Arrivals tells PAT25 Heli to keep watch for CRJ. There is no acknowledgment. Arrivals then tells PAT 25 to pass behind CRJ. There is no acknowledgment.
Rubbish. Listen to the YT video directly above your last post.
There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342.
TCAS does not require, nor use, ADS-B information (yet). If the PAT had it's Mode C ON, the TCAS on the CRJ would give full warnings... if it was high enough, which it wasn't. However, the TCAS issued a Traffic Advisory "Traffic Traffic" as the CRJ passed through 500ft (as per the NTSB briefing).
So in the accident in question the LC issued an en-route clearance to the Blackhawk to which there was no read back at all, because the helicopter crew never heard it. Subsequently I don’t think we see the LC chasing up for one, let alone correcting any errors as he ought — he was just too busy doing the work of two people. The purpose of the system broke down.
IMO the fact that the helo crew didn't readback/acknowledge "pass behind" is irrelevant. Twice before, they told the LC that they had the CRJ in sight and requested visual sep, which was granted. Surely you don't specifically need to be told to not hit the CRJ after you've reported it in sight?
I think the LC saw what was unfolding and said that because he had concerns that the chopper didn't actually have the CRJ. He was right.
simply confirms the helicopter crew had no idea of the imminent danger they were in.
In this scenario, there is zero information in the call to "pass behind" that indicates any imminent danger. All it does is further legitimise the previous two approvals for visual separation.
Now if the controller had said "you look to be tracking very close to the CRJ are you sure you can pass behind?" or similar, then maybe the helo crew would have got excited. A call like that might have even triggered a "holy sh1t" moment about the TCAS "Traffic". But as far as they were concerned, they knew they had the traffic in sight and could do the visual sep thing and even if they had heard "pass behind" they would have said/thought "well, obviously". Except they had the wrong aircraft. ATC had an idea they had the wrong aircraft but didn't get the message across.
As for the reference, same thing. The helo crew could have read-back "pass behind" but it wouldn't have achieved anything.
What a lawyer should want is a simple straightforward path to a good result for their client. In this case it seems the helicopter crew and by extension the military and the federal government are clearly legally liable. If an army private drives an army truck through a yield sign and causes an accident they and the army are legally liable. Here the helicopter crew did the equivalent by violating the right of way of the plane and causing the accident. This seems simple and clear cut. As opposed to trying to blame the FAA. Why go for a complicated and chancy argument when a simple one will suffice?
What a load of codswallop.
SubjectsFAA
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you ignore the signs saying no trucks on the expressway
What "rule" did anybody break in the DCA midair case?
The enthusiastic amateurs can spear the seemingly obvious culprits but that is not how aviation has become the safest mode of transport ever.
Originally Posted by
HotnHigh
If the helo crew mistook another aircraft to one they should have been avoiding (a likely mistake)
No they didn't; it wasn't a mistake, they knew which one they were avoiding. It just wasn't the one they ran into. Taking off on a taxiway is a mistake because we all know what a taxiway and runway are. But avoiding the "wrong" aircraft cannot be a mistake when no attempt or method was made or existed to verify they did have the wrong aircraft in sight.
Yes, by all means decide liability for recompense to those who lost loved ones on that fateful day - (top tip, go where the money is!).
Just don't pick on the helo crew.
This is what I hate about pilots' obligation to "lookout and See and Avoid". Weasel words written by some bright spark when the Wright brothers were flying but now exposing every pilot to a lawyer-fest when it is, in practical terms, very difficult to do these days with a mix slow and fast aircraft and busy skies.
There's more to these events than meets the eye...
The CRJ crew was aware of the traffic. They received a Traffic alert from TCAS 18 seconds prior to impact.
Depends how you define "aware". Clearly, they weren't "aware" enough to realise they were about to run into it until the last second. I must admit that, if I got a TA at less than 500ft on final at a controlled airport, I would have a good think about it before doing anything. It's night, they'd have to look at the TCAS return to see where it actually was, work out what it was doing, then start looking out. And guess what, just before they collided, the CRJ crew started pulling up, so they probably did all that and it took that long to react.
If your comment was intended to be a criticism, which I interpret it was, I think you're being unrealistic and unfair.
