August 10, 2025, 05:00:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11936009
There have been a number of references above to the woefully inadequate vertical separation provided between helicopter Route 4 and the approach to Runway 33. Given altimeter errors (expected and maybe not so expected) in the helicopter, a helicopter flying high (and possibly offset sideways towards the end of Runway 33) and an aircraft maybe low on approach, there really wasn’t any guaranteed separation.
I strikes me that, from my layman’s point of view, that this is the primary and gaping hole (among numerous others) in the Swiss cheese here.
At the same time, I get the sense that no controller was ever going to intentionally permit a helicopter to pass directly under an approaching aircraft and challenge that limited clearance.
My question is, should this have been (or was it?) formalized as an ATC procedure? Because if this had been proceduralized, I find it hard to believe that just nighttime VFR separation would have been found acceptable in that environment. Rather I would think that lateral separation should have been actively managed by ATC.
For one thing, with the CRJ (or whatever aircraft) pilots making a late switch to 33, turning to line up with the runway, etc., they may not have had the bandwidth to scan for a possibly conflicting helicopter, if they could even have seen it from their cockpit. (IIRC from the inquiry, the NTSB will be investigating that last point.)
I don’t know how difficult it may have been for the helicopter to see the CRJ, but the simple fact is that they did not.
On another subject, one thing that struck me from the inquiry was that the helicopter pilot apparently had very limited recent flight time, yet was assigned a challenging check ride.
This contrasted with the testimony of the leader (?) of one of the local Medivac groups, who discussed how much more experience he and his pilots had flying in that challenging environment (and often single-pilot ops at that).
Is the Army not providing adequate training and flight time to ensure their pilots can operate safely in those conditions?
I strikes me that, from my layman’s point of view, that this is the primary and gaping hole (among numerous others) in the Swiss cheese here.
At the same time, I get the sense that no controller was ever going to intentionally permit a helicopter to pass directly under an approaching aircraft and challenge that limited clearance.
My question is, should this have been (or was it?) formalized as an ATC procedure? Because if this had been proceduralized, I find it hard to believe that just nighttime VFR separation would have been found acceptable in that environment. Rather I would think that lateral separation should have been actively managed by ATC.
For one thing, with the CRJ (or whatever aircraft) pilots making a late switch to 33, turning to line up with the runway, etc., they may not have had the bandwidth to scan for a possibly conflicting helicopter, if they could even have seen it from their cockpit. (IIRC from the inquiry, the NTSB will be investigating that last point.)
I don’t know how difficult it may have been for the helicopter to see the CRJ, but the simple fact is that they did not.
On another subject, one thing that struck me from the inquiry was that the helicopter pilot apparently had very limited recent flight time, yet was assigned a challenging check ride.
This contrasted with the testimony of the leader (?) of one of the local Medivac groups, who discussed how much more experience he and his pilots had flying in that challenging environment (and often single-pilot ops at that).
Is the Army not providing adequate training and flight time to ensure their pilots can operate safely in those conditions?
Last edited by andihce; 10th August 2025 at 06:44 . Reason: clarification
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
NTSB
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Vertical Separation
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August 10, 2025, 06:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11936017
There have been a number of references above to the woefully inadequate vertical separation provided between helicopter Route 4 and the approach to Runway 33. Given altimeter errors (expected and maybe not so expected) in the helicopter, a helicopter flying high (and possibly offset sideways towards the end of Runway 33) and an aircraft maybe low on approach, there really wasn\x92t any guaranteed separation.
I strikes me that, from my layman\x92s point of view, that this is the primary and gaping hole (among numerous others) in the Swiss cheese here.
At the same time, I get the sense that no controller was ever going to allow a helicopter to pass directly under an approaching aircraft and challenge that limited clearance.
My question is, should this have been (or was it?) formalized as an ATC procedure? Because if this had been proceduralized, I find it hard to believe that just nighttime VFR separation would have been found acceptable in that environment. Rather I would think that lateral separation should have been actively managed by ATC.
For one thing, with the CRJ (or whatever aircraft) pilots making a late switch to 33, turning to line up with the runway, etc., they may not have had the bandwidth to scan for a possibly conflicting helicopter, if they could even have seen it from their cockpit. (IIRC from the inquiry, the NTSB will be investigating that last point.)
I don\x92t know how difficult it may have been for the helicopter to see the CRJ, but the simple fact is that they did not.
I strikes me that, from my layman\x92s point of view, that this is the primary and gaping hole (among numerous others) in the Swiss cheese here.
