Posts by user "DaveReidUK" [Posts: 15 Total up-votes: 34 Page: 1 of 1]ΒΆ

DaveReidUK
February 01, 2025, 12:13:00 GMT
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Post: 11818980
Originally Posted by megan
Have to ask, why the use of goggles in basically night CAVOK and a densely light city area.
It's being reported that the purpose of the flight was specifically to use NVGs (not sure whether for training purposes or for a check).

Subjects Night Vision Goggles (NVG)

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DaveReidUK
February 01, 2025, 17:00:00 GMT
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Post: 11819168
Originally Posted by SASless
Some folks here need to read back through the thread before posting.

The helicopter crew is said to have had NVG's but at this point no information has been provided re their use of NVG's.
NVG's have been mentioned several times earlier in the thread.

Also, Reuters:

"Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the helicopter was flown by a "fairly experienced crew" of three soldiers who were wearing night-vision goggles on an annual training flight."

Subjects Night Vision Goggles (NVG)

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DaveReidUK
February 02, 2025, 07:39:00 GMT
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Post: 11819561
Originally Posted by cbradio
ATC did do what he is "supposed" to do. The Blackhawk was told to "pass behind". Nothing to do with vertical separation. It's a form of separation. That's how it works. Thousands of times every day, all over the place.

As a system ' - at night - I think it's crazy. But that's the system.
To be fair to posters, the preceding 650-odd posts have contained a disturbing number harping on about "vertical separation" - and the media haven't helped, either.

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  Pass Behind  Pass Behind (All)  Separation (ALL)  Vertical Separation

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DaveReidUK
February 02, 2025, 13:55:00 GMT
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Post: 11819809
Originally Posted by meleagertoo
That route should have been, imho, at least 5-800ft or more above two dots up on the glideslope.
Planning to pass above an aircraft on final approach - what could possibly go wrong?

Subjects: None

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DaveReidUK
February 02, 2025, 21:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11820137
Originally Posted by uncle_maxwell
Separately, is it correct to say that CRJ were on final, or were they perhaps still turning onto final?
The ADS-B data suggests that the CRJ had been on a steady track of approximately 326\xb0T for around 10 seconds before the data went haywire.

Subjects ADSB (All)  CRJ

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DaveReidUK
February 03, 2025, 12:58:00 GMT
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Post: 11820516
Originally Posted by makobob
Tower controller made a fatal error in communicating with the Army UH-60. Time was clearly critical and was wasted by asking the H-60 if they had jet traffic in site. Clearly, they did not.
​​
Originally Posted by makobob
In my view, the tower controller could have easily prevented this fatal collision.
This was discussed earlier, with several posts being based on listening to an incomplete ATC recording which failed to pick up the (UHF) frequency on which the helicopter crew were responding.

As far as I can see, the helicopter crew when asked twice if they had the CRJ in sight responded in the affirmative both times. I think it's a tad unfair to criticise the controller for not being able to divine that they were actually looking at a different aircraft in the approach sequence.

Subjects ATC  CRJ

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DaveReidUK
February 03, 2025, 16:04:00 GMT
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Post: 11820658
Originally Posted by Hot 'n' High
I noted the CRJ ( BS5342 ) had company traffic(?) ( BS5347 ) joining
BS ??

Subjects CRJ

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DaveReidUK
February 14, 2025, 13:14:00 GMT
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Post: 11827981
Originally Posted by airplanecrazy
FWIW, this is my take on the layout of the crash scene:
Wreckage locations pinpointed to within 10 millimetres? I'm impressed !!

Subjects: None

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DaveReidUK
February 20, 2025, 07:51:00 GMT
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Post: 11831998
Originally Posted by airplanecrazy
I used ADS-B reported GEO Altitude as my source and added the EGM96 correction for the lat/long of KDCA. Given that, nothing in the chart is derived from pressure altitude. As an aside, I did take a look at QNH adjusted pressure altitude (to get calibrated altitude) and it was largely in agreement with Geo Altitude. The exceptions were two helicopters N11PP and N22PP, and I don't know if it is something I am doing wrong in my calculations or something wrong with their ADS-B equipment.
GEO Altitude ?

Subjects ADSB (All)  KDCA  QNH

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 16:38:00 GMT
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Post: 12028081
Two-and-a-half hours into the hearing, and it's grim stuff, with the FAA being crucified in real-time.

