January 31, 2025, 03:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817877
TWR gives AA5342 as traffic to the helicopter, stating they are over the Woodrow (Wilson) bridge, however the helicopter crew keeps flying into the final approach path of R33. 40 seconds later TWR again asks if they have the “CRJ” in sight, and they reply they have, but at this point the CRJ is less than 200’ above them and only 0.5nm away. At the same time the following aircraft on approach to R01, an AA A319 on flight 3130, is above the Woodrow Bridge on finals. Possibly the helicopter crew at some point confused the A319 for the CRJ.
The helicopter crew again confirms they have “the aircraft” in sight and requests visual separation, but surely if they had the CRJ in sight at less than 200’ vertically and half a mile away they would be taking immediate evasive action and not requesting visual separation???
The helicopter crew again confirms they have “the aircraft” in sight and requests visual separation, but surely if they had the CRJ in sight at less than 200’ vertically and half a mile away they would be taking immediate evasive action and not requesting visual separation???
It doesn't seem "fair" for aircraft like the CRJ, that in busy, complex airspace, another aircraft can request and receive VFR, meaning in broad terms, they're outside of ATC's guardrails. CRJ now have an aircraft in the vicinity that isn't being controlled by ATC.
Doesn't seem like a good process to an outsider.
Subjects
AA5342
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 03:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817890
Subjects
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
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February 02, 2025, 01:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819432
The CRJ was diverted to 33 because of traffic. No other reason. The pattern was congested, so ATC diverted them to relieve those issues for them at the time. The CRJ could have declined the ATC's request, but they would have had to circle for another approach to R1. From what I have seen, the CRJ adapted to that request professionally and ATC should have made sure that they were safe. Instead, ATC put the onus on the helo crew to maintain a safe airspace. That't the ATC's job, especially given the situation.
Ws should expect more.
Ws should expect more.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
VFR
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February 03, 2025, 10:04:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11820374
The amazing thing is that there wasn’t an accident like this every month at DCA with the procedures and environment as they were. I suspect that there have been a lot of close calls and they’ll find a filing cabinet worth of reports but likely not much was done. If you continuously set up a dangerous scenario that in the end relies for safety on a procedure that is known to be unreliable (visual ID at night in a city environment), then statistics eventually intervene. This has likely been mitigated over the years by awareness, training, professionalism and sheer will to survive but when you are dealt the perfect bad hand and the last of the barriers to MAC fail, this is the result. Another factor pointed out recently is the “mission” status of military flights: someone with more gold on their uniform and a bigger hat than you has said to go and do this task with that equipment, so you do it.
Speaking to some of my colleagues who have used NVGs operationally, they say they do reduce your field-of-view and flatten depth perception - one said he had mistaken a star for another aircraft for a while; it was only further away than he thought by a factor of ten trillion...
Speaking to some of my colleagues who have used NVGs operationally, they say they do reduce your field-of-view and flatten depth perception - one said he had mistaken a star for another aircraft for a while; it was only further away than he thought by a factor of ten trillion...
What's wrong with this picture?
Last edited by artee; 3rd February 2025 at 10:37 . Reason: Corrected wording.
Subjects
Close Calls
DCA
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
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February 06, 2025, 23:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823316
It would be interesting to know what percentage of time the military helos request (and presumably get) Visual Separation.
Last edited by artee; 7th February 2025 at 00:21 . Reason: Changed VFR to Visual Separation.
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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March 30, 2025, 01:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11857026
I'm applying SLF/attorney license here (hey, there's poetic license, so why not?) of repeating - with some editing - a post I placed on the R&N thread about testing at DCA.
<snip>
It is known that ADSB-Out is not active on the Army and other certain missions in the relevant airspace. Is there also a pattern or practice of operating with a mindset that FAA ATC is a necessary nuisance, to be indulged but not focused upon as closely as other airspace users? If any reader asserts this question accuses the Army pilots or any one of them in the helicopter on January 29 of negligence - that would be incorrect. The way in which the airspace had been designed, managed and operated handed those pilots a pre-determined normalization of complacency - so it appears, does it not?. They operated their flight within the system they had been given, which does not constitute negligence. The designers, managers, and operators of that system . . . well, it will be for the courts to sort out whether the exception to the removal of federal immunity to tort claims applies to those systemic level actions, or not. If it were not for the existence of the discretionary function exception, I personally believe the race to the courthouse would already have been a feeding frenzy worthy of the most biting negative stereotypes about lawyers.
<snip>
<snip>
It is known that ADSB-Out is not active on the Army and other certain missions in the relevant airspace. Is there also a pattern or practice of operating with a mindset that FAA ATC is a necessary nuisance, to be indulged but not focused upon as closely as other airspace users? If any reader asserts this question accuses the Army pilots or any one of them in the helicopter on January 29 of negligence - that would be incorrect. The way in which the airspace had been designed, managed and operated handed those pilots a pre-determined normalization of complacency - so it appears, does it not?. They operated their flight within the system they had been given, which does not constitute negligence. The designers, managers, and operators of that system . . . well, it will be for the courts to sort out whether the exception to the removal of federal immunity to tort claims applies to those systemic level actions, or not. If it were not for the existence of the discretionary function exception, I personally believe the race to the courthouse would already have been a feeding frenzy worthy of the most biting negative stereotypes about lawyers.
<snip>
There were other holes in the cheese, so the pilot was working in a compromised environment.
I'm just an SLF, so no domain expertise at all.
Last edited by artee; 30th March 2025 at 04:00 . Reason: Typo
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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August 15, 2025, 06:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11938787
Ward Carroll posted some thoughts about the crash following the evidence a couple of weeks ago. He gives a quick summary of the faacts, and looks at the blame game.
He's quite clear that he thinks that ATC alerting the CRJ about the presence of the helo (using visual flight separation) probably wouldn't have changed the outcome.
But he does pick up on the cockpit dynamics on PAT25. He says
"Now, the most important facts to emerge from the hearings this week center on the cockpit exchange between Warrant Officer Eves and Captain Robach that happened just about a minute before the midair. He says to her, " All right, kind of come left for me, ma'am. I think that's why he's asking ." And she replies, " Sure ." He says, " We're kinda.. ." And she cuts him off by saying, " Oh-kay, fine ." And he finishes his statement “… out toward the middle ”, meaning the middle of the river and west of helicopter route 4. So PAT 25 is above and west of where they should have been as the CRJ is properly on final approach for runway 33. Using maritime rules of the road terms, the CRJ was the burden vessel and the Blackhawk was the giveway vessel." He quotes someone (David Cherbonnier) posting:
"In military protocol, referring to a fellow officer as sir or ma'am is the role of a subordinate. It’s use in the cockpit indicated ‘privilege of rank’ as opposed to the typical instructor student relationship. The instructor was a Chief Warrant Officer with over 10 years service as an enlisted person prior to selection as a Chief Warrant Officer and as well as met all criteria to be a check pilot and as such was the person in charge during the entire training/examination exercise. In any other capacity, a Captain represents a person who has been recognized by Congress to have the qualifications to become an officer. In my experience, an examinee’s response in a drawn out “ oh-kay fine ” would have signaled check ride over. In this instance, deference was given to rank. Was that a contributing factor?"
He's quite clear that he thinks that ATC alerting the CRJ about the presence of the helo (using visual flight separation) probably wouldn't have changed the outcome.
