Posts about: "Visual Separation" [Posts: 250 Page: 13 of 13]¶

You may bet:
1. These persons, making such SA, won't be part of any investigation especially not part of court trial process.
2. Bad systems do not have independent and respecred SA - that is the first reason- why they are bad for workers, customers and society
3. Last, but no least, it is very hard to prove financial benefits of making independent SA and respect it afterwards.

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I entirely agree that getting the facts, at the granular level (that is, with as much completeness and detail as the facts themselves warrant), about how the airspace got configured and how its operation was established as those facts existed on the night of January 29 should be a strong focus - I would say exteme focus - of a real effort to understand how this accident could have happened. Including the names, and roles and responsibilities, of all significant decision-makers and others with non-trivial input into any decisions. As prior posts have made clear, the way in which the helicopter routes were used during particular approach and departure usage of DCA runways did not just spring into existence deus ex machina.

It is tempting to say that a proper discovery plan in the federal district court litigation - which let's recall has only just started - would indeed drill down into those granular facts. The case might actually see that sort of intense and relentless discovery. In the current era of electronic discovery and perhaps utilizing AI tools to continue to refine content of interrogatories and requests to produce documents (and, down the road a bit, requests to admit specifically articulated facts), more massively intrusive discovery efforts would seem possible. And I say "intrusive" because good and effective discovery really is like taking a sewing needle to one's finger to extract a wood splinter which has embedded itself deeply even if also visibly. You've got to keep digging at it.

If such discovery actually eventuates in the litigation, it could produce results approaching revelation of "the truth" about what happened. Still, seeking compensation for the families of the accident victims, and I'm not unaware for the attorneys for their work (if not also for validation and fulfillment in the type of legal careers they've chosen) will be the main lodestar for all that happenes, imo. (Whether this case ultimately turns out to be an example of the need for "civil justice reform" in the United States .... I can't predict. That would be like saying Congress should enact special legislation to compensate the families of the crash victims, after a proper investigation beyond what the NTSB will provide .... yeah, when Hades sets new wind-chill records.)

Same comments about the myriad previous incidents and follow-up or absence of follow-up. It could be the focus of highly intrusive discovery, which to be effective would need to be conducted in waves, taking information extracted first and then using it to dig out more. I should add, probably need to add, that whether the case management plan which ultimately will be approved by the federal district court judge will or will not contemplate such wide-ranging, time-consuming, expensive, and - to the defendants, "objectionable as unduly burdensome" - discovery is yet to be seen. Of course, the attorneys and law firms already in action (per the Complaint filed recently) aren't rookies, far from it.

One other comment which current Congressional action seems to make relevant. Already 12.5 billion bucks have been appropriated with another 18 billion supposedly somewhere in the Congressional authorizations-appropriations process. No one in the aviation community needs reminding of the litany of emerging and/or intensifying issues confronting the NAS. I happen to hold the view that the European and global ATM communities have advanced very significantly on defining these issues and working - albeit incrementally, and even though not without political issues - on solutions. New entrants, not least UAM. The introduction of AI into ATC functions. Cybersecurity (remote towers being a valid example of the locus of the issue). Of course the drive toward reduced emissions, whether called net-zero or anything else. Include calls for equity and inclusion. HAO; Class E airspace. Service Delivery Model of the ATM Master Plan (Service-Oriented Architecture). My point, which is only partially a rhetorical question, is: how could it be even remotely possible for the United States to design and implement a new ATC system worth 30 billion dollars - and which accounts for the issues I've noted to the extent they apply here as well as in Europe and globally - if the actual hard and distressing facts about the causes of the January 29 2025 DCA midair collision are not uneartherd and properly taken into account?

None. That would obviously be unsafe, so the helicopter would be expected to use lateral separation. (e.g. "Pass behind the CRJ.")

The 200 ft altitude restriction seems to have given some the impression that helicopters were routinely passing directly below the approach traffic, but that's not the case. And even if it was, it wouldn't really be relevant to this accident. The Blackhawk pilots weren't trying to duck underneath the plane, they never even saw it.

You mean no SA was made because this scenario was not even considered ? That makes things worse for the FAA if this local "visual " procedure was written down somewhere or even just tolerated , because as I understood, it was standard practice .I am not sure if you know how safety assessments are made , but you must consider every possible scenario when designing procedures.


From a European / EASA perspective :
Re the "Lateral separation" you mention : in that scenario so close to the Runway threshold it would mean only a left turn is possible, i.e. away from the thresholds of both runways , it would mean flying over build up areas , and doing so at 200ft above buildings with possible antennas on top , etc.. ,not really safe , and definitively not at night . As to \x93pass behind\x94 , the standard wake turbulence separation criteria would not be met , especially passing behind/below and I would not even try that at 200ft under a large jet..

So , applying standard safety assessment criteria , allowing visual separation to aircraft on that route, even less at night where danger of mis identification is increased . would definitively not be considered \x93 Safe\x94 .

During the interviews, one Heli pilot from that same group ,mentioned that asking for visual separation was a routine request , even if you did not see the traffic at time of the request . That fact alone, if really proven to be systematically the case , would also add to the normalization of deviance case and put full responsibility on the regulator, not the pilots

Visual Flight Rules aren't a local procedure.

