Posts about: "VFR" [Posts: 141 Page: 2 of 8]¶

Hi all, I’m a UK lapsed PPL and, having listened to the recordings of the ATC comms during this incident, a number of things strike me.

1. The ATC (local controller, or LC) was entirely blameless and appears to have followed all the rules.

2. Likewise the crew of the airliner were entirely blameless, and appeared to be following the procedures perfectly.

3. The mistake, if that is the right word, clearly lies with the actions of the crew of the helicopter here, and the traffic they reported being visual with was obviously not the airliner involved. We will never know what they were looking at, but it wasn’t the CRJ referred to by the LC.

4. My guess is that the result of the investigation into this incident will point the finger at some sort of misunderstanding of radio comms, eg. The helicopter crew might have thought the LC was referring to another aircraft or something similar. Remember, misunderstood comms was responsible for Tenerife in 1977.

5. The troubling thing, though, was that it sounded to me as if the LC here was on the verge of being overwhelmed. He had to speak so quickly that his comms were bordering on being unfathomable. And yet it seems that this was ‘normality’ at DCA.

6. Effective radio comms depend on the people communicating speaking clearly and precisely, so that what they say is understood by all parties involved. That includes waiting for read-backs and acknowledgements.

7. This man was having to speak so fast in order to do his job that it seems strikingly obvious that the volume of traffic he was having to deal with was far too high.

8. I remember that in the UK when I was flying radio comms were set down in a detailed publication which I think was known as CAP413. What I heard of the comms at DCA last night fell rather short of that publication, but it was in no way the fault of the LC.

9. Rather, it was down to whoever set down how much traffic capacity was ‘safe’ to be handled at DCA, and the procedures allowed to accomplish that capacity. It was a fault of the procedures themselves, and my own personal opinion is that having low-level VFR helicopter traffic in potential conflict with low-level VFR airliner traffic in this way, and especially at night, is utterly bonkers.

10. Unless and until the authorities in the US reduce the volume of traffic that they deem to be safe at certain airports, these sorts of incidents will continue to be possible.

11. But of course they won’t reduce the volume, will they. Because the greater volume means more dollars, and dollars trumps safety, doesn’t it, regardless of the platitudes of politicians. It’s just that they have managed to get away with it for so long.

See and avoid in airline operations simply does not work. High workload, human factors, visual limitations, high closing speeds simply make it unreliable.

There have been countless similar cases of near misses. Near airports, crossing traffic, especially helicopters is a real issue, as is the totally inappropriate see and avoid principle with commercial traffic. In my view we need a complete rule change and rethink around lack of radar separation between IFR and VFR traffic.

All too frequently ATC allow IFR and VFR far too close on approach and are permitted to just inform the VFR traffic to visually manoeuvre themselves all too close to IFR traffic. The book 'The Naked Pilot' years ago established that see and avoid does not work, simple as that.

Class D airspace whilst not necessarily involved here often causes such issues. Pilot's wrongly believe ATC separates IFR and VFR. Frequently ATC allow conflicts to develop on the basis of law, rather than duty of care. We need to get back to common sense, and that is ATC must stop VFR traffic getting anywhere near airliners on final approach or from crossing the go around track. Either lateral or vertical separation needs to be enforced or repeats of this type of accident will definitely repeat.

Lessons have not been learned previous to this accident. I fear we will see a repeat, and low level near airport ATC separation needs to improve.

We need the industry to wake up and realise, see and avoid is unreliable, and air law does not protect IFR traffic from VFR traffic enough.

OK so what's your interpretation of the rules here then?

The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.

The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.

Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.

Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.

Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.

It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.

It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.

Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.

the industry, and in Washington the military and the State, knows this, but chooses movement rates and freedom over delays and failure to deliver. Aviation is not zero-harm. This is a risk which is well established as tolerable, the rate of occurrence seems acceptably low overall, and I suspect nothing will change. Those affected should, in my opinion, be enormously compensated, which will not bring loved ones back but will make going on more tolerable, and will enable the status quo to continue, satisfying the commercial, capitalist, military, and executive imperatives. I’m often reminded of the scene in Airplane, which cuts to the made-up TV talk show, ‘Counterpoint’, whose host says (and I may be a word or two off here), ‘I say, they bought their tickets, they knew what they were getting into…. Let them die’. Macabre I know, but feel free to challenge me if you don’t believe that this is a true reflection of our reality.

