Posts by user "WillowRun 6-3" [Posts: 100 Total up-votes: 113 Page: 2 of 5]¶

Thanks for assuring that disscussion of (or at least posts about) legal issues on the thread do include proper legal terms and principles. Reasonable care, in particular.

And further as you say, it is possible that a particular crew operating under particular assigned roles and responsibilities, and given knowledge and familiarity with the way DCA ATCOs handle helicopter flights in and near approach corridors - knowledge and familiarity accumulated over time at the levels of both the individual Army aviators and their unit(s) - did in fact exercise care that was reasonable under all those circumstances. I think the second sentence of your post effectively says the same thing.

I cannot adjust my view of this accident to account for a bias against blaming aviators - it's not that I'm unwilling to make such an adjustment where assignment of responsibility is clear and well-established, but as merely an interested outside observer of the aviation sector (whether writ large or down to specific cases in court, or any other rack & stack of it) I have to acknowledge this bias. (The Pakistan 8303 accident, for example, was a situation in which responsibility was clear and well-established, if I followed the accident thread including report correctly). But self-adjustment of bias is unlikely.

So, what was reasonable care in this specific set of physical and procedureal conditions in the relevant moments prior to the midair collision? It might be a logical and factual conclusion to draw that, given (what I think can fairly be called) "normalization of complacency", do the acts and omissions of the crew really amount to negligence? As other posts here have indicated, I'm doubtful of drawing that conclusion. But given the highly aberrational nature of the occurence, what is there to which to assign responsibility, then? Well, the set-up of the airspace and how it was controlled - again, not by the individual ATCOs, rather by the system.

And it is the looming presence of that "system" which gives me pause about whether the invocation of the discretionary function exception would in effect bar the courthouse door.

A friend who sometimes reads threads here asked me recently whether I have any involvement in representing any clients or potential clients with regard to this accident. I definitely do not (just in case anyone reading wonders "what's in it for . . ." WR 6-3).

@ H 'n' H .....

About bias against blaming pilots..... thanks for the background in the pertinent post you wrote. I'll get the book.

Being given a view into the inside story of an investigation and its findings is quite interesting, and it is good to know this part of the background of what leads many posters (and elsewhere) to avoid assigning responsibility to aviators, and even to apply - if this phrase may be imputed here - a higher burden of proof.

But the bias I was acknowledging is from a different source. There are, in the legal profession, plenty of blogs (and forums also I would imagine) with streams of comments. And other aviation sites of course too. Although some of my very earliest posts (thankfully, under somewhat of a different callsign) had too many cringeworthy aspects . . . or maybe a few were almost entirely cringe-provoking, I haven't been kicked out yet. So insofar as having a bias against assigning responsibility to aviators, whatever its source and lineage, whatever its causal roots and heritage, and whatever analytic gymnastics it might require for sorting out other actors and their potential roles in accidents, I have understood the existence of an unwritten rule on this forum. And to me, it makes sense and is not arbitrary. As an old lawyer joke has it: An attorney sees a parrot in a pet shop window, and early for court, strolls into the shop, and proceeds to make what he thinks are bird-sounding noises like "Polly want a cracker?" To which the bird responds, "I can talk. I can talk. Can you fly? Can you fly?'"

That applies only in cross-examination, and not always there either.

I'm applying SLF/attorney license here (hey, there's poetic license, so why not?) of repeating - with some editing - a post I placed on the R&N thread about testing at DCA.

1) Regarding ADSB-Out being turned off, what is the reason there was such emphasis placed on this at the recent Congressional hearing (and just scoring media points per usual in Committee hearings doesn't qualify as a "reason" in this context). Is the reason that there are objections to running the kinds of tests in question (per the R&N thread) in or near DCA airspace? Is it valid to say there is no connection to the chain of causes-and-effects which led to the midair collision on Janaury 29 (but if there is, what is that connection, specifically)? Is the reason some connection with the occurence of TA's and RA's on TCAS as documented by NTSB? (although other posts on the R&N thread indicate that ADSB-out isn't connected to TCAS advisories . . . that is, if I understood those other posts). Or something else? I'm dismissing the mere fact that FR24 doesn't provide information to enthusiasts as the reason for such emphasis in the hearing.