I agree. The prudent thing to do would be to not call traffic in sight and let the controller give you a hold. But first you'd have to know the plane is there.

If that was/is happening, that's a huge problem. But I don't understand how the FAA would be responsible. Visual separation is initiated by the pilot, when they say "traffic in sight." Controllers sometimes prompt it (e.g. "Do you have that traffic in sight?"), but that didn't happen in this case. A pilot should never call traffic in sight unless they truly have it in sight and are completely confident that they can maintain safe separation. I do get the impression that the Blackhawk pilots may not have fully understood that. Both from the NTSB hearings and the ATC recordings (the way they don't even wait for the controller to finish speaking before shouting "traffic in sight request visual separation!")

Indeed but Visual Flight rules (VFR) and visual separations are two very different things . Visual separation can be ( and are) locally restricted , and even Airlines restricted ( think Lufthansa and the SFO incident) . My point is , with hindsight of course, that here, in this route in DCA it should have been restricted , even more so at night..

That is why you have a controller and procedures in place If the procedure says no simultaneous use, no traffic needs to be passed and no request for visual made , unless you allow the normalization of deviance
When you say FAA you mean the regulator right ? because here we have the service provider ( making the local procedures) and the Regulator certifying them being the same entity The "regulator " part should make a safety assessment of the procedures and approve them . In this case they were not safe , and, as I said earlier , especially after the numerous incidents a local restriction should have been in place : no visual separation allowed on those portions of the airspace , or no simultaneous use of that portion of the route when 15/33 is in use.

I strongly suspect this is what will come up anyway in the NTSB report .

From FAA website (verbatim):
Trump\x92s Transportation Secretary Formalizes Permanent Restrictions for Aircraft in Reagan National Airport Airspace

Thursday, January 22, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. \x97 U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy today announced that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is formalizing permanent restrictions for helicopters and powered-lift from operating in certain areas near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), unless these aircraft are conducting essential operations. These restrictions were put in place immediately following the American Airlines 5342 crash and supported by the NTSB\x92s preliminary recommendations.

\x93After that horrific night in January, this Administration made a promise to do whatever it takes to secure the skies over our nation\x92s capital and ensure such a tragedy would never happen again. Today\x92s announcement reaffirms that commitment,\x94 said U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy. \x93The safety of the American people will always be our top priority. I look forward to continuing to collaborate with the NTSB on any additional actions.\x94

The FAA published an Interim Final Rule (IFR) that will significantly reduce midair-collision risks and implement a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation to prohibit certain helicopter operations when Runways 15 and 33 at DCA are in use.

\x93We took decisive action immediately following the January 2025 midair collision to reduce risk in the airspace,\x94 said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford. \x93This is a key step toward ensuring these improvements remain permanent and we\x92re continuing to work with the NTSB to ensure an accident like this never happens again.\x94

While the interim final rule goes into effect tomorrow, the public is invited to submit written comments, which the FAA will consider before issuing a final rule.

Additional Information:

The FAA took immediate action to restrict mixed traffic around DCA and made permanent helicopter route changes after the NTSB recommendations. U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy and the FAA didn\x92t stop there \x96 taking additional actions for DCA to address operations, procedures, and personnel, including:

Established procedures to eliminate helicopter and fixed-wing mixed traffic near the airport
Closed Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge
Revised agreements with the military to require ADS-B Out broadcasting
Discontinued take offs from the Pentagon until the FAA and Department of War updated procedures and fixed technical issues at the Pentagon Heliport
Eliminated the use of visual separation within 5 nautical miles of DCA
Published modifications to helicopter zones and routes moving them farther away from DCA flight paths
Increased support, oversight and staffing at DCA
In October 2025, the FAA updated Helicopter routes and zones at DCA, Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) and Baltimore/ Washington International Airport (BWI).

The FAA previously implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFR) around DCA. To make the restrictions contained in the TFRs permanent, the FAA issued an IFR which is set to publish on January 23, 2026, and will take effect immediately. The public is invited to submit comments on the IFR and the FAA will later publish a Final Rule in response to those comments.

Probable Cause Statement:

Those are addressed in some of the 75-odd Findings statements.

But all of those deficiencies arguably added up to the stated Probable Cause: "the lack of effective pilot applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a mid-air collision"

I haven't read the report yet but if this is what it concludes, it looks like it's going to be a disappointing read. Aircraft move around and it's not possible to design routes that never intersect....in an environment such as the one in question, ATC should be authorising the aircraft to follow specific routes only when the requisite separation will exist. As I mentioned much earlier in the thread, t he procedures that were applied by ATC immediately before the accident are ‘standard’ and used the world over. None are intrinsically unsafe but their application (as with all the other rules that need to be followed) needs to be appropriate. Visual separation at night is likely to be fine on a clear night with just two or three aircraft in the sky but it’s unlikely to be in any way appropriate in high traffic density environments. Just because there’s a rule that says you can do something doesn’t mean it’s necessarily a good idea. You can have a helicopter route as close to an approach path (or any other route) just as long as you don't allow a helicopter and another aircraft to be in the same place at the same time. Whilst the other mentioned causal and contributory factors are all going to be valid up to a point, fundamentally, the FAA permitted inappropriate application of completely suitable procedures. How and why this situation was allowed to prevail is, I hope, discussed in detail in the report even if it didn't make it into the Probable Cause statement.