But he does pick up on the cockpit dynamics on PAT25. He says
"Now, the most important facts to emerge from the hearings this week center on the cockpit exchange between Warrant Officer Eves and Captain Robach that happened just about a minute before the midair. He says to her, " All right, kind of come left for me, ma'am. I think that's why he's asking ." And she replies, " Sure ." He says, " We're kinda.. ." And she cuts him off by saying, " Oh-kay, fine ." And he finishes his statement “… out toward the middle ”, meaning the middle of the river and west of helicopter route 4. So PAT 25 is above and west of where they should have been as the CRJ is properly on final approach for runway 33. Using maritime rules of the road terms, the CRJ was the burden vessel and the Blackhawk was the giveway vessel." He quotes someone (David Cherbonnier) posting:
"In military protocol, referring to a fellow officer as sir or ma'am is the role of a subordinate. It’s use in the cockpit indicated ‘privilege of rank’ as opposed to the typical instructor student relationship. The instructor was a Chief Warrant Officer with over 10 years service as an enlisted person prior to selection as a Chief Warrant Officer and as well as met all criteria to be a check pilot and as such was the person in charge during the entire training/examination exercise. In any other capacity, a Captain represents a person who has been recognized by Congress to have the qualifications to become an officer. In my experience, an examinee’s response in a drawn out “ oh-kay fine ” would have signaled check ride over. In this instance, deference was given to rank. Was that a contributing factor?"
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
PAT25
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
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September 29, 2025, 10:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11961413
I think it's not unreasonable to assume that words being exchanged in the cockpit/the extra workload prevented the pilots from noticing the ATC transmissions to the helicopter, and that would have impaired their situational awareness. Situational awareness is required for safe flight, especially in congested airspace.
If the SOP requirement was instituted by the airline out of a safety concern, to reduce the workload on the pilots during that critical phase of flight, then that has a bearing on how responsibility is apportioned.
If the SOP requirement was instituted by the airline out of a safety concern, to reduce the workload on the pilots during that critical phase of flight, then that has a bearing on how responsibility is apportioned.
Subjects
ATC
Situational Awareness
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September 30, 2025, 23:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11962302
A preliminary caveat is necessary - actually, two caveats. The simpler one is that in my legal career I have not handled personal injury (negligence) matters and, although every attorney licensed in the United States presumably knows at least basics of any given legal subject matter - and even though this is only an internet forum and not practicing law - how the facts relating to the briefing of the approach to 3-3 will impact the liability issues probably will get pretty complicated in the actual lawsuit. (More on this to follow).
...
...
), such that we can better understand the legal side.
Last edited by artee; 1st October 2025 at 00:07 .
Subjects
Accountability/Liability
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December 12, 2025, 06:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12003936
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/Documents/...tion%20Act.pdf
Letter to Congressional leaders re: NDAA from NTSB Chair Homendy.
The letter is addressed to the Chair and Ranking Members of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate.
Letter to Congressional leaders re: NDAA from NTSB Chair Homendy.
The letter is addressed to the Chair and Ranking Members of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate.
Subjects
DCA
NDAA
NTSB
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy
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January 28, 2026, 03:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12028339
"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the FAA's placement of a helicopter route in close proximity to a runway approach path."
The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination.
A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation.
WillowRun 6-3
The PC statement should be read in its entirety, and at the conscious risk of ripe cliche, context matters. The Board did not assign the probable cause to the intersecting flight routes as such. For one thing, Chair Homendy repeatedly since the early days of the Board investigation has hammered upon the fact that the vertical separation was as little as 75 feet without any procedural separation (such as the helos holding at Haines Point). And also since the start of the investigation, time and again the complexity of the DCA airspace, and the (in my strident opinion) very messed up operation of DCA with regard to - as ATC staff testified - just "making it work", have been emphasized. Plus the refusal of FAA ATO to act upon the input from the helicopter working group several years ago, plus FAA's declining to note "hot spots" on charts. And the staffing issues, and lack of fidelity to SMS on the part of FAA and to some extent the Army as well. And there were, quite obviously, many findings of fact which are necessarily part of the context for reading . . . and understanding, the PC determination.
A person need not be an aeronautical engineer, airspace architect, or civilian or military aviator to understand from the get-go that intersecting flight paths might be found across the NAS. I'll stand to be corrected but I do not think - having watched the entirety of the hearing today - that the criticism of the Probable Cause finding is a valid, fair or accurate assessment of the Board's work in this investigation.
WillowRun 6-3
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
Findings
Helicopter Working Group
Hot Spots
NTSB
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy
Probable Cause
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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