Posts by user "ATC Watcher" [Posts: 75 Total up-votes: 183 Page: 4 of 4]ΒΆ

ATC Watcher
October 20, 2025, 10:42:00 GMT
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Post: 11972979
Originally Posted by island_airphoto
in this particular case it would have helped the helicopter immensely and AA maybe.
Big speculation . Have you experience with an ADS-B-in CDTI display ? I have one in my glider . It is not a TCAS display , TCAS ( or FLARM in my case) display the altitude relative to you ( e,g + 13 ot - 5 ) while ADS-B gives the barometric altitude . (e.g 05 ) not that easy to differentiate and it takes a second or 2 make the mental calculations and ADS-B also does not give alerts , ( at least on the CDTIs I saw ) it is just displaying traffic , and in our case here all pilots in both aircrfat were looking outside at this point , not focusing on displays inside the cockpit ..My guess at least. So yes maybe it would have helped but am not so sure it would have made a difference in here .
, no one not in a mental institution would think helicopters should be dodging and ducking planes below 500 feet on short final.
Absolutely ! .and even more so at night

Last edited by ATC Watcher; 20th October 2025 at 11:59 . Reason: typos

Subjects ADSB (All)  ADSB In  TCAS (All)

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ATC Watcher
October 21, 2025, 18:59:00 GMT
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Post: 11973808
The 78 feet deviation by the Mil Heli is not the cause of this accident . I hope the lawyers during the trial do not focus on that and minimize the rest .

Bit of historical background : when designing this route decades ago they must have followed basic ICAO/ FAA principles . separation IFR-VFR is 500 feet . allowed deviation then was 100 ft either way , so even if one a/c is 100ft above and the other 100ft too low , there would still be 300 ft separation preventing a collision ,
When that was introduced decades ago I bet you a bottle of (real) Champagne that the procedure was use of that route 4 was restricted during RWY 33 arrivals and RWY 15 departures. It was one or the other but not both simultaneously .
How , when and why , over time , did it degraded to the point that this restriction could be disregarded would be interested to investigate and unveil . The why I think we know, i.e. enabling to move more and more traffic, but when and by who we don't. How and on who's pressure did the numerous previous incidents got disregarded is another question worth asking . Not why the Heli pilot was flying 78 ft too high .

Throwing the Heli pilot (and perhaps also the controller on duty) "under the bus" as you say in your country, would be so wrong as it would prevent getting to the truth and learn the real lessons of this accident .

Subjects ATC  FAA  ICAO  Route 4  Separation (ALL)

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ATC Watcher
October 22, 2025, 09:30:00 GMT
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Post: 11974130
Thanks WR-6-3 for the legal perspective , Extremely enlightening for a non-law savvy person like me .I like the " hot dog-warm puppy" analogy between a trial and the truth . Looking forward to the actual trial and your comments on it when the day will come .
@ IgnorantAndroid :
If the helicopter hadn't called "traffic in sight," they would've been instructed to hold until the CRJ was clear. In general, a VFR aircraft saying "traffic in sight" is effectively exempt from such procedures
I am aware of that as this is what the controllers hang on to since the beginning , since they were trained like that and thought they were just following the rules . . However we are a safety business ,. It is not because it is legal than it is safe

Which safety assessment was made and validated ( and by who) which allowed visual separation for an helicopter at 200ft to pass below the approach path of an aircrfat at 3 or 400 feet ?, resulting in a 100-200ft separation ?
That is the question I would be asking first.
How about which actions were taken after the previous incidents , and possibly acting on the normalization of deviance , would be the next .


Subjects CRJ  Normalization of Deviance  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  VFR  Visual Separation

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ATC Watcher
October 22, 2025, 14:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11974342
From the Ops group :
A US Senate Panel is considering a broad aviation safety package today, Oct 21, that addresses concerns raised by the collision over the Potomac River back in Jan 2025. This includes a potential mandate for all aircraft already required to have ADS-B Out to also be equipped with ADS-B In by 2031. It also aims to end most military ADS-B exemptions. If the process runs smoothly, this may become law in a matter of months.
The key words are " potential mandate " and " by 2031 , so as we say in French :this is more to "amuse the gallery "( i.e. please the onlookers , appearing to do something ) than to address a safety issue .

