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BFSGrad
January 30, 2025, 02:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11816789

CRJ700 lining up for runway 33 flew approach over Joint Base Anacostia. This is a typical flight path when flying runway 1 approach and breaking off for runway 33. Moderate NW winds this evening.

Subjects: None

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BFSGrad
January 30, 2025, 04:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11816846

Quote:

Originally Posted by pattern_is_full

Potomac water temperature reported as 42\xb0F/5\xb0C. Open to revision, of course.

A week ago, a truck ran off the Arlington Memorial Bridge, which is upriver from DCA. That rescue/recovery effort was complicated by river ice. Even if no visible ice at DCA, the Potomac is frigid.

Subjects DCA

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BFSGrad
January 30, 2025, 05:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11816892

Quote:

Originally Posted by Capi_Cafre'

A late change to 33 had the potential to put the jet low and in conflict with the helicopter corridor.

Don\x92t think it was a late change. Listening to LiveATC, local controller (LC) calls the CRJ at 1200 ft, inbound 33, over the Wilson Bridge as a traffic advisory to PAT25. Don\x92t hear reply but it sounds like LC then says \x93visual separation approved.

LC then approves AAL1630 for immediate takeoff runway 1 with advisory of CRJ on 2-mile left base for 33.

LC queries PAT25 \x93do you have the CRJ in sight\x94? No reply heard but LC then directs PAT25 to pass behind the CRJ.

PAT25 may have been watching next in sequence, AAL3130, landing runway 1, instead of CRJ.

Subjects ATC CRJ PAT25 Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Pass Behind (PAT25) Separation (ALL)

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BFSGrad
January 30, 2025, 15:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817345

Observations after listening to the KDCA 134.35 audio file:

After LC provides CRJ at Wilson Bridge/1200ft/runway 33 traffic advisory, PAT25 requests visual separation, which LC immediately approves. This is several minutes prior to the collision.

LC is working at least 2 other helos in addition to PAT25.

PAT25 is responding to LC on VHF 134.35. LC is simultaneously transmitting on 119.1 and 134.35 so both PAT25 and the CRJ were hearing all LC transmissions but each was not hearing the others replies.

Immediately prior to the collision when the LC queries if PAT25 has the CRJ in sight and to pass behind the CRJ, the immediate response is “[unclear] has the aircraft in sight, request visual separation” to which the LC immediately responds “approved.” The voice sounded the same as earlier PAT25 transmissions. If so, the non-urgent tone of the reply would indicate that PAT25 had no indication that a collision was imminent and was likely looking at the wrong aircraft.

Subjects CRJ Frequency 119.1 Frequency 134.35 KDCA PAT25 Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

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BFSGrad
January 30, 2025, 16:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817358

Quote:

Originally Posted by Luc Lion

In my understanding, the minimum safe separation in altitude is 500 feet.
As the approach to R33 crosses IDTEK (over the East bank of the river) at about 490 feet MSL, there is no way another aircraft can safely pass underneath at 200 feet MSL.
Thus, I think, the helicopter route RT 4 must be closed whenever an approach (visual or RNAV) to R33 is underway.

IDTEK is actually SE of the east Potomac shoreline. The 3 deg extended centerline from runway 33 aim point to the east Potomac shoreline (west land limit of Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling) gives an altitude of just under 300 ft. But I agree with your point about the incompatible nature of simultaneous route 4 and runway 33 ops.

Subjects Route 4 Separation (ALL)

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BFSGrad
February 11, 2025, 00:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825784

Quote:

Originally Posted by deltafox44

+1
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?

The situation was actually more visually complicated. Screenshot below is about 5 seconds prior to collision with red arrow pointing at 5342 turning into 33. There are 5 aircraft on final for 1 with a 6th joining the parade. AAL 3130 is over the Wilson Bridge and as I recall, UAL 472 next with a couple more JIAs in the stack. Adding to the background against which PAT25 is target hunting is National Harbor with some lesser contribution from the Naval Research Lab and Blue Plains.

Subjects PAT25

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BFSGrad
February 12, 2025, 22:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11827015

Quote:

Originally Posted by SINGAPURCANAC

I would like to ask if it is known number of aircraft at TWR Frequency( ies) at the moment of collision?
One ATCO, worked , at three separate frequency, three runways, 6 aircraft for arrival 01, one a/c 33, plus three helicopter, plus how many departures ( both active and approaching/crossing active runways) ?
Plus active estimate for a few aircraft more?
Ground vehicles, any?

Listening to the tower and helo local controller audio files, here\x92s what I come up with from shortly before up to the time of the accident:

Fixed wing
AAL1630, departed 1, waiting handoff to departure
JIA5305, holding short 1, #2
DAL832, holding short 1 #3
JIA5342, cleared to land 33
AAL3130, cleared to land 1
AAL472, cleared visual 1
JIA5347, cleared visual 1, requested 33

Rotary wing
PAT25
helo, Zone 4
helo, callsign Blackjack 1, freq change approved just prior
helo, callsign Muscle 12, handed off to ADW prior
helo, request Route 3, Zone 6
helo, Zone 7
Medevac AirCare helo, proceeding to Inova Fairfax

Some of the helo\x92s on above list may be duplicates due to poor audio quality.

At the time of the accident, runway 4/22 was not in use.

Subjects ATC ATCO PAT25

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BFSGrad
March 04, 2025, 16:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11840738

Quote:

Originally Posted by aa73

pretty sure I was the circled aircraft that night, AA1855 from CLT. We were just about to be cleared onto the MTV1 when it happened. Did not see it happen but pretty sure we heard JIA5342 being handed off to tower. We were then vectored off the approach and eventually diverted to IAD. Tragic night.

Oh so close…

The circled aircraft is RPA4432/E75L with JIA5347/CRJ9 in front and JIA5273/CRJ7 behind. JIA5302/CRJ7 is joining behind JIA5273.

AAL1855/B738 is just out of that screenshot to the SW over Nanjemoy Creek.

Subjects: None

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BFSGrad
March 08, 2025, 19:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11843597

Quote:

Originally Posted by hans brinker

They should be required to take an uber to IAD, and all the added flights out of DCA beyond the perimeter should be cancelled.

If you really want to punish them, forgo the Uber instead for an hour-long train ride on the Metro Silver Line.

Subjects DCA

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BFSGrad
March 11, 2025, 03:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11845055

Quote:

Originally Posted by LowObservable

Seems like Marine One is still the only helo allowed to fly around here, inside the Beltway at least. Route 5 (I-395 to the Pentagon) seems completely shut down.

It may seem that way but not the case. Any of the flight tracker programs show regular helicopter activity inside the Beltway with plenty of medical helo ops plus LEO ops (FFX, PG, DC, MSP, USCG). Even a few news helos. What does seem to have changed is PAT ops inside the Beltway, at least temporarily. Training flights have shifted outside the Beltway to a variety of locations, including Route 9. Two PAT flights today circumnavigated the Beltway.

Quote:

Originally Posted by LowObservable

Almost as if there was no safety case behind the PAT operation.

Not sure what you mean by this comment. CW3 Roth interview explained the training requirement for Route 1/4 ops. Question is whether these training flights can be conducted safely. I think they can as long as ATC doesn\x92t delegate their primary responsibility for Class B separation. It is politically untenable to resume Route 1/4 PAT training flights at present. I suspect 12th AB and DCA ATC are reviewing their previous policy that VFR visual separation is safe along these routes.

Subjects ATC DCA Route 5 Route 9 Separation (ALL) VFR Visual Separation

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BFSGrad
March 11, 2025, 20:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11845606

AIR-25-01 Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of KDCA

Quote:

Findings

Existing separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on runway 33 are insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a midair collision.

When Route 4 operations are prohibited as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-25-1, it is critical for public safety helicopter operations to have an alternate route for operating in and around Washington, DC, without increasing controller workload.

