Posts about: "Situational Awareness" [Posts: 61 Page: 2 of 4]¶

Well, they got an earful of noise the other night, didn\x92t they? Maybe, the politicians that cry for ever more service at DCA AND robust \x93continuity of govt\x94 programs (utter tosh IMO), need to tell the constituents and residents that the noise is necessary. But, that\x92d take courage.

YES/NO

Musings:

"The system" includes all of us that are involved in aviation at all levels, everyday. Thee are a lot of flights that go into DCA every day, each crew observing the same conditions, and conducting briefings of the arrivals, approaches and departures. Same out of LAX etc. How many of us, as stakeholders in the system have raised our concerns to the system by the means available, the ASRS, company safety reporting systems, the squadron SMS systems. How many safety managers have bothered to go and do an operational route survey/audit? Without our active participation, then we are relying on some person long retired who designed a procedure that survives to this point in time, and due to our collective indifference to the common users safety we remain broadly mute, until something falls off the perch. At this point we feign surprise, shock and some horror, yet, search inside, how many of us are surprised by this event, or Jeju Air in Muan, or the Russians shooting down yet another civil aircraft, Instead, we pontificate, (myself possibly more than most) and point the bone at all others in the system,

SMS systems only work if they have data that is meaningful. Each airline may seem to be swamped in data, that however is not the case for dealing with extremely low incidence, but high consequence events. There is not enough data generally to do a damned thing with, for just UAL, DAL, AAL etc or other operators. To be able to understand fully a system behavior there has to be adequate data, At present the only aggregated data of any note is that with NASA under the ASRS, and with ICAO at the reportable event level. Each ICAO state safety plan is supposed to provide data to the extent it can to its own community and to ICAO, and that is generally the last that is seen of the data. The airlines and operators dont get feedback, ICAO may or may not apply that data towards rule making, but that is years hence, and does not meet the needs of the user or the public today. Without the data being available to all, it is diminished in its utility. SMS systems have limited effectiveness that is IMHO glossed over universally, as actually getting data that is useful takes effort, and then evaluating that data takes critical analysis. By squandering the opportunity to have the data to evaluate, it should be no surprise that occasionally, we have SA-1, SA-2 and SA-3 type situational awareness failures of biblical proportions.

Aerospace suffers from frequent events that are normal in most respects. Functional resonance is a reasonable paradigm to assess how the system is really working, to give the system the understanding of how large the slip between assumptions and real system behavior is. The means of doing that is available from the flight data, and from operational audit aimed at understanding how expectations of process match with the real world.

Alternatively, we can sit back and blame the victims of the most recent mishaps, chasing those that should take responsibility for this, which to an extent falls on all of us that use the system and don't bother to raise concerns to the system.

Complacency works well though, until it doesn't.

Hello fellow flyers, I am a 65 y/o retired pilot. I served 20 years in the Navy flying P-3C and trainers then served another 20 years flying for Southwest Airlines, nine of those years as Captain. Also, I am a graduate of the Naval Post Graduate Aviation Safety School with extensive hands on experience in military mishap investigation.

I have mostly enjoyed my latest years of not sitting at the front end of a jet. During my 40 years of flying people, I never really felt the stresses of being responsible for the well being of so many. Now that I spend most of my days on my boat fishing or growing tomatoes in my garden, life's pressures are minimal. This has opened my eyes to the gravity of the enormous responsibility I held on my shoulders, for the safety and well being of so many.

I have always had the mindset not to "arm-chair" quarterback any aviation mishap, regardless of how tempting it may be. But the aviation mishap that occurred at DCA on the evening of Wednesday, January 29 has compelled me to speak out.

Was it preventable? Sadly, It was entirely preventable.

How did it happen you may ask. After all both aircraft were clearly operating normally up until impact. First lets clear up one detail both the President and our news media has consistently made error.

Elevation refers to the height above sea level of the ground. These two aircraft were flying altitudes, not elevations. Aircraft fly altitudes and above 18,000 feet they are called flight levels. Example, flight level 180 is 18,000 feet. The ill-fated regional jet was at approximately 325 feet when it was impacted by the Army UH-60 helicopter. I have flown into Washington National since the first days Southwest began operations at DCA. I was already a Captain at this point, and I can tell you this airport is one of the most technically challenging of any I have flown.