Subjects ADSB (All)  ADSB In  ADSB Out

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ATC Watcher
October 23, 2025, 10:56:00 GMT
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Post: 11974883
Originally Posted by ignorantAndroid
None. That would obviously be unsafe, so the helicopter would be expected to use lateral separation. (e.g. "Pass behind the CRJ.")
.
You mean no SA was made because this scenario was not even considered ? That makes things worse for the FAA if this local "visual " procedure was written down somewhere or even just tolerated , because as I understood, it was standard practice .I am not sure if you know how safety assessments are made , but you must consider every possible scenario when designing procedures.


From a European / EASA perspective :
Re the "Lateral separation" you mention : in that scenario so close to the Runway threshold it would mean only a left turn is possible, i.e. away from the thresholds of both runways , it would mean flying over build up areas , and doing so at 200ft above buildings with possible antennas on top , etc.. ,not really safe , and definitively not at night . As to \x93pass behind\x94 , the standard wake turbulence separation criteria would not be met , especially passing behind/below and I would not even try that at 200ft under a large jet..

So , applying standard safety assessment criteria , allowing visual separation to aircraft on that route, even less at night where danger of mis identification is increased . would definitively not be considered \x93 Safe\x94 .

During the interviews, one Heli pilot from that same group ,mentioned that asking for visual separation was a routine request , even if you did not see the traffic at time of the request . That fact alone, if really proven to be systematically the case , would also add to the normalization of deviance case and put full responsibility on the regulator, not the pilots


Subjects CRJ  FAA  Normalization of Deviance  Pass Behind  Pass Behind (All)  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  Visual Separation

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ATC Watcher
October 24, 2025, 09:49:00 GMT
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Post: 11975500
Originally Posted by ignorantAndroid
Visual Flight Rules aren't a local procedure.
I agree. The prudent thing to do would be to not call traffic in sight and let the controller give you a hold.
" )
Indeed but Visual Flight rules (VFR) and visual separations are two very different things . Visual separation can be ( and are) locally restricted , and even Airlines restricted ( think Lufthansa and the SFO incident) . My point is , with hindsight of course, that here, in this route in DCA it should have been restricted , even more so at night..

But first you'd have to know the plane is there.
That is why you have a controller and procedures in place If the procedure says no simultaneous use, no traffic needs to be passed and no request for visual made , unless you allow the normalization of deviance
I But I don't understand how the FAA would be responsible. Visual separation is initiated by the pilot, when they say "traffic in sight.
When you say FAA you mean the regulator right ? because here we have the service provider ( making the local procedures) and the Regulator certifying them being the same entity The "regulator " part should make a safety assessment of the procedures and approve them . In this case they were not safe , and, as I said earlier , especially after the numerous incidents a local restriction should have been in place : no visual separation allowed on those portions of the airspace , or no simultaneous use of that portion of the route when 15/33 is in use.

I strongly suspect this is what will come up anyway in the NTSB report .

Subjects ATC  DCA  FAA  NTSB  Normalization of Deviance  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  VFR  Visual Separation

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ATC Watcher
December 18, 2025, 08:59:00 GMT
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Post: 12007341
The filing said that an air-traffic controller didn’t comply with a federal order to tell aircraft on converging courses to separate. t
Oh Boy , that is not going to go down well in the ATC community , , throwing the individual controller under the bus , as was feared , and no mention of this "best practice" used and enforced well before this particular controller came to work in that facility and on which he was trained on , . Just throwing the FAA regulations "Federal order " book at him ?
If this will be In my country , there will be an immediate call for " work to rules " in that airport .," I know it is illegal in the US to call for that , but it starts to look like we are going back to 1981, building another perfect storm ..

Subjects ATC  FAA

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ATC Watcher
December 18, 2025, 16:29:00 GMT
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Post: 12007556
Originally Posted by Chu Chu
It looks like the Answer admits that the controllers failed to give a required notification, but not that this was a cause of the accident. I\x92m not sure there was any other realistic choice.
Yes , there was a choice : recognizing the procedures were flawed , the Helo i routes map was unsafe , the local training and local way of working were not following the "order" for decades and for the FAA to take the blame for all this , not singling out the operators of those local procedures. It is a systemic failure , not an individual controller error.
Then :
The government also said the American Airlines pilots should have been alerted to the location of the Black Hawk helicopter by a collision alert system and that the pilots \x93failed to maintain vigilance\x94 to avoid the aircraft.
At 300 ft on short final ??? same BS. I will not be surprised if they will also be carrying part of the blame in the end for accepting a non previously briefed visual APP as per their SOPs. How many hundred times this side step procedure was made to avoid delays will likely bear zero bearing in the end. .

