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| BFSGrad
April 15, 2025, 20:35:00 GMT permalink Post: 11867556 |
Previous comments about runway 33 at DCA being used only for RJ or smaller. Today with winds howling out of the northwest, 33 is being used for all types (runway 1 also in use). Watched a SWA B737 and AAL A21N land on 33.
If you want to see the standard visual flight path into 33 at DCA, today is a good day to observe. IAD also operating single crosswind runway for arrivals. Subjects
DCA
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| BFSGrad
April 27, 2025, 17:19:00 GMT permalink Post: 11874462 |
This type of reporting does not serve aviation safety well. Apparently the editors at the NYT decided that, since nothing new had been reported about the DCA accident, it would be a good time to sweep together some of the facts currently known, add some informed speculation by \x93experts,\x94 and than \x93humanize\x94 the accident by adding photos and personal information about the people involved in the accident. Add in a bit of fact twisting and you have an article that will generate lots of clicks. One example: The article states, \x93the controller made a request that was permissible but atypical, according to the N.T.S.B. [5342 change from 1 to 33]. That last phrase \x93according to the NTSB\x94 is hyperlinked, with the linked document being the NTSB\x92s AIR-25-01 report. Does the NTSB report describe anything \x93atypical\x94 about changing to land on 33? No. In fact, the report makes this contrary statement: \x93Conducting northbound operations with simultaneous operations to runways 1 and 33 is a routine ATC procedure in compliance with FAA Order 7110.65BB.\x94 Even changing from 1 to 33 relatively late in the approach (which the NYT calls a \x93divert\x94), is routine for DCA. The evening of the accident, several aircraft operating both before and after 5342 were presented with this decision. One declined the switch to 33 and another specifically requeste d a change to 33. These decisions occurred after the aircraft had been handed off from PCT to the DCA LC and the aircraft were established inbound to runway 1. Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
NTSB
New York Times
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| BFSGrad
April 27, 2025, 20:22:00 GMT permalink Post: 11874540 |
I\x92ll make an assumption that this is the paragraph in the NYT article that you find compelling:
The helicopter crew appeared to have made more than one mistake. Not only was the Black Hawk flying too high, but in the final seconds before the crash, its pilot failed to heed a directive from her co-pilot, an Army flight instructor, to change course.
​​​​​​​CVR data indicated that, following this transmission, the IP told the pilot they believed ATC was asking for the helicopter to move left toward the east bank of the Potomac.
This is the danger of this type of sloppy media reporting. Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
NTSB
New York Times
Preliminary Report
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| BFSGrad
April 29, 2025, 17:04:00 GMT permalink Post: 11875527 |
If Route 5 is not being used (and Route 4 is shutdown), how are military helicopters accessing JPN? Prior to the DCA accident, I don\x92t know that I\x92d ever seen a UH-60 out my way on Route 9 in nearly 3 decades. Now PAT UH-60s are almost a daily occurrence on Route 9 (saw/heard 4 yesterday). The ADW-based UH-1Ns are also flying Route 9 more frequently. I maintain the the DC helicopter routes (including Route 4) interior to the Beltway are not inherently unsafe if used with appropriate restrictions and ATC-applied separation. Subjects
DCA
FAA
Route 4
Route 5
Route 9
Separation (ALL)
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| BFSGrad
May 02, 2025, 18:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11877325 |
Back in my post #1385, I briefly mentioned some new info that the NTSB provided at the 3/27 Senate hearing regarding the NTSB’s investigation of the functionality of the 12th AB UH-60 fleet ADS-B systems. Below is the full transcript of the NTSB’s relevant testimony:
NTSB: One thing I can say on ADS-B Out OFF that’s policy of the Army. We are still looking at installation, programming and potential for equipment malfunction, and the reason that I mention this is because, for this accident helicopter, no ADS-B data had been received from an FAA ground station for 730 days prior to the accident and that was abnormal.
