January 31, 2025, 10:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818101
Quote from an NTSB report
\x94 The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flight crew to comply with the provisions of a maintain visual separation clearance including the requirement to inform the controller when they no longer had the other aircraft in sight.
Contributing to the accident were the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures to separate two aircraft on potentially conflicting tracks when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical radar separation to either aircraft. \x93
That was of course PSA 182 I\x92m not entirely sure that after a lengthy investigation the report won\x92t say something similar.
\x94 The NTSB determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the flight crew to comply with the provisions of a maintain visual separation clearance including the requirement to inform the controller when they no longer had the other aircraft in sight.
Contributing to the accident were the air traffic control procedures in effect which authorized the controllers to use visual separation procedures to separate two aircraft on potentially conflicting tracks when the capability was available to provide either lateral or vertical radar separation to either aircraft. \x93
That was of course PSA 182 I\x92m not entirely sure that after a lengthy investigation the report won\x92t say something similar.
Subjects
ATC
NTSB
Probable Cause
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 11:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818105
This visual separation at night thing is bananas. Heli confirms he is visual with RJ, but ATC is relying on him actually having made visual with the correct aircraft.
Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 11:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818111
At 00:26 ATC informs them about the CRJ, and PAT25 requests visual separation. At 01:08 the conflict alert sounds and ATC instructs them to pass behind. This is not read back; instead PAT25 affirms they have the traffic in sight and asks again for visual separation. ATC seems to approve this request for the second time, but this transmission is not very clear.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
PAT25
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 12:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818151
There is some audio around on Youtube. Scanner stuff for arrivals at Reagan. CRJ can be heard accepting runway 33.
Arrivals tells PAT25 Heli to keep watch for CRJ. There is no acknowledgment. Arrivals then tells PAT 25 to pass behind CRJ. There is no acknowledgment. Then boom.
Arrivals tells PAT25 Heli to keep watch for CRJ. There is no acknowledgment. Arrivals then tells PAT 25 to pass behind CRJ. There is no acknowledgment. Then boom.
Subjects
CRJ
PAT25
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Pass Behind (PAT25)
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 12:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818178
Funny, I’m hearing a lot of
professional
pilots here say exactly that, one way or another.
I don’t like saying this, but reading your posts, my gut feeling is you may be part of the problem.
It’s well-known that modern airliners are specifically designed to be flown safely by the average pilot, not the cream. If ATC procedures aren’t designed and operated in a similar vein, does it need, a) a professional pilot to infer increased risk, or b) plain common sense?
I would much rather be on the flight that refuses to accept a night visual separation than hope my pilot is above average. Why?
Because hope is a poor hedge (if you like gambling analogies).
I don’t like saying this, but reading your posts, my gut feeling is you may be part of the problem.
It’s well-known that modern airliners are specifically designed to be flown safely by the average pilot, not the cream. If ATC procedures aren’t designed and operated in a similar vein, does it need, a) a professional pilot to infer increased risk, or b) plain common sense?
I would much rather be on the flight that refuses to accept a night visual separation than hope my pilot is above average. Why?
Because hope is a poor hedge (if you like gambling analogies).
Subjects
ATC
DCA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 13:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818201
But that isn't the first communication that mentions the CRJ. The heli had previously been told the exact location, altitude, type and which runway the CRJ was positioning for. The heli crew replied that they were visual. It is only later that the controller refers to the CRJ in isolation (with no position) but he is simply querying 'are you still visual with the aircraft that you literally just told me you were visual with?'. There is no need for any night ID skills and even if you don't have a clue what a CRJ looks like, that entire combination of calls still make sense. I agree that if the heli had been made more aware of how proximate the CRJ was then that might have resolved an incorrect SA picture, but the heli had repeatedly told the controller that he was visual. If a procedure is designed that allows a heli to correctly pass under another aircraft by 100-200 feet, at night, is the controller really supposed to be able to judge from the tower whether they are extremely close (as would appear to be the case if they were both on the correct path) or if they were on a collision course?
.....
.....
Last edited by Jetstream67; 31st January 2025 at 13:37 . Reason: clarity
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 14:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818253
Talk of it being difficult to pick out aircraft nav lights is a red herring. The heli was, initially, several hundred feet below the CRJ and should have been able to easily see the lights against the night sky.
Blaming the airspace design is also a non starter. Are we really going to say that just because the airspace is poorly designed then I'm just going to fly in to that regional jet over there?
First rule of airmanship anyone? Keep a good lookout. Seems like the helicopter crew failed to do so having been given their requested visual separation. Should have had eyes on stalks.
Blaming the airspace design is also a non starter. Are we really going to say that just because the airspace is poorly designed then I'm just going to fly in to that regional jet over there?
First rule of airmanship anyone? Keep a good lookout. Seems like the helicopter crew failed to do so having been given their requested visual separation. Should have had eyes on stalks.
Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 14:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818262
Originally Posted by
slfool
I assume that means the "apparently static head on approaching light" factor can be discounted.
Originally Posted by
slfool
I also assume that still doesn't mean the helo pilot would have seen the jet
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 14:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818263
Interestingly, if the SMS works in the US the same as everywhere else in the world, procedures should be audited on a regular basis, with a focus on any changes which may have invalidated the original assumptions made about the frequency of hazards and associated risks. These procedure reviews would also take place after receipt of any safety reports where the procedure could have been a contributing factor.
The NASA ASRS database contains safety reports raised over the US. A quick search with the term “helicopter” produced 40+ reports with the highlights shown below.. (apologies, to save time these are all copy and pasted) There are more, but I appreciate that most of us have annual eye examinations to pass so didn’t want to overdo it!
1. While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a “monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the “clear of conflict” the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead.
2. ATC delayed switch from Approach to Tower led to TA and resulting altitude deviation causing a GPWS Caution. Tower then issued a low altitude alert. Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. By the time Tower responded we had a RA to descend which led to a GPWS and low altitude alert from Tower. We confirmed traffic in sight and maneuvered back on coarse to correct the deviation, in judgement the safety of flight was not compromised as such we continued the approach to landing on Runway 19. As I believe a go-around would have exacerbated the situation and led to further problems.
3. I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].
I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X, approved the request and issued the altimeter.
Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.
Note. My standard practice for helicopter s flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopter s pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.
Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopter s over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.
Once Aircraft Y landed, he asked about the flight of three helicopter s off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.
Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.
I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.
4
Our flight] into DCA was in a NMAC. We were supposed to circle from the visual Runway 1 to instead land on 33. We followed the [company] station bulletin procedures exactly as planned and came within very close contact of another aircraft. This occurred about 400 feet off the ground to the point where the pilot monitoring had to take the controls to make a correction in order to prevent it from becoming a midair collision. After there was action taken to make a correction from the close call, we were then informed by DCA tower of close traffic although at that point it would have been too late. I have flown with people who for the purpose of having a better chance of a stabilized approach would have had a wider circle to land procedure which I'm sure would have almost definitely ended in the collision of two aircraft over the turn to final for 33 in DCA. There was an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower to [our flight] or DCA Tower to the associated helicopter who did not ever pop up on TCAS which I'm assuming is due to a lack of an operating transponder. No TCAS RA was associated with this event.
