Posts by user "Musician" [Posts: 36 Total up-votes: 27 Page: 2 of 2]ΒΆ

Musician
December 13, 2025, 11:29:00 GMT
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Post: 12004581
Originally Posted by MechEngr
His opposition by voting "YES" on it is curious. It seems like the wrong order to proceed. Would it not be better to object to the provision before the vote when there could be some influence in the House rather than hoping the Senate won't agree and just pass it as-is.
It was probably brought to his attention after the vote? especially if it was a last-minute addition.

Though in hindsight, his initial comment "This legislation restores our military\x92s focus on lethality" is a bit on the nose.

It's just baffling why the Army doesn't keep the ADS-B equipment on their helicopters operable, it'd be safer at any altitude when they're sharing airspace with civilians.
I can only imagine someone thinking, "well we can't stop doing training flights when the equipment isn't working" (and Homendy glaring at them "then get it fixed").

Subjects ADSB (All)  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy

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Musician
December 14, 2025, 12:24:00 GMT
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Post: 12005085
Originally Posted by BBK
I believe this is relevant to the discussion.
Thank you! That's the press briefing I posted a clip of earlier, minus 30 seconds of opening, but with the Q&A (starts at 4:00) that my clip did not have.
It's always good to see these first hand.

Subjects: None

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Musician
December 14, 2025, 16:27:00 GMT
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Post: 12005225
Originally Posted by AirScotia
If I've got this wrong, can you correct me?
Looks basically correct, though I would add some points.

- The bill mandates a "risk assessment", but does not explain what that entails, or how the person making that assessment should be qualifed. A simple check box on the waiver form, "I assessed the risk to civil aviation", would presumably suffice.

- The civil aviation authorities (DOT, FAA, airlines) have no input on these assessments. This is why Homendy calls it a "whitewash", because it sounds like someone cares about risk, but there's no actual assurance the risk would be managed.

- Because these and other important provisions are so poorly defined, Homendy called the section badly written, and she's right. You need to know what the bill is talking about, or the ambiguity leads to court cases.

- we have seen a legislative effort to mandate ADS-B IN, which may be ongoing behind the scenes, and possibly scheduled to a push with the release of the final report. However, ADS-B IN is useless (in this context) if the military doesn't send ADS-B. I think that explains Homendy's level of anger.

I believe, without this provision, the Army needs to fix their ADS-B gear, and go to the FAA if they need a waiver for those top secret missions.

Subjects ADSB (All)  FAA  Final Report  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy

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Musician
January 26, 2026, 22:01:00 GMT
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Post: 12027674
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
According to reporting published today by The Air Current - one of its periodic articles reporting on air safety which are not paywalled - the NTSB will meet on January 27.
The official announcement is at https://www.ntsb.gov/news/press-rele...A20260112.aspx . It mentions the meeting is set to start Tuesday, Jan. 27 at 9 a.m. Eastern time, and has a link to their live webcast. In my experience, the meetings are usually also available on Youtube.

The docket at https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108 is unchanged from the previous hearing, with the exception of some personal items that have been removed.

Last edited by Musician; 27th January 2026 at 16:52 .

Subjects NTSB  NTSB Docket

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Musician
January 27, 2026, 16:53:00 GMT
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Post: 12028093
I don't see a livestream on youtube, but they have some supporting animations.
The caption/transcript is at https://transcript.verbit.co/?transc...WidthMode=true
The docket has had more than 60 items added. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108

Boardmeeting Overview Animation

Aircraft Visibility Study

Control Tower Visibility Study

Subjects NTSB Docket

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Musician
January 28, 2026, 02:07:00 GMT
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Post: 12028325
A lot of what you guys are complaining about was in fact adressed by the hearing, and will be addressed by the final report.

Subjects Final Report

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Musician
January 29, 2026, 13:55:00 GMT
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Post: 12029155
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
weird that they don’t even mention the Blackhawk PF’s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn’t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)
It's in the findings.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx
31. Due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter’s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter’s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.
.
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
that recreation is incredible, kudos to NTSB I don’t know why they chose to create it from the IP’s (RHS)’s point of view though, the PF was LHS and arguably had a better view of the CRJ the entire time
I'm guessing because the IP reported the aircraft in sight, the PF didn't.
27. The PAT25 instructor pilot did not positively identify flight 5342 at the time of the initial traffic advisory despite his statement that he had the traffic in sight and his request for visual separation.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  Findings  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Musician
January 30, 2026, 12:48:00 GMT
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Post: 12029671
Originally Posted by Easy Street
As some won't follow the link and read all of the findings, I think it's only fair to the IP to quote the next finding as well, which speaks to concerns over the inherent (un)safety of visual separation at night in dynamic traffic environments:

