Posts by user "WillowRun 6-3" [Posts: 100 Total up-votes: 113 Page: 5 of 5]¶

This is a "what if" post.

It is based on wondering how, or more pointedly why, someone might have proposed and pressed for the inclusion of the legislative section at issue. And by "how and why" I mean beyond the obvious, and frankly superficial, rationale that the armed forces' aviation elements operating in Washington, D.C. airspace and specifically near and around DCA, should have environments for training flights or check rides closer to what they want.

Suppose - what if - the role of legal issues in armed forces decsion-making or decision processes is a subject that, at this moment, presents more than typical difficulties. And specifically, if the subject of the looming court action in the litigation by the families of the deceased passengers on the RJ causes especially acute difficulties. The prospect of the Army, as well as the FAA and Department of Transportation, getting socked with a huge judgment - and getting socked after a trial during which the testimony and other evidence makes them look rather less than world-class in competence - causes someone to try to do something to avert such an outcome.

"But hey", someone says, "we can rely on the discretionary function exception, and then push all the liability onto the airline. Tough sledding for them and their shareholders, but 'protect the institution' ..." (or words to that effect).

It then is pointed out that the exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity will not be established on the current state of facts. So..... "what if we get legislation passed which applies specifically to management of DCA airspace with respect to military flight operations, and which irrefutably expresses a "policy judgment"? If it had been in place before the accident, Army and USFG would have discretionary function protection. Let's try to get it in place now and use "relation back" arguments and analysis to show that, contrary to what wild-eyed posters on some forum on the interwebs write, the policy judgments protected by the exception were indeed in place and effective as the basis for airspace management on January 29."

A kind of back-dating the check.

Don't mean to spoil the humour but the Chairwoman certainly concluded she was obligated to refer to the statutory language precisely.

I don't see anything in the above which states or implies that the provision in question is a good idea, or even just a neutral idea -- but then, the post perhaps (or likely) wasn't intended to state point of view on the provision's wisdom or absence of wisdom.

But regardless, I'm just trying to "noodle" (as a higher-seniority level lawyer in the same firm once used the term) how such a provision was inserted into the NDAA. I might have been taken in too much by press releases and watching hearings, but the current leadership of the House T&I (Transportation and Infrastructure) Committee has not given - to at least this one observer - any reason to think they would move in a direction contrary to the urgent safety recommendations made by NTSB soon after the accident (which were in fact implemented by DOT soon thereafter). So where is this coming from, this provision?

I won't try to argue leverage against any of the links in the reasoning in the quoted post. For one thing, the cynicism - not saying it isn't valid or warranted - on which the reasoning is based is sharper and more basic than the cynicism I usually experience. But this avoidance still doesn't address the question, where did the provision originate, and why?

Perhaps it is coming from the Executive branch and the Congress people involved feel pressure, for all sorts of Jet-Blasty reasons. The Pentagon might not want the adverse publicity of a trial which casts very unfavorable light. And with the recently announced systems integrator contract for the new ATC system, likewise, trial developments showing governmental incompetence would be seen as impeding the rest of the required appropriations. Not least, the public hype for the new ATC system has frequently referred to the work being completed in three or four years. Reliable sources (including a long time senior ATCO in a major European country with current involvement in a major ATCOs organization) scoff at the idea that all the necessary steps could possibly be completed in less than 8 to 10 years (including but not limited to site acquisition, construction, training on new equipment, not to mention sufficient rosters of ATCOs and then doing the relocations necessary if main facilities are actually consolidated). A really negative trial in Washington would not be helpful with regard to continuing to tout the expected so-very-rapid arrival of the new ATC system which will - it is said - make up for many years of lost time in the NAS.

I'm not arguing that this is what happened - just, what is the root of the provision? I mean, unless one believes it's a good idea, then I guess the "what if" is answered by saying, "good idea". Or even....
"That's good thinking there, Cool Breeze." (Couldn't resist the Boomer aside.)

From the Committee website; Rep. Nehls also has issued a statement opposing the NDAA provision which has elicited vehement objections from NTSB.