This occurred due to an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower and [our flight] or DCA Tower and the associated helicopter . Otherwise the other reason this may have happened is because of an unclear idea of where aircraft should be located during Runway 33 circle to land operations. I believe I was on track with what the [company] guidelines are for that particular procedure but there is a possibility that the other traffic operating around that area may not be aware of where exactly we are located or maybe they don't have a specific guideline to keep the arriving traffic separated from the low flying helicopter s.
5
I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have.
6
We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in
sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final.
when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around
regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a
turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed
on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an
explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have
happened. Number one, he said that the helicopter s operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter
was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a
second because they would never expect those helicopter s to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've
never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the
helicopter , and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot.
Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions.
7
It was the end of a long day and the events were happening very quickly during a high workload portion of the flight. As all pilots know, the River Visual is a very demanding approach during the best of circumstances. It is very labor intensive when done at night during periods of high traffic volume. The advertised approach in use at DCA was the LDA 19 with VASI being out of service. During the initial approach, Potomac asked if we would accept the charted River Visual approach (VASI back working) and we did. At approximately the 7 DME point we were in the end process of configuring the airplane for landing and the First Officer was accomplishing the Landing Checklist. The radio chatter was considerable and the Tower at some point advised us of helicopter traffic ahead and to the left (I believe he said 10 to 11 o'clock) and he was going to pass from left to right, below us and he "HAS US IN SIGHT." It has to be noted that these traffic calls and helicopter s have unfortunately become background noise. There are always numerous military and government helicopter s running up and down that river at all times of the day and night. Because of this, what would normally be alarming at any other airport in the country has become commonplace at DCA. The FAA allows these aircraft to operate in this environment and we have no choice, but to accept it and deal with it. Therefore, the helicopter s being very close are not out of the norm. As you can imagine, I was concentrating on the approach and doing the required gyrations to stay over the river and not violate the White House prohibited airspace, and to keep the aircraft on the proper vertical profile. The Runway 19 visual was loaded in the FMGC and I was using it as a backup to my eyes. I was 'dead on' the donut and everything looked normal. I was at or very slightly above the recommended altitudes at each DME point. As I was approaching 4 DME, I caught a glimpse of the helicopter out of my left window and he did look higher than I expected to see him. I asked the First Officer to confirm if he was going to cross from north to south. He confirmed, however I directed him to ask the Tower and confirm it with them because it did not look right. The First Officer could not get a word in with the Tower. It was at that point, we got a TCAS "TRAFFIC" call. Again, this is not out of the 'norm' for DCA. I was getting ready to take possible evasive action because it was getting uncomfortable; all this while trying to fly the demanding profile. Within seconds, we got a TCAS alert, "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED." I complied with the TCAS alert and was thinking of going around but it all happened so very quickly that the point was moot. The helicopter passed 200 FT (MAX) below us. We were at 900 FT, slightly above the path. The Tower never called out the traffic beyond the first notification. The landing was uneventful. Due to the workload, we asked the Ground Controller for the Tower number and I called when I got to my vehicle. I called the Tower and spoke with the Controller in charge. At first it was it was obvious he was somewhat on the defensive and I had to press the point and ask very specific questions about the standard helicopter operations in the area. After some prodding, he admitted that it was a military helicopter flying from/to Ft. Meade and that he was at 700 FT and was "a little higher than normal." I asked what altitude was he supposed to be at and he replied, "three to four hundred feet." In addition, he did admit that the Tower version of collision avoidance did go to alarm but before they had a chance to react, the event was over. I cannot imagine what business is so pressing that these helicopter s are allowed to cross the path of airliners carrying hundreds of people! I do not understand why they are not crossed IN-BETWEEN arrivals. They have at least 4 miles between these arriving aircraft and it seems that would be more prudent.
8
We were on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach to Washington National Airport, and the Tower instructed us to circle to land on Runway 33. While we made our approach to Runway 33, Tower advised a helicopter was maneuvering at our 12 o'clock position. As we continued our approach, Tower instructed the helicopter to "make a right 360 for a jet on a 2 mile final for Runway 33, and to report him in sight" (referring to our aircraft.)
The Tower then asked the helicopter if he had us in sight. He replied "yes", and the Tower told him to maintain visual separation. As we began our turn from base to final, the helicopter made what looked like a right turn directly into our flight path. The Captain, the pilot flying, made a hard right turn and executed a missed approach to avoid a collision. I'm not sure how close we came to the helicopter since it was on the left side of the aircraft, but I would guess it was only a few hundred feet.
9
WE WERE EXECUTING AN ILS IN IMC. AS MY FO ANNOUNCED 'APCHING MINIMUMS, RWY IN SIGHT,' I BEGAN MY TRANSITION FROM FLT DIRECTOR REF TO VISUAL REF FOR A HAND FLOWN LNDG. MY AIRSPD WAS PROBABLY AROUND 130-135 KIAS. AS I WAS TRANSITIONING I SUDDENLY SAW A DARK COLORED MIL HELI ON MY APCH PATH. HE BLENDED IN VISUALLY WITH THE DISMAL WX CONDITIONS. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY ACFT LIGHTING. AS I SAW HIM, SO DID THE DCA TWR CTLR. THE CTLR ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE AND FORCEFUL ATC INSTRUCTION TO THE HELI. THE HELI EXECUTED AN ABRUPT EVASIVE MANEUVER AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE FOG. I LANDED SAFELY. THIS ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 3-4 SECONDS. MY ACFT (BOEING 757) CONFIGN WAS GEAR DOWN, FULL 30 DEG FLAPS, ON SPD, ON COURSE, ON GLIDE PATH. EVASIVE MANEUVERING CAPABILITY IS LIMITED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MY ALT WAS ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE POTOMAC RIVER. ARPT TERMINALS AND CTL TWR WERE TO MY L, PROHIBITED AREA P-56 WAS TO MY R, AND THE HELI IN QUESTION WAS IN THE WX IN FRONT OF ME SOMEWHERE. I DIDN'T FEEL I COULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH WITH THAT ACFT IN THE FOG IN FRONT OF ME. WE WERE STILL ON LNDG PROFILE AND I DECIDED LNDG WAS THE SAFEST COURSE AVAILABLE. WE MADE A NORMAL EXIT FROM THE RWY TO THE L WITH MUCH LNDG ROOM LEFT ON RWY 36. TAXIED TO THE GATE AND PARKED. MADE AN IMMEDIATE PHONE CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AND RPTED THE INCIDENT. THEN CALLED MY AIRLINE FLT MGMNT SUPVRS AND RPTED THE INCIDENT AND MADE A WRITTEN RPT TO THE AIRLINE SAFETY DEPT UPON ARR AT MY BASE THAT NIGHT. I AM GLAD THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE CTLR TO SEE THE HELI IN TIME TO TAKE ACTION. IF THE VISIBILITY HAD BEEN ANY LESS HE WOULDN'T HAVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT DURING HIS SPEAKING WITH THE TWR FACILITY AT DCA, A CTLR IN TRAINING WAS HANDLING THE MIL TFC AT THE N END OF THE ARPT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER, MORE EXPERIENCED, CTLR. THE SECOND CTLR IS THE ONE THAT TOOK OVER THE MIKE AND ORDERED THE HELI TO LEAVE THE APCH ENVIRONMENT OF THE LNDG TFC. THE RPTR STATES THAT HIS TRAINING WOULD NORMALLY CAUSE HIM TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BUT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ENCOUNTER WITH THE SAME ACFT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD POSSIBILITY AND SO DECIDED THAT LNDG WAS THE SAFEST PATH TO FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT THE PHONE CONVERSATION REVEALED THAT EXTENSIVE TRAINING FOR A MIL EXERCISE OR OP WAS IN PROGRESS AND WAS BEING STAGED FROM THE N PART OF THE DCA COMPLEX. THE RPTR DOESN'T KNOW WHETHER THE HELI PLT MISUNDERSTOOD HIS INSTRUCTIONS OR WHETHER THE CTLR ISSUED SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE.