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  FAA

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ATC Watcher
January 31, 2026, 11:31:00 GMT
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Post: 12030150
​​QUOTE=sunnySA;12030070]FWIW, I don't understand why NTSB didn't recommend re-transmit.

Current Voice Switching Systems allow multiple frequencies and provide re-transmit options, and as such provide instantaneous splitting of frequencies to separate control positions.

Shows the age of the hardware used in FAA . But using the current method is also a choice ,
The standard way to couple frequencies in ATC is what was avail in DC , you can transmit on both, listen to both simultaneously but not retransmitting on both . potentially reducing eventual blocked transmissions , or at least improves the detection of blocked transmissions .
in ATC , VHF anti blocking systems are being discussed since Tenerife ( 1977) , CONTRAN was the first one , tested but never really implanted , ,later some copies were made , introduced here and there but with a switch to disable, when traffic got too high ,. not sure what the situation is today but I doubt it changed much. ( waiting to be contradicted)
,
In the air , most new 8,33 VHFs have a "dual" function , where you can listen to 2 frequency simultaneously , but when the master is receiving , the slave is blocked out , some have a replay function but useless in flight , especially when flying manual VFR at 200 ft .. I doubt this would have made any difference in this case . Plus it would not solve UHF/VHF ground coupling issue.







Subjects ATC  FAA  NTSB  VFR

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ATC Watcher
February 06, 2026, 20:38:00 GMT
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Post: 12033480
Whow! Legislation to force the FAA and the US military to fully implement NTSB recommendations ? That will be a first since the grand Canyon collision in 1956 if it really materialize.

Subjects FAA  NTSB

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ATC Watcher
February 14, 2026, 09:44:00 GMT
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Post: 12037077
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
The Wall Street Journal has published an intensely relevant piece reporting on the advocacy efforts - and the grief, and the resilience - of Tim and Sheri Lilley, the parents of Sam Lilley, the F/O of Bluestreak 5342.
WillowRun 6-3
Thanks for posting this WR 6-3 , very moving text . One thing we aviation professionals do not always fully understand is how deep the emotions are by the grieving families after an accident . It runs strong for years , decades after the event , children and even grand chidden of victims are still maintaining alive the emotions 50, even 60 years after an accident . They never forget and nearly always cannot understand why we discuss this in theory, legal and technical terms that, in their views, is meant to be protecting or at best excusing the real culprits for the death of their loved ones.
I have unfortunately witnessed this almost all the time in the accidents I surveyed.

On the legal front , only in my home country, France , it always has been a disaster for the families , from the 1968 AF Caravelle shot down , the 1973 Iberia mid air collision in Nantes, the 1986 UTA DC10 bombing , the Concorde, or AF447 , every single time , it took well over 10 years to get a trial and every time the judgement was absolving , what the families saw as the real culprits, and the wounds are still open for them , decades later

Justice in the US is much faster , but I am not convinced the result will be better for the families. I hope for them I am wrong . Keep us posted WR 6-3.
.

Last edited by ATC Watcher; 14th February 2026 at 11:35 . Reason: typos

Subjects Grief  Wall Street Journal

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ATC Watcher
February 16, 2026, 19:39:00 GMT
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Post: 12038200
paulross , when you say :
Firstly, immediately after an accident the friends and relatives are desperate for information, first the What, then the Why. They will look anywhere and everywhere for this information. In this modern world this might well lead them here. When I post on this forum I am always conscious that some of the bereaved are most likely reading. If that is you then I hold you in the light.
This is a very important sentence . Explaining , yes but not passing judgement and not to who you think is to blame . I always try to refrain myself and some other posters here to pass judgement before all facts are known just because of this .

