Page Links: First Previous 1 2 3 4 Next Last Index Page
| ATC Watcher
February 12, 2025, 16:42:00 GMT permalink Post: 11826805 |
Hi, ATC Watcher,
I am sorry you see a witch hunt in my post. It was supposed to be an idea for a future improvement, rather than a criticism of the very hard worked man who was on the job. On the flying end, there is quite a rigid procedure to follow if a TCAS RA goes off. From posts since I see, that there seems to be one for for STCA triggers too. It seems to me that the gravity of the situation is brought faster to a pilot's attention if the Conflict warning is announced on the RT. That is just one factor in this sad affair of course. Both TCAS and STCA are last ditch saviours but only if full attention can be paid to them. Now on the Conflict alert on the BRITE display . I have no first hand info on the SOPs in DCA on how a TWR controller uses the BRITE and if STCA are even displayed . `, but if they are, seen the charts and the routes , I guess STCA alerts are very common .especially when you delegate separation and you then play with a couple of hundred feet, vertical separation Too many unnecessary alerts equals normalization of deviance, . Look at the Haneda preliminary report , same .. Finally since you mention TCAS RAs , there is a major difference with STCA , it is not the same as a TCAS RA . With an RA , as a pilot you have to react and follow , it is mandatory , for a controller a STCA is just an alert , just like a TCAS TA , if in your judgement it will pass you will not do anything , and if you have already issued a correcting instruction ( heading, level , etc,,) or here delegate visual separation , the STCA just becomes a nuisance. . I sincerely hope the DC Controller will not be made the scapegoat of this accident . Not so sure it will not. Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Preliminary Report
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 15, 2025, 09:19:00 GMT permalink Post: 11828441 |
The helicopter should never have been allowed to be that close to landing traffic,
In any case the procedure us currently withdrawn until end of March and I sincerely doubt they will re-install it before the final report is out. .. A couple of new info points the NTSB clarified : Both aircraft were on VHF , so we can drop this UHF discussion , the Blackhawk had ADS-B equipped but was not transmitting , it was check ride with NVG, and they most probably all had them on .and there was a last second evasive action attempt by the CRJ crew, which go a TA previously . On the TWR, the CAs are displayed in the BRITE even with audio on .. For the rest we have to wait until the next NTSB briefing Subjects
ADSB (All)
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
Final Report
NTSB
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 15, 2025, 16:36:00 GMT permalink Post: 11828709 |
Subjects
ADSB (All)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 16, 2025, 21:46:00 GMT permalink Post: 11829474 |
Width of routes on the map is irrelevant as in VFR you fly from point to point. or it is following a landmark, a river, road, or here a river bank. It is a track and it has no width .
Subjects
VFR
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 16, 2025, 22:11:00 GMT permalink Post: 11829492 |
No, it does not matter much as he was performing a visual separation ,and remember, he was instructed to pass behind so it may deviate from track. ( although they might have missed this instruction according the CVR )
Subjects
PAT25
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 17, 2025, 08:38:00 GMT permalink Post: 11829705 |
safety is our number one priority'
As many and I said before, discussion about Altimeters or width of VFR routes are just distractions to deflect from the real cause , which for me can be resumed into the lack of a safety assessment and safety case of existing procedures. We all had to do this when SMS was widely introduced in the late 90s It was not that easy , but we discovered a few holes that were closed. Here in DCA we see a couple of procedures that would not have passed a safety case : e.g Route 4, Circling to RWY 33 with that route active, visual separation at night , use of NVG on that route ..etc,, Flying in itself always bares a risk,, our job is to minimize the risk , not to eliminate it , but here the Regulatory ( i.e FAA) failed to minimize the risks. As in the US the FAA is both the service provider and the Regulator , and is in addition dependent of political will and pressure for its funding , the willingness to implement unpopular measures, may be limited. A Judge might look into this differently but for those part of the discussion I hand over the floor to .Willow run 6-3 . Subjects
DCA
FAA
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 17, 2025, 21:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11830196 |
@ Fullwings
:
No rotary pilot I know would knowingly pass that close under/behind a jet transport as the wake could literally be the end of you at 200’AGL.