10
WE WERE ON THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. THERE WAS A MIL HELI OPERATING A TRAINING FLT FLYING N TO S OVER THE RIVER AT 500 FT MSL. WE APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST 80 KTS FASTER (WHILE IN OUR LNDG CONFIGN) THAN THE HELI. TWR ADVISED US OF THE HELI AND THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND HE WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. WE OVERTOOK ALMOST DIRECTLY ABOVE THE HELI AT ABOUT 3.5 DME AND 1100 FT MSL, RIGHT AT THE TURN IN THE RIVER THAT IS REQUIRED ON THE APCH. WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM OUR TCASII AT 1100 FT. WE FLEW AS FAR TO THE E SIDE OF THE RIVER AS WE COULD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON THE HELI ON THE W SIDE OF THE RIVER. WINDS WERE OUT OF THE SW AT 15-20 KTS. THE TCASII INDICATED CLR OF CONFLICT. WE STARTED TO DSND AGAIN AND AT 900 FT AGL, RECEIVED ANOTHER RA FROM OUR TCASII. AT THAT POINT IN THE APCH, THE RIVER TURNED BACK TO THE SSW. AS WE MADE OUR R TURN WE REGAINED VISUAL WITH THE HELI AND CONTINUED TO DSND. TCASII GAVE US 'CLR OF CONFLICT' AND WE FINISHED THE APCH AND LANDED. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND HE LISTENED AND SAID THIS WAS NORMAL. I HAVE FLOWN THIS APCH AT LEAST 15 TIMES AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THIS APCH PUSHING THE ENVELOPE FOR SAFETY, WITH THE AMOUNT OF ATTN I HAD TO GIVE TO THE HELI WHILE FOLLOWING THE RIVER AND DSNDING IN A XWIND AND AT A HIGH LNDG WT. THE TWR NEVER MADE IT CLR TO US WHERE THE HELI WAS GOING. ON THE PHONE THE SUPVR SAID THEY TRAIN FLYING N TO S AND BACK AT 500 FT. APPARENTLY, THEY DO THIS FROM 2 DME N TO 10 DME, BASICALLY UNDER THE WHOLE APCH. WHY CAN'T THEY DO THIS AFTER 10 O'CLOCK PM OR DURING LOW TFC FLOW PERIODS? AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ACFT SHOULD BE SPACED BETTER SO AS NOT TO FLY SO CLOSE TO THE HELI WHILE ON THE APCH. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED HELIS PREVIOUSLY WHILE SHOOTING THIS APCH, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALWAYS CLOSER IN SPD TO US AND THEREFORE WE WOULD NOT OVERTAKE THEM AS FAST, OR WE WERE SPACED BETTER. ALSO, THEY ALWAYS HAD A DEST THAT WE WERE ADVISED OF. I'M SENDING IN THIS RPT BECAUSE I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LEVEL OF SAFETY INVOLVED WITH FLYING WITHIN 400 FT VERTLY OF A HELI AND THAT IS CONSIDERED A NORMAL OP.
11
DURING ILS APCH, SBOUND, HELI COMING DOWN POTOMAC RIVER ABOUT 500 FT MSL, TFC CALLED BY TWR, WE DIDN'T SEE IT. WE GOT AN RA ON TCASII -- HAD TO FOLLOW RA INSTRUCTIONS. THEN WE WERE HIGH ABOVE GS, HAD TO DSND MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE WANTED TO IN ORDER TO LAND. THIS HELI CONFLICT AROUND DCA IS A DAILY PROB! GOING TO TA ONLY ON TCASII WOULD DEFEAT PURPOSE OF TCASII. LNDG ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE HELI'S. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
12
I WAS TURNING FINAL FOR STOL LNDG RWY 21 DCA. I SAW A HELI APCHING ON CONFLICTING FLT PATH. IT WAS APPROX 400 FT BELOW US, BUT WE WERE DSNDING FOR LNDG. I ADVISED DCA TWR OF TFC. HE SAID 'TFC LOW LEVEL, 200 FT.' JUST AS I WAS GOING TO MANEUVER TO AVOID, THE CHOPPER MADE A STEEP TURN AWAY FROM US. AT THIS POINT WE WERE WITHIN 100 FT VERTICALLY AND 1000 FT HORIZLY. BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING A STOL LNDG AT DCA, MY TURN TO AVOID HIM WOULD ALSO CAUSE A GAR. TWR HAD PUT US ON RWY 21 WHILE THE ARPT WAS IN A 'N' OP (ALL OTHER TFC LNDG ON RWY 36). I RECEIVED NO WARNING FROM TWR OF HELI TFC AND I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF CHOPPER PLT HAD US IN SIGHT (UNTIL HE MADE THE EVASIVE TURN). THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME OF SUCH AN OCCURRENCE AT DCA. I HAVE HAD MANY CONFLICTS WITH CHOPPERS, BOTH ON LNDG AND TKOF AT DCA. I HAVE TALKED TO TWR SEVERAL TIMES (INCLUDING THIS TIME) AND HAVE RECEIVED APOLOGIES AND ADMITTING OF ERRORS BUT THE PROB CONTINUES. THE HELI IS A VERY MANEUVERABLE ACFT. IF THE CHOPPER PLTS WOULD JUST GIVE US MORE SEPARATION, THE PROB WOULD BE SOLVED. WHEN THEY SEE US THEY COULD SLOW OR HOVER, TURN, ETC. CONFLICTS OCCUR WHEN TWR FORGETS TO ADVISE ME THAT CHOPPER HAS ME IN SIGHT AND THE CHOPPER MAINTAINS HIS 'TRAJECTORY' WHICH CONFLICTS WITH MY LIMITED ARR OR DEP AIRSPACE.