However, that is not why this disaster happened.

I would be very surprised if the RJ black box revealed either of the two young PSA pilots were aware up until the moment of impact. Why you may ask? Because when you are flying a jet on short final, at 325 feet, you are focused on the flare and touch-down point on the runway. Perhaps the young First Officer may have seen the UH-60 just with enough warning to make a call-out, just prior to impact. From the angle of impact, very unlikely the more seasoned Captain would have even been able to see anything at all. If the First Officer was making the landing, it is most certain that neither of them saw it coming and there was nothing said on the microphone. I have no doubt, the pilots on the regional jet will be completely vindicated. In any aviation mishap, there is a chain of events that lead up to the accident. If any one of the links in the chain are broken, the accident will not happen. In this case, there are two remaining main causal factors.

DCA control tower: Tower controller made a fatal error in communicating with the Army UH-60. Time was clearly critical and was wasted by asking the H-60 if they had jet traffic in site. Clearly, they did not. What should have been said in a very assertive voice, "PAT25 (UH-60's callsign), IMMEDIATE TURN TO XXX HEADING, CLIMB AND MAINTAIN XXX ALTITUDE TO AVOID COLLISION. Tower was no help at all. First they cleared the RJ for a last minute change to 33, and then failed to ensure their approach corridor was clear of traffic. In my view, the tower controller could have easily prevented this fatal collision.

Army UH-60 crew: In military aviation training, we have always have preached the importance for pilots to maintain situational awareness. That philosophy by the way is also a cornerstone to commercial aviation safety. Were the pilots tuned up to tower when the controller gave the RJ clearance to land runway 33? Had they been aware the commuter jet was going to track over the ground through their intended flight direction, something should have been said. Request vector, due to traffic! One H-60 pilot responded, yes we have traffic in site, we will maintain VFR (visual flight rules) which means "see and avoid" yes even at night. Clearly he was looking at the wrong traffic which by the way is a very common occurrence, especially at night. No doubt the Army crew was engaged in training, which may have been a distractor to situational awareness.

In the end, the chain of events were allowed to happen as did this horrible accident that took the lives of sixty-seven beautiful souls. The President is totally correct in that we need to hire pilots and air-traffic controllers based on merit and experience, nothing else! I have witnessed first hand, the failed attempts to ensure diversity while training pilots, at the expense of safety. That practice, both military and commercial aviation, needs to stop! The current administration has their hands full but I have complete confidence they will make significant headway. Clearly we need to train and educate more air traffic controllers! The shortage and perhaps poor training standards are likely the primary cause of this mishap. I have no doubt our new Transportation Secretary is on it with both feet running. We need to maintain pilot standards also. The pilot shortage resulted in the FAA reducing the flight hours required to be hired to fly commercially. Why didn't they allow experienced pilots age 65-67 to work? In this country, we have effectively dumbed down just about everything, in the name of getting everyone through.

Just like on the operating table, you want the most experienced individuals in the most demanding jobs!

Regarding the collision of American Eagle JIA342 and Army Blackhawk PAT25, I lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of both the FAA and the United States Army Aviation Branch. If the NTSB in any way blame the pilots in the incident, they are not doing their job. Let’s look at all of the holes in this swiss cheese:

1. In an effort to maximize commercial air traffic in and out of DCA, the FAA has created the “deviate to RWY 33 procedure” for air traffic in-bound to RWY 01. This requires a right-hand turn from the RWY 01 approach followed by an immediate hard left-hand turn to line up on RWY 33. FAA criteria for a stabilized approach states that you have to be stable at 500 feet AGL on final in VMC or perform an immediate go-around. But on this particular approach, you will be at or below 400 feet AGL as you come out of the left turn to final. So the FAA has granted an exception to the “stabilized requirements” at DCA to allow for this maneuver. This allows ATC to shorten the distance between arriving and departing aircraft that are utilizing conflicting RWYs. The FAA in essence violates its own safety standards on stabilized approaches for the sake of expediency.

2. The FAA creates the Route 1/4 helicopter route through the DCA airspace as a VFR route with constantly changing altitude requirements. The lowest limit is at 200 ft MSL through the area east of DCA. Any pilot will tell you that flying that low over water at night is a best a tense experience. Try not to break that limit flying at night while also trying to communicate with ATC and simultaneously searching for possible conflicting aircraft.

3. The United States Army Aviation Branch deems it acceptable to allow training missions for Army Reserve pilots with limited flying experience to fly these helicopter routes through this complex and extremely active airspace. Compounding this, training flights at night using night-vision goggles are deemed “safe” in spite of the fact that using said goggles severely limits peripheral vision and makes it difficult if not impossible to perceive any color other than green and white. Picking out particular lights against the background of urban lighting is challenging, as is depth perception. Scanning key cockpit instruments is also made more difficult, making it challenging to accurately maintain altitude. Add to that workload the need to be in constant communication with ATC as well as monitoring all other comms traffic not directed to you but necessary in order to maintain good situational awareness. Given the density of commercial air traffic on this route, common sense would dictate that this route be flown by only the most experienced pilots and only when absolutely necessary. Reasonable logic would understand that conducting training missions should not be using final approach areas with heavy commercial traffic.

4. The Army crew on PAT25 are flying a mission they have been ordered to fly, at night and using night vision goggles. Although they may feel it is difficult and may be anxious about it, their command structure has determined that it is an appropriate training procedure and as such must meet minimum safety requirements. They do not have the authority to question the mission or the orders to fly it.

5. JIA342 is on approach for RWY 01, but is asked at the last minute by ATC to deviate to RWY 33, requiring the “circle to land” maneuver. Therefore, they are now on approach different from what they briefed for.

6. Any aircraft following the “circle to land” approach to RWY 33 will most likely have both pilots focused on RWY 33 as they come out of the left turn to final, especially if it was a last-minute request by ATC. In this case they will be looking to make sure that AA1630, which has just been given clearance to depart from RWY 01, is clear of the intersection with RWY 33 as they complete their final approach, and be ready for a go-around if it is not. In addition, this left bank makes it extremely difficult for the first officer to see any conflicting traffic coming towards them from the 1 to 2 o’clock position, as that traffic will probably be below the right window level. For the pilot, who is on the left side of the cockpit, visibility of such conflicting traffic will be nearly impossible.

7. For whatever reason, ATC is working with “split frequencies while controlling this airspace, so that although the controller hears both the aircraft on approach and the helo traffic south-bound on “Route 1”, the pilots of those respective aircraft only hear information directed at them. Thus they are not aware of all that is going on around them, and as such their situational awareness is limited by factors outside of their control.

8. ATC informs PAT25 of the conflicting aircraft on approach for RWY 33 at 1200 feet MSL, but at the time, PAT25 is heading almost due east towards the Jefferson Memorial on Helo Route 4 while JIA342 (the CRJ) is executing its right turn departing from the RWY 01 approach and is now heading in a northeast direction as it prepares to make a hard left onto the RWY 33 short final approach. From their respective positions, PAT25 in all likelihood sees the landing lights of AA3130 which is trailing JIA342 and whose landing lights are pointed almost directly in his direction, and mistakenly identifies it as the aircraft approaching RWY 33. At no time does it appear that ATC notifies JIA342 of the conflicting helo traffic. They are most likely focused on their approach to RWY 33, which was just handed to them.

9. As JIA342 rolls out of its left hand turn to final on RWY 33, completing the deviation they were just handed and had not briefed for, it is now approaching the 9-11 o’clock position of PAT25. Since the pilot of PAT25 is on the right-hand side of the Blackhawk, visibility of the CRJ may be limited. Both pilots of PAT25 are now most likely visibly fixated on passing to the rear of AA3130, which is in their 1-3 O’clock position, and which is the conflicting aircraft they perceive as the one ATC initially warned them about.

10. ATC, now receiving a conflicting aircraft warning, asks PAT25 if they have JIA342 in sight. In the absence of any obvious difference from the first mid-identification of the conflicting traffic, confirmation bias raises its ugly head. The voice response from the training pilot is calm and confident in stating that they do have it in sight and claim visual separation, probably proving once again that he mistakenly has AA3130 in sight slightly to his right directly in front of him and more than a mile away. Both pilots are totally unaware of JIA342 which is now arriving in front of them from their left.

11. The collision occurs.



In my humble opinion, the crews of both aircraft involved were set up by both the FAA and the Army Department of Aviation through a series of poorly based decisions which focused on expediency and departed from any appropriate utilization of a rational use of risk assessment. Consider the following:

1. Approval of the circling to RWY 33 maneuver which violates normal stabilized approach standards.

2. The establishment of a series of complex VFR helicopter track complex and heavily restricted air space as well as through final approach paths.

3. A 200 foot maximum altitude requirement over water and required even at night, which may result in a less than 200 foot vertical separation between aircraft on approach to RWY 33 and those traveling on Helo Route 1/4.

4. The decision to conduct military training missions in this complex and busy airspace with an abundance of commercial passenger traffic either arriving to or departing from DCA.

5. The use of split frequencies by the FAA which negatively impacts the situational awareness of all of the pilots in the airspace.

6. The use of night vision goggles to place even more limitations on the pilots.

Granted, all pilots involved may not have had the thousands of hours senior commercial and military pilot possess. But even the most senior individuals when placed in the task saturated environments these two crews faced would have at the very least felt their “pucker factor” increase through this. And there is probably an equal chance that the lack of common sense and appropriate safety design exhibited by the controlling entities would have resulted in a similar outcome. The odds were significantly stacked against these two flight crews, and unfortunately, against the passengers and flight attendants as well. If ever there were an example of an accident waiting to happen, this is it.

Has there been any confirmation on whether Blackhawk crews flying Priority Air Transport (PAT) missions receive additional deconfliction training beyond standard procedures? Given the reported multiple near-misses around DCA and now the crash, situational awareness protocols don't appear sufficiently robust for PAT pilots in mixed-airspace operations

I can\x92t speak for DCA, but my local Class D airport (KELM) has had a radar repeater in the tower cab since the late 1980s, and all the local controllers use it. I would think DCA almost certainly has one. The radar repeater is not used to give vectors to aircraft, but as an aid to the controller\x92s situational awareness.

Whilst the rules differ between different countries, I am sure the following will be evaluated during the investigation:

- Any policy that permits visual separation from traffic at NIGHT should be reviewed.

- Any policy that permits routes - especially with such minimal planned separation - that cross final approach tracks should be reviewed.

- Any policy that permits 'band-boxing' of UHF and VHF radio communication frequencies should be reviewed, especially as it does not enable the crew of the UHF and VHF aircraft to hear the transmissions of the other crew. This reduces flight crew situational awareness (SA).

Some other items not directly related to this incident, but that could lead to collisions are:

- Land and Hold Short (LAHSO) operations should be reviewed.

- Clearing aircraft to land with traffic ahead but yet to land, should be reviewed. (e.g. "XXXX123 number 4 cleared to land")

- Having Ramp areas uncontrolled by ATC.

- Encouraging crew to 'report visual' (and thus becoming completely responsible for their own separation from that moment) should be reviewed.

787 Capt / SE / TRI / TRE

indeed relevant to this accident (except for the V / UHF aspect), but at least you understand half of what is said on the other frequency. What about all these countries where you don't understand a word from what is being said to half or more of the other traffic....

One major fact: the wreckage is located in the middle of the river, west of route 4. SA question is, what lateral separation image had the helicopter crew in mind trying to stay behind the jet, possibly focussing on the second jet on approach to 01.

Disagree, as relying on only visual separation from the helicopter had everything to do with this. As for the rest, I think we mostly agree.

I think I indicated either having 500 ft vertical OR 1.5 nm horizontal, not both (which would indeed be excessive). Visual acknowledgment is only required within that hockey puck like area and I doubt whether it is acceptable to allow that option at night.

I do think the landing aircraft should be made aware of other traffic if it gets within the safe area, either by having that traffic on the same frequency, or by actively informing them. Situational awareness is everything and in any case this prepares them for a probable 'traffic' warning.

The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees

Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.

Yes, but their ATC transponder was obviously operating normally in C mode. That should be enough to show PAT25 on CRJ screen as traffic, even if no RA was given (bearing in mind, they were cca 300ft AGL) It is of course completelly unreasonable to expect that CRJ crew should see or even avoid the Blackhawk incoming from (slightly) right, as they were merely 20-ish seconds from touchdown and manually aligning with the runway. Also, I believe that operating ATC transponder on Blackhawk allowed for clear view on ATC screen and I wonder if there was no alarm triggered on ATC computers - they probably do have such guard software in operation on DCA?
In another midair collision report, that happened in July 2022 at NorthLas Vegas airport, NTSB put out this:
Interviews with personnel at the air traffic control tower indicated that staffing was deficient, and most staff were required to work mandatory overtime shifts, reaching an annual average of 400 to 500 hours of overtime per controller. According to the air traffic manager (ATM), the inadequate staffing had resulted in reduced training discissions, and the management team was unable to appropriately monitor employee performance. The ATM stated that everyone on the team was exhausted, and that work/life balance was non-existent. It is likely that the cumulative effects of continued deficient staffing, excessive overtime, reduced training, and inadequate recovery time between shifts took a considerable toll on the control tower workforce.
I wonder, how this situation is with DCA ATC service.
I am not trying to blame ATC either. He issued clearance to PAT25 to cross behind and asked (and got) confirmation for CRJ in sight twice. It seems quite clear that helicopter crew did not look at the same airplane that ATC was asking about.
What baffles me here is, that it was obvious a routine procedure to let helicopters cross active runway heading less than 2 miles from runway treshold, leaving practically zero margin for error. Backups, designed to catch pilots or ATC errors (TCAS and ATC alarms) cannot catch up in short time left if someone makes a mistake, so this arrangement as based on "see and avoid" concept, in the night, with many lights in the background and a fact, that other aircraft on collision course does not move relatively on the screen, but just grows bigger. Unfortunatelly, that dot on the screen that will kill you starts growing bigger only in the last few seconds.
If I would ask ATC to cross runway heading DAY VFR so close to runway treshold at my airport with incoming commercial traffic, I would be denied 100 times out of 100 attempts. (and probably called nuts).
My guess on this tragedy is, that thru the years, the system was trying to pack more and more aircraft in the same space and same infrastructure, by gradually squeezing margins and safegueards, until one day, Jenga tower collapsed.

As someone mentioned above, ADS-B isn't used by/for TCAS. TCAS doesn't work below 500' for various reasons.

The recertification flight might specifically need to be at night. It might even specifically require NVG. I also wonder if both pilots would be on NVG or just one of the two.

Absolutely agree.

A second controller -might- have had more time to observe the conflict. They -might- have twigged and second guessed the helo's separation. But they very well might not have. The spacing might have been close enough to the every day occurances that the controller might not have been able to tell.

Having the helicopters on a separate frequency from the fixed wing would certainly not have helped anyone's situational awareness.

Yes ,you are right regarding the federal rules book , I would however like to see what the local procedures addendum says````` ,and what were the standard operating best practices being used to train people in DC TWR , Because assuming the Heli position was opened in the TWR , from the R/T exchange, it looks like asking for visual separation was kind of standard , and would in that case the info be passed to the TWR controller who will then advise the aircrfat on final APP , as both were then on different frequencies ? sounds improbable to me . But speculating of course. .
​​​​​​​Absolutely .

The Black Hawk crew had lost totally their situational awareness. If you are instructed to pass behind a traffic which is landing on rwy 33 how can you be on final rwy 33 before the traffic has passed you? Perhaps they noticed that they were approaching the final of rwy 33 and started a right hand climbing turn, but too late.
CRJ was possible behind the windsield frames in the first sight but anyway it was not conflicting traffic while it was on the base for rwy 33. Final turn at below 500ft doesn’t make it any easier for the helicopter to realize/react to the changing situation.

One thing came to my mind: was the PAT 25 avoiding the traffic by flying ahead of the CRJ instead behind it in first place? ”Pass behind” was told only 18 seconds before the impact.

NTSB didn\x92t mention much in the way of cross cockpit intercom chatter. Must be a lot more that could have been said about the SA on both aircraft, eg altimeter checks, visual lookout, intentions, perceptions, checklists\x85etc.

Sure.

At 8:46:01 ATC called the helicopter with information about the CRJ, 1200’ over Wilson Bridge, circling to runway 33. The information about ‘…circling to…’ was not on the CVR of the helicopter. Inference is that part was missed (but not explicit). No requirement to read back traffic info, just acknowledge it.

At 8:47:42 the helicopter pilot stepped on the latter part of ATC’s transmission to the Blackhawk which was an instruction to ‘…pass behind the…’ The helicopter crew could not possibly have heard that instruction because they stepped on it themselves. Read back is required to an en-route clearance. Afterwards there was an intercom discussion between the helicopter pilots about whether they were to move further east.

