Posts by user "CayleysCoachman" [Posts: 6 Total up-votes: 7 Page: 1 of 1]¶

in a place where controllers give headings to aircraft flying visually well below MSA, perhaps, but no such place exists. Controllers provide a service, they are not an authority.

the industry, and in Washington the military and the State, knows this, but chooses movement rates and freedom over delays and failure to deliver. Aviation is not zero-harm. This is a risk which is well established as tolerable, the rate of occurrence seems acceptably low overall, and I suspect nothing will change. Those affected should, in my opinion, be enormously compensated, which will not bring loved ones back but will make going on more tolerable, and will enable the status quo to continue, satisfying the commercial, capitalist, military, and executive imperatives. I’m often reminded of the scene in Airplane, which cuts to the made-up TV talk show, ‘Counterpoint’, whose host says (and I may be a word or two off here), ‘I say, they bought their tickets, they knew what they were getting into…. Let them die’. Macabre I know, but feel free to challenge me if you don’t believe that this is a true reflection of our reality.

The report into this event will make interesting reading too.

https://assets.publishing.service.go...-KAY_02-09.pdf

Page 61 lays out the possibility that in manoeuvring to avoid a perceived risk of collision, a pilot may have unwittingly flown into a different collision.

That’s an awfully cluttered display, chock-a-block with information with no salience whatsoever. For many years, I flew a lovely large piston twin, being passed down almost from one owner to the next, with the aircraft, until its last owner installed acres of Garmin glass. I could no longer perceive the propeller RPM with sufficient granularity; the fuel flows were obscured, the whole place became like Blackpool illuminations, and, as I was fundamentally only flying it for my own pleasure, I stepped back.

Urgent information needs salience in displays and suitable attention-getters, but in that regard, proximate traffic near an airport could be given greater prominence, then to be lost in learned noise. TCAS is not the answer to this collision. I’m increasingly reminded of the term, ‘defensive controlling’. Yes, you expect to have vertical separation if the climber stops at its cleared level, but why not give it a five degree heading change, not to achieve any kind of separation, but just to make sure they don’t hit if it busts….

The transfer of responsibility to the helo crew here was entirely legitimate, but also created the single point of failure which led to a collision, and that was foreseeable.

\x85and yet that is precisely how ICAO stipulates that accident investigation should work. The consequent focus on such things as \x91proximate cause\x92 and the SIA-world\x92s inherent unwillingness to deal with underlying aetiology work against holistic approaches and generate exactly the outcomes you warn against.

My apologies, I tend to regard the conversation here as being reflective of the lounge bar rather than the witness box. You're right, 'recommends' is a better word and I will try to be more pedantic.

Regarding Fukushima, the problem lies not with regulators, but with regulation and its evil twin, compliance. And on your last line, I might add, 'by politics'. The process of sharing draft reports with interested parties is harmful enough to the investigative process, as we have seen with crystal clarity over the Clutha case for example, but is even more damaging in its influence to the jobbing investigator sitting at a word processor, thinking not only of that process, but all the petty politics which are exercised by managers in SIAs. Sometimes the investigator feels charged with writing a benign account of a series of improbable, unfortunate, and unforeseeable coincidences, which aligned with previously unknown holes in otherwise-solid cheese, despite being fully aware that there is much more to it than that.