13
DURING RIVER VISUAL APCH DCA (LNDG RWY 18), 3 HELIS CROSSED OUR FLT PATH. THE FIRST CAUSED AN RA ON TCASII WITH A 0-300 FT CLB (WHICH WE FOLLOWED). THE HELI WENT DIRECTLY UNDER OUR ACFT WITH LESS THAN 300 FT SEPARATION. THE NEXT 2 HELIS CAUSED MONITOR VERT DSCNT ON THE TCASII. ALL 3 HELIS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 1 MI. THE TWR NEVER CALLED ANY TFC, UNTIL WE CALLED THE FIRST HELI IN SIGHT. THEN HE SAID 3 HELIS WERE XING THE RIVER. WITHOUT THE RA WE WOULD HAVE COME EVEN CLOSER THAN 300 FT TO THE FIRST HELI.
14
WASHINGTON APCH CTL CLRED ACR X FOR THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH. AT THE WILSON BRIDGE THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND STOL ON RWY 33. I TURNED OFF THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH ONTO A L BASE LEG FOR RWY 33. THE PATTERN FLOWN WAS SQUARE. I TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1/2 MI S OF THE E BANK OF THE POTOMAC RIVER. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED OF A HELI IN OUR AREA AND WE DID NOT HEAR THE TWR TALKING TO A HELI ON 119.1 (1-WAY OR 2-WAY COM). WE DID NOT SEE A HELI DURING OUR APCH. THE SKY WAS HAZY AND THE SUN WAS OFF THE L SIDE. IT WAS DAYLIGHT. LINED UP ON FINAL AND STABILIZED FOR A STOL LNDG, I SUDDENLY CAUGHT SIGHT OF A PRESIDENTIAL TYPE HELI XING OUR FLT PATH, APPROX 50-100 FT BELOW AND 100 FT IN FRONT OF US AT OUR 11:30 POS, AS WE PASSED THROUGH 600 FT MSL. THE HELI WAS MOVING L TO R AT A GOOD SPD, BUT I DETERMINED A COLLISION WAS POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED PWR, PULLED UP AND CALLED 'GAR' TO THE FO. AS WE PULLED UP I CALLED OUT THE HELI TO THE FO WHO THEN SAW IT CLOSE AND BELOW AS IT PASSED OFF THE R SIDE. THE GAR WAS UNEVENTFUL AND COMPLIED WITH TWR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN AFTER WE CALLED WITH GAR AND NEAR MISS. THE TWR'S RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER AND UNDERSTAND' ONLY. THE HELI IN QUESTION DID NOT APPEAR TO ALTER COURSE OR FLT PATH UNTIL DSNDING AND LNDG AT ANACOSTRA. ON THE GND I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE TWR ON LANDLINE BUT KEPT GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL (3 ATTEMPTS). SINCE I WAS DUE BACK OUT IN 10 MINS FOR MY NEXT FLT, I RETURNED TO MY ACFT AND CONTINUED ON MY SCHEDULE. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE TWR KNEW OF OR HAD TALKED TO THE HELI IN QUESTION. MANY TIMES THE TWR TALKS TO HELIS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ, BUT YOU CAN HEAR THE TWR'S COM TO THEM ON 119.1. THEY WILL USUALLY POINT OUT HELI TFC TO US AND COMMENT THAT THE HELI IS AT SUCH AND SUCH AN ALT, DIRECTION AND THAT THEY (THE HELI) HAVE US IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT WAS 'VERY' CLOSE AND FAR FROM THE NORM I'VE EXPERIENCED IN 15 YRS OF FLYING INTO AND OUT OF DCA.
15
HOT, HAZY AFTERNOON IN WASHINGTON (HAZE DID RESTRICT VISIBILITY) FLYING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA, CREW IS DCA BASED SO WE ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. AT ABOUT 4-5 DME, TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD LAND ON RWY 15, I DECLINED AND SAID THAT I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE FOR RWY 18. TWR THEN ADVISED US THERE WOULD BE 2 HELIS COMING OUT OF THE TIDAL BASIN AREA. (IT IS NOT AT ALL UNCOMMON TO SEE HELIS XING OUR FLT PATH WHEN WE ARE TAKING OFF TO THE N AND CLBING). I COULD SEE A CONTACT ON OUR TCASII SCREEN -- JUST ONE TARGET -- AND BTWN 600 AND 500 FT ON FINAL, WE GOT AN RA THAT COMMANDED CLB. I HAD THE FO LEVEL OFF AT 500 FT, THE TARGET SHOWED 200 FT BELOW ON THE TCASII AND VERY CLOSE ABEAM ME (ON 5 NM SCALE) AND I NEVER DID SEE EITHER HELI. WE STARTED BACK DOWN WHEN THE TCASII SHOWED WE WERE PASSED THEM, WE WERE HIGH AS WE ROLLED WINGS LEVEL ON FINAL BUT, WE WERE STILL ABLE TO SAFELY COMPLETE THE APCH. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS APCH AT DCA FOR 7 1/2 YRS, AND THIS ONE REALLY GOT MY ATTN. TWR IS NOT CTLING THE HELIS, I CAN'T BE SURE THE HELIS HAVE ME IN SIGHT, I KNOW THE SECOND HELI IS LOOKING AT HIS LEAD -- THEREFORE, I KNOW HE IS NOT LOOKING AT ME, AND I AM DSNDING INTO HIM WHILE ON FINAL ON A CHALLENGING APCH. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE A MIDAIR, AND UNFORTUNATELY, PROBABLY IS CONSIDERED ROUTINE OPS BY DCA TWR.
16
MANEUVERING IN GOOD VMC FOR LNDG ON RWY 21 AT DCA (CLRED FOR VIS APCH, MONITORING TWR FREQ FOR LNDG CLRNC). TWR ADVISED OF HELI TFC BELOW AND AHEAD. THIS TFC WAS SPOTTED FLYING SW WHERE ANACOSTIA RIVER MEETS POTOMAC. NO CONFLICT, INITIALLY. THE HELI, A MIL TYPE, THEN TURNED NW UP THE POTOMAC RIVER. THIS NOW BECAME AN IMMEDIATELY INCREASING TFC CONFLICT. CONVERGING FLT PATHS. I ASKED TWR TO PROVIDE SEP, HOPING HE WOULD STOP, SLOW OR TURN THE HELI. HE RESPONDED WITH, "MAINTAIN VIS SEP." MANEUVERING IN CLOSE FOR A STOL LNDG ALLOWS FOR VERY LITTLE LEEWAY FROM THE DESIRED FLT PATH. A GAR FROM THIS POS IS ALSO DANGEROUS. THERE WAS NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO TWR AND THE HELI WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. I CONTINUED AND LANDED VERY CAUTIOUSLY WHEN I REALIZED WE WOULD MISS TFC. HOWEVER, WE ONLY MISSED BY APPROX 300'. I FEEL THAT ATC (TWR) IGNORED ITS BASIC OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING SEP. THE HELI COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN SLOWED, STOPPED OR TURNED AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING AN IMPENDING COLLISION. TWR CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF BOTH ACFT'S FLT PATHS. I HOPE THEY (TWR) DO NOT THINK 200-300' IS A SAFE AMOUNT OF TFC SEP. THIS HELI CONFLICT, AND POOR ATC SEP OF IT, AT DCA IS AN ONGOING PROB. HERE IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
The NASA ASRS database contains safety reports raised over the US. A quick search with the term “helicopter” produced 40+ reports with the highlights shown below.. (apologies, to save time these are all copy and pasted) There are more, but I appreciate that most of us have annual eye examinations to pass so didn’t want to overdo it!
1. While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a “monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the “clear of conflict” the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead.
2. ATC delayed switch from Approach to Tower led to TA and resulting altitude deviation causing a GPWS Caution. Tower then issued a low altitude alert. Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. By the time Tower responded we had a RA to descend which led to a GPWS and low altitude alert from Tower. We confirmed traffic in sight and maneuvered back on coarse to correct the deviation, in judgement the safety of flight was not compromised as such we continued the approach to landing on Runway 19. As I believe a go-around would have exacerbated the situation and led to further problems.
3. I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].
I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X, approved the request and issued the altimeter.
Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.
Note. My standard practice for helicopter s flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopter s pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.
Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopter s over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.
Once Aircraft Y landed, he asked about the flight of three helicopter s off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.
Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.
I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.
4
Our flight] into DCA was in a NMAC. We were supposed to circle from the visual Runway 1 to instead land on 33. We followed the [company] station bulletin procedures exactly as planned and came within very close contact of another aircraft. This occurred about 400 feet off the ground to the point where the pilot monitoring had to take the controls to make a correction in order to prevent it from becoming a midair collision. After there was action taken to make a correction from the close call, we were then informed by DCA tower of close traffic although at that point it would have been too late. I have flown with people who for the purpose of having a better chance of a stabilized approach would have had a wider circle to land procedure which I'm sure would have almost definitely ended in the collision of two aircraft over the turn to final for 33 in DCA. There was an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower to [our flight] or DCA Tower to the associated helicopter who did not ever pop up on TCAS which I'm assuming is due to a lack of an operating transponder. No TCAS RA was associated with this event.
This occurred due to an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower and [our flight] or DCA Tower and the associated helicopter . Otherwise the other reason this may have happened is because of an unclear idea of where aircraft should be located during Runway 33 circle to land operations. I believe I was on track with what the [company] guidelines are for that particular procedure but there is a possibility that the other traffic operating around that area may not be aware of where exactly we are located or maybe they don't have a specific guideline to keep the arriving traffic separated from the low flying helicopter s.
5
I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have.
6
We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in
sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final.
when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around
regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a
turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed
on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an
explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have
happened. Number one, he said that the helicopter s operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter
was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a
second because they would never expect those helicopter s to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've
never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the
helicopter , and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot.
Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions.
7
It was the end of a long day and the events were happening very quickly during a high workload portion of the flight. As all pilots know, the River Visual is a very demanding approach during the best of circumstances. It is very labor intensive when done at night during periods of high traffic volume. The advertised approach in use at DCA was the LDA 19 with VASI being out of service. During the initial approach, Potomac asked if we would accept the charted River Visual approach (VASI back working) and we did. At approximately the 7 DME point we were in the end process of configuring the airplane for landing and the First Officer was accomplishing the Landing Checklist. The radio chatter was considerable and the Tower at some point advised us of helicopter traffic ahead and to the left (I believe he said 10 to 11 o'clock) and he was going to pass from left to right, below us and he "HAS US IN SIGHT." It has to be noted that these traffic calls and helicopter s have unfortunately become background noise. There are always numerous military and government helicopter s running up and down that river at all times of the day and night. Because of this, what would normally be alarming at any other airport in the country has become commonplace at DCA. The FAA allows these aircraft to operate in this environment and we have no choice, but to accept it and deal with it. Therefore, the helicopter s being very close are not out of the norm. As you can imagine, I was concentrating on the approach and doing the required gyrations to stay over the river and not violate the White House prohibited airspace, and to keep the aircraft on the proper vertical profile. The Runway 19 visual was loaded in the FMGC and I was using it as a backup to my eyes. I was 'dead on' the donut and everything looked normal. I was at or very slightly above the recommended altitudes at each DME point. As I was approaching 4 DME, I caught a glimpse of the helicopter out of my left window and he did look higher than I expected to see him. I asked the First Officer to confirm if he was going to cross from north to south. He confirmed, however I directed him to ask the Tower and confirm it with them because it did not look right. The First Officer could not get a word in with the Tower. It was at that point, we got a TCAS "TRAFFIC" call. Again, this is not out of the 'norm' for DCA. I was getting ready to take possible evasive action because it was getting uncomfortable; all this while trying to fly the demanding profile. Within seconds, we got a TCAS alert, "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED." I complied with the TCAS alert and was thinking of going around but it all happened so very quickly that the point was moot. The helicopter passed 200 FT (MAX) below us. We were at 900 FT, slightly above the path. The Tower never called out the traffic beyond the first notification. The landing was uneventful. Due to the workload, we asked the Ground Controller for the Tower number and I called when I got to my vehicle. I called the Tower and spoke with the Controller in charge. At first it was it was obvious he was somewhat on the defensive and I had to press the point and ask very specific questions about the standard helicopter operations in the area. After some prodding, he admitted that it was a military helicopter flying from/to Ft. Meade and that he was at 700 FT and was "a little higher than normal." I asked what altitude was he supposed to be at and he replied, "three to four hundred feet." In addition, he did admit that the Tower version of collision avoidance did go to alarm but before they had a chance to react, the event was over. I cannot imagine what business is so pressing that these helicopter s are allowed to cross the path of airliners carrying hundreds of people! I do not understand why they are not crossed IN-BETWEEN arrivals. They have at least 4 miles between these arriving aircraft and it seems that would be more prudent.
8
We were on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach to Washington National Airport, and the Tower instructed us to circle to land on Runway 33. While we made our approach to Runway 33, Tower advised a helicopter was maneuvering at our 12 o'clock position. As we continued our approach, Tower instructed the helicopter to "make a right 360 for a jet on a 2 mile final for Runway 33, and to report him in sight" (referring to our aircraft.)
The Tower then asked the helicopter if he had us in sight. He replied "yes", and the Tower told him to maintain visual separation. As we began our turn from base to final, the helicopter made what looked like a right turn directly into our flight path. The Captain, the pilot flying, made a hard right turn and executed a missed approach to avoid a collision. I'm not sure how close we came to the helicopter since it was on the left side of the aircraft, but I would guess it was only a few hundred feet.
9
WE WERE EXECUTING AN ILS IN IMC. AS MY FO ANNOUNCED 'APCHING MINIMUMS, RWY IN SIGHT,' I BEGAN MY TRANSITION FROM FLT DIRECTOR REF TO VISUAL REF FOR A HAND FLOWN LNDG. MY AIRSPD WAS PROBABLY AROUND 130-135 KIAS. AS I WAS TRANSITIONING I SUDDENLY SAW A DARK COLORED MIL HELI ON MY APCH PATH. HE BLENDED IN VISUALLY WITH THE DISMAL WX CONDITIONS. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY ACFT LIGHTING. AS I SAW HIM, SO DID THE DCA TWR CTLR. THE CTLR ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE AND FORCEFUL ATC INSTRUCTION TO THE HELI. THE HELI EXECUTED AN ABRUPT EVASIVE MANEUVER AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE FOG. I LANDED SAFELY. THIS ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 3-4 SECONDS. MY ACFT (BOEING 757) CONFIGN WAS GEAR DOWN, FULL 30 DEG FLAPS, ON SPD, ON COURSE, ON GLIDE PATH. EVASIVE MANEUVERING CAPABILITY IS LIMITED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MY ALT WAS ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE POTOMAC RIVER. ARPT TERMINALS AND CTL TWR WERE TO MY L, PROHIBITED AREA P-56 WAS TO MY R, AND THE HELI IN QUESTION WAS IN THE WX IN FRONT OF ME SOMEWHERE. I DIDN'T FEEL I COULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH WITH THAT ACFT IN THE FOG IN FRONT OF ME. WE WERE STILL ON LNDG PROFILE AND I DECIDED LNDG WAS THE SAFEST COURSE AVAILABLE. WE MADE A NORMAL EXIT FROM THE RWY TO THE L WITH MUCH LNDG ROOM LEFT ON RWY 36. TAXIED TO THE GATE AND PARKED. MADE AN IMMEDIATE PHONE CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AND RPTED THE INCIDENT. THEN CALLED MY AIRLINE FLT MGMNT SUPVRS AND RPTED THE INCIDENT AND MADE A WRITTEN RPT TO THE AIRLINE SAFETY DEPT UPON ARR AT MY BASE THAT NIGHT. I AM GLAD THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE CTLR TO SEE THE HELI IN TIME TO TAKE ACTION. IF THE VISIBILITY HAD BEEN ANY LESS HE WOULDN'T HAVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT DURING HIS SPEAKING WITH THE TWR FACILITY AT DCA, A CTLR IN TRAINING WAS HANDLING THE MIL TFC AT THE N END OF THE ARPT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER, MORE EXPERIENCED, CTLR. THE SECOND CTLR IS THE ONE THAT TOOK OVER THE MIKE AND ORDERED THE HELI TO LEAVE THE APCH ENVIRONMENT OF THE LNDG TFC. THE RPTR STATES THAT HIS TRAINING WOULD NORMALLY CAUSE HIM TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BUT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ENCOUNTER WITH THE SAME ACFT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD POSSIBILITY AND SO DECIDED THAT LNDG WAS THE SAFEST PATH TO FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT THE PHONE CONVERSATION REVEALED THAT EXTENSIVE TRAINING FOR A MIL EXERCISE OR OP WAS IN PROGRESS AND WAS BEING STAGED FROM THE N PART OF THE DCA COMPLEX. THE RPTR DOESN'T KNOW WHETHER THE HELI PLT MISUNDERSTOOD HIS INSTRUCTIONS OR WHETHER THE CTLR ISSUED SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE.
10
WE WERE ON THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. THERE WAS A MIL HELI OPERATING A TRAINING FLT FLYING N TO S OVER THE RIVER AT 500 FT MSL. WE APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST 80 KTS FASTER (WHILE IN OUR LNDG CONFIGN) THAN THE HELI. TWR ADVISED US OF THE HELI AND THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND HE WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. WE OVERTOOK ALMOST DIRECTLY ABOVE THE HELI AT ABOUT 3.5 DME AND 1100 FT MSL, RIGHT AT THE TURN IN THE RIVER THAT IS REQUIRED ON THE APCH. WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM OUR TCASII AT 1100 FT. WE FLEW AS FAR TO THE E SIDE OF THE RIVER AS WE COULD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON THE HELI ON THE W SIDE OF THE RIVER. WINDS WERE OUT OF THE SW AT 15-20 KTS. THE TCASII INDICATED CLR OF CONFLICT. WE STARTED TO DSND AGAIN AND AT 900 FT AGL, RECEIVED ANOTHER RA FROM OUR TCASII. AT THAT POINT IN THE APCH, THE RIVER TURNED BACK TO THE SSW. AS WE MADE OUR R TURN WE REGAINED VISUAL WITH THE HELI AND CONTINUED TO DSND. TCASII GAVE US 'CLR OF CONFLICT' AND WE FINISHED THE APCH AND LANDED. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND HE LISTENED AND SAID THIS WAS NORMAL. I HAVE FLOWN THIS APCH AT LEAST 15 TIMES AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THIS APCH PUSHING THE ENVELOPE FOR SAFETY, WITH THE AMOUNT OF ATTN I HAD TO GIVE TO THE HELI WHILE FOLLOWING THE RIVER AND DSNDING IN A XWIND AND AT A HIGH LNDG WT. THE TWR NEVER MADE IT CLR TO US WHERE THE HELI WAS GOING. ON THE PHONE THE SUPVR SAID THEY TRAIN FLYING N TO S AND BACK AT 500 FT. APPARENTLY, THEY DO THIS FROM 2 DME N TO 10 DME, BASICALLY UNDER THE WHOLE APCH. WHY CAN'T THEY DO THIS AFTER 10 O'CLOCK PM OR DURING LOW TFC FLOW PERIODS? AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ACFT SHOULD BE SPACED BETTER SO AS NOT TO FLY SO CLOSE TO THE HELI WHILE ON THE APCH. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED HELIS PREVIOUSLY WHILE SHOOTING THIS APCH, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALWAYS CLOSER IN SPD TO US AND THEREFORE WE WOULD NOT OVERTAKE THEM AS FAST, OR WE WERE SPACED BETTER. ALSO, THEY ALWAYS HAD A DEST THAT WE WERE ADVISED OF. I'M SENDING IN THIS RPT BECAUSE I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LEVEL OF SAFETY INVOLVED WITH FLYING WITHIN 400 FT VERTLY OF A HELI AND THAT IS CONSIDERED A NORMAL OP.
