In defence of the helo crew: operating in class B (VFR, IFR no matter), who could have expected that when LC asked them to spot the CRJ and pass behind, they would be already so terribly close and closing in rapidly.....

Indeed, and from what others have shown here, very easy for them to have focussed on the AA aircraft which was on approach to runway 1.

I was also a little surprised at the suggestion that the helicopter crew may have been using NVGs. Perhaps someone with knowledge of this sort of thing might comment? Would that be normal - it seems that on a fine bright night, in a busy tight environment, as well lit as it is NVGs would seriously add risk. Whjy not fly out normally then go to NVGs once out of the high intensity area? It sounds as if NVGs add flare, reduce SA and make scan much harder. I guess that is an acceptable trade of when dealing with typical military operations at night, but it rather surprises me they might be used in this emvironment.

Any comment or enlightenment welcomed !

What do you consider 'so terribly close'?

When the CRJ traffic was first called to the heli, and the heli acknowledged that they were visual, the CRJ looks to have been around 4NM south of the field.

NVGs probably aren't ideal in that environment and I haven't seen any factual statement that they were using them. Even if they were wearing them it doesn't mean they were actively using them (it is usually possible to lift them up out of the way). My only concern would be flying below 200ft, at night, across multiple bridges in an environment where there may be obstructions (not knowing the specifics of that portion of airspace). It may (or may not) have been advantageous to have one person using NVGs for ground collision avoidance, but it's a balancing act that depends on the conditions on the specific night.

You need to go further back in the ATC playbacks. The helicopter crew had previously reported visual contact with the CRJ and requested (yes - requested) and been given responsibility for visual separation. The exchange you are referring to is the one which followed the collision alert and the controller's subsequent questioning of the helicopter crew as to whether they really did have the CRJ in sight.

The ceiling is so the helicopters maintain clearance with aircraft, particularly in the landing phase. The Helos can easily operate below 200 feet in
VFR conditions. Their path also crosses the airplane runway traffic patterns.

Agreed and their ability to use the radio with clarity and stick to ICAO language is worth underlining.Speed of delivery in ATC communication adds nothing to safety.

SAR Bloke Easy Street Nicd

Comments appreciated of course. Indeed, I was referring to the second LC comms with the helo (coinciding with CA alerts). Class B mandates ATC to ensure separation , no matter VFR (indeed twice requested and twice accepted) or IFR (on the question whether AA by/when accepting 33 canceled IFR or not). This IMO implies much more on ATC than re-requesting whether A/C in sight, in particular in case of CA alert, less than one good/bad minute apart.

I am not a USA airspace expert, and I'm sure there are many rules that I don't know about, but having just read the FAR AIM section on 'pilot-applied visual separation' it reads to me, as an interested foreigner, that the LC can pass responsibility for separation to a pilot if they are visual. The class B separation criteria states:

VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than:

1. 1 \xbd miles separation, or
2. 500 feet vertical separation, or
3. Visual separation, as specified in paragraph  7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph  7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing.

The rules for pilot-applied visual separation state:

1. If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
2. Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge.

Whilst I agree giving avoidance instructions would possibly be a sensible thing to do, I can't see that explicitly written in the FAR AIM if pilot-applied visual separation has been approved. There may be other sections (or other regulations) that go into more detail that I am not aware of.

Thanks, indeed from the ATC transcripts published online so far, it doesn\x92t transpire that LC, after the helo (re-) confirmed being visible with the CRJ, complied with the following:\x93NOTE-

1. If aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.

PHRASEOLOGY-

(ACID), TRAFFIC, (clock position and distance), (direction) BOUND, (type of aircraft), HAS YOU IN SIGHT AND WILL MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION.

1. Advise the pilots if the targets appear likely to merge.

NOTE-

Issue this advisory in conjunction with the instruction to maintain visual separation, the advisory to the other aircraft of the converging course, or thereafter if the controller subsequently becomes aware that the targets are merging.\x94

There has been a lot posted about how the whole area in congested and what appears to be possibly risky cohabitation between hellos and low flying commercial traffic.

I don't think I have seen anything about how this is operated outside of VMC.? Obviously not relevant to that specific accident as visibility was excellent but how do they operate when VFR is not possible? Massive capacity reduction?