I was sadly involved in the aftermath of the Uebrlingen collision , and I am still to this day so upset at this ignorant Swiss journalist that printed the nationality, name of the controller on duty and the village where he lived at a time where only wild speculations were around as to what really happened, and that directly led to his murder by the father of one of the victims, in his home in front of his wife and 2 small children. Designating who to blame hours after an accident seem to be the norm on social media today , but at least , here on PPRuNe , let's try to be professionals and not doing that .
Thanks for posting your story Paulross.

Subjects ATC

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ATC Watcher
February 17, 2026, 08:38:00 GMT
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Post: 12038456
Originally Posted by SINGAPURCANAC
Interesting or not, "Uberlingen" has made over time the most significant changes in modern aviation ( safety, accountability and responsibility.).
Indeed they did, the deep structural changes Skyguide made afterwards were used and sometimes followed by many European ANSPs , but not all .

from WR-6-3 : Those presentations, as the old saying goes, "left a mark."
The judicial has it own ways . Sadly in Switzerland in the last years we saw younger eager State prosecutors going after Pilots and Controllers after incidents to get in the spotlight and threatening to end incident reporting , the basis of our Safety management systems .Ironically some of the lessons (and the presentations ) of Ueberlingen had been forgotten with time in the very country it happened, .

Subjects Accountability/Liability

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ATC Watcher
February 17, 2026, 11:23:00 GMT
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Post: 12038569
We are going now a bit off topic , but there are indeed similarities between DCA and Uberlingen on how the families and lawyers react , and most likely how the judges will react in the end to find who are responsible and award damages to the families.
Lawyers represent both sides so sometimes it is shocking for us professionals who know the truth , confirmed by the official accident report to hear their arguments . .

In Uberlingen there were 13 holes in the cheese layer , any one of them closed and there would likely not have been an accident .For the judges to select only a few of them and concentrate on the person responsible for that hole is not what we, professionals would do , but this is how their system works. ,
Some of the holes were plain bad luck , but many others were man made. The BFU investigated and (tried to) explain all the holes, , the judges only a couple.

The similarities with DCA : on the accident itself , , for the controllers : normalization of deviance , being trained to do things which are not in the book .The judge will look at the book and say the controller did not follow the procedures . . Lawyers from the other side will be exploiting this loophole .
On the pilots : both the Russians and the Bluestreak did things not in their book either , for instance on reactions to TCAS alerts , or on accepting a procedure not briefed.. Lawyers are likely to exploits that as well.

From blind pew : Accidents have far reaching consequences and surely we owe it to the victims and their families to be told the truth.
But the cover ups keep coming
We should not expect the truth coming from the legal system and even when the legal system brings out the truth in the end it does not necessary close the grief for the families . . Taking the Nantes Collison of 1973, , the final trial came 9 years after the event, and after major objections from the Government and the Military which tried to cover up the evidence. and had already delivered their version of the "facts: on the media and State television . .
Still today , 50 years later , the French Government and especially the Armeee de l'Air , still refuse the judgement conclusion ( saying that they are responsible for the collision ) , saying it was false , and still refuse to acknowledge the evidence . For the victim's families , mostly British and Spanish, the wound is still wide open as no-one was held responsible in the end , only "the State " in all its anonymity .


Subjects ATC  DCA  Grief  Normalization of Deviance  TCAS (All)

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ATC Watcher
February 18, 2026, 16:22:00 GMT
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Post: 12039242
The 100ft in the altimeter is within IFR tolerance , not really the point here , yes you should check against elevation airfield before start , but we learn there is a small discrepancy when on the ground and when the rotor blows over the static holes, and ATC will check again in flight the alt against mode C, it is mandatory on first contact with ATC , but mode C is calibrated on 1013 not QNH , anyway not the major cause here, just another hole on the cheese that night .

As to the lack of experience of the PF , I think 56 h of flying visual and manual an helicopter is significantly more important experience wise that the same number on say, a 747 .I also do not think this was factor.
The reasons and direct causes of this accident are within the 50 NTSB recommendations , not in the altimeter or experience of the PF , unless she had a couple of close calls herself doing visual separation at night before and did not learn from that.

Last edited by ATC Watcher; 18th February 2026 at 16:35 .

Subjects ATC  Altimeter (All)  Close Calls  IFR  NTSB  QNH  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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