11
DURING ILS APCH, SBOUND, HELI COMING DOWN POTOMAC RIVER ABOUT 500 FT MSL, TFC CALLED BY TWR, WE DIDN'T SEE IT. WE GOT AN RA ON TCASII -- HAD TO FOLLOW RA INSTRUCTIONS. THEN WE WERE HIGH ABOVE GS, HAD TO DSND MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE WANTED TO IN ORDER TO LAND. THIS HELI CONFLICT AROUND DCA IS A DAILY PROB! GOING TO TA ONLY ON TCASII WOULD DEFEAT PURPOSE OF TCASII. LNDG ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE HELI'S. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
12
I WAS TURNING FINAL FOR STOL LNDG RWY 21 DCA. I SAW A HELI APCHING ON CONFLICTING FLT PATH. IT WAS APPROX 400 FT BELOW US, BUT WE WERE DSNDING FOR LNDG. I ADVISED DCA TWR OF TFC. HE SAID 'TFC LOW LEVEL, 200 FT.' JUST AS I WAS GOING TO MANEUVER TO AVOID, THE CHOPPER MADE A STEEP TURN AWAY FROM US. AT THIS POINT WE WERE WITHIN 100 FT VERTICALLY AND 1000 FT HORIZLY. BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING A STOL LNDG AT DCA, MY TURN TO AVOID HIM WOULD ALSO CAUSE A GAR. TWR HAD PUT US ON RWY 21 WHILE THE ARPT WAS IN A 'N' OP (ALL OTHER TFC LNDG ON RWY 36). I RECEIVED NO WARNING FROM TWR OF HELI TFC AND I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF CHOPPER PLT HAD US IN SIGHT (UNTIL HE MADE THE EVASIVE TURN). THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME OF SUCH AN OCCURRENCE AT DCA. I HAVE HAD MANY CONFLICTS WITH CHOPPERS, BOTH ON LNDG AND TKOF AT DCA. I HAVE TALKED TO TWR SEVERAL TIMES (INCLUDING THIS TIME) AND HAVE RECEIVED APOLOGIES AND ADMITTING OF ERRORS BUT THE PROB CONTINUES. THE HELI IS A VERY MANEUVERABLE ACFT. IF THE CHOPPER PLTS WOULD JUST GIVE US MORE SEPARATION, THE PROB WOULD BE SOLVED. WHEN THEY SEE US THEY COULD SLOW OR HOVER, TURN, ETC. CONFLICTS OCCUR WHEN TWR FORGETS TO ADVISE ME THAT CHOPPER HAS ME IN SIGHT AND THE CHOPPER MAINTAINS HIS 'TRAJECTORY' WHICH CONFLICTS WITH MY LIMITED ARR OR DEP AIRSPACE.
13
DURING RIVER VISUAL APCH DCA (LNDG RWY 18), 3 HELIS CROSSED OUR FLT PATH. THE FIRST CAUSED AN RA ON TCASII WITH A 0-300 FT CLB (WHICH WE FOLLOWED). THE HELI WENT DIRECTLY UNDER OUR ACFT WITH LESS THAN 300 FT SEPARATION. THE NEXT 2 HELIS CAUSED MONITOR VERT DSCNT ON THE TCASII. ALL 3 HELIS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 1 MI. THE TWR NEVER CALLED ANY TFC, UNTIL WE CALLED THE FIRST HELI IN SIGHT. THEN HE SAID 3 HELIS WERE XING THE RIVER. WITHOUT THE RA WE WOULD HAVE COME EVEN CLOSER THAN 300 FT TO THE FIRST HELI.
14
WASHINGTON APCH CTL CLRED ACR X FOR THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH. AT THE WILSON BRIDGE THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND STOL ON RWY 33. I TURNED OFF THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH ONTO A L BASE LEG FOR RWY 33. THE PATTERN FLOWN WAS SQUARE. I TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1/2 MI S OF THE E BANK OF THE POTOMAC RIVER. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED OF A HELI IN OUR AREA AND WE DID NOT HEAR THE TWR TALKING TO A HELI ON 119.1 (1-WAY OR 2-WAY COM). WE DID NOT SEE A HELI DURING OUR APCH. THE SKY WAS HAZY AND THE SUN WAS OFF THE L SIDE. IT WAS DAYLIGHT. LINED UP ON FINAL AND STABILIZED FOR A STOL LNDG, I SUDDENLY CAUGHT SIGHT OF A PRESIDENTIAL TYPE HELI XING OUR FLT PATH, APPROX 50-100 FT BELOW AND 100 FT IN FRONT OF US AT OUR 11:30 POS, AS WE PASSED THROUGH 600 FT MSL. THE HELI WAS MOVING L TO R AT A GOOD SPD, BUT I DETERMINED A COLLISION WAS POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED PWR, PULLED UP AND CALLED 'GAR' TO THE FO. AS WE PULLED UP I CALLED OUT THE HELI TO THE FO WHO THEN SAW IT CLOSE AND BELOW AS IT PASSED OFF THE R SIDE. THE GAR WAS UNEVENTFUL AND COMPLIED WITH TWR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN AFTER WE CALLED WITH GAR AND NEAR MISS. THE TWR'S RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER AND UNDERSTAND' ONLY. THE HELI IN QUESTION DID NOT APPEAR TO ALTER COURSE OR FLT PATH UNTIL DSNDING AND LNDG AT ANACOSTRA. ON THE GND I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE TWR ON LANDLINE BUT KEPT GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL (3 ATTEMPTS). SINCE I WAS DUE BACK OUT IN 10 MINS FOR MY NEXT FLT, I RETURNED TO MY ACFT AND CONTINUED ON MY SCHEDULE. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE TWR KNEW OF OR HAD TALKED TO THE HELI IN QUESTION. MANY TIMES THE TWR TALKS TO HELIS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ, BUT YOU CAN HEAR THE TWR'S COM TO THEM ON 119.1. THEY WILL USUALLY POINT OUT HELI TFC TO US AND COMMENT THAT THE HELI IS AT SUCH AND SUCH AN ALT, DIRECTION AND THAT THEY (THE HELI) HAVE US IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT WAS 'VERY' CLOSE AND FAR FROM THE NORM I'VE EXPERIENCED IN 15 YRS OF FLYING INTO AND OUT OF DCA.
15
HOT, HAZY AFTERNOON IN WASHINGTON (HAZE DID RESTRICT VISIBILITY) FLYING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA, CREW IS DCA BASED SO WE ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. AT ABOUT 4-5 DME, TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD LAND ON RWY 15, I DECLINED AND SAID THAT I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE FOR RWY 18. TWR THEN ADVISED US THERE WOULD BE 2 HELIS COMING OUT OF THE TIDAL BASIN AREA. (IT IS NOT AT ALL UNCOMMON TO SEE HELIS XING OUR FLT PATH WHEN WE ARE TAKING OFF TO THE N AND CLBING). I COULD SEE A CONTACT ON OUR TCASII SCREEN -- JUST ONE TARGET -- AND BTWN 600 AND 500 FT ON FINAL, WE GOT AN RA THAT COMMANDED CLB. I HAD THE FO LEVEL OFF AT 500 FT, THE TARGET SHOWED 200 FT BELOW ON THE TCASII AND VERY CLOSE ABEAM ME (ON 5 NM SCALE) AND I NEVER DID SEE EITHER HELI. WE STARTED BACK DOWN WHEN THE TCASII SHOWED WE WERE PASSED THEM, WE WERE HIGH AS WE ROLLED WINGS LEVEL ON FINAL BUT, WE WERE STILL ABLE TO SAFELY COMPLETE THE APCH. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS APCH AT DCA FOR 7 1/2 YRS, AND THIS ONE REALLY GOT MY ATTN. TWR IS NOT CTLING THE HELIS, I CAN'T BE SURE THE HELIS HAVE ME IN SIGHT, I KNOW THE SECOND HELI IS LOOKING AT HIS LEAD -- THEREFORE, I KNOW HE IS NOT LOOKING AT ME, AND I AM DSNDING INTO HIM WHILE ON FINAL ON A CHALLENGING APCH. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE A MIDAIR, AND UNFORTUNATELY, PROBABLY IS CONSIDERED ROUTINE OPS BY DCA TWR.