Washington, D.C. \x96 Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Troy E. Nehls (R-TX) announced that the Subcommittee will receive testimony from Bryan Bedford, marking his first appearance in front of Congress as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Subcommittee Members will have the opportunity to discuss recent regulatory actions taken by the FAA and current issues in aviation, and seek updates on the continued implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The hearing, entitled, \x93The State of American Aviation,\x94 will be held at 10:00 a.m. ET on Tuesday, December 16, 2025, in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building.
Witness List:

The Honorable Bryan Bedford, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, United States Department of Transportation

The NTSB has not said, and Chairwoman Homendy's letter does not say, that lack of ADS-B Out was the central cause of the accident. Without going through the whole thread again, as far as I recall no one has even argued, let alone persuasively asserted, that lack of ADS-B Out caused the accident. Any even mostly attentive reading of the thread would lead one to conclude that there were several big problems with the "situation" on the night of the accident. Just picking the one easiest for a non-aircrew to comprehend, the difficulty of discerning different objects, in the air and on the ground, at night and at low altitudes, particularly against the background of city lights, was a factor. No one has claimed lack of ADS-B Out made it a factor nor has anyone claimed that having ADS-B Out would remove it as a factor in given situations.

The argument that the NTSB Chair and the Congressional people who are opposed have heard some imperative to "don't just sit there, do something" is a straw man, imo.

But taking it with more credence than it seems to deserve, how do you explain the absence of much, or really any, opposition to the NTSB's recommendation issued shortly after the accident? Too much heat in the aftermath of the tragedy to state the opposition at that time, instead wait until things died down?

Thank you MechEngr for stating in detail, and explaining, the recommendations made by NTSB and their relation to ADS-B systems, both Out and In.

It appears I had mistakenly thought NTSB had made a recommendation after the accident about ADS-B. That was incorrect.

It would be interesting to try to unearth the document trail with respect to the agreement reached by FAA and the DoD with regard to ADS-B Out usage, which agreement was reached (per the NTSB Chair letter) after the accident. Of course unearthing documents which relate to controversial subjects could well be a fool's errand. .... ..... ...... oh wait, there's such a thing as pre-trial discovery, and the lawsuits are in federal district court.

Senator Cantwell gave two speeches in recent days on the Senate floor about Section 373. I'm not posting links to them, because "politics". Still, something worth noting from them is that the Senator, previously Chair of the Commerce Committe - the Committee with jurisdiction for civil aviation - and currently Ranking Member, stated she does not know who inserted the highly questionable Section 373 into the NDAA. And whether as prevention or preemption, yes, the families of Flight 5342, including the family of the First Officer, are raising a loud objection to Section 373 - but the concerns over the legislative provision are not based on any effort to serve or to please the trial lawyers suing on the families' behalf. Chairwoman Homendy of the NTSB does indeed operate in a political environment, no kidding, but she is conducting her public advocacy as a safety professional and not a politician. (I'm not lauding any Senator's bona fides as aviation safety advocates because, again "politics.")

I believe the quoted language is from one of my posts on this thread (and no, I'm not complaining about non-attribution).

There are examples where liability was conceded, but these cases were not against the federal government. And the matter of damages was not litigated, but instead determined through a special procedure.

In the cases brought by families of individuals who were killed in the 9/11 attacks, and also in the cases arising from the Deepwater Horizon disaster, plaintiffs had an option to continue their claims in court, or to accept a concession of liability (or at least agreement by defendants to comply with the special process) and have their individual damage awards adjudicated by a "special master". (Special masters are not infrequently appointed by federal district courts to handle detailed matters requiring some type of in-depth knowledge or experience). In both the 9/11 and Deepwater Horizon cases, the special master was a lawyer by the name of Kenneth Feinberg - just to prevent any questions, I have no connection with Mr. Feinberg nor have I ever communicated with him or met him. The process involves individuals describing the extent of their loss and the special master assigning a value, based on knowledge of the range of damage awards on similar facts. It isn't an exact science and does not ever present itself as such (regardless of who serves as special master), but then jury trials and a judge's methods of providing some control over a jury aren't what anyone with a working and reasonable mind would call exact either.

(Caveat: I haven't represented clients in such a special process and I might have mangled one or more parts of what I've described - the main reason to post it is that the way suggested for the government to avoid having its incompetence demonstrated on the witness stand is closely aligned with an existing process for ordinary defendants. Whether Uncle Sam, particularly during the current White House administration, would even think about admitting liability, well, that's a different question.)

Re: AirScotia and the summary in the recent post:

"The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed."

I'm not certain the first sentence above is correct. The letter from the NTSB Chair regarding Section 373 states: "The NTSB has, for decades, advocated for ADS-B In and Out and its substantial contribution to safety, especially near airports."