2) If the Army operates certain "missions" with ADSB-Out turned off, and it conducts these operations based on national security concerns, my initial thought about this practice is, . . . . . . . hey, isn't there a discretionary function involved in deciding what avionics (or electronics system if this isn't within the technical definition and scope of "avionics") to operate based on national security concerns? So the Senator declaring that there is "no justification" seems to deliberately overlook the existence in the Federal Tort Claims Act of the exception. (I realize there has not been, to my knowledge at least, any lawsuits filed yet. But they're certainly going to happen.)

Of course, this all said, the indictment of the structure and operation of the portion of the NAS in which DCA is situated might (as suggested previosly) itself be adjudged inconsistent and non-compliant with basic standards of aviation safety. The only not-crazy-sounding justification for that state of affairs would seem to be "but we have to move traffic in volume." As a legal wrangle over whether that obvious judgment of a "policy" nature is or is not a proper basis for keeping federal immunity in place in a particular matter . . . I am quite skeptical such a legal wrangle would ever make it as far as an actual courtroom proceeding. But will Congress not try to manuever itself into the issue for all the usual reasons - some people want actually to address the problem constructively, some just want to please their donors, and some just follow the crowd, or so it always appears.

3) Something about discovery in civil litigation was underscored by the exchange in the video clip: there's an Army memo, dated Aug. 9, 2024 as referenced by Sen. Cruz, about operating in the NAS with ADSB-Out turned off. And the Army so far declines to turn it over to the Committee. (Applying the rough equivalent of a pre-snap read by a QB, the manner in which the Army witness replied to Sen. Cruz's questions gave the impression that the Army and DoD will strongly resist the memo in question becoming public.)

[Okay, I'll refrain from speculating how much fun it would be to decide which officer or officers would be presented as the Person(s) Most Knowledgeable about the matters discussed in this memo (on the Army side, receiving the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice), or similarly, how much fun would be had by counsel describing the "subject matter(s)" which must be specifically iterated in a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition notice (on the plaintiffs' side).]

4. I'm very determinedly hoping this won't be read or even misinterpreted as an offensive point. In the YT video produced by "Mover" in which he interviewed a former Army helicopter aviator (post 1228), it was possible to draw the impression that Army helicopter pilots operating in the airspace in which DCA is situated have a certain attitude toward FAA ATC. That is, the Army operates - one could get the impression - in its own "airspace system" and deals with FAA ATC only as much and only as quickly as necessary. Listening to the pertient Jan. 29 ATC R/T, and knowing the visual difficulties presented by the basic facts of nighttime in that specific area of the DCA airspace, plus NVGs, an observer could get the impression that the Army aviator handling the R/T was doing so in a perfunctory manner on Jan. 29.

To explain further, upthread (in post 1261) in the context of a Mover/Gonky YT video (post 1228) someone much more knowledgeable than myself observed that the way in which the Army pilot interviewed in the video described communications with FAA ATCOs in DCA airspace was as if Army chopper pilots view FAA ATCOs somewhat as a nuisance. Far be it from me to fault any pilot over any practice or custom in anything, including comms with ATCOs. But faulting any pilot is not the point. The point is that in that YT video, as related that other poster, --
"it was suggested that it\x92s perfectly OK to second guess what ATC might have said to you, reply to that, and then if no correction is forthcoming you can comply with your guess. As others have pointed out implicitly, that works if there\x92s only one error involved, but here there were three: an untrue statement, leading to a wrongly issued clearance, and a missing read back."

It is known that ADSB-Out is not active on the Army and other certain missions in the relevant airspace. Is there also a pattern or practice of operating with a mindset that FAA ATC is a necessary nuisance, to be indulged but not focused upon as closely as other airspace users? If any reader asserts this question accuses the Army pilots or any one of them in the helicopter on January 29 of negligence - that would be incorrect. The way in which the airspace had been designed, managed and operated handed those pilots a pre-determined normalization of complacency - so it appears, does it not?. They operated their flight within the system they had been given, which does not constitute negligence. The designers, managers, and operators of that system . . . well, it will be for the courts to sort out whether the exception to the removal of federal immunity to tort claims applies to those systemic level actions, or not. If it were not for the existence of the discretionary function exception, I personally believe the race to the courthouse would already have been a feeding frenzy worthy of the most biting negative stereotypes about lawyers.

Speaking of immunities, wasn't it generally believed that the airspace within the NAS, and especially airspace in which major airports in the United States are situated, was immune to midair collisions, in general and not only collisions sudden, without actionable warning, and with at most two or three seconds' knowledge of impending death and disaster? Mere SLF/attorney as I am, I had believed that. It follows, but only under that mindset, that what occurred was obviously negligence, and even gross negligence. The point is, expect the lawsuits to be, in a word, consistent with the ugliness one feels seeing the wreckage pulled from the Potomac, or reading about the backgrounds of 67 people. Or both.

Let's say that the reasoning you have described is not only valid but also the dominant theme of an anticipated trial. Is it not difficult to contemplate a trial in which the central theory of liability is invoking a dread phrase, one with both the words "pilot" and "error", or at least the "negligence" version of that phrase. This would be a horrible case to see unfold. Of course the lawyers representing the families and other loved ones of the accident victims will press hard to make exactly such an unfolding happen - and their clients, the families and other loved ones, will be pressing just as hard as the families of the MAX accident victims are doing in the criminal case in federal court in Texas, if not harder.

This is not a reason either to dismiss, or to claim decisivenesss of, any particular legal reasoning here. It is instead recognition that reasoning which points to the request for visual separation and then the failure to maintain it as the basic cause of the accident will produce a very unpleasant legal case. Think of the Army units assigned to this sort of duty, how they are trained to treat "continuity of governement" and transport of highly important (presumably) officials as a kind of higher calling - at least that's the impression given by several statements or articles. And one set of their fellow servicemembers are put in the position of being blamed, and not present even to try to explain what happened. And that's in addition to usual strident reluctance to assign responsibility to aviators in situations where things go wrong.

Over the past several days, it has become clearer that the airspace environment was indeed so compromised that, as SLF/attorney without technical expertise or even knowledge about airspace design, management and operation, it would be best to stop trying to refine an understanding of the causes and effects and instead leave the puzzle-solving aside until the NTSB report is completed and released. That said, the way Sen. Cruz pressed witnesses last week suggests that waiting for the report will be a difficult task.

I appreciate any and every acknowledgement of efforts to make positive contributions to this forum - thank you for your post!

As other posts have admitted I am biased against assigning responsibility in situations such as this one to any aviator. There additionally may be a somewhat unique factor in this case too (involving some personal history about Army aviation maintenance training circa 1975, enlistment as an alternative to dead-end mindless jobs, and studying German in high school and for a couple of semesters in college so that if I ever went to Germany in the Army . . . ).

Because I'm an attorney and not a pilot. Of course your description of the relationship between the forum purpose and unbiased analysis is correct. And by the same token, if I were working on this accident in my professional capacity, I hope to High Heaven that I would not be biased in any way, just the facts and the applicable law, and (apologies) the interests of justice.

But I crash this party every time I post, and so I'll let the professionals in the aviation community direct the painful vector of responsibility to aviators, where they must. As SLF/attorney I have determined it appropriate to respect the fact that the average professional pilot has already forgotten more about understanding accident causes and reasons than I will ever know. As I said, in a professional capacity, I would be working with such pro's and would "try to keep up."

ATC Watcher:
"The primary cause of this collision is airspace design and normalization of deviance over the years. I hope the judges will see that when the trial comes. We should leave the military crew and their grieving families out of this."

Which takes the pertinent legal case right back to the question whether the federal government will be protected by sovereign immunity. Sitting in, say, a conference room discussing in the abstract "airspace design" I don't think a single competent aviation attorney would not reply that design of airspace is a discretionary function (so sovereign immunity applies), and perhaps is a classic illustration of such discretion exercised functionally. Normalization of deviance is likely a closer question on the premise that it occurred through numerous small (or perceived as small at the time) changes and revisions of procedures and airspace design. But operation of the airspace when viewed in such a macro frame of reference looks pretty discretionary as a function, too.

But abstractions lost their meaning as 67 entirely blameless people lost their lives in this catastrophe. I'm not in this matter - not representing or advising anyone - but my mind can't get off outlining the attack on the discretionary function exception (to avoid doubt, I'm saying the exception needs to be argued against and shown not to apply on these facts). It is with hindsight, true, but the situation which existed in the airspace in question on the night of Wednesday 29 January broke, stomped upon, and otherwise disregarded so many basic rules of the aviation safety mindset that ....
like they say, you can take the lawyer out of litigating, but you can't take litigating out of the lawyer.

Here's a new thought. In lawsuits (another poster helpfully noted upthread) under the Federal Tort Claims Act - the statute which takes sovereign immunity away but subject to exceptions - claims for punitive damages are not allowed.

Think about that for half a minute. Just on the facts, forget the legal technicality under the FTCA, would this not FREAKING be a case warranting punitive damages against the federal government for setting the stage of this accident and then putting the players in motion? So, you're an attorney, part of the team representing any one of the families of victims of this CATASTROPHE in the middle of the air ... or some or even all, of the victims' families. What do you do?

I will be neither surprised nor shocked if the lawsuits also name American Airlines, which has no protection obviously under the FTCA. It didn't do anything wrong..... but naming the airline as a defendant gets their insurers involved, and then establishment of a fund and a process to compensate the representatives of the victims can be brought forward and conducted. Skip the courthouse except to get things started, but this matter needs a creative approach. Oh, did I mention, part of the approval for such a fund and compensation process would have to be pretty sweeping reform of how FAA does business and what business it does, and the reform plan had better be down to chapter and verse?
WR 6-3

If my post is open to misinterpretation, then that's on me. In other words it's not a matter of affirmatively wanting to "drag" the airline into a lawsuit in which it would not be a legitimate party. Rather, in the exercise of forecasting the inevitable lawsuits (or at least applying some analytic foresight), and trying to think like counsel for the victims' families, a non-frivolous claim against the airline could open the case in total to claims for punitive damages. As you note, although in the role of claimant, for its hull loss the airline would likely be involved anyway. And so would its insurers.

Beyond that, and because my referring to making the airline a party is not meant to be trivial, the underlying idea is that establishment of a fund and claims process would be one of two main components of an approach to resolving the matter. The other component would have to be some - and I realize this is perhaps too much magical thinking - hard-truth reform and rework of airspace configuration and usage rules, nationwide. I don't wish to preach or pontificate, but this catastrophic accident happened after the Safety Call to Action, after the National Airspace Safety Team report, after the intense public, political, and international attention to and focus upon FAA in the aftermath of Lion Air and Ethiopian. So the underlying and motivating objective is to follow and apply former U.S. Amb. to Japan Rahm Emanuel's aphorism, "a crisis is a terrible thing to waste."

And yes, though it's hopefully non-frivolous, and despite it being a placeholder claim rather than an entirely direct claim, telling ATC "Unable" in re: Rwy 3-3 given the known airspace complications would appear the most viable option.

About those discussions at senior levels . . . If your reference to such discussions was meant to include not only within a given airline, but also some or all of the cadres of senior officials in the industry, U.S. government, international colleagues, and think tanks - those are the same discussions which are supposed to be going on now, in light of the NTSB's pro-active responses to the accident. Although it is a limited sample, in the accidents in which Board processes have been involved in the time I have been trying to keep up via PPRuNe and other information sources, I can't recall a similar "urgent recommendation" addressed to FAA as NTSB issued in this matter. Safety Alerts to Operators (SAFO's) yes, such as after Air Canada "There's no one on 2-8-Right but you" 759 in San Francisco in 2017. But not the same as what has issued from NTSB now. Perhaps I missed some salient details but the review which FAA became instructed and/or motivated to conduct would have a total NAS scope.

Or maybe such a review will, regrettably, require an Act of Congress (it should not require this, but, you know, K Street, campaign donors, the seniority system, and the generally stellar academic and career experience required prior to election to the Congress . . . . too bad elected represenatives are not required to build hours first).

Thanks for the hat tip & etc.

Not sure of what video you've referred to about the Air Canada incident. But yes, without a doubt, it was a very close call. Only a slight difference in the height above the taxiway for the Air Canada flight, or slight delay in initiating the go-around . . . and many factors which play into those parameters (reaction time, etc.).

I don't recall any interviews of the aviators being published (but I haven't run off to go looking through sources available online). Somewhat more in the direction of drift, the thread on the incident was useful background for trying to follow and understand the Lufthansa diversion occurrence.

Edit and slight correction: NTSB Incident Report, NTSB/AIR 18/01, PB2018-101561 (Sept. 25, 2018) does include information from the incident investigation interviews of the pilots (including several quotations) but to my knowledge the transcripts of interviews were not disclosed to the public.

Website of Chicago law firm with very significant practice representing families of victims of aviation accidents has information that preliminary procedural claim was filed on February 18, on behalf of one of the DCA accident victims for $250 million. The filing relates to the procedural requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act which must be fulfilled prior to filing a lawsuit in federal district court.