NTSB: So we began looking at the fleet for the battalion [12th AB]. The battalion had 25 helicopters that includes this particular helicopter. Nine of them were Mike models and all were transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned ON because we have to verify that it’s working. There were 16 Limas including the accident helicopter, which we’re still looking at. Seven were transmitting when ADS-B Out was turned ON; eight were not and stopped doing so something between May and November 2023. We don’t know why. Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified the issue and began working with the Army to try to isolate the reason. So I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out ON but you have to also make sure that it’s working. Sen. Moran: You indicated working with the Army, but there’s other participants in this arena. Were you narrowing it to the Army? Is there something necessarily wrong there or is there a problem more broadly in receiving the information? NTSB: For the ADS-B Out we wanted to look at the helicopter fleet for the battalion to see whether ADS-B Out, when turned ON, was actually transmitting data because we did think it was abnormal that, for the helicopter involved in the accident, wasn’t transmitting data for so long. Subjects
ADSB (All)
ADSB Out
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Route 9
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| BFSGrad
May 03, 2025, 04:08:00 GMT permalink Post: 11877511 |
DCA LC helicopter and fixed wing positions were combined (Bueller? Bueller?) PAT23 was a Gold Top (Mike) UH-60 PAT23 was issued two holds along Route 5: (1st) 3 mi W of DCA, and (2nd) at \x93Glebe\x94 LC then cleared PAT23 from \x93Glebe\x94 along Route 5 to the Pentagon LC made multiple requests to PAT23 to report landing assured. It seemed to take an unusually long time for PAT23 to get to the JPN landing pad. Unclear why PAT23 (and apparently other helicopters) fly counter-clockwise; i.e., continue to follow 395 S of Pentagon (past south parking), then turn N to follow 110 (past the Metro entrance) to the JPN landing pad. Why not use the charted transition route along 27/Washington Blvd? LC seemed unclear of PAT23\x92s position. At one point directed PAT23 to fly westbound while PAT23 appeared to be landing. Both DAL1671 and RPA5825 go-arounds were LC directed. No pilot reports of TCAS RA heard. After checking in with departure/approach, PCT didn\x92t request reason for go-around and pilots made no comment about go-around. Subjects
ADSB (All)
DCA
PAT23
Route 5
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
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| BFSGrad
May 03, 2025, 19:28:00 GMT permalink Post: 11877898 |
CAUTION - TFC PAT - KJPN EAST/WEST OPS. SPECIAL PRO TFC PAT. WHEN LDG W ALL ARR ACFT MAKE LEFT TFC CIRCLING THE PENTAGON AT OR BLW 200 FT. WHEN DEP E ALL ACFT MAKE RIGHT TFC CIRCLING THE PENTAGON AT OR BLW 200 FT.
​​​​​​​SPECIAL PRO; TFC PAT AND OPR RULES EXIST DUE TO WASHINGTON TCA; PRK; NOISE; FLT PLAN CDN AND VISUAL RTE RSTRNS.
​​​​​​​HELIPAD PHYSLY LCTD ON W SIDE OF PENTAGON BLDG.
​​​​​​​Owned by the Army
U.S.ARMY ATCA-ASO CAMERON STA ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314 Subjects
KDCA
PAT23
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| BFSGrad
May 05, 2025, 22:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11879082 |
Excerpts from various news sources:
The Army on Monday said it has suspended helicopter flights into the Pentagon, following an incident last week involving a military helicopter flying near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport that prompted air traffic controllers to divert two commercial flights that had been attempting to land.
​​​​​​​Following the incident, the Army said it had conducted the Thursday helicopter flight \x93in accordance with published FAA flight routes.\x94 Capt. Victoria Goldfedib, U.S. Army spokesperson, said that Pentagon controllers directed the helicopter to perform a go-around, flying over the helipad \x97 which then prompted Reagan National controllers to take action to \x93ensure the appropriate deconfliction of airspace.\x94
​​​​​​​A U.S. official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said that according to initial information, the military helicopter was doing an emergency evacuation rehearsal.
​​​​​​​An FAA summary of Thursday\x92s incident obtained by The Washington Post says the helicopter was not within newly restricted airspace and was following new rules requiring it to broadcast its location using a satellite-based system.
The Army said in a statement late Friday that it was operating in accordance with FAA flight routes. The Army said it \x93remains committed to aviation safety and conducting flight operations within all approved guidelines and procedures.\x94 The \x93scenic\x94 characterization was \x93inappropriate,\x94 the Army official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation. No senior leader was on the helicopter, which carried two aviators and a crew chief, the official said. Subjects
FAA
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| BFSGrad
May 24, 2025, 03:55:00 GMT permalink Post: 11889415 |
Pentagon lost contact with Army helo that caused DC jet diversions
Brig. Gen. Matthew Braman, the head of Army aviation, told the AP in an exclusive interview that the controllers lost contact with the Black Hawk because a temporary control tower antenna was not set up in a location where it would be able to maintain contact with the helicopter as it flew low and rounded the Pentagon to land. He said the antenna was set up during construction of a new control tower and has now been moved to the roof of the Pentagon.