Seems that two consecutive radio calls to the helicopter got corrupted which led to a breakdown in SA onboard the helicopter. Probably they had no idea that they needed to look left over the city lights to see the CRJ and were convinced their traffic was in the line up of jets on 01 extended centreline and therefore no factor.

VHOED191006 , and others interested.

Dumbo Question 3

As you are no doubt aware TWR Visual Separation is a very powerful tool / method in the eyes of the controller or in the eyes of a delegated pilot. (Literally and metaphorically speaking, i.e pun intended.)

It is the very basis of ATC Aerodrome Control. Sophisticated use requires experience and excellent situational awareness.

I just wonder how many (if any) of the “reported” near collisions in the NTSB Preliminary report going back 4 and 14 years respectfully included perfectly safe visual separation?

The small elephant in the room.

ATCDumbo
I'm all ears, excellent point. This focus on ADSB-OUT, and ADSB-IN is really a furphy in terms of this investigation to determine the facts, the whole facts and nothing but the facts.

If 5342 had ADSB-IN then PAT25 not having or not displaying ADSB-OUT could be relevant depending on 5342's cockpit display, the training of the pilots and their scanning.
5342 didn't have ADSB-IN so move along, move along, nothing to see, these aren't the droids you're looking for.

**Caveat. If the TWR display were using ADS-B for their updates and to generate Collision Alerts then the absence of PAT25 ADSB-OUT could be relevant.
But would the TWR ATC even know (or care) whether PAT-25 was ADSB-OUT capable. TWR ATC involves looking out the windows and judging the relative positions of aircraft.

Note: ATC display systems are not referenced in the NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report. This seems to be a glaring omission. So perhaps the NTSB are either very dumb or deceitful or both.

To further illustrate the focus on ADSB. Figure 1 Google Earth image with preliminary ADS-B data for flight 5342 and radar data for PAT25.
The ADS-B plots are 1 seconds intervals, the radar data are 4 second interval (as stated during US Congress Q&A).
So the focus is on the whizz bang ADS-B kit rather than what the ATC saw on their display.

There is reference to ATC radios, and 5342 was on frequency 119.1 MHZ and PAT25 was on frequency 134.35 MHZ. The ATC could've had them on the same frequency (changed PAT25 to 119.1 MHZ) but this would be abnormal. ATC Voice Switch systems like Frequentis, SITTI and Rohde & Schwarz typically have a frequency coupling, whereby controller broadcasts on multiple frequencies (2 or more) and voice communications on one frequency are heard on the other. In this case, ATC would broadcast on 119.1 MHZ and 134.55 MHZ and 5342 would hear instructions for aircraft on 134.55 MHZ, and PAT25 would hear instructions for aircraft on 119.1 MHZ.

Yes, visual separation is typically used close to an aerodrome where the ATC is applying visual separation to reduce the standard from 3NM to something less, 2NM, 1NM, or even less, depending on the circumstance which includes weather (included visibility), day / night, workload to monitor the separation, plus other considerations such as equipment.

I just wonder how many of the January Route 4 Helicopter plots crossing RWY 33 Approach (post 1346) were the result of ATC issuing a control instruction to change the track to closer to the shoreline or further over water.

Use of Route 4 during RWY 33 Approaches or RWY 15 Departures is possible providing a clearance limit is imposed prior to assigning relevant traffic, positive control instruction(s) and in the case of 5342, advising them of the relative position of PAT25 and that PAT25 would be maintaining separation from them.

Example for Route 4 southbound would be a clearance limit of Hains Point. Helicopter would be released past this point when there is no conflict (nil traffic) or assigned separation to avoid (pass behind). If there is a in-line stream of arriving traffic then Route 4 may not be available.

Sydney KSA has something similar for one of their helicopter routes - BONDI 5 (yep, named after the beach), delays may occur when RWY 07 is in use for DEP, or RWY 25 is in use for ARR. Further, the route is not available when RWY 16 PRM approaches are being conducted. Sydney KSA helicopter routes are in text form - TRACK TO..., TRACK VIA..., EAST OF..., and the INBOUND routes to Sydney KSA have a clearance limit in the clearance. A map display is very useful however it should be based on route descriptions. Perhaps the committee of 17 knows the history of the helicopter routes in and around DCA.