At the same time, I get the sense that no controller was ever going to allow a helicopter to pass directly under an approaching aircraft and challenge that limited clearance.
My question is, should this have been (or was it?) formalized as an ATC procedure? Because if this had been proceduralized, I find it hard to believe that just nighttime VFR separation would have been found acceptable in that environment. Rather I would think that lateral separation should have been actively managed by ATC.
For one thing, with the CRJ (or whatever aircraft) pilots making a late switch to 33, turning to line up with the runway, etc., they may not have had the bandwidth to scan for a possibly conflicting helicopter, if they could even have seen it from their cockpit. (IIRC from the inquiry, the NTSB will be investigating that last point.)
I don\x92t know how difficult it may have been for the helicopter to see the CRJ, but the simple fact is that they did not.
And to stick with motoring analogies, some of us are used to considering that at a junction another vehicle can be partly obscured by a pillar for one eye, and in the blind spot of our other eye, so we might move our head sideways to help check better. Some aircraft have more windscreen pillars (this helicopter has four) so the aircraft in a constant relative position - which is the one that is the collision risk - may stay behind a pillar unless we move our head.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
NTSB
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Vertical Separation
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August 10, 2025, 06:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11936029
There have been a number of references above to the woefully inadequate vertical separation provided between helicopter Route 4 and the approach to Runway 33. Given altimeter errors (expected and maybe not so expected) in the helicopter, a helicopter flying high (and possibly offset sideways towards the end of Runway 33) and an aircraft maybe low on approach, there really wasn\x92t any guaranteed separation.
I strikes me that, from my layman\x92s point of view, that this is the primary and gaping hole (among numerous others) in the Swiss cheese here.
At the same time, I get the sense that no controller was ever going to allow a helicopter to pass directly under an approaching aircraft and challenge that limited clearance.
My question is, should this have been (or was it?) formalized as an ATC procedure? Because if this had been proceduralized, I find it hard to believe that just nighttime VFR separation would have been found acceptable in that environment. Rather I would think that lateral separation should have been actively managed by ATC.
I strikes me that, from my layman\x92s point of view, that this is the primary and gaping hole (among numerous others) in the Swiss cheese here.
At the same time, I get the sense that no controller was ever going to allow a helicopter to pass directly under an approaching aircraft and challenge that limited clearance.
My question is, should this have been (or was it?) formalized as an ATC procedure? Because if this had been proceduralized, I find it hard to believe that just nighttime VFR separation would have been found acceptable in that environment. Rather I would think that lateral separation should have been actively managed by ATC.
For one thing, with the CRJ (or whatever aircraft) pilots making a late switch to 33, turning to line up with the runway, etc., they may not have had the bandwidth to scan for a possibly conflicting helicopter, if they could even have seen it from their cockpit. (IIRC from the inquiry, the NTSB will be investigating that last point.)
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
IFR
NTSB
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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August 10, 2025, 22:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11936403
Bit of confusion here . TCAS is not a separation tool , it is a last minute anti collision system . You are not obliged to monitor the screen, definitively not at 300ft on finals Not sure the CRJ crew noticed it . . Fact is the CRJ crew was not passed the traffic info . the reason why has been covered in the NTSB docket ( interview of the controller)
In class B , controllers will provide separation between IFR and VFR however they can delegate separation to an aircrfat visually following a strict procedure and phraseology .and issuing an ATC Instruction : " maintain visual separation "
In class B , controllers will provide separation between IFR and VFR however they can delegate separation to an aircrfat visually following a strict procedure and phraseology .and issuing an ATC Instruction : " maintain visual separation "
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
IFR
NTSB
NTSB Docket
Phraseology (ATC)
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
VFR
Visual Separation
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August 12, 2025, 21:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11937477
Does this fit the definition for 'normalisation of deviance' provided by Capn Bloggs a few posts above? ("Normalised deviation means deviating from published (perportedly safe) procedures, with no adverse consequences, so the deviations continue. In this case, it's pretty obvious that the "published procedures" were flawed in the first place.") I think it does but .... that's why I'm asking.
Then 3rd , if you have to be designing a conflicting route system , it would be procedurally clear that the 2 could not be used simultaneously . In other word , here in DCA, when runway 33 is in use for landing . Route 4 would be closed, and vice versa, when you have an Heli on route 4 you can't use runway 33 for landing.