16
MANEUVERING IN GOOD VMC FOR LNDG ON RWY 21 AT DCA (CLRED FOR VIS APCH, MONITORING TWR FREQ FOR LNDG CLRNC). TWR ADVISED OF HELI TFC BELOW AND AHEAD. THIS TFC WAS SPOTTED FLYING SW WHERE ANACOSTIA RIVER MEETS POTOMAC. NO CONFLICT, INITIALLY. THE HELI, A MIL TYPE, THEN TURNED NW UP THE POTOMAC RIVER. THIS NOW BECAME AN IMMEDIATELY INCREASING TFC CONFLICT. CONVERGING FLT PATHS. I ASKED TWR TO PROVIDE SEP, HOPING HE WOULD STOP, SLOW OR TURN THE HELI. HE RESPONDED WITH, "MAINTAIN VIS SEP." MANEUVERING IN CLOSE FOR A STOL LNDG ALLOWS FOR VERY LITTLE LEEWAY FROM THE DESIRED FLT PATH. A GAR FROM THIS POS IS ALSO DANGEROUS. THERE WAS NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO TWR AND THE HELI WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. I CONTINUED AND LANDED VERY CAUTIOUSLY WHEN I REALIZED WE WOULD MISS TFC. HOWEVER, WE ONLY MISSED BY APPROX 300'. I FEEL THAT ATC (TWR) IGNORED ITS BASIC OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING SEP. THE HELI COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN SLOWED, STOPPED OR TURNED AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING AN IMPENDING COLLISION. TWR CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF BOTH ACFT'S FLT PATHS. I HOPE THEY (TWR) DO NOT THINK 200-300' IS A SAFE AMOUNT OF TFC SEP. THIS HELI CONFLICT, AND POOR ATC SEP OF IT, AT DCA IS AN ONGOING PROB. HERE IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
Subjects
ATC
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
Close Calls
DCA
FAA
Frequency 119.1
Radar
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 17:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818419
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 19:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818487
Going through everything again, I'm wondering what would have happened if the helicopter did not ask or accept visual separation? What was the backup plan? Tell the helicopter to hold? Missed approach instructions for the CRJ?
Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 20:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818517
Based on the videos there should have been no difficulty picking out the lights of the CRJ, the helo is approaching it not quite head-on but definitely in the right front quadrant. And the CRJ is above all the city lights.
It is genuinely odd how they flew directly into this thing which must literally have been lighting up the interior of their cockpit. Also, why were they above the 200ft route ceiling?
(Still from the video referenced above by ORAC.)
Helo on the left
It is genuinely odd how they flew directly into this thing which must literally have been lighting up the interior of their cockpit. Also, why were they above the 200ft route ceiling?
(Still from the video referenced above by ORAC.)
Helo on the left
I have ZERO doubt that either crew had a slightest idea of what was about to happen. I can fill 30 minutes explaining my next 10 seconds but suffice to say, a complete surprise. “WTF was that” will be the short version.
Subjects
CRJ
Findings
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 20:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818524
You need to go further back in the ATC playbacks. The helicopter crew had previously reported visual contact with the CRJ and requested (yes - requested) and been given responsibility for visual separation. The exchange you are referring to is the one which followed the collision alert and the controller's subsequent questioning of the helicopter crew as to whether they really did have the CRJ in sight.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 22:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818566
SAR Bloke
Easy Street
Nicd
Comments appreciated of course. Indeed, I was referring to the second LC comms with the helo (coinciding with CA alerts). Class B mandates ATC to ensure separation , no matter VFR (indeed twice requested and twice accepted) or IFR (on the question whether AA by/when accepting 33 canceled IFR or not). This IMO implies much more on ATC than re-requesting whether A/C in sight, in particular in case of CA alert, less than one good/bad minute apart.
Comments appreciated of course. Indeed, I was referring to the second LC comms with the helo (coinciding with CA alerts). Class B mandates ATC to ensure separation , no matter VFR (indeed twice requested and twice accepted) or IFR (on the question whether AA by/when accepting 33 canceled IFR or not). This IMO implies much more on ATC than re-requesting whether A/C in sight, in particular in case of CA alert, less than one good/bad minute apart.
VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than:
- 1 \xbd miles separation, or
- 500 feet vertical separation, or
- Visual separation, as specified in paragraph 7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph 7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing.
The rules for pilot-applied visual separation state:
- If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
- Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge.
Subjects
ATC
IFR
Radar
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 22:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818582
It works most of the time until you run out of luck.
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 22:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818585
"2.
Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge"
I don't think this was done and implies controller is not absolved of responsibility even after visual separation approved.
I don't think this was done and implies controller is not absolved of responsibility even after visual separation approved.
Subjects
ATC
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 23:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818616
I am not a USA airspace expert, and I'm sure there are many rules that I don't know about, but having just read the FAR AIM section on 'pilot-applied visual separation' it reads to me, as an interested foreigner, that the LC can pass responsibility for separation to a pilot if they are visual. The class B separation criteria states:
VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than:
The rules for pilot-applied visual separation state:
VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than:
- 1 \xbd miles separation, or
- 500 feet vertical separation, or
- Visual separation, as specified in paragraph 7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph 7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing.
The rules for pilot-applied visual separation state:
- If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
- Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge.
- If aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
(ACID), TRAFFIC, (clock position and distance), (direction) BOUND, (type of aircraft), HAS YOU IN SIGHT AND WILL MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION.
- Advise the pilots if the targets appear likely to merge.
Issue this advisory in conjunction with the instruction to maintain visual separation, the advisory to the other aircraft of the converging course, or thereafter if the controller subsequently becomes aware that the targets are merging.\x94
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Radar
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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February 01, 2025, 00:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818637
Note I say \x91through\x92 and not \x91under\x92.
I\x92m sure it is done at many airports around the World and we have a similar procedure at a large international airport in East Asia.
HOWEVER, the idea that the 200ft ceiling on the heli route is designed to provide vertical separation from the approach is ludicrous.
I suspect that limit is imposed to allow clearance from the Take-off climb surface if using the opