Posts about: "Traffic in Sight" [Posts: 72 Page: 3 of 4]¶

Not from a retired DC controller but from a current one , quote taken from another ATC forum :
The bold additions are mine . Just that we are absolutely clear , those are opinions , not facts .

The entire thread is devoted to that!
The airplane was not in IMC, it was a clear night. They were on a visual approach to 33 and got hit by a helicopter. The helicopter said they had the traffic in sight and obviously didn't. That is the short version.

Lawyers will sue everyone remotely involved. It is throwing pasta against the wall to see what sticks.
In real life the pilots were on short final and paying attention to airspeed and glideslope lights. Traffic that said they had them in sight and would fly behind them would not be a priority. Even if there was no tower at all, they owned that last 500 feet, random crossing traffic would not have right of way.

This is a photo of Washington, DC, at night on the approach to National. Lots of lights. You might mistake automobile headlights for the plane you say you have in sight, or, as mentioned before, they might have fixated on the plane behind the plane they were supposed to see and avoid.

https://media.istockphoto.com/id/125...gcSoTmRDpMdzk=

Unfortunately the RJ crew would not have known that the other traffic had them in sight and were looking to avoid because, if I recall correctly, they were on a different frequency to the helicopter. If I get a traffic alert in my personal aircraft (I don't get RAs, just traffic warnings), I'm taking action to increase the altitude difference between me and the conflicting traffic. As others have said: Hoping the other aircraft has me in sight to avoid is not a foolproof plan of action.....

That\x92s perhaps a VFR response and appropriate here, but you cannot deviate from a clearance on just TA. TCAS training since its adoption has been to not maneuver for a TA, only for an RA.

The IP radioed "traffic in sight" which clearly showed that they had the wrong plane, if any in sight and lost both situational awareness. If have no idea why the helicopter had not its ADSB turned on. Training for real sneaking at night through DCA is idiotic as we know now with 20/20 hindsight. Visual separation with several planes in the area is challenging in daylight, let alone at night. You easy miss one.

How would the helicopter pilot know they had the CORRECT traffic in sight? It almost seems like the were looking at another aircraft. Can visual separation be successfully applied in such a busy night sky?

That is ultimately the call of the crew. ATC only gives the option, it's the PICs responsibility to assess whether it is feasible and safe. I don't personally know any ATCo who would be comfortable offering that in this particular scenario, but that's coming from the European perspective where we have nothing even close to the proximity of military/civilian mixed traffic. I only did a little approach familiarization and no tower work, but just talking to colleagues who did, I don't think I'd be comfortable to offer visual separation in that environment. But then again threat normalization is a pretty effective thing.

I appreciate the invitation to comment. With first acknowledging there are several technical factors involved here as to which I have limited understanding (and also that I've commented several times on legal issues likely to be presented by the accident regardless), the legal picture probably is best understood if it is described in two contexts. The fact that the most clearly responsible entities - the Army and the FAA - are both parts of the federal government means that sovereign immunity must be taken into account. (Sikorski, mentioned as a potential defendant by one of the attorneys involved in the case already, has no significant legal risk here, in my view. The reason is its protection by a judicial doctrine known as the "military contractor defense." The specifications given to Sikorski for its design and manufacture were reasonably precise and it met them. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp. (1989), if more depth and detail is desired.)

As for the airline, to fault the pilots when they were on short finals and expected to concentrate on flying - as others have expressed here numerous times - seems very ill-founded. Whether the airline company could be alleged to have responsibility for not having spoken up more effectively to cause the airspace design and procedure to be redone also strikes me as far too oblivious to the actual operation of the NAS, and the FAA and Congressional processes, to have any validity as an approach to liability. The airline and even Sikorski could still be named as defendants but, to reiterate, this would be just for leverage and not because there is any real pathway to liability for either one.

That having been set as background, the first context ignores the existence of sovereign immunity issues and looks just at what happened and who was responsible. As a rubric for this, "normalization of deviance" seems very accurate. This includes the fact that over time, ignoring Conflict Alerts came to be routine. It includes the practice of confirming "traffic in sight" or related proper terminology, for visual separation even though no traffic had been sighted yet - because it had become routine that the traffic would come into view and be properly identified as the traffic ATC had called out. The testimony about "just make it work", as I heard it, similarly was very concerning; iirc an overall very credible FAA witness acknowledged that the "just make it work" attitude also resulted in decreased safety margins. As did the medical helicopter operator who also had Army helicopter service background. Add in the lack of advanced training, and though I have not practiced law as legal counsel for accident victims' families, the liability theories here appear strong.

Then factor in the use of 3-3 to allievate congestion from high departure rates, rather than slowing or reducing departure slots. Part of the pressure to use 3-3 (as I understood the testimony) was that the Potomac Tracon wanted to increase in-trail separation but DCA instead increased use of 3-3. This was consistent with the attitude, "just make it work".

As to ADS-B on the helicopters, my understanding is that given the roles and missions of the helicopter operations, ADS-B is not equippage the military and its civilian control (in the sense of oversight) could have approved consistent with those roles and missions generally, and especially the continuing-of-government function.

Putting all the causal factors together into a "theory of the case" is perhaps better left to advocates for the accident victims' families (just as defense theories better left to defense counsel in this matter). But since you've impliedly asked, I would not - in this first context - parse out three of the four factors you noted, the lack of ADS-B being the one left out. That leaves the helicopter operating approximately 70 feet too high, the airspace design and procedures including the helicopter routes, and the inaction following the several safety alerts in databases and other reporting functions prior to the occurence of the accident. And including the forced enlistment of DCA for handling more traffic than the widely accepted airspace utilization and safe operation rules and procedures would allow - but they "just made it work." In other words, all of these three factors combine into the most likely theory of liability.

There is a second context, however. Federal government defendants are protected, despite the broad removal (waiver) of sovereign immunity by federal statute, from liability if the alleged negligence resulted from the exercise of discretion. If the actions or omissions being challenged resulted from decisions in which the federal entity weighed economic, social, political and other factors against each other in a form of "policy" decision-making, sovereign immunity remains in place. You can see where this is leading, of course. At what point does the over-use of DCA move out of the protection of "discretionary functions and decision-making" and into the realm of ... just plain negiligence which needs to be addressed in a court action. And likewise, at what point does the Army's set of decisions about how the routes are flown, and how visual separation and traffic sightings are handled, move out of the protection given by discretionary decisions and into the realm of significant negligence not deserving of such protection? Same question for FAA - surely the presence of safety concerns in databases and reporting systems - as unorganized as they may be and as lacking in systematic review as they may be - are matters within the FAA's discretionary functions and decision-making . . . until they're not. (And not equipping PAT helicopters or other D.C.-based Very Important air transport operations by helicopter with ADS-B would have no chance of being ruled not resulting from a discretionary function and decision - it's not even arguable imo.)

I almost included with this (already lengthy) post the "syllabus" of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in the United States v. Varig Airlines case, which I think is the most pertinent aviation case in which the discretionary function rule is fundamentally involved....but this isn't a legal forum. Still, the U.S. S. Ct. opinion (467 U.S. 797 1984) gives me uncertainty about how any court of competent jurisdiction will draw the line between what would in a case against a not-federal defendant definitely appear to be negligence, and the actions and omissions of the federal defendants here. (My personal view is that the federal defendants acted with such severe negligence that the discretionary function protection has been lost - but that is a gut reaction to the "this accident never should have happened" idea and not legal analysis.)

Finally and last for a reason, I am not commenting about the motives of legal counsel who are representing or advising clients involved in this matter. I have not practiced law a single day, or a single billable hour, or otherwise, on behalf of the families or representatives of aviation accident victims, or the defendants in such matters. As a result, in participation as a guest on this forum I think it's much wiser to let the members of the bar who do have clients and who do practice in this area let their conduct in their professional capacities speak for itself.

It's simple; the altitude restriction was never intended to be the sole method of separation. At most, it was an additional layer of protection. The controller wouldn't have cleared the Blackhawk to continue if they hadn't said they had the traffic in sight. But they did say that, whether it was true or not. ATC is a service provided to pilots, not an authority. Pilot-applied visual separation essentially overrides any procedure used by ATC. When you say "Traffic in sight," you are saying "I don't need your help maintaining separation, I have it under control and I take full responsibility."

The IFR aircraft wouldn't be required to have the traffic in sight.

And yet as we saw, this approach failed. So something has to be wrong with it.

Yet was not the controller required to inform the CRJ of the helicopter, which (as the inquiry noted) he failed to do? Thus a possible cross-check was lost.

Are you sure about that? My understanding of Class B airspace is that all aircraft proceed only on the basis of an ATC clearance. So to re-parse your statement\x85When a pilot says \x93Traffic in sight\x94 it just means he can see it, nothing more. It\x92s when he then says, \x93Request visual separation\x94 that he\x92s suggesting to the Local Controller he doesn\x92t need help with separation. And then it\x92s only when the Local Controller says, \x93Visual separation approved\x94 that the pilot takes on the responsibility for separation.

No, they're exactly the same. If you say "traffic in sight" then the controller will immediately say "Maintain visual separation."

"Request visual separation" is non-standard.


https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...section_2.html

As I posted on here before I had that exact same scenario happen to me on runway 33 in DCA. Traffic closing on a collision course on TCAS. Tower reported the traffic had us in sight. When the traffic closed to \xbd mile with no vector change apparent We went around from 400 feet. We never saw the traffic. Tower chewed my butt saying the traffic had us in sight. I didn\x92t care.

Absolutely, it was a non-standard discourse. But however you look at what was said, PAT 25 requested the change to visual separation. Meaning PAT25 correctly believed he was under standard 1.5nm/500ft separation at the time and that he needed LC approval for Visual separation to be applied. The change in the separation standard being applied did not happen until the LC accepted PAT 25\x92s traffic visual report and authorised the change. It\x92s not an automatic change made just on the pilot\x92s say so, ie by reporting visual, which I think is what you may be implying (happy if you correct me). Both pilot and LC are necessary (and both made errors here).

Actually, it's not the exact same scenario.

In the case you quote, Tower reported the traffic had you in sight. In the case in question, AA5342 was not provided traffic by the DCA LC.
In the case you quote, did Tower say that the traffic was going to maintain own separation? Did Tower provide a bearing/direction and distance to this traffic? Did Tower provide the height of the traffic?

For a while I was flying schedules which were often conducted SVFR as they were very short legs . I'd often get from Twr on joining the circuit at my various destinations, and having confirmed I'd got traffic XYZ in sight, a clearance "Roger, C/S, keeping that traffic in sight, report Final XX. You are No 2 to the XYZ.". From that point on, my positioning was determined by me based on visual separation with the other traffic - so not totally identical to the DCA accident but the principle was the same - I was responsible for remaining clear of XYZ and positioning appropriately behind them (including accounting for wake/runway occupancy effects etc). Occasionally I'd then get "C/S, new clearance - report ready for L/R base." usually with a reason if there was time - often it was App not leaving TWR a big enough gap to sneak me in between 2 IFR arrivals.

In other words, Twr would delegate separation to me with the initial clearance but, if for whatever reason, they became unhappy - I got issued with a revised, more restrictive, clearance. Similarly, if I lost sight of the traffic at any point after the initial "Report Final" clearance, it was my responsibility to advise ATC that I was no longer visual with XYZ (ie I could no longer comply with the clearance ATC had given me) and ATC would then update my clearance on that basis - "..... report ready for base" or similar until they could visually assure themselves of separation. Indeed, on those occasions, it was not unknown for ATC to say "C/S, I have you both in sight - that traffic is well ahead of you, report Final XX, No 2". I was thus relieved of my responsibility to self-position.

What ATC giveth away in their airspace ATC can taketh back again in their airspace!

Now, "normalised deviation" may skew such a way of working such as PAT routinely expecting to get what they ask for and ATC routinely giving them what they want......... Not saying that happened at DCA but............ Also, I've lost track in the Thread if PAT were visual but with another a/c or the intended one but simply "lost it" at some point........... And whether visual separation at night in such busy airspace was wise ............

Likely the traffic did have us in sight as we were a 727 and there was still some light. Likely was however not going to give me the warm and fuzzy feeling I wanted.

The procedure calls for the heli pilot to report "traffic in sight", which they did. The unsafe part is that likely they hadn't actually seen the traffic.
Visual separation at night is less of a problem if you follow the procedure as intended and don't report "traffic in sight" until you have correctly identified which traffic you're supposed to see.
We don't know if the heli crew thought they had seen that traffic (but picked the wrong one) or not, though the CVR conveys the impression they didn't, because they didn't talk about it (like they did about other traffic earlier in the flight).

It's also difficult to judge distance if all you see is a light, in your night vision goggles.
And it's especially difficult if you fail to predict the other aircraft's maneouver. The CRJ rolled out on final only 7 seconds before the collision. Until then, from a purely visual standpoint, everything would've looked fine. It required the heli crew to be aware of where the runway 33 extended centerline was (and where they were) to avoid being where the CRJ was going.