The NTSB on March 7 issued a pre-preliminary report of sorts, specifically urging immediate action to shut down helicopter route 4 when Runway 33/15 is in use (for landings and departures, respectively). There is no reference to ADS-B in the March 7 urgent recommendation document.

I cannot say how it was that FAA and DoD agreed to start ADS-B Out use by military aircraft in the relevant airspace. But it did not result from the same urgent recommendations, at least insofar as those recommendations were stated in writing on March 7, which led to the closure of helicopter route 4. (I would note that the Preliminary Report by the Board was issued a few days later, on March 11.)

Regarding Section 373's legistative history, to use a term it perhaps does not deserve, there is less mystery than your summation suggests. There certainly are staff of one or both Armed Services Committees, and/or staff of Members serving on one or both of the those Committees, and/or the Representatives and/or Senators who run those Committees, who originated the language, and agreed upon the version that ended up in the legislation (it obviously would have gone through a series of revisions).

So the question is why was their action done without consulting the same people (Committee staff, House/Senate members' staff, and the legislators themselves) whose routine committee work has jurisdiction for civil aviation.

And there's another level also. Where within the defense bureaucracy or some other place in the interagency or executive branch did the impetus for the provision originate? I can see that the post pointing out that the provision, if enacted, would not help the Army in court, is probably correct. What other reason the Army may have had to sponsor the provision (and to do so quietly) I can't say. Which leaves, can it really be that difficult to devise a system for how and when military aircraft with significant emergency or classified operations (as compared to essentially routine operations) need different handling in the airspace?

Administrator Bedford testified today before the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. The ostensible calling of the hearing as noted above was for an update on implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 as well as general oversight. As was widely anticipated, several Members questioned the Administrator, at times pointedly, about the presence and effect of Section 373 in the FY2026 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act), i.e., the controversial provision undoing safety-related changes made in the aftermath of the DCA midair collision on 29 Janaury of this year.

The video link I am including in this post is from the Forbes magazine website (and I apologize that it includes adverts). I don't know if the video link presumably available on the Subcommittee webpage (or it could be on the Committee webpage) has the same time-stamps as the Forbes video and since it's the one I watched, I'm using it here.

The families of at least some of the families of people who lost their lives in the DCA midair were present for the hearing.

Rep. Nehls (R.-TX), Chair of the Subcomm., and the other three leaders each gave opening statements (Comm. Chair Sam Graves (R.-MO.), Comm. Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D.-WA.), and Subcomm. Ranking Member Andre Carson (D.-IN)). Representative Nehls's opening statement hinted that ADS-B Out and Sec. 373 were going to see some emphasis (unsurprising, as Rep. Nehls had already issued a statement decrying Sec. 373).

The Administrator's testimony started at around 19:00. When he concluded, the Subcommittee Chair, Rep. Nehls, opened the questioning (at about 23:00). He asked, in a fairly pointed manner, about the controversial Section of the NDAA, Sec. 373. What did the Administrator answer, readers of the thread (who presumably have far better things to do than watch Congressional hearings) may wonder??

Mr. Bedford responded that FAA policy is not to comment on pending legislation. But he added that the section had shown up in the NDAA without any advice having been sought from or given by the FAA. And that both he and Secretary Duffy have "no intention" of going back to the airspace situation as it was on January 29.

At about 29:15 the Administrator referred to "someone in the Senate" having placed Section 373 into the NDAA. At about 29:45, he noted that after the accident the gaps in the safety situation were closed "and will remain closed." He also seemed to refer to "renegotiation" of the FAA Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Defense (and at least twice during the hearing noted that the DoD had been good partners with FAA with regard to DCA (and Capital Region, I believe) airspace usage).

Congresswoman Norton also questioned the Administrator about Section 373 (1:47:__) although without much follow-up.

At about 2:15:__ (oops, I didn't note who was questioning) Mr. Bedford again used the phrase, "not going back" to the airspace situation as it existed, and that mixed traffic situations (military and civil) were, "not gonna happen". He noted the Memorandum of Agreement between FAA and the DoD - in this instance not referring to any renegotiation process (whether presently or planned) - and added that he is "not aware of any desire to change it" (close to verbatim, but I'm not a court reporter).