The preliminary claim process ostensibly or superficially provides a vehicle for dispute resolution and monetary settlement prior to litigation. (I am not expressing or implying any view with regard to the likelihood of any such resolution and settlement being reached for the claim of this specific plaintiff or any larger set of plaintiffs' claims, or with regard to the prospects of "negotiations" starting, progressing, or producing results.)

Apart from the IMC non-issue, the cause-and-effect chain of events and omissions in this accident is still under investigation. But I'll try to give some answer to your post - although I doubt my mind will latch onto anything new compared to the volume of this thread to date.

There are unknowns at this point about what information the Army PAT25 crew had in front of them about the altitude at which they were operating. There also are unknowns about the Army crew's visual scan (which, as a non-aviator, sounds to me like a complex subset of facts; I do work on maintaining strong visual scan plying limited access highways and even local streets and roads in my car but the instrument panel of my vehicle is, shall we say, somewhat limited in comparison). Add in the relatively fixed attributes of the physical environment, the background lights of the city and surrounding areas, the river, and so forth. Plus, NVGs, plus experience using same by the particular crew.

Then with all those factual matters still subject to fairly significant unknowns (at least as I am able to follow the developments), your question(s) turn to the acts or omissions of ATC. I am fairly strongly inclined to "stay in my lane" - meaning, there is a lot more about how ATC functions are performed that I don't know, compared to what I might actually have picked up from forum threads and other sources. It stands to reason that the visual separation set-up is subject to formal written rules and procedures, but I don't know to what extent these presumed rules and procedures reach down to very specific operational details. Beyond that, the signal-to-noise ratio of what more I might say would not be too especially good.

I'm reminded of the old saw that some one or another fairly well-versed individual has already forgotten more about a given subject than some smart-aleck will ever be able to master about such subject. I don't want to trip over that . . . altitude restriction.

One other perhaps non-trivial item I can add is that the attorney whose office has filed the preliminary claim (as required pursuant to the federal statute) is very accomplished in this field. I've met him at professional (Aviation Law) conferences. I have enough respect for other members of the bar who have amassed vastly larger public records of accomplishment - even those records which prompt lawyer-bashers to decry the profession and all who practice in it - not to try to pass off forum talk as the equivalent, or even merely reflective of, the serious legal thinking going on in that attorney's conference room. And many other law firm conference rooms. The issues in this matter aren't going to be simple, neat, or pleasant. Perhaps the air has been deflated out of the emotional shock-balloon the midair collision visited upon many folks; it is still my view that this was a catastrophe, wrenching in many respects the NAS all the way back to the skies over New York City in 1960 and the midair which ultimately gave rise to the formation of PATCO. And the strike, which led to, with respect to controller staffing . . . . .

(emphasis added)

After waiting a few days to find out whether replies would be posted by other knowledgeable aviators besides Sailvi767, and despite status as just SLF/attorney, I've got to ask: Is it a reasonable inference to draw from the quoted post, especially the part underlined, that the RJ crew perhaps was not completely without responsibility for the collision? I do not lightly (this has been batted about previously) even so much as imply responsibility for accidents on the part of pilots. Yet the quoted post seems to suggest that in this specific instance for the specific reasons stated, the RJ crew might have had a share of the responsibiity.

I admit I had thought of the RJ crew as having been not aware of any information suggesting or indicating immiment danger (despite having written an academic paper about Uberlingen a few years ago). And, the facts which potentially lead to assigning a share of responsibility to the RJ crew also would then change the contours and progression of the litigation, quite dramatically, and not only in terms of impact on familly members. Bringing in the airline as a defendant would direct the complaint drafter's mind to questions of the most effective style, organization and content to make the case for punitive damages. Forum readers following the legal aspects of the accident on the thread may recall that punitive damages are not recoverable in a tort claim brought against the United States Federal Government The airline company or companies here have no such protection.

"..... this was definitely not a case of "Well, they had the traffic info so they should have avoided it!" - it's wayyyyyy more subtle and complex than that. . . ."

Regrets: in my post trying to comment on Sailvi767's observation regarding the RJ crew having the best situational awareness, in retrospect I should have emphasized and explained what I meant by using the the word "imminent". The thread previously did clearly reference factors such as the inhibition of TAs and RAs at specified heights, and the TA alert. What seemed different in the post about the RJ crew's SA was what I, as only SLF/attorney, understood as the suggestion that a different crew with different mindset might have realized before the last second prior to impact that "erring on the side of caution" was the correct action to take. Please note - this is not an effort to put words into Sailvi767's post whatsoever.

Perhaps it was already pretty clear to others, but I had thought - for the reasons your post H&H talks about - that naming the airline as a defendant in the lawsuits would be just for form's sake at best, and to draw in its insurance coverages. Every law student (in the U.S. that is, I don't know about other systems) is taught that a shorthand for negligence is whether the alleged negligent party "knew or should have known" about the risk of harm the party was creating. The observation that I think the post about the RJ crew's SA justifies is certainly not that they "knew". But it does suggest that although it is highly unlikely they "should have known", there either are some facts supporting the assertion that they "could have known", or at least enough facts to warrant making the airline a defendant.

About prior safety-related reports and whether any risk assessments were done and what those assessments showed, it appears very likely if not certain that some answers to "who knows" will be found through the discovery process particularly, although not only, if the airline is named as defendant.

(Lastly, I apologize for convoluting the thread.)
WR 6-3

Well, isn't that razor-sharp, incisive, accident cause analysis?

1. So if an "intolerable risk" is identified by the NTSB Chair, your view is that nonethless the pilot flying the helicopter necessarily was incompetent when that risk finally reached occurrence? The Swiss Cheese model requires accounting for all the holes in the block first of all existing somewhere, and then enough of them lining up - but not necessarily all of the holes lining up. The pilot might have been fully competent and might not have been - but the intolerable risk present in the airspace design makes it necessary to know a lot more relevant facts in the record to supoort a logical conclusion.

Or perhaps you'll next assert that Chair Homendy is just covering for DEI.

2. Any second-year associate in a firm of more than three lawyers who has done nothing more than watch five depositions would raiload your argument to the extent it is based on the NYT's twisting of the summary of the CVR about turning left. Directive? Among other things, if the pilot flying was being "directed" then to the extent there is responsibility, it has to be mutual.

3. Whenever I read pieces like the one published in the NYT I wonder if one of the reporters has a close friend working on one of the lawsuits and is just trying to shape public opinion. Even if that speculation is merely a cheap shot, I didn't read anything in the piece which changed the level of "complexity" of the accident. Perhaps it was deeply hidden and required more reading between the lines. Regardless, its publication is a sorry excuse to jump far ahead of the investigations.

NTSB Newsroom:
"NTSB investigating Thursday's incidents at Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) in which a Delta Air Lines Airbus A319 and a Republic Airways Embraer E170 were instructed by air traffic control to perform go-arounds due to a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter inbound to the Pentagon."

[Credit: post on X by NTSB Newsroom, seen as reply to post by @STATter911 (cited by LowObs); verified from NTSB webpage]

"The helicopter \x97 also a Black Hawk \x97 \x93 took a scenic route around the Pentagon versus proceeding directly from the west to the heliport,\x94 [the] FAA assistant administrator for government and industry affairs [...] wrote in an email obtained by POLITICO." (emphasis added)

The FAA official's choice of words was either meant as a sarcastic comment criticizing the flight path operated by the helicopter - or if taken literally did he intend to communicate that the helicopter crew knowingly flew a route with better visuals of the city as if sightseeing? The fact that even after the accident there still are issues like this is bad enough; if he intended to be understood literally....

And is there a factual, basis for believing this particular helicopter flight was a training mission as opposed to the VIP transport about which Sec. Duffy's remarks were pretty strident? If information about it having been a training mission was included in prior posts, I missed it.

I don't know but I wonder, are there some VIPs who do not also meet the criteria for status as a "senior leader"?

From non-paywalled content published today by The Air Current (quoted without any change):

U.S. Army Brigadier General Matthew Braman has rotated out of his role as Director of Army Aviation, leaving the branch\x92s central aviation office without clear leadership in the wake of January\x92s fatal midair collision between an Army Black Hawk helicopter and a PSA Airlines CRJ700 near Washington, D.C.\x92s Reagan National Airport (DCA).

An Army official told The Air Current that the move was made as a part of the Department of Defense\x92s broader effort to streamline its general officer workforce. Going forward, the role will be filled by a lower ranking Army Colonel (O-6), the official said, though the Army declined to comment on who is currently serving in Braman\x92s former role or who is expected to fill it.

Army personnel \x97 and others involved in the DCA investigation \x97 are due to appear starting on July 30 at the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board\x92s three-day hearing on the crash to submit sworn testimony and answer investigators\x92 questions. Braman is expected to testify during the hearing, TAC has learned.

The NTSB hearing on the accident is being live-streamed on PBS.org.