I can't speak for the USA, but my understanding was always that the flight rules for the CRJ don't change, unless the crew cancel their IFR plan: ie flying a visual approach doesn't change the flight rule status. The crew can still expect IFR separation from other IFR & SVFR flights, & traffic information on conflicting VFR flights.

as European ATCO I can hardly believe the way some of my US colleagues are conducting their duties. I think the state ATC in US is today is in large part residue of Reagan firing of 10.000 ATCOS. I think you are very right. First of all, night visual approach in so densely lit environment, night VFR in very close proximity of runway...all this is just a recipe for disaster. Which unfortunately arrived in worst form.

Yes, that would be my understanding also.

I am wondering the same thing, in the UK/EU unless the IFR crew specifically cancels their IFR plan with ATC, (it can be done immediately on frequency), IFR separation requirements still apply.

In the US does an agreement to make a visual approach regardless of airspace classification, cancel IFR separation requirements for the ATCO?

"It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights." - DC isn't actually that big of a city or that brightly lit, and it seems the UH-60 was heading south west, well away from DC toward a not very dense part of suburban N. Virginia. Mostly they would see a very wide part of the Potomac river ahead, and in the distance on the western shore is a Daingerfield island (US park service land and mostly unlit), the GW parkway going N/S for a couple hundred meters (all the parkways are dangerously unlit IMO) followed by some low level typical suburb condos of a couple stories towards Potomac Yard, which other than street lights or the sign from Target is not very bright. I kayak there all the time and there's nothing much to see looking westward. I've been out of KVKX at night and can see that area and it's not dazzling.

"Radar useless as the aircraft are too low." - It seems there's valid radar returns from both aircraft. the FAA has a good diagram of the Potomac TRACON radar sites, about 10 different radars, and having visited the TRACON several times, they readily explain there's another nearly facility that is a duplicate of their radar feed, but for national security. I assume there's coverage till the river service for security to prevent someone from sneaking up the river with bad ideas

"Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. " - I fly in the area and in my experience everyone is on the same VHF, they might be also duped to UHF and can hear everybody on my handheld. You hear AF-1 all the time on freq.

"The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic" - Most of the area NE of the airfield in a prohibited area, and there's a lot of military installations within 5 miles of DC that they are shuttling around, so that path seems perfectly acceptable given the numerous constraints. there's nothing wrong with a helo corridor as long as you stay within it and maintain the prescribed altitude. Also, it's not like KDCA is some secret place, the flight paths are pretty well known if that's where you work. It's popular to sit in parks on both ends and watch the planes, there's literally millions of local people that know exactly the planes are coming and going on both directions. so if you're a helo there, you know where the hot spots are. Likewise, its not just any helo in that area, everyone is vetted, fingerprinted in the inner FRZ.

" on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone" - The UH-60 was not going to DCA, the assumption was it was using the helo route 4 corridor. All the UH-60Ls I've seen have full glass with moving map and I'm assuming a magenta line for the helo corridor.

Fun Fact - Calling it "Reagan" will get you tarred and feathered in the area. Folks refuse to utter the name and for years (decades) the Metro refused to rename the station until legally forced.

No, a visual approach started under IFR remains under IFR unless IFR is explicitly cancelled.

However, note that the airspace class at major US airports is B (rarely used elsewhere). Cancelling IFR in Class B does not relieve ATC of separation responsibility because VFR flights must still be separated from all other flights ( VFR separation standards here ). Separation responsibility only transfers to a pilot when they accept ' visual separation ' and the controller must continue giving separation instructions until that point. Aircraft can be given 'visual separation' against other aircraft, including IFR aircraft as happened here, without the other aircraft needing to have the traffic in sight. The controller must advise the other aircraft that visual separation is being applied if the flight paths are converging .

None of that is necessarily a problem.

The problem is reliance on visual separation at night. The ease with which the eye is drawn to bright lights (which may not be the lights of interest) and inability to perceive depth and distance from a point source of light (made worse by NVG) make it a high risk activity even between combat aircraft. To permit it to be relied upon for protection of airline traffic is madness.