The Administrator's testimony was noteworthy for several other reasons (not counting the evidence the hearing provided that not every single Member of the House of Representatives deserves categorization in MechEngr's "critter" status), and here are two I thought most significant - most significant to a pro pilot audience, that is.

The current Administrator is a very smooth operator and this should surprise no one (and this is meant as a compliment to professionalism). Dealing with sometimes ill-founded questions (to be polite) and a few outright stupid questions takes patience. Beyond that, there were no instances, at least to the extent of my knowledge, when the Administrator ran away from the truth of the situation across the FAA. And he still managed to be a good soldier (so to speak) as a member of the current Executive administration. Without getting into politics but strictly in the realm of operating as a professional, not everyone in high places at the moment has the ability as well as willingness to talk detailed "X's and O's" about complicated federal enterprises while still staying within the lanes drawn somewhere on Pennsylvania Avenue (see? - not politics).

Second, the Administrator provided several answers in his testimony about the status of the modernization program. As a possibly interesting even if small point, I don't think I heard "brand new ATC system" or even just "new ATC system" even once; it consistently was Air Traffic Control Modernization. Substantively, he outlined four layers: copper wire to fiber; analog to digital systems (and TDMA to VOIP); analog architecture in general to digital architecture; and a fourth layer of "compute" meaning that now, each facility has its own computing resources and the program intends to move this into one cloud-based layer. He also emphasized work that has already been done and gave a slam-dunk defense of selection of Peraton, and sorry for this disrespect, to an outright stupid question about FAA selecting Peraton as systems integrator.

(I realize the ATC Modernization program isn't exactly about DCA but in two senses it is; the accident greatly motivated the program to be drawn up and to receive the first tranche of appropriations, and the families of the accident victims were present for the hearing today. And a third factor: the facts about the modernization program are important as a counterpoint to Section 373's troubling content, not to mention its illegitimate sourcing. I have not heard one single voice of a legitimate aviation wise-person, not a single legitimate worthy, say it is a good provision. How modern can the NAS become if something like Section 373 -- no wait, if Section 373 itself actually -- becomes law?)

Link: https://youtu.be/UJM4YsV_hmw?si=116yx6W1AnJaIELY

The Senate has passed the legislation with the controversial Section 373 still included. According to The Wall Street Journal, the bill now goes to the President for signature into law. (Also, I should have checked my knowledge of legislative process more thoroughly - my previous post stating a House-Senate conference would follow Senate passage was incorrect.)

But there is other action regarding Section 373. Excerpt from the WSJ article:
________________
"The bill passed despite concern from federal officials and senators over an airport-related measure in the 3,086-page package. Lawmakers said it was unclear how the provision ended up in the final version, and senators quickly approved a bill that would overrule it. That measure still needs to be passed by the House.
......... [ paragraphs with background re: accident omitted ]......

"Anger at Section 373
Sens. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) and Maria Cantwell (D., Wash.) led a bipartisan effort to remove Section 373 and replace it with the ROTOR Act, which would require aircraft in controlled airspace to be equipped with ADS-B and would impose stricter oversight of military flights in the area. At a press conference Monday, Cruz, Cantwell and families of victims from the collision denounced the section.

\x93There\x92s no reason to have this language in the National Defense Authorization Act unless you\x92re somebody who wants to continue to see letting the military do whatever they want to do in a congested airspace,\x94 Cantwell said.

Trump administration officials have also criticized the measure. \x93It\x92s a safety whitewash,\x94 said Jennifer Homendy, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, last week. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy said that regardless of any legislation passed by Congress, he will ensure that there is no cross traffic between planes and helicopters.

After the vote Wednesday on the NDAA, Cruz took to the floor and passed the ROTOR Act by unanimous consent, a shortcut to quickly approve legislation when no senator objects. A spokesman for the Defense Department said the Pentagon supports the bill."
________________________

Wall Street Journal,
quoting in full (claiming fair use):

The U.S. government accepted fault for a midair collision earlier this year that killed 67 people near Washington, D.C., saying it is willing to pay damages to the families in connection with the incident.

The Justice Department\x92s filing in federal court Wednesday said the pilots of an Army Black Hawk helicopter \x93failed to maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid\x94 an American Airlines regional jet.

\x93Their failure was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the accident,\x94 the department\x92s lawyers wrote.

The filing said that an air-traffic controller didn\x92t comply with a federal order to tell aircraft on converging courses to separate. The government also said the American Airlines pilots should have been alerted to the location of the Black Hawk helicopter by a collision alert system and that the pilots \x93failed to maintain vigilance\x94 to avoid the aircraft.

The American regional jet had been flying from Wichita, Kan., when it collided with the Army helicopter on approach to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on Jan. 29. The military helicopter was conducting a training exercise along the Potomac River, one of the most congested airspaces in the U.S.
_________
Edit: The court filing in which liability is admitted is the Answer by the United States to the Complaint. It's 209 pages, not a surprise, as the Complaint includes quite detailed allegations, most all of which needed to be addressed point by point.
Notably, the airline is still a defendant and in fact lead counsel for the plaintiffs already has issued a statement to that effect.
I'm not indulging any further law prof mode for now.

Some reactions and at least attempts at valid observations.

FAA and ATCOs. Did the Department of Justice's Answer to the Complaint throw the controller(s) "under the bus?" Yes, and no. In brief, the Answer does not state that the controllers' acts or omissions were a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the accident.

The Complaint alleges a long list of allegedly negligent acts by the controller(s) in Paragraph 250, which starts on page 158 and runs on to 164 (in the Answer). Without having studied the pleadings for hours upon hours (as one might do in actual practice) perhaps I've missed something -- but I think the only admission made by DOJ with regard to the controllers is that a very specifically cited FAA rule or procedure of some sort was not followed: "the DCA local controller did not comply with \xb6 7-2-1(a)(2)(d) of FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, chg. 3, Air Traffic Control (Sept. 5, 2024)." This specific admission is made recurrently in the Answer, amidst many other denials of (again, unless I missed something) everything else in the massive and detailed Paragraph 250 of the Complaint.

Edit [forgot to include]: the Complaint alleges generally the following about FAA and the ATCOs.
"the Federal Aviation Administration\x92s air traffic controllers failed in their two most important priorities, namely to separate aircraft in airspace and issue Safety Alerts when aircraft are in an unsafe proximity to one another; that the air traffic controllers on duty failed to abide by numerous other policies and procedures, including that air traffic control failed to provide traffic advisories to both aircraft and air traffic control failed to resolve an aural and visual Conflict Alert that advised air traffic control that the two aircraft were on an unsafe and converging collision course; and that the air traffic controllers failed in their duties concerning the \x93tower team concept\x94 within an air traffic control facility so that all controllers assist each other to prevent, amongst other things, a mid-air collision. The Defendants\x92 [meaning, both the U.S. and the airlines] collective failures (for which they are jointly and severally liable) caused, and/or contributed to this senseless and entirely avoidable tragedy."

So, "no", because the DOJ does not admit ATC was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause (both needed for liability, if I recall 1-L) but yes, first, specifically with regard to the FAA Order, and second, for all of the reasons ATC Watcher invokes. Whether those several factors would ever be considered for inclusion in an Answer to a big tort case such as this is doubtful . . .BUT especially after the fireworks over Section 373, watch for the NTSB report to lay it all out. (And incidentally, the Complaint now includes several excerpts from NTSB hearing and docket - not sure if these were part of the original Complaint. The Answer is the first pleading in response to the Complaint and it has become the Master Complaint, as I understand it, because it is the pleading on behalf of all the plaintiffs, regardless of whether they are represented by the attorneys who filed the very first Complaint in the case. Further, according to press reports (WSJ print edition today) both the airline companies filed motions to dismiss. Thankfully, or maybe not, my Pacer account is acting up, so, no comment....)

2. The airline and its parent company. The Complaint paints a very negative picture about the acts and omissions of the airline companies and the two pilots of 5342. The Answer was filed only on behalf of the United States (FAA and Army) and so the DOJ does not address the specific allegations forming the claims against the airline - this is standard practice. Still, I found this in the Answer (re: Para. 174): "The United States admits that the AE5342 pilots failied to maintain vigilance and to see and avoid PAT25".

I am refraining from trying to summarize or comment on the many aspects of the story about the airline pilots and airline companies alleged in the Complaint. It is a very detailed story. It probably if not certainly will outrage people in the industry writ large. I've not practiced tort law, either suing or defending, but that won't stop me from saying that it seems pretty clear that the trial lawyers are gunning for the airline company deep pockets, the availability of punitive damages when those are not awardable against the Federal Government, the availability of a jury trial, and insurance policies. To state the obvious.

As for the Army, Para. 253 starts on page 168 and runs to 176; the DOJ admits some but not all of the many specifically alleged negligent acts and omissions by the Army and those pilots.

One other little item caught my attention. In paragraph 106, reference is made to "risk assessment" stuff the Army aviation unit conducted or did not conduct. "Risk Assessment", that wouldn't be the same thing as showed up in Section 373, by chance?

(For information, the case number in federal district court in D.C. is 1:25-cv-03382-ACR.)

Absolutely agree.
The Air Current just published a review of those systemic failures. Well worth the reading time. (And TAC publishes stuff on safety matters freely available, not behind pay wall.)

It won't endear anyone to the people running the show in the federal interagency and who have responsibility for the conceptual design, architecture and implementation of the U.S. "ATC Modernization" programme (European spelling done deliberately here) but it strikes this SLF/attorney as remarkably clear that unless a full accounting of what went horribly and tragically wrong in DCA airspace on the night of 29 January 2025 is done and done tranparently, any hope for a successful rebuilding of the ATM components of the U.S. NAS is about slim, to none. Just one small but illustrative example. ATCOs at DCA wanted "hot spots" of potential traffic conflict noted on charts. FAA HQ denied the request. Why? It didn't have in place a standardized method of marking such notations on charts. This actually was testified to at the Board hearing.

From FAA website (verbatim):
Trump\x92s Transportation Secretary Formalizes Permanent Restrictions for Aircraft in Reagan National Airport Airspace

Thursday, January 22, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. \x97 U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy today announced that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is formalizing permanent restrictions for helicopters and powered-lift from operating in certain areas near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), unless these aircraft are conducting essential operations. These restrictions were put in place immediately following the American Airlines 5342 crash and supported by the NTSB\x92s preliminary recommendations.

\x93After that horrific night in January, this Administration made a promise to do whatever it takes to secure the skies over our nation\x92s capital and ensure such a tragedy would never happen again. Today\x92s announcement reaffirms that commitment,\x94 said U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy. \x93The safety of the American people will always be our top priority. I look forward to continuing to collaborate with the NTSB on any additional actions.\x94

The FAA published an Interim Final Rule (IFR) that will significantly reduce midair-collision risks and implement a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation to prohibit certain helicopter operations when Runways 15 and 33 at DCA are in use.

\x93We took decisive action immediately following the January 2025 midair collision to reduce risk in the airspace,\x94 said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford. \x93This is a key step toward ensuring these improvements remain permanent and we\x92re continuing to work with the NTSB to ensure an accident like this never happens again.\x94

While the interim final rule goes into effect tomorrow, the public is invited to submit written comments, which the FAA will consider before issuing a final rule.

Additional Information:

The FAA took immediate action to restrict mixed traffic around DCA and made permanent helicopter route changes after the NTSB recommendations. U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy and the FAA didn\x92t stop there \x96 taking additional actions for DCA to address operations, procedures, and personnel, including:

Established procedures to eliminate helicopter and fixed-wing mixed traffic near the airport
Closed Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge
Revised agreements with the military to require ADS-B Out broadcasting
Discontinued take offs from the Pentagon until the FAA and Department of War updated procedures and fixed technical issues at the Pentagon Heliport
Eliminated the use of visual separation within 5 nautical miles of DCA
Published modifications to helicopter zones and routes moving them farther away from DCA flight paths
Increased support, oversight and staffing at DCA
In October 2025, the FAA updated Helicopter routes and zones at DCA, Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) and Baltimore/ Washington International Airport (BWI).

The FAA previously implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFR) around DCA. To make the restrictions contained in the TFRs permanent, the FAA issued an IFR which is set to publish on January 23, 2026, and will take effect immediately. The public is invited to submit comments on the IFR and the FAA will later publish a Final Rule in response to those comments.

According to reporting published today by The Air Current - one of its periodic articles reporting on air safety which are not paywalled - the NTSB will meet on January 27. The meeting will include revealing and voting on the probable cause determination produced by its investigation into the DCA midair collision 29 January 2025.

The reporting indicates that the Board's final report is expected within two weeks.

Various safety recommendations also are anticipated to be on the agenda for the NTSB's January 27 meeting.

Of particular interest, among many other factors involved in this horrifically senseless accident (my characterization, not found in TAC reporting as such), is whether the NTSB's meeting which will mark the end of its official investigatory process will touch upon the controversial section of the NDAA, Section 373 (subject of previous posts at the time of passage, upthread).