@ Lascaille :
I very strongly doubt that the US govt would do a 'technically we're immune so tough luck' here. The optics would be dire.
Here if you want to learn or just refresh your memory ; https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-...%20government. As an aside , the NTSB conclusions of that collision are interesting compared to our DCA accident : ( exactly 40 years ago !)
The NTSB determined
"that the probable cause of the accident was the limitations of the air traffic control system to provide collision protection, through both air traffic control procedures and automated redundancy."In addition to the inadvertent and unauthorized entry of the PA-28 into the LA Terminal Control Area, another factor at play was the limitations of the "see and avoid" concept to ensure traffic separation.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Probable Cause
Route 4
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 22, 2025, 09:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11833528 |
I can think of one: you apply IFR separation standards (the minimum in the US is 1.5nm/500’?), at least for night operations. If two routes come closer to each other than that in either dimension, e.g. DCA RW33 approach and helicopter route 1, then traffic must be actively kept apart.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
ICAO
IFR
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 22, 2025, 17:10:00 GMT permalink Post: 11833773 |
I am not sure the subsequent line of discussion over how Class B requires ATC (not pilots) to separate all traffic is a very productive one. Any separation instruction given by ATC relies upon the pilot executing it, for instance by maintaining the cleared altitude. Here, it relied on the pilot not colliding with the specific traffic he had confirmed visual contact with. So far as the FAA is concerned, that's a sufficient degree of control and differs from the "see and avoid" principle applicable to VFR/VFR in Class C, and VFR/Any in Class D. Again, the question is whether that's appropriate. . Listening to the NTSB , the only ATC instruction given : to " pass behind " was not received , and therefore not acknowledged by the crew , so we are here 100% in the good old "see and avoid" scenario I would say Subjects
ATC
FAA
ICAO
NTSB
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 26, 2025, 13:21:00 GMT permalink Post: 11836384 |
The second point of interest for me is the discussion on the previous incident with the RA the day before ( min 34 ) where the Helo crew only learned of this when it was raised on the media a few days after the accident ,as the Heli crew was on a different frequency and did not heard the RA and the go around as a consequences., raising the issue that there might have been far more such incidents as they were all not reported to the helicopters operators. Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 28, 2025, 08:38:00 GMT permalink Post: 11837582 |
No you can't , not in ICAO land anyway . Definition of " visual" for us is via eyeballs not an electronic display .,We always correct (mostly US)pilots which when passing traffic info reply to us " we have it on TCAS" . This is not a positive visual acquisition .
Subjects
ICAO
TCAS (All)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
February 28, 2025, 17:37:00 GMT permalink Post: 11837926 |
Yes that as the old way , the JAL/JAL encounter and Ueberlingen changed that to : forget visual acquisition just follow the RA, The traffic you see might not be the one giving the RA and even if you do the maneuver you might take will increase the risk , as in the 2 cases I mentioned.
Subjects
TCAS (All)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 01, 2025, 09:09:00 GMT permalink Post: 11838389 |
There are however also issues with visual acquisitions on TAs , all very well described here , if you want to go further : https://skybrary.aero/sites/default/...shelf/2051.pdf Subjects
TCAS RA
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 14, 2025, 08:49:00 GMT permalink Post: 11847257 |
Remarks from a (past) European perspective , but I guess the same applies in the US.
Collecting data on incidents is the easiest part, Then you have to have a team looking at them , determine eventual patterns and make recommendations . Different sort of knowledge required, much more complex and will take time . . It then goes to the next level, : publishing those recommendations . That can be tricky and can also take time and can be amended by people above you pay grade. but it remains in the Investigation organization domain . The last level is implementation of the published recommendations , this goes outside the Incident investigation organization , and can be ignored ( which happens in the vast majority of cases) , or takes years to materialize. Yes incident investigation is a very frustrating business. Subjects: None 3 recorded likes for this post.Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 22, 2025, 22:11:00 GMT permalink Post: 11852334 |
Probably five dozen lawyers have added, or will add, to their work-in-progress plans for their fact investigation and discovery activities locating, interviewing, and taking the depositions of retired ATCOs - with pertinent knowledge and appropriate credibility and experience, of course.
There were many things done wrong here that all had to happen for this to take place.
This started long before that night.
1. The actively used heli routes near landing traffic with merely hundreds of feet or less of "separation ". 2. The CA system being unreliable , it goes off all the time.. very high % of CA alarms in towers are useless. They do not have the effect outsiders or higher management think they do. We get so used to them going off that they don't carry the weight some wish they did. I have seen close calls where the CA goes off after the planes are a mile already past each other. 3. Visual separation with helicopters that normally use airspace, how often do they actually have traffic in sight and can maintain it? Are they just saying they do to get their job done? Should visual separation be allowed under NVGs ? 4. Many TCAS-RA problems under similar conditions, but nothing solid done about it? Where was management before? LSC? I honestly wonder if some controllers hated that operation but felt pressured into doing it to keep rate high and let the helis do their mission at the same time ? Subjects
ATC
Close Calls
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 23, 2025, 11:49:00 GMT permalink Post: 11852630 |
As I said a few time before, the route is a track , it has no width , just the standard navigation tolerance, and frankly 50, 75 or 100 FT , it does not matter , it is all far outside normal separation safety margins . And during a visual Approach you are not expected to be exactly on the foot precisely on the PAPI either. A visual is not a precision approach .
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 26, 2025, 20:02:00 GMT permalink Post: 11854726 |
A possible scenario is that one or both of the helo pilots did visually acquire the CRJ on the initial traffic call, briefly broke visual contact, and then subsequently acquired visual on the wrong traffic, maintaining that incorrect traffic contact until the collision. My recollection when I ran some geometry from the initial CRJ traffic call is that CRJ and AAL (or other traffic in the stack) would have differed in azimuth by about 3 degrees.
Subjects
CRJ
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 26, 2025, 21:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11854783 |
Not sure what right turn you\x92re referring to. Figures 2 and 3 of the NSTB preliminary report show PAT25 tracking parallel to the eastern shore of the Potomac River at the time of the collision. Because this shoreline tracks a line about 200/020 true, PAT25 had to turn to the right after passing Hains Point track Route 4 and that\x92s what the track shows.
Subjects
PAT25
Preliminary Report
Radar
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 27, 2025, 06:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 11854966 |
I see the radar recording differently but the NTSB will settle that for us , that last second 1,6 deg left input might just be e a manual correction to correct that previous right tracking , we'll see . Anyway , even if they were flying t straight , the absence of a left turn is for me the riddle , as if they had visual with either aircraft the only way to laterally avoid was a left maneuver..
Subjects
NTSB
Preliminary Report
Radar
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| ATC Watcher
March 30, 2025, 17:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11857453 |
I feel like this ADS-B discussion at political level is just a diversion , either they have been badly briefed by their staff , or they have and are deliberately chosen to raise this in public to shift the blame game somewhere else.
Because , even if the helo had ADSB out and the CRJ an "in " receiver and a CDTI display , what would have happened then ? . The crew would have spotted the Helo, maybe asked ATC what was that , and the reply of the controller would have been something like : " it is a military helicopter on route 4 , has you in sight , passing behind ." and then would you , flying the CRJ , take evasive action or go around after hearing that ? No . . The primary cause of this collision is airspace design and normalization of deviance over the years. I hope the judges will see that when the trial comes. We should leave the military crew and their grieving families out of this. Subjects
ADSB (All)
ADSB Out
ATC
CRJ
Route 4
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |