED TO TWR SEVERAL TIMES (INCLUDING THIS TIME) AND HAVE RECEIVED APOLOGIES AND ADMITTING OF ERRORS BUT THE PROB CONTINUES. THE HELI IS A VERY MANEUVERABLE ACFT. IF THE CHOPPER PLTS WOULD JUST GIVE US MORE SEPARATION, THE PROB WOULD BE SOLVED. WHEN THEY SEE US THEY COULD SLOW OR HOVER, TURN, ETC. CONFLICTS OCCUR WHEN TWR FORGETS TO ADVISE ME THAT CHOPPER HAS ME IN SIGHT AND THE CHOPPER MAINTAINS HIS 'TRAJECTORY' WHICH CONFLICTS WITH MY LIMITED ARR OR DEP AIRSPACE. 13 DURING RIVER VISUAL APCH DCA (LNDG RWY 18), 3 HELIS CROSSED OUR FLT PATH. THE FIRST CAUSED AN RA ON TCASII WITH A 0-300 FT CLB (WHICH WE FOLLOWED). THE HELI WENT DIRECTLY UNDER OUR ACFT WITH LESS THAN 300 FT SEPARATION. THE NEXT 2 HELIS CAUSED MONITOR VERT DSCNT ON THE TCASII. ALL 3 HELIS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 1 MI. THE TWR NEVER CALLED ANY TFC, UNTIL WE CALLED THE FIRST HELI IN SIGHT. THEN HE SAID 3 HELIS WERE XING THE RIVER. WITHOUT THE RA WE WOULD HAVE COME EVEN CLOSER THAN 300 FT TO THE FIRST HELI. 14 WASHINGTON APCH CTL CLRED ACR X FOR THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH. AT THE WILSON BRIDGE THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND STOL ON RWY 33. I TURNED OFF THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH ONTO A L BASE LEG FOR RWY 33. THE PATTERN FLOWN WAS SQUARE. I TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1/2 MI S OF THE E BANK OF THE POTOMAC RIVER. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED OF A HELI IN OUR AREA AND WE DID NOT HEAR THE TWR TALKING TO A HELI ON 119.1 (1-WAY OR 2-WAY COM). WE DID NOT SEE A HELI DURING OUR APCH. THE SKY WAS HAZY AND THE SUN WAS OFF THE L SIDE. IT WAS DAYLIGHT. LINED UP ON FINAL AND STABILIZED FOR A STOL LNDG, I SUDDENLY CAUGHT SIGHT OF A PRESIDENTIAL TYPE HELI XING OUR FLT PATH, APPROX 50-100 FT BELOW AND 100 FT IN FRONT OF US AT OUR 11:30 POS, AS WE PASSED THROUGH 600 FT MSL. THE HELI WAS MOVING L TO R AT A GOOD SPD, BUT I DETERMINED A COLLISION WAS POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED PWR, PULLED UP AND CALLED 'GAR' TO THE FO. AS WE PULLED UP I CALLED OUT THE HELI TO THE FO WHO THEN SAW IT CLOSE AND BELOW AS IT PASSED OFF THE R SIDE. THE GAR WAS UNEVENTFUL AND COMPLIED WITH TWR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN AFTER WE CALLED WITH GAR AND NEAR MISS. THE TWR'S RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER AND UNDERSTAND' ONLY. THE HELI IN QUESTION DID NOT APPEAR TO ALTER COURSE OR FLT PATH UNTIL DSNDING AND LNDG AT ANACOSTRA. ON THE GND I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE TWR ON LANDLINE BUT KEPT GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL (3 ATTEMPTS). SINCE I WAS DUE BACK OUT IN 10 MINS FOR MY NEXT FLT, I RETURNED TO MY ACFT AND CONTINUED ON MY SCHEDULE. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE TWR KNEW OF OR HAD TALKED TO THE HELI IN QUESTION. MANY TIMES THE TWR TALKS TO HELIS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ, BUT YOU CAN HEAR THE TWR'S COM TO THEM ON 119.1. THEY WILL USUALLY POINT OUT HELI TFC TO US AND COMMENT THAT THE HELI IS AT SUCH AND SUCH AN ALT, DIRECTION AND THAT THEY (THE HELI) HAVE US IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT WAS 'VERY' CLOSE AND FAR FROM THE NORM I'VE EXPERIENCED IN 15 YRS OF FLYING INTO AND OUT OF DCA. 15 HOT, HAZY AFTERNOON IN WASHINGTON (HAZE DID RESTRICT VISIBILITY) FLYING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA, CREW IS DCA BASED SO WE ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. AT ABOUT 4-5 DME, TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD LAND ON RWY 15, I DECLINED AND SAID THAT I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE FOR RWY 18. TWR THEN ADVISED US THERE WOULD BE 2 HELIS COMING OUT OF THE TIDAL BASIN AREA. (IT IS NOT AT ALL UNCOMMON TO SEE HELIS XING OUR FLT PATH WHEN WE ARE TAKING OFF TO THE N AND CLBING). I COULD SEE A CONTACT ON OUR TCASII SCREEN -- JUST ONE TARGET -- AND BTWN 600 AND 500 FT ON FINAL, WE GOT AN RA THAT COMMANDED CLB. I HAD THE FO LEVEL OFF AT 500 FT, THE TARGET SHOWED 200 FT BELOW ON THE TCASII AND VERY CLOSE ABEAM ME (ON 5 NM SCALE) AND I NEVER DID SEE EITHER HELI. WE STARTED BACK DOWN WHEN THE TCASII SHOWED WE WERE PASSED THEM, WE WERE HIGH AS WE ROLLED WINGS LEVEL ON FINAL BUT, WE WERE STILL ABLE TO SAFELY COMPLETE THE APCH. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS APCH AT DCA FOR 7 1/2 YRS, AND THIS ONE REALLY GOT MY ATTN. TWR IS NOT CTLING THE HELIS, I CAN'T BE SURE THE HELIS HAVE ME IN SIGHT, I KNOW THE SECOND HELI IS LOOKING AT HIS LEAD -- THEREFORE, I KNOW HE IS NOT LOOKING AT ME, AND I AM DSNDING INTO HIM WHILE ON FINAL ON A CHALLENGING APCH. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE A MIDAIR, AND UNFORTUNATELY, PROBABLY IS CONSIDERED ROUTINE OPS BY DCA TWR. 16 MANEUVERING IN GOOD VMC FOR LNDG ON RWY 21 AT DCA (CLRED FOR VIS APCH, MONITORING TWR FREQ FOR LNDG CLRNC). TWR ADVISED OF HELI TFC BELOW AND AHEAD. THIS TFC WAS SPOTTED FLYING SW WHERE ANACOSTIA RIVER MEETS POTOMAC. NO CONFLICT, INITIALLY. THE HELI, A MIL TYPE, THEN TURNED NW UP THE POTOMAC RIVER. THIS NOW BECAME AN IMMEDIATELY INCREASING TFC CONFLICT. CONVERGING FLT PATHS. I ASKED TWR TO PROVIDE SEP, HOPING HE WOULD STOP, SLOW OR TURN THE HELI. HE RESPONDED WITH, "MAINTAIN VIS SEP." MANEUVERING IN CLOSE FOR A STOL LNDG ALLOWS FOR VERY LITTLE LEEWAY FROM THE DESIRED FLT PATH. A GAR FROM THIS POS IS ALSO DANGEROUS. THERE WAS NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO TWR AND THE HELI WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. I CONTINUED AND LANDED VERY CAUTIOUSLY WHEN I REALIZED WE WOULD MISS TFC. HOWEVER, WE ONLY MISSED BY APPROX 300'. I FEEL THAT ATC (TWR) IGNORED ITS BASIC OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING SEP. THE HELI COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN SLOWED, STOPPED OR TURNED AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING AN IMPENDING COLLISION. TWR CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF BOTH ACFT'S FLT PATHS. I HOPE THEY (TWR) DO NOT THINK 200-300' IS A SAFE AMOUNT OF TFC SEP. THIS HELI CONFLICT, AND POOR ATC SEP OF IT, AT DCA IS AN ONGOING PROB. HERE IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN. Subjects
ATC
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
Close Calls
DCA
FAA
Frequency 119.1
Radar
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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| 21600HRS
January 31, 2025, 14:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818264 |
This procedure was not for sure designed so that the vertical separation is only separation, no, horizontal separation is supposed to be the way you do it. Separation is anyway based on visual avoidance in dark, not good! Anyway the HELO was zick zacking, not following the route 1 and 4, and did not maintain altitude, why was that?
30 seconds before the collision, when LC asked if they have traffic in sight, HELO was on track about 200\xb0, because of wind (320/25) HDG was somerhing like 215\xb0. Bearing to CRJ was 10 o’clock and to A319 about 11 o’clock. At this moment CRJ was flying track to North, base for rwy 33, and was not at all conflicting traffic from HELO’s point of view. Few seconds later HELO turned to the South, perhaps to avoid A319, soon after noticed that A319 will pass far ahead and turned back to right… so sad. Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Vertical Separation
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| SASless
January 31, 2025, 15:13:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818281 |
You would have to say something like "I don't trust them, I am going around". It beats dying, but sure would get some odd comments from the tower.
I learned that from during my Student Pilot days and it was reaffirmed till I retired from flying. The Rule is "see and be seen"....which I read as being a two way street kind of situation. When there is doubt...there is no doubt....remedy the situation as quickly and safely as possible. If your aircraft is so complex and difficult to fly, or your procedures do not require or allow you to look out when appropriate, and that one of you cannot be spared to take a look out the window now and then....or if you think there is no need for you get your scan outside because you think yourself too busy inside.....there is something close to home that warrants changing. Bottom line....nothing prevents you from doing a "missed approach" and give it a second try if it eliminates a critical risk of some kind. Even Air Line Pilots do not have to land on every approach and need to kick the mindset every second counts and remind their management that an occasional delay's expense is far cheaper than an accident. It also might make the difference between being retired and enjoying life and just being another statistic or name on a list of those killed In a crash. This discussion about who is burdened with the responsibility for traffic separation between ATC and Pilots omits one thing.....the PIC of each aircraft is equally responsible for the safety of their own aircraft. More importantly, ATC Controllers might have to live with their mistakes but Pilots die by theirs. Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
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| island_airphoto
January 31, 2025, 15:25:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818288 |
I expect the current system will not last, at the very least they'll go back to a dedicated helicopter controller that could have devoted his full attention to vectoring the Black Hawk somewhere else. I expect an overloaded controller will mentally dump a helo pilot that says he sees the other traffic and will go behind it from his top worry if he has airplanes too to deal with as well. Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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| fireflybob
January 31, 2025, 15:53:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818310 |
I'm not saying I agreed with this but that I believe is the situation in the UK. Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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| moosepileit
January 31, 2025, 17:13:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818379 |
Heathrow is great, calm and polite.
Even as they apologize for setting up a near miss, they are, polite and calm. They are human, and subject to the same frailties as the rest of us. They are sure polite though. Heathrow suffers from the problem that their local airspace is.. logical, as are the flight paths, and generally the runway utilisation. They don't have the benefit of the special design skills applied to JFK's terminal procedures which seem to have been designed to give cardio workouts for the controller and the pilots. Masterful airspace design. JFK, making Abuja look attractive.
Re-stated I being the target being "seen" would be thinking "Is it for sure me he is seeing?" and I would be looking for him to make darn tooting I
KNEW
where the conflicting traffic was as ATC thought it to be a conflict.
I learned that from during my Student Pilot days and it was reaffirmed till I retired from flying. The Rule is "see and be seen"....which I read as being a two way street kind of situation. When there is doubt...there is no doubt....remedy the situation as quickly and safely as possible. If your aircraft is so complex and difficult to fly, or your procedures do not require or allow you to look out when appropriate, and that one of you cannot be spared to take a look out the window now and then....or if you think there is no need for you get your scan outside because you think yourself too busy inside.....there is something close to home that warrants changing. Bottom line....nothing prevents you from doing a "missed approach" and give it a second try if it eliminates a critical risk of some kind. Even Air Line Pilots do not have to land on every approach and need to kick the mindset every second counts and remind their management that an occasional delay's expense is far cheaper than an accident. It also might make the difference between being retired and enjoying life and just being another statistic or name on a list of those killed In a crash. This discussion about who is burdened with the responsibility for traffic separation between ATC and Pilots omits one thing.....the PIC of each aircraft is equally responsible for the safety of their own aircraft. More importantly, ATC Controllers might have to live with their mistakes but Pilots die by theirs. DCA, and others nornalize collision alerts in the background of a significant % of ATC transmssions. TCAS RA heights show mandatory Day, VMC go arounds the day prior- but how close was the helicopter to the 737 not going around 2 minutes earlier the day prior, so low TCAS TA only height below 900' allows continuing? You think the CRJ crew, below 500', rolling out of a left turn to 33 sees the helicopter to their right or even notices the TCAS TA display? Maybe it gets a glance IF the short final is wired. Problem is the Traffic aural is already expected in the airspace, same as hearing the ATC collision alarms in their transmission background. There will be line of sight recreations in the reports. The CRJ will not have but a scant chance to have seen the PAT25, with caveats- the CVR has to be heard. Pat25 likely had a 500 hour pic getting a checkride in the right, distant seat and the radio PM/1000 hour pilot in left seat, seeing only AAL3130 and trying to figure out how to pass behind, cognitive dissonance with what is seen.. 3 seconds later, all ends. James Reason, Diane Vaughan, NASA, et al... Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Close Calls
DCA
PAT25
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
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| Easy Street
January 31, 2025, 17:58:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818419 |
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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| digits_
January 31, 2025, 19:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818487 |
Going through everything again, I'm wondering what would have happened if the helicopter did not ask or accept visual separation? What was the backup plan? Tell the helicopter to hold? Missed approach instructions for the CRJ?
Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| pax britanica
January 31, 2025, 19:54:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818499 |
Where else does 200ft vertical get classed as separation on top of which the CRJ was obviously descending as well .as it was on final approach . On the radar shots both aircraft are head to head for several seconds again with decreasing 200ft separation but the stressed out controller either doesnt see it or as many people have pointed out asks the helo pilot if he can see something -at night! instead of ordering an immediate left turn . One of the more avoidable accidents and especially sad because of it . God knows what the tower controller is going thru at the moment both from massive regret and no doubt a degree of he will get the blame cos its going to be him or the helo pilot not anyone involved with the absurd planning of having aircraft on head on converging courses both below 500ft with one in a descending turn a mile from touchdown
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Radar
Separation (ALL)
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