Strongly concur with DaveR.

There are, in the facts developed by the NTSB investigation, not merely holes in the Alpine-country cheese which "line up." There are instead multiple lines through the cheese. It's more like the cheese has been shot through with a dozen rounds by Dirty Harry.

The Board Chair certainly has not pulled her punches in scoring FAA's responsiveness to the investigators' requests for information.

At the same time, Chair Homendy had strong praise for DoT Sec'y Duffy.

This makes for some interesting "political" tensions, doesn't it? A totally restructured, redesigned and reengineered ATC system - really, an almost entirely new Air Traffic Management architecture and all the facilities and technology by which it will operate - is touted by the White House as a project to be completed before the next presidential inauguration day. I think a person can, at the same time, (i) have some empathy for the Secretary who so very early in his service at DoT was confronted with this (except for its reality) unimaginable accident; (ii) have some admiration for the high-wire act of carrying the administration's water but not diverging too far or too obviously from the reality of what an entirely new or almost entirely new ATM architecture in the U.S. will entail; and (iii) have some, if not sympathy, then at least recognition of the challenge of leading (through the office of FAA Administrator, of course) an agency which has had its failures quite so starkly revealed and documented. This is going to be some Report.

A bit off-topic, but nothing I heard today makes it any less interesting to contemplate the question: in the continuing lawsuit, who speaks for the Bluestreak 5342 pilots? They're blamed by the plaintiffs for what they did and what they didn't do, but they are every bit as much victims of this systemic breakdown as the passengers and flight attendants. I would also ask, who speaks for the Army aviators? who also are victims of the systemic breakdown. It all makes me kind of wish Chair Homendy was in the legal profession, tbh.

True with regard to NTSB rec's.

But the discussion was about a working group organized, convened and conducted by people from the FAA DCA staff and other concerned parties. The output of that group is what got "ignored"

"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path."

The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination.

A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation.
WillowRun 6-3

Uh, yes, very conspicuous by its absence.

First, I have taken something posted on this thread some time ago as a deeply important article of faith. It was (I'm not quoting it exactly but from memory) "they owned the airspace of the last several hundred feet of the final approach to 3-3." The effort to paint them as negligent by the (estimable and highly successful) plaintiff lawyers frankly makes me want to puke. And I don't care one iota that some or several of those lawyers own their own aircraft and have pilot licenses. They didn't build hours, did they? And, .... it's one thing to try build a case against the airline company, but something else to assail the deceased pilots.

Relatedly, and second, I tend to think the NTSB sees this in somewhat the same way. But the NTSB really excoriated the FAA, and it richly deserved it too. This was - it cannot be said too often AFAI-am concerned - a systemic failure. So between being revolted by the effort to invade the ownership of those last few hundred feet of airspace or flight path of Bluestreak 5342 on final to 3-3 on the night of 29 January 2025, and gunning for bear in the form of a complacent, ridiculously evasive if not obstructionist if not dishonest FAA, the Board had zero-decimal-zero tolerance or inclination for assigning causal factors to two dead pilots on final to 3-3. And that's EVEN IF the airline company should have done more.

Third, and I don't know if it would be viable, but to the extent that the accountability for this accident lies mostly with FAA, and somewhat with the Army pilots and Army, then aren't the pilots victims too, rather than negilgent party-defendants? Shouldn't their estates have legal representation, as a party-intervenor in the case? That is what I meant earlier, who speaks for them? As we all know, the Board does not find fault. I somewhat think the lawyers seeking their contingency fee will probably, I guess, be talking about "fault." But the Army pilots are a bit different. It is distasteful and unseemly to criticize them, as they were in service, and just as much victims of the systemic failures as Bluestreak 5342's two pilots. And Uncle Sam, why, he's already admitted fault.

Fourth and last, yes, the airline company will get raked over the coals for not having outsmarted the failures of the FAA. Jackpot justice, what a way to improve the architecture and operation of the NAS. (With apologies to a very estimable and deservedly highly well-respected airline industry attorney - a real one - who at a conference in Paris oh, a couple three years or so ago, made the point that plaintiff lawyers should not be the ones setting aviation policy through liability lawsuits.)

What good is a lawyer clodding around a pilot's forum on the internet without a rant now and again, eh?