But it is not only DCA, I have been flying regularly VFR in Vegas a few years back , and what the tourist helicopters companies were allowed to do there was. let's say " amazing " compared to what we are allowed to do in Europe.
Subjects
DCA
Route 4
VFR
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August 14, 2025, 16:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11938451
Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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August 14, 2025, 20:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11938600
Only the PSA CRJ was scheduled. The PAT flight was an ad hoc VFR Class B transition.
Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller.
Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller.
If I understand the way the q&a progressed, and especially the definition provided by the examiner during the q&a of the Army pilot, "procedurally separate" means the airspace design is such that if both aircraft adhere to their assigned routes, the Route 4 helicopter operation can safely cross the approach path to 3-3 (and, though it should be obvious, please correct this if I've said it incorrectly or without enough precision). But as the Army pilot as well as the med evacuation group chief testified, they took steps to avoid operating across the approach path if there was DCA traffic - which the examiner referred to as "mitigations".
(The wash machine of my mind is cycling through some further thoughts on how the facts emerging from the hearings and certain items in the (voluminous) docket are likely to interact with the relevant legal issues and, in turn, how that appears likely to impact the looming NAS, FAA, and "new ATC system" reforms.)
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
FAA
NTSB Docket
Route 4
VFR
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August 15, 2025, 02:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11938729
Only the PSA CRJ was scheduled. The PAT flight was an ad hoc VFR Class B transition.
Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller.
Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller.
One of the Army pilots at the NTSB hearing said he'd always been instructed to hold when there was traffic on approach to 33. I'd be willing to bet that he never called "traffic in sight" in those instances. That's the crucial difference.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
NTSB
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
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August 15, 2025, 07:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11938800
Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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August 15, 2025, 09:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11938867
Last edited by Stagformation; 15th August 2025 at 21:48 .
Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
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September 29, 2025, 02:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11961287
Actually, it's not the exact same scenario.
In the case you quote, Tower reported the traffic had you in sight. In the case in question, AA5342 was not provided traffic by the DCA LC.
In the case you quote, did Tower say that the traffic was going to maintain own separation? Did Tower provide a bearing/direction and distance to this traffic? Did Tower provide the height of the traffic?
In the case you quote, Tower reported the traffic had you in sight. In the case in question, AA5342 was not provided traffic by the DCA LC.
In the case you quote, did Tower say that the traffic was going to maintain own separation? Did Tower provide a bearing/direction and distance to this traffic? Did Tower provide the height of the traffic?
Subjects
AA5342
DCA
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
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October 18, 2025, 19:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11972195
Fitting and enabling ADSB has to have some positives, so I don\x92t think it\x92s a waste of time. The elephant in the room is mixing IFR and VFR at night on routes that have no (or totally inadequate) separation; this is inside
controlled airspace
- it should be
controlled!
The whole point of separating traffic by level, speed, direction and/or SID/airway/STAR is that if ATC goes down (or is distracted) or has to revert to procedural separation, aircraft are not immediately going to start hitting each other.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
ATC
IFR
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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October 19, 2025, 08:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11972330
Subjects
ADSB (All)
IFR
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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October 21, 2025, 14:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11973706
What has that got to do with this event? They were not on an IFR flight plan.
Also, as an aside the term "altitude" is typically used in aviation.
(Yes, I know that DH for a precision approach is "decision height"...and HAT is shown on approach plates (Height Above Touchdown).
Also, as an aside the term "altitude" is typically used in aviation.
(Yes, I know that DH for a precision approach is "decision height"...and HAT is shown on approach plates (Height Above Touchdown).
Why do I think the IFR ACS might be relevant? Because it specifies the accuracy the FAA requires of skilled pilots when separation is to be achieved by procedural means. The fact that the "designed" separation between the 33 approach slope and the top of Route 4 was less than the allowable error for skilled pilots could be used to rebut an allegation of negligent flying as the cause of the accident. The Army no doubt has its own standards document, but I'd be surprised if it was radically different. Building the argument off the FAA's own document forces the focus onto its route design and visual separation procedures.
As to why this might be relevant to VFR flying - is it your opinion that parameters should be flown more accurately in VFR than in IFR? In any case, I have now dug further into the ACS and the same tolerance is prescribed for commercial VFR helicopter operations (see CH.VII.A.S8).
Last edited by Easy Street; 21st October 2025 at 15:16 .
Subjects
FAA
IFR
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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October 21, 2025, 22:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11973919
The 78 feet deviation by the Mil Heli is not the cause of this accident . I hope the lawyers during the trial do not focus on that and minimize the rest .