28. With several other targets located directly in front of the helicopter represented by points of light with no other features by which to identify aircraft type, and without additional position information from the controller, the instructor pilot likely identified the wrong target.
Yes. That is also apparent from the NTSB visibility study that we've been commenting on in this exchange.
The question was why the NTSB chose the right seat of the helicopter, and that was because the instructor assumed responsibility for the visual separation. There is no cockpit communication about the identification, so the PF wasn't involved in that.

One problem the helicopter had was that the CRJ was flying a turn. Flying straight, you know you're going to collide with something (even if it is just a dot of light) if it doesn't move visually. The CRJ's lights were moving left, so that would've looked like it was safely passing the helicopter by. The crew needed the situational awareness that the CRJ was going to turn towards them as it lined up for runway 33, but they didn't have it. ATC did, but didn't share, for reasons also addressed in the findings.

Subjects ATC  CRJ  Findings  NTSB  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 07, 2026, 07:49:00 GMT
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Post: 12033661
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
Joint statement from House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA),
These are the guys responsible for stalling the ROTOR act that the Senate passed with bipartisan support last year.

https://www.politico.com/live-update...-bill-00764270
But Transportation Chair Sam Graves (R-Mo.) has objected to the bill, saying he wants big changes to it.
In a series of recent interviews, Graves has cited concerns over impacts to general aviation, the small-scale flights that range from recreational trips on single-engine planes to crop dusting.
On Tuesday, the top Democrat on the House transportation panel, Rep. Rick Larsen of Washington, said in an interview he was mulling two options: either adjusting the ROTOR Act or crafting new legislation after the National Transportation Safety Board last week issued 50 recommendations related to the catastrophe, which killed 67 people.
.
The journalists asked Homendy about it on the day of the board meeting, and she diplomatically said she'd been busy with the DCA midair documents since the board meeting and final report were coming up, but she also reiterated she wants ADS-B IN on every aircraft, so...

The NTSB has the enviable role of being able to champion safety absent any other consideration. The FAA and politics in general need to balance that with economic, business and other interests, so the outcomes are pretty much guaranteed to be compromises falling short of what we would want.

Subjects ADSB (All)  DCA  FAA  Final Report  NTSB  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy

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Musician
February 18, 2026, 01:30:00 GMT
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Post: 12038924
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
.
Altimeter testing showed that the 100-ft pressure altitude discrepancy seen in the FDR data for the accident flight was observed on three other UH-60L helicopters operated by the 12th Aviation Battalion. These altimeter testing results also showed that the pressure altitude data recorded by the helicopters\x92 FDRs, when corrected for local conditions, was representative of what was indicated on the right side altimeter. Therefore, the FDR pressure altitude data for the accident helicopter, when corrected for local conditions, was likely representative of what was indicated on the IP\x92s barometric altimeter during the accident flight.

[...]. The NTSB concludes that, due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter\x92s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter\x92s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.

For the northern segment of Route 4, which included the area of the collision, of the 523 flights analyzed, 260 flights (49%) were identified as exceeding route altitude limitations at some point during the flight. Had the error tolerances of barometric altimeters been considered during design of the helicopter route maximum altitudes, the incompatibility of a 200-ft ceiling and barometric altimeter errors may have been identified.


Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Final Report  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Route Altitude

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Musician
February 18, 2026, 02:50:00 GMT
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Post: 12038946
Originally Posted by MechEngr
They requested visual separation and gave affirmation they had the other aircraft in sight. Failing to check the altimeter to a known datum was the least contributor.
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.

You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 18, 2026, 06:15:00 GMT
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Post: 12038986
Originally Posted by Chiefttp
The Helicopter Pilot flying the helicopter flew 56 hours the previous year prior, a little more than 4.5 hours per month! Only 4.4 hours in the previous 60 days! And She was on a checkride! Any military pilot will attest to the fact that when your due a checkride you try to get some practice flying prior to the checkride. I guess all the additional duties precluded that .Tough to stay proficient flying so little…..
No, she did get some practice in, it's in the report:
A pilot who flew with the accident pilot stated that she practiced basic flight maneuvers and NVG tasks in preparation for her upcoming evaluation flight. He recalled that the pilot seemed “rusty” due to a lack of recent flying but that, otherwise, nothing stood out about her performance.
.
The PF actually had more hours on the "accident helicopter make and model" than the instructor pilot, and people who flew with her in 2023 and 2024 thought she was flying well enough.

Subjects Night Vision Goggles (NVG)

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Musician
February 18, 2026, 19:31:00 GMT
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Post: 12039332
Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50
Wrong. Visual lookout is a responsibility for all members of the crew. That's a shared responsibility, and briefed before every flight.
The PIC reported 'traffic in sight' when he clearly hadn't, he should never have asked for visual separation (normalisation of deviance).
We don't know of any gestures, if any pilot pointed at lights, but there is nothing in the CVR transcript that indicates the PF was aware of the traffic, or that the PIC pointed the traffic out to her; the PF certainly did not factor in the decision to request visual separation.

So when the PIC transmitted,
20:46:07.9 RDO-1 PAT two five has the traffic in sight request visual separation .
what would you have the PF do? Ask the instructor where it is? Or trust the instructor, and concentrate on flying?
or did the PF know that neither of them could identify the traffic, but accepted it as normal?

Subjects CVR  Normalization of Deviance  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 19, 2026, 16:25:00 GMT
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Post: 12039774
Originally Posted by Chiefttp
Island Airphoto,
NVG\x92s are vision enhancers, by multiples at night. Also, This was an evaluation flight/checkride, so the other pilot was performing EP duties, not IP duties. She wasn\x92t a student on this flight, She was to act as the PIC\x85.
Then why did the PNF decide to request visual separation?

Subjects Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 19, 2026, 18:33:00 GMT
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Post: 12039831
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
repeatedly in the CVR transcript of the Blackhawk the instructor tells the PF they are straying from their clearance
Once only, not repeatedly. She's following the river when they come out of the side arm, but in the wrong direction. My understanding is that the PNF is supposed to be navigating, though.
the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I’ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would’ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would’ve been even more taxing for the instructor
The landing at the helipad where she abandoned because the wind made the helicopter hard to control, and she lost sight of the landing zone? and then the instructor calls "go around", possibly because of some deer?
I don’t know how anyone can pretend these things didn’t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.

if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ’s flatboats occurred within the PF’s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly.

the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably
I don't think the handling played a part at all.

What I do see is that when the instructor is flying, he's having some altitude excursions as well.

There's also a visual separation while the instructor is flying, and it plays out like this:
20:00:11.0 APR-P PAT two five if you hear Potomac acknowledge with an IDENT. traffic at your nine to ten o'clock in two miles eastbound one thousand eight hundred indicated its a helicopter.

INT-2 [trainee] do you see him?
INT-1 [instructor] nope.

INT-2 do you see him?
INT-1 no. nine to ten o'clock. *.

20:00:22.7 RDO-2 * * traffic

INT-1 yeah. I got it. tally. coming left.
INT-1 alright you want me to keep chasing this number one needle or-
INT-2 yeah. just avoid traffic at this point.
INT-1 yup. I got the traffic out the right door
.
and only then does she call 'traffic in sight maintaining visual separation'.

For the CRJ, the instructor calls 'traffic in sight' without ascertaining that the PF sees it. When the tower cautions them again, the CRJ still hasn't turned, so while it's visible, it doesn't appear a threat. I think both pilots expect the CRJ to be to their right, because that's where the bridge is when ATC tells them where the CRJ is initially, and because the instructor thinks that ATC wants them to move left. They don't understand that the CRJ is on their left and will be turning onto the runway heading.

I imagine, based on that, that the PF believed the instructor has the CRJ in sight on his side. If she did see the CRJ, it would've been well above and on a diverging course, except for the final 6 seconds or so; it wouldn't have appeared to be a threat.

With his radio call, the instructor put himself in the position of being responsible for avoiding AA5342, but he didn't actually know where it was (maybe he thought he did).
There are a lot of factors contributing to that, but that's the big hole here for me.

Last edited by Musician; 19th February 2026 at 18:47 .

Subjects AA5342  ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  CVR  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Musician
February 19, 2026, 22:41:00 GMT
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Post: 12039932
Thank you!
Originally Posted by Easy Street
Clearly, he hadn't. I'm impressed with the NTSB's reporting on this aspect: the difficulties of using NVG to identify and visually separate from other aircraft are very well described in the narrative, and the photographs through NVG from representative vantage points illustrate them superbly for the uninitiated.
Not to mention the animation:



Subjects Night Vision Goggles (NVG)

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