IFR, not VFR, the airliner is circling in VMC. This invalidates the following, with a lack of knowing the distict difference- that said, the conclusion is correct, it was bound to happen, the swiss cheese just had to align.

It's eerily similar to the P-63/B-17 midair- a blind collision that was instantly apparent how flawed the basic plan was, even though it had worked before.

SLF here, so please don't shout.

It doesn't seem "fair" for aircraft like the CRJ, that in busy, complex airspace, another aircraft can request and receive VFR, meaning in broad terms, they're outside of ATC's guardrails. CRJ now have an aircraft in the vicinity that isn't being controlled by ATC.

Doesn't seem like a good process to an outsider.

About 90% of my flights into DCA have been VFR. Being VFR and being free to do whatever are VERY different things. I was always under positive control VFR or IFR, going where I was sent and the altitude and heading ATC wanted me to use. I'll admit to having about an hour of helicopter time, so I can't say if the helipcopters get the same treatment or just get told to stick to their routes or ???

The whole mechanism of "aircraft in sight" no longer works, when the airspace is crowded: "Which aircraft are you supposed to have in sight" ???????

Yep, the system in place just does not work once the airspace becomes crowded, "IE which airplane are you supposed to have in sight" ?

With only one other airplane, it's clear, with more than 1, it becomes a gamble.


For VFR there is a missed approach procedure: Back into the circuit. Which will be a bit hairy, when the "miss" happens (long) before reaching the runway. Depending on the aircraft type, 2 circuit types may be defined: A small one for slow stuff and a large one for the bigger ones. And as usual with VFR traffic, ATC or self-communication is needed to pick the moment of the next landing attempt.

One can discuss whether this is a procedure or not, though there is at least "something".

VFR flights not being separated form each other is a class C thing. VFR not being separated from IFR is a class D thing. In class B all flights are separated from each others regardless of flight rules. So all the discussions on flight rule changes are irrelevant for ghis incident anyhow.

Welcome to more modern times. The last Seahawks I flew (Late 1990s) had radios that could do both UHF and VHF. The last T-34C trainers I flew as an instructor had VHF installed (mid to late 90's) to overcome that very issue, and to allow Instructors and Students to do approaches to and land at more airfields than just military ones. The last Black Hawk (L) I flew (early 00's) had radios that allowed us to transmit and receive on VHF. Since that Black Hawk Battalion does VIP flights in the DC area a lot, I seriously doubt that they do not have VHF radios equipped.
The SH-60B Seahawks I flew had that feature, which required a doppler system to work like that. (If I recall the NATOPS terms correctly, it's called a coupled approach and you entered it well below 90 knots). The Black Hawks I flew (UH-60L) did not have that feature as they did not have the doppler system installed, and thus no collective inner loop actuator. (One of many differences between Seahawks and Black Hawks). Can't say if the UH-60Ms do or do not, but I doubt it. Added weight that hardly helps their core mission, and with GPS some of what that system does for nav stability is taken care of anyway.
My most common instruction from tower when I had requested clearance to cross the extended centerline of a runway (on a VFR helo route through their ATA) was either "cleared as requested" or "Do a left 360 for spacing"... they never asked me to go into a hover . (My clearest memory of this comes from flying in the Tidewater region of Virginia (Norfolk, Hampton Roads, etc).

I am not sure what local rules, MOUs, and agreements that Army flying unit had, or has, with the ATC and Reagan tower, but I suspect that they are more involved than just the helo routes already discussed in this extended thread. Given that they habitually fly across the river in pursuit of their mission, and that Reagan/National is used to them being there on a daily basis, there may be MOUs and special procedures pre-agreed (Probably under an MOU or formal letter) and signed off by the FAA.
I know that we had a couple of such letters (a couple of decades ago) for the various MOAs and operating areas in Texas, but that was a different kind of flying. It will be interesting to see what the investigation turns up.

Kenny, I respect your experience with landing in KDCA 15 years ago but, either the 3.00\xb0 published angle of the PAPI is a lie, or Google map scaling is wrong, or your memories are distorted.
As per Google map, the distance from the TDZ to the eastern bank of the Potomac is 1635 m and, with 3.00\xb0 angle, the glide path is supposed to be at an height of 85.5 m, or 280 ft at that point.
Reversely, a height of 500 ft above TDZ is on the glide at a distance of 9540 ft or 2908 m from the TDZ. Google map shows that overhead the northbound lane of I-295.
I think that it's plausible that you aligned your plane with RW33 centerline over the Potomac's East bank if you were flying a steep VFR approach, not a night IFR approach.