While "an accident waiting to happen" is an old cliche, there can't have been many accidents where it was more apt, with reference being made to a precursor at DCA a dozen or so years ago where only luck avoided a similar outcome, and sod-all having been done in the meantime to mitigate the possibility of a recurrence.

Subjects Accident Waiting to Happen  DCA  FAA

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 21:12:00 GMT
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Post: 12028223
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
A bit off-topic, but nothing I heard today makes it any less interesting to contemplate the question: in the continuing lawsuit, who speaks for the Bluestreak 5342 pilots? They're blamed by the plaintiffs for what they did and what they didn't do, but they are every bit as much victims of this systemic breakdown as the passengers and flight attendants. I would also ask, who speaks for the Army aviators? who also are victims of the systemic breakdown. It all makes me kind of wish Chair Homendy was in the legal profession, tbh.
That's about to be partly answered, with the caveat that it's never in the NTSB's remit to assign blame to individuals. Currently at around #20 of 71 Findings, which will presumably be followed by the Probable Cause statements.

There will follow a raft of Safety Recommendations (I haven't been keeping count of how many have been referred to), though it's not clear whether they will be explicitly listed during the hearing.

Subjects Findings  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy  Probable Cause  Safety Recommendations

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 22:35:00 GMT
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Post: 12028253
Originally Posted by Undertow
The FAA ignored them
Strictly speaking, the FAA as regulator doesn't "ignore" NTSB Safety Recommendations.

It responds to them, with either acceptance or rejection, and in the latter case provides its reasons for doing so. It may also suggest alternative means of compliance with the Board's wishes, and in some cases this leads to quite a bit of to-and-froing between the two organisations until a final position is reached.

The hearing is about to start on the Probable Cause statements, having had a prolonged debate on proposed amendments to several of the Findings (which are now all agreed).

Subjects FAA  Findings  NTSB  Probable Cause  Safety Recommendations

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 23:09:00 GMT
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Post: 12028272
Probable Cause Statement:

The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path.

Their failure to regularly review and evaluate helicopter routes and available data, and their failure to act on recommendations to mitigate the risk of a mid-air collision near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, as well as the air traffic system's overreliance on visual separation.

In order to promote efficient traffic flow without consideration for the limitations of the see and avoid concept.

Also causal was the lack of effective pilot applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a mid-air collision.

Additional causal factors were were the tower team's loss of situational awareness and degraded performance due to a high workload of the combined helicopter and local control positions, and the absence of a risk assessment process to identify and mitigate real time operational risk factors, which resulted in miss prioritization of duties, inadequate traffic advisory advisories, and the lack of safety alerts to both flight crews.

Also causal was the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of air tolerances on barometric altimeter in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude.

Contributing factors include the limitations of the traffic awareness and collision alerting systems on both aircraft, which precluded effective alerting of the impending collision to the flight crew's.

An unsustainable airport arrival rate, increasing traffic volume with a changing fleet mix and airline scheduling practices at DCA, which regularly strain the DCA Atct workforce and degraded safety over time.

The Army's lack of a fully implemented safety management system, which should have identified and addressed hazards associated with altitude exceedances on the Washington, D.C. Helicopter routes.

The FAA's failure across multiple organizations to implement previous NTSB recommendations, including Ads-b in and to follow and fully integrate its established safety management system, which should have led to several organizational and operational changes based on previously identified risk that were known to management and the absence of effective data sharing and analysis among the FAA aircraft operators and other relevant organizations.

Subjects Barometric Altimeter  DCA  FAA  NTSB  Probable Cause  Route Altitude  See and Avoid  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  Visual Separation

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 23:13:00 GMT
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Post: 12028273
48 Safety Recommendations to follow (32 of them addressed to the FAA).

Those can wait until tomorrow ...

Subjects FAA  Safety Recommendations

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 23:38:00 GMT
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Post: 12028289
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
weird that they don\x92t even mention the Blackhawk PF\x92s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn\x92t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)

Additionally this would\x92ve been sapping the IP/PM\x92s capacity to an extent no doubt as he had to monitor her deviations

wasn\x92t this a currency flight for her and she\x92s already blown a segment of it? Clearly her recency/skill level is at least a factor?

ditto they don\x92t mention the limitations of VFR separation under night vision





Those are addressed in some of the 75-odd Findings statements.

But all of those deficiencies arguably added up to the stated Probable Cause: "the lack of effective pilot applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a mid-air collision"


Subjects Blackhawk (H-60)  Findings  Probable Cause  Separation (ALL)  VFR  Visual Separation

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