SubjectsCRJTCAS (All)
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Sailvi767, you're doing nothing more that Monday-morning quarterbacking. To say "yes, we're below 900ft so it won't give us a RA so let's get out of here" is totally unrealistic in these circumstances. Statements like "
Watching an aircraft track in on a collision course and doing nothing takes a lot of courage." are just nonsense, in that, of course it would take a lot of courage and no-one in their right mind would do that in a normal situation, cruising along higher up. But these guys were 500ft off the water, at night, manoeuvring to a late-change final approach.
Last edited by Capn Bloggs; 11th August 2025 at
11:10
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Reason: grammar
Re ATC assigning own separation, that happens here in Oz. IIRC, it went like this: "Report sighting the 737 on final"..."Traffic sighted"..."Follow as number two". Although critically, Our Oz AIP states:
Originally Posted by
AIP Australia
(3) where an aircraft has been instructed to maintain own separation from an IFR aircraft, ATC will issue traffic information to the pilot of the IFR aircraft, including advice that responsibility for separation has been assigned to the other aircraft;
Re TCAS, my Boeing manual states
Originally Posted by
Boeing
The Traffic Advisory (TA) is inhibited below 1,100 feet (+100 feet) AGL for TCAS change 6 computers and below 500 feet (+100 feet) for TCAS change 7 computers.
Change 7 came in some years ago. I wonder if the CRJ's TCAS was the same and the TA was inhibited a few seconds before the collision, which was below 500ft?
Re "normalised deviation", I'm not sure this applies here. Normalised deviation means
deviating
from published (perportedly safe) procedures, with no adverse consequences, so the deviations continue. In this case, it's pretty obvious that the "published procedures" were flawed in the first place.
SubjectsATCIFRSeparation (ALL)TCAS (All)
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Are there procedures published? If Yes, was everybody following those procedures?
If Yes, no normalisation of deviance. The procedures themselves were/are flawed, not the execution of them.
If No, then there's normalisation of deviance. The users are not following the procedures and if those procedures have been in place for some time, the users have been "getting away with it" ie NoD until now.
Not so much slackness and cutting corners, it's a failure of the FAA's Safety Management System that allows this dangerous stuff to continue. Reports would have been put in routinely I suspect; even the TCAS events should have triggered some SMS action.
Is the FAA ISO9001 approved?
SubjectsFAATCAS (All)
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He's quite clear that he thinks that ATC alerting the CRJ about the presence of the helo (using visual flight separation) probably wouldn't have changed the outcome.
I disagree. My hackles would be up a bit, probably/hopefully enough, for me to wonder and have a look for it. A traffic headsup call from ATC would also lend more credence to the TCAS TA.
SubjectsATCCRJSeparation (ALL)TCAS (All)
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HNH, I can't agree with any of that. The ONLY reason federal regs are written is to set a standard that anybody can operate to/in/with and be safe. This idea that a major US carrier shouldn't have operated into DCA because it might be dangerous, depending on how the airline assesses it, and is therefore sue-able, when the FAA itself allows it, doesn't gel IMO. The sole job of the regulator is to ensure the airspace and it's procedures will allow a safe operation. In any case, I think what you are suggesting, that AA have worked out, by itself, that operating into DCA is unsafe, won't happen these day because the almighty dollar rules. The minimum standard, set by the FAA, will more often that not, be complied-with. Most company restrictions of the type you mention don't involve simply not doing it, which is what is being suggested here.
SubjectsDCAFAA
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I think it's not unreasonable to assume that words being exchanged in the cockpit/the extra workload prevented the pilots from noticing the ATC transmissions to the helicopter, and that would have impaired their situational awareness.
I think it
is
unreasonable. Those crews probably do that runway change often, and would do it blindfolded. As for workload, I agree with Layman; the workload, even if they had briefed it, would have been the same.
Originally Posted by
Musician
Situational awareness is required for safe flight, especially in congested airspace.
Clearly not a pilot, again. Pilots, especially of multi-crew aircraft should NOT have to listen every transmission to every other aircraft to "maintain situational awareness".
This is the problem with enthusiastic amateurs and blood-thirsty lawyers: all these peripheral issues take centre-stage and the real causes are not addressed. Easier to spear the pilots of the CRJ for not doing a unneeded briefing or missing a TCAS alerts than get the FAA and army boffins that approved that sh1tshow in the first place...