Braman said federal air traffic controllers inside the Washington airport also didn’t have a good fix on the location of the helicopter. The Black Hawk was transmitting data that should have given controllers its precise location, but Braman said FAA officials told him in meetings last week that the data the controllers were getting from multiple feeds and sensors was inconclusive, with some of it deviating by as much as three-quarters of a mile. Because of the 20-second loss of contact, the Pentagon’s tower did not clear the Black Hawk to land, so the helicopter circled the Pentagon a second time. That’s when air traffic controllers at the airport decided to abort the landing of a second jet, a Republic Airways Embraer E170, because they did not have a confident fix on the Black Hawk’s location, Braman said. Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
FAA
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| BFSGrad
July 30, 2025, 19:22:00 GMT permalink Post: 11930888 |
Up to 205 documents now in the docket, including composite CVR transcript. Couple of things jumped out:
1. PAT25 PF started to turn right at Cabin John (American Legion Bridge), which would have taken them toward Great Falls; i.e., up the Potomac. IP had to tell PF to turn left, which would start track down Potomac River (helo route 1). Odd. Not the best SA by PF. 2. No discussion in the PAT25 cockpit about the called CRJ traffic. 3. PSA Captain/PF expressed to PM a preference for continuing to runway 1 but accepted runway 33. Media will make a big deal out of this. I don\x92t think it is. Subjects
CRJ
NTSB Docket
PAT25
Situational Awareness
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| BFSGrad
July 31, 2025, 20:24:00 GMT permalink Post: 11931525 |
1st Helo operating out of ADW, call sign MUSL.
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| BFSGrad
July 31, 2025, 22:12:00 GMT permalink Post: 11931558 |
They were flying over the river, not the built up areas. Not sure how much time you have flying in a Blackhawk, but if you are over the water at night at 200' your radalt is giving you better indications of how far you are above water than your bar alt. If the two disagree, which one do you think you'll be using?
(Same is true in the Seahawk). Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
PAT25
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| BFSGrad
July 31, 2025, 23:00:00 GMT permalink Post: 11931572 |
To complicate further, the Army Day 1 witness, CW4 Lewis, indicated she would have flown route 1/4 using radalt as her altitude reference. She also offered that she had zero DC route experience. Subjects: None No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads. |
| BFSGrad
August 03, 2025, 21:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11932914 |
Subjects
NTSB
NTSB Docket
Radar
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| BFSGrad
August 06, 2025, 15:09:00 GMT permalink Post: 11934187 |
If ATC have taken the trouble to issue a traffic advisory to a helo, why does the helo pilot think it\x92s reasonable to assume the traffic (which they haven\x92t seen!) will be no factor. Surely the Controller has called out that particular traffic to the helo for a reason he knows, like the traffic\x92s intended flight path will shortly become a collision risk.
Subjects
ATC
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| BFSGrad
August 06, 2025, 17:53:00 GMT permalink Post: 11934280 |
Yes, it was functional and activated during the accident sequence. The DCA CA system is discussed extensively in the ATC interviews.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
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| BFSGrad
August 09, 2025, 17:05:00 GMT permalink Post: 11935810 |
Docket info cites MilSpecs controlling altimeter accuracy for PAT25 aircraft; e.g., \xb130 ft at sea level. Part 43 lists altimeter accuracy of \xb120 ft at sea level. I don’t think these differences are going to adversely impact the safety of military aircraft operating in civilian airspace. The cause of CAs/RAs lies elsewhere.
Subjects
NTSB Docket
PAT25
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| BFSGrad
August 10, 2025, 22:26:00 GMT permalink Post: 11936398 |
Two interesting events noted on the recordings: At about 20:00L, PCT calls helicopter traffic to PAT25. I count at least 12 statements between the two pilots regarding the called traffic in addition to radio transmissions to PCT regarding the traffic. Contrast this to the CRJ called traffic which generates zero discussion between the PAT25 flight crew. At about 20:37L, there’s a traffic interaction between MUSL13 and BLJK1 (two helicopters) that generates a conflict alert. The DCA LC provides multiple traffic alerts to both aircraft, including direction, range, and altitude of the conflicting aircraft, even after visual separation is approved for BLJK1. Contrast this with the accident sequence where PAT25 is provided with a single traffic alert and the CRJ gets bupkis. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
PAT25
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| BFSGrad
August 14, 2025, 16:25:00 GMT permalink Post: 11938451 |
Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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| BFSGrad
August 22, 2025, 21:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11942707 |
This incident was discussed in posts #1506-1527 of this thread.
NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report - N879RW (RPA), UH-60 (PAT23)
…but around this time, PAT23 had checked in with the JPN Heliport Tower (HT) LC controller and was attempting to land on the helipad without a landing clearance. When the JPN HT LC controller queried the crew to ask who had cleared them to land, the crew advised they were executing a go around and that DCA ATCT had cleared them to the helipad.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
NTSB
PAT23
Preliminary Report
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