500' vertical, parallel separation is what a TCAS RA/Resolution provides. At the heights of the involved, RAs are suppressed. Hence why the Republic had to go around the day prior, but the 737, earlier and lower did not.

500' is also the VFR and IFR vertical offset standard. If unable to achieve, should not be allowed. 200' leg must be to be 500' below south flow DCA departures, so North flow arrivals need a better gate.

Not necessarily disagreeing that it's not the most ideal operation, but I am not sure if operators consider it messy. This is extremely common. With winds from N in VFR, there's usually just the one sequenced traffic flow coming north up the river, and then on final ATC is giving clearance to landing visual or ILS RWY1, or depending on timing, sidestepping some RJ traffic over to a visual RWY33. You can look on Flightaware for the that airframe and a week or so ago prior to mishap, they landed 33 not once but twice (once in dark) the same day.

Having coffee this morning with my friend (my old CFI) who's a FO for one of the other American Eagle providers based at DCA, his opinion was that since that 5,200 ft on RWY33 is sufficient for an RJ, the primary reason he gets sidestepped to 33 about half the time is that it ends very close to the American's regional jet terminal and that using RWY33 saves wasting a couple hundred bucks to taxi for no reason which adds up with their large amount of activity. I don't fly there but as pax I on an RJ, with those winds in VFR, in my experience we landed 33 maybe 40% of the time.

My friend doesn't speak for all the RJ pilots obviously, but he didn't consider this sidestep to 31 to be at all unexpected or in his mind adding any significant risk and mentioned it was part of his localization checkout (his company has specific ground and line training required for the airfield). Most tellingly, he literally said it was not on his Top Ten gripes about DCA (he likes to complain a bit &#128512

Messy: taking an aircraft that is on a straight in approach that is parallel offset from the low level route (4) to instead cross the route south of the airport and then cross on final approach the same route again. If you find that comfortable, then have you heard about an accident recently in DC?

The problem with systemic failures is the come along looking like excellent alternatives until the wheels fall off the wagon and it ends in tears. You have to be lucky 100% of the time, the grim reaper only needs one win.

Couldn't the same result be achieved by landing on RWY 01 and (assuming 15/33 is not in use) simply taxiing off 01 onto 33? It wouldn't be slower, there'd be no hazard from landing or departing traffic on 01, and, as the ground track would be shorter and one engine could be shut down to taxi, quite possibly more fuel-efficient.

My understanding is that the helo crew requested VFR, which ATC accepted. So essentially the helo crew requested the onus. Whether ATC should have accepted is a valid question, but it seems to have been commonplace. Normalisation of deviance?

The helo was always always flying VFR. ATC's job was protecting the CRJ.

In Class B, all aircraft are separated, it might visual, it ATC is required to provide separation, IFR or VFR traffic. This standard goes back to the original TCA in 1972.

FAA Order JO 7110.65AA - Air Traffic Control

7.9.4 SEPARATION
a. Standard IFR services to IFR aircraft.
b. VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than:
1. 1 \xbd miles separation, or
2. 500 feet vertical separation, or
3. Visual separation, as specified in paragraph  7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph  7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing.

7.2.1 VISUAL SEPARATION
a.2. Pilot-applied visual separation.
(a) Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved and ensure there is an ability to communicate with the other aircraft.
(b) The pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft as follows
(1) Tell the pilot about the other aircraft. Include position, direction, type, and, unless it is obvious, the other aircraft's intention.
(2) Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the other aircraft is in sight.
(3) Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from that aircraft.

Hello fellow flyers, I am a 65 y/o retired pilot. I served 20 years in the Navy flying P-3C and trainers then served another 20 years flying for Southwest Airlines, nine of those years as Captain. Also, I am a graduate of the Naval Post Graduate Aviation Safety School with extensive hands on experience in military mishap investigation.

I have mostly enjoyed my latest years of not sitting at the front end of a jet. During my 40 years of flying people, I never really felt the stresses of being responsible for the well being of so many. Now that I spend most of my days on my boat fishing or growing tomatoes in my garden, life's pressures are minimal. This has opened my eyes to the gravity of the enormous responsibility I held on my shoulders, for the safety and well being of so many.