To the Federal Aviation Administration:

Prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. (A-25-1) (Urgent)

Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (A-25-2) (Urgent)

Subjects ATC Findings KDCA Route 4 Separation (ALL)

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BFSGrad
March 11, 2025, 20:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11845619

NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report - N709PS, PAT25

Subjects NTSB PAT25 Preliminary Report

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BFSGrad
March 12, 2025, 18:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11846383

Quote:

Originally Posted by LowObservable

But what about the arrowed line of the map to the west of the Pentagon, connecting Route 1 and Route 5? Isn't that the route the helipad, twice as far from the 15 piano keys? One would definitely hope that traffic is coordinated.

Seems to be a misconception that a published helicopter route must allow for simultaneous ops with fixed wing traffic; e.g., JPN ops and runway 15 landing traffic. While 99% of the published DC helicopter routes are very likely to ensure deconfliction with fixed wing traffic, there are those trouble spots, one of which has recently been in the news. In the case of JPN and runway 15, the obvious answer is that ATC doesn\x92t permit helicopters to land or depart JPN if traffic is landing on runway 15. Or ATC doesn\x92t allow landing traffic for runway 15 while JPN is active.

Subjects ATC Route 5

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BFSGrad
March 26, 2025, 18:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11854670

Quote:

Originally Posted by Easy Street

I think it's also important to recall from way upthread that at the point of being called as the factor traffic by ATC, the CRJ and the AAL aircraft behind it in the stream were extremely close together in the helo pilots' field of view, because the circling manoeuvre had barely begun.

Taking that concept a bit further, it is unlikely that one or both helo pilots maintained continuous visual on the called traffic after the initial \x93traffic in sight\x94 confirmation given their high visual workload (other traffic scan, visual navigation, maintaining altitude). A possible scenario is that one or both of the helo pilots did visually acquire the CRJ on the initial traffic call, briefly broke visual contact, and then subsequently acquired visual on the wrong traffic, maintaining that incorrect traffic contact until the collision. My recollection when I ran some geometry from the initial CRJ traffic call is that CRJ and AAL (or other traffic in the stack) would have differed in azimuth by about 3 degrees.

Subjects ATC CRJ

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BFSGrad
March 26, 2025, 21:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11854747

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Indeed but that does not explain the right turn , on the contrary , turning right was putting them in direct conflict with both the CRJ and the AA , or any other on finals 01. Turning left was the only option to stay clear laterally . Cannot understand what they saw that made them turn right

Not sure what right turn you\x92re referring to. Figures 2 and 3 of the NSTB preliminary report show PAT25 tracking parallel to the eastern shore of the Potomac River at the time of the collision. Because this shoreline tracks a line about 200/020 true, PAT25 had to turn to the right after passing Hains Point track Route 4 and that\x92s what the track shows.

Subjects ATC CRJ PAT25 Preliminary Report Route 4

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BFSGrad
March 26, 2025, 22:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11854815

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

That is not the one I mean . The radar track video (a screen shot is on post 848 but the video is clearer) show a slight right turn less than a minute or so before the collision . Even if they were just correcting the course to be exactly on track, it makes no sense to turn towards the right to avoid a aircraft on finals on either 01 or worse 33.

I don’t think the radar track shows a last-minute right turn turn by the helo (I looked at the post #848 image). The NTSB preliminary report states the helo had a 1.6 deg left bank at the time of the impact. Although the report notes the evasive maneuver by the CRJ (elevator, pitch), there’s no mention of evasive maneuver by the helo. I think you might be biased by some of the early but inaccurate MLAT tracks that showed a significant right turn by the helo prior to impact.

Subjects ATC CRJ NTSB Preliminary Report Radar

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BFSGrad
March 27, 2025, 18:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11855392

Quote:

Originally Posted by MechEngr

This is the first time I believe Senator Cruz's anger.

Disappointed to hear that. Searching for or expecting genuine emotion in the political theater of a congressional hearing is like searching for virtue in a brothel.

I also watched the hearing and learned little new from the parade of platitudes and witness obfuscation. I thought far too much time was spent on ADS-B (an acronym which Maria Cantwell is incapable of uttering correctly). No discussion on use of visual separation. There were a few new points:

1. Cause of spurious DCA TCAS alerts. ME links in related thread.
2. When NTSB examined other Blackhawks of 12th AB fleet, found significant number which did not transmit ADS-B even when ADS-B switched on. One helo (accident helo?) was found to have not transmitted ADS-B for past 700+ days.