Bit of historical background : when designing this route decades ago they must have followed basic ICAO/ FAA principles . separation IFR-VFR is 500 feet . allowed deviation then was 100 ft either way , so even if one a/c is 100ft above and the other 100ft too low , there would still be 300 ft separation preventing a collision ,
Bit of historical background : when designing this route decades ago they must have followed basic ICAO/ FAA principles . separation IFR-VFR is 500 feet . allowed deviation then was 100 ft either way , so even if one a/c is 100ft above and the other 100ft too low , there would still be 300 ft separation preventing a collision ,
When that was introduced decades ago I bet you a bottle of (real) Champagne that the procedure was use of that route 4 was restricted during RWY 33 arrivals and RWY 15 departures. It was one or the other but not both simultaneously .
How , when and why , over time , did it degraded to the point that this restriction could be disregarded would be interested to investigate and unveil .
How , when and why , over time , did it degraded to the point that this restriction could be disregarded would be interested to investigate and unveil .
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
FAA
ICAO
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
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October 22, 2025, 09:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11974130
Thanks
WR-6-3
for the legal perspective , Extremely enlightening for a non-law savvy person like me .I like the " hot dog-warm puppy" analogy between a trial and the truth . Looking forward to the actual trial and your comments on it when the day will come .
@ IgnorantAndroid :
I am aware of that as this is what the controllers hang on to since the beginning , since they were trained like that and thought they were just following the rules . . However we are a safety business ,. It is not because it is legal than it is safe
Which safety assessment was made and validated ( and by who) which allowed visual separation for an helicopter at 200ft to pass below the approach path of an aircrfat at 3 or 400 feet ?, resulting in a 100-200ft separation ?
That is the question I would be asking first.
How about which actions were taken after the previous incidents , and possibly acting on the normalization of deviance , would be the next .
@ IgnorantAndroid :
If the helicopter hadn't called "traffic in sight," they would've been instructed to hold until the CRJ was clear. In general, a VFR aircraft saying "traffic in sight" is effectively exempt from such procedures
Which safety assessment was made and validated ( and by who) which allowed visual separation for an helicopter at 200ft to pass below the approach path of an aircrfat at 3 or 400 feet ?, resulting in a 100-200ft separation ?
That is the question I would be asking first.
How about which actions were taken after the previous incidents , and possibly acting on the normalization of deviance , would be the next .
Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
Visual Separation
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October 22, 2025, 21:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11974590
Thank you for your reply. I will offer the view that you are overthinking this.
Subjects
CRJ
IFR
Traffic in Sight
VFR
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October 24, 2025, 09:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11975500
But first you'd have to know the plane is there.
I But I don't understand how the FAA would be responsible. Visual separation is initiated by the pilot, when they say "traffic in sight.
I strongly suspect this is what will come up anyway in the NTSB report .
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
Visual Separation
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December 20, 2025, 19:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12008689
I've seen pictures of US military aircraft using devices such as Sentry to feed EFBs with ADSB data, but have no idea if that's widespread throughout the services or indeed was in use during this accident. However, what I do know is that it would be very unlikely that either helo pilot would have the capacity to scan down onto a knee-mounted EFB while flying VFR over a dark river on NVG at 200 feet (and in the non-handling pilot's case, monitoring the handling pilot's height and talking her down). Integration of an audio warning from the EFB to the intercom system would be needed to draw attention to conflictions, and I very much doubt that would have been implemented. Remember, they thought they had the traffic in sight, so there was nothing pressing them to check for other traffic given they were in (supposedly) fully-controlled Class B.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Traffic in Sight
VFR
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January 27, 2026, 23:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12028277
weird that they don\x92t even mention the Blackhawk PF\x92s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn\x92t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)
Additionally this would\x92ve been sapping the IP/PM\x92s capacity to an extent no doubt as he had to monitor her deviations
wasn\x92t this a currency flight for her and she\x92s already blown a segment of it? Clearly her recency/skill level is at least a factor?
ditto they don\x92t mention the limitations of VFR separation under night vision
Additionally this would\x92ve been sapping the IP/PM\x92s capacity to an extent no doubt as he had to monitor her deviations
wasn\x92t this a currency flight for her and she\x92s already blown a segment of it? Clearly her recency/skill level is at least a factor?
ditto they don\x92t mention the limitations of VFR separation under night vision
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
Probable Cause
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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