I have always had the mindset not to "arm-chair" quarterback any aviation mishap, regardless of how tempting it may be. But the aviation mishap that occurred at DCA on the evening of Wednesday, January 29 has compelled me to speak out.

Was it preventable? Sadly, It was entirely preventable.

How did it happen you may ask. After all both aircraft were clearly operating normally up until impact. First lets clear up one detail both the President and our news media has consistently made error.

Elevation refers to the height above sea level of the ground. These two aircraft were flying altitudes, not elevations. Aircraft fly altitudes and above 18,000 feet they are called flight levels. Example, flight level 180 is 18,000 feet. The ill-fated regional jet was at approximately 325 feet when it was impacted by the Army UH-60 helicopter. I have flown into Washington National since the first days Southwest began operations at DCA. I was already a Captain at this point, and I can tell you this airport is one of the most technically challenging of any I have flown.

However, that is not why this disaster happened.

I would be very surprised if the RJ black box revealed either of the two young PSA pilots were aware up until the moment of impact. Why you may ask? Because when you are flying a jet on short final, at 325 feet, you are focused on the flare and touch-down point on the runway. Perhaps the young First Officer may have seen the UH-60 just with enough warning to make a call-out, just prior to impact. From the angle of impact, very unlikely the more seasoned Captain would have even been able to see anything at all. If the First Officer was making the landing, it is most certain that neither of them saw it coming and there was nothing said on the microphone. I have no doubt, the pilots on the regional jet will be completely vindicated. In any aviation mishap, there is a chain of events that lead up to the accident. If any one of the links in the chain are broken, the accident will not happen. In this case, there are two remaining main causal factors.

DCA control tower: Tower controller made a fatal error in communicating with the Army UH-60. Time was clearly critical and was wasted by asking the H-60 if they had jet traffic in site. Clearly, they did not. What should have been said in a very assertive voice, "PAT25 (UH-60's callsign), IMMEDIATE TURN TO XXX HEADING, CLIMB AND MAINTAIN XXX ALTITUDE TO AVOID COLLISION. Tower was no help at all. First they cleared the RJ for a last minute change to 33, and then failed to ensure their approach corridor was clear of traffic. In my view, the tower controller could have easily prevented this fatal collision.

Army UH-60 crew: In military aviation training, we have always have preached the importance for pilots to maintain situational awareness. That philosophy by the way is also a cornerstone to commercial aviation safety. Were the pilots tuned up to tower when the controller gave the RJ clearance to land runway 33? Had they been aware the commuter jet was going to track over the ground through their intended flight direction, something should have been said. Request vector, due to traffic! One H-60 pilot responded, yes we have traffic in site, we will maintain VFR (visual flight rules) which means "see and avoid" yes even at night. Clearly he was looking at the wrong traffic which by the way is a very common occurrence, especially at night. No doubt the Army crew was engaged in training, which may have been a distractor to situational awareness.

In the end, the chain of events were allowed to happen as did this horrible accident that took the lives of sixty-seven beautiful souls. The President is totally correct in that we need to hire pilots and air-traffic controllers based on merit and experience, nothing else! I have witnessed first hand, the failed attempts to ensure diversity while training pilots, at the expense of safety. That practice, both military and commercial aviation, needs to stop! The current administration has their hands full but I have complete confidence they will make significant headway. Clearly we need to train and educate more air traffic controllers! The shortage and perhaps poor training standards are likely the primary cause of this mishap. I have no doubt our new Transportation Secretary is on it with both feet running. We need to maintain pilot standards also. The pilot shortage resulted in the FAA reducing the flight hours required to be hired to fly commercially. Why didn't they allow experienced pilots age 65-67 to work? In this country, we have effectively dumbed down just about everything, in the name of getting everyone through.

Just like on the operating table, you want the most experienced individuals in the most demanding jobs!

Pretty standard in my experience was to begin any approach briefing with my oppo with us airing the likely arrival routing and what the potential safety threats were for the arrival. Apart from the area chart showing the helo routes, there does seem to be a complete lack of any information about helo and VFR operations on any of the approach charts for KDCA.

This seems to me to be a big charting oversight, because these charts would be stage centre as any crew conducted their approach briefing and then made reference to them while they flew the actual approach. There\x92s simply nothing on there to suggest risk of mid-air collision might be a factor, where the hotspots are, or extra vigilance required etc.