Subjects ADSB (All) DCA NTSB Separation (ALL) TCAS (All) Visual Separation

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BFSGrad
March 29, 2025, 04:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11856414

Quote:

Originally Posted by VHOED191006

Ohhhh for f***sake

Wondering if this was support for an Arlington funeral given altitude and flight path. Appears it was a flight of two T-38s as DO61 is tracked continuously but DO63 pops up only briefly in formation with DO61 as the jets pass over Falls Church.

DAL2983 (A319) and DO61 had an altitude separation of about 100 ft and 0.5 nm at closest point of approach with a relative closure rate of 440 kts.

Two interactions just prior to above that may not have generated RAs: RPA4500 (E75L) passed DO61 with no lateral separation and about 1800 ft vertical separation with a relative closure of 540 kts. JIA5308 (CRJ7) passed DO61 with no lateral separation and 1200 ft separation with a relative closure of 475 kts. Unknown where DO63 was with respect to DO61.

Subjects Separation (ALL) TCAS RA Vertical Separation

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BFSGrad
March 29, 2025, 16:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11856721

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATCDumbo

As you are no doubt aware TWR Visual Separation is a very powerful tool / method in the eyes of the controller or in the eyes of a delegated pilot. (Literally and metaphorically speaking, i.e pun intended.) It is the very basis of ATC Aerodrome Control. Sophisticated use requires experience and excellent situational awareness. I just wonder how many (if any) of the \x93reported\x94 near collisions in the NTSB Preliminary report going back 4 and 14 years respectfully included perfectly safe visual separation?.

Since we\x92re discussing the DCA accident, let\x92s be clear about U.S. terminology as specified by 7110.65.

There is tower-applied visual separation . That is not relevant to the DCA accident.

There is also pilot-applied visual separation . That is what PAT25 requested and the LC approved.

As for the perfectly-safe visual separation, the DCA accident might have been avoided had the LC applied all of the elements of pilot-applied visual separation; i.e.

Quote:

(d) If aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.

(e) Advise the pilots if the targets appear likely to merge.

Subjects ATC DCA NTSB PAT25 Preliminary Report Separation (ALL) Situational Awareness Visual Separation

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BFSGrad
April 01, 2025, 22:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11858934

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

But , back to DCA , I I would be interested to know if previous instructions to circle 33 while on finals 01 was a commonly used procedure , and if it was occasionally refused by some pilots in the past and what was then the reaction of ATC .. divert to Dulles ?

The visual (circle) 33 is by far the most commonly used flight path to get aircraft into 33. The infrequently-used RNAV 33 closely tracks the visual 33 flight path. There is also the rare visual straight-in for 33 (see last year\x92s runway incursion with N250AA).

The NTSB preliminary report states that about 4% of DCA\x92s arrivals use runway 33. With 25,000 monthly flights, you can do the math. 33 used more frequently than average in the winter due to the typical strong NW winds seen in the DC area. That was the case on 1/29.

While it may be a wishful narrative that pilots get sent to ATC jail if \x93unable,\x94 doubt that\x92s anywhere close to the truth. I think the reality is if a pilot states \x93unable,\x94 ATC makes the necessary adjustments, which may involve an aircraft being resequenced in the queue. Don\x92t really think ATC has the authority to deny an aircraft a landing clearance out of spite if flight planned for DCA.

Quote:

Originally Posted by abax

It is buried in all these pages of this thread,,,but it seems that tragically so, 2-3 aircrafts before the fatal 5342, ATC requested rwy33 to another crew (same aircraft, same airline iirc) , and they declined ("Unable")

And just as the collision was occurring, JIA5347 was checking in on the Mount Vernon Visual specifically requesting 33 . Luck of the draw\x85

Subjects ATC DCA NTSB Preliminary Report

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Posts by user "BFSGrad" [Posts: 45 Total up-votes: 49 Page: 1 of 3]¶