Note: 450 ft overhead the eastern bank gives you a 8.4% slope or 4.8\xb0 to the TDZ.

In the USA VFR at night is fine, there is no rule against it. Some maybe EU based posters here seem to equate VFR with no traffic services. Landing at any Class B you get separation services IFR or VFR. The helos running around at 200 feet is a very odd thing, I guess I never realized how odd until this crash.
I expect the current system will not last, at the very least they'll go back to a dedicated helicopter controller that could have devoted his full attention to vectoring the Black Hawk somewhere else. I expect an overloaded controller will mentally dump a helo pilot that says he sees the other traffic and will go behind it from his top worry if he has airplanes too to deal with as well.

My recollection may also be a little hazy but I recall the rules in the UK were changed a few years ago to permit VFR at night.
I'm not saying I agreed with this but that I believe is the situation in the UK.

I have been watching this thread for a while now and felt compelled to respond, mainly due to some of the comments on here, a proportion of which, come from professionals within our industry which in itself is troubling.

Lets break it down based on what we know so far:

See and Avoid We have years and years and years of evidence about the limitations of see and avoid. It is not and never will be effective mitigation to a collision risk on its own. It needs to be backed up with other barriers such as ACAS etc. The human eye is particularly bad at spotting stationary objects, which would have been the case in this instance with another aircraft on a steady bearing. Those who criticise the aircrew for not keeping a good lookout are being disingenuous. The ability to judge distance at night, is difficult. Those who suggest the helicopter was looking up at the night sky, omit to recognise that the cameras on which you are basing that opinion, were at ground level. The crew of the Helo would have been at a similar altitude, looking at a background of many lights, with other aircraft barely above the horizon. The reports state that the aircrew may have been on NVG. This exacerbates the issue as they narrow your field of view, make depth perception even worse and of course, those I know of, do not display different colours, such as navigation lights. So see and avoid needs to be backed up by other measures and one can also see how VFR at night is fraught with danger.

Procedures - There is nothing inherently wrong with helicopter lanes close to aerodromes as long as the procedures that control such traffic are robust. I do not know what the local procedures state for routes 1 and 4 but I would expect them to include a limitation to ensure that you cannot use route 4/1 if an approach is being made to Rwy 33 or vice versa, an approach cannot be made to Rwy 33 if there is traffic on route 1/4. If such a procedure does no t exist then we could argue negligence. Lets assume one does exist. In that case, I would expect some process to block the route or the approach, using an aide memoire such as a flight strip or other electronic means. The recent crash at Haneda, highlights the need for such a safety barrier.

The Controller - Reports suggest that controller numbers were down to 19, which is woefully inadequate for an operation such as this and I hope the NTSB looks at what actions were taken by the airport to close in the face of staff limitations. We assume from reports, that the controller concerned was working in a combined position, with band-boxed frequencies. Looking at FR24 replays, it was quite busy at the time and we also do not know what level of fatigue the individuals were under. If the procedures above were in force, was a blocking strip forgotten? Was the controller overloaded or distracted? I hope they were not combining Radar and tower!

Phraseology - Others on here have mentioned about phraseology used. First of all, I cannot understand this machismo, that US controllers have to speak fast. Stop it! It is dangerous and you only end up having to repeat yourself. Others have mentioned about using the clock code. The Tower controller may not have the endorsement to use radar procedures and may have been forced to use geographical points. From what I have heard and yes lets wait for the report, it seems that the phraseology used was sub optimal.

Duty of Care - Some of here have spoken about the transfer of responsibility onto the helicopter operator. This is a pet hate of mine, of people hiding behind the rules to abrogate responsibility. Everyone in the system has a duty of care and Air Traffic Controllers, regardless of type of service, have an accountability to do what they can to prevent collisions. That is written into the highest levels of ICAO Annex 11

My condolences to all involved and my thoughts are also with those under investigation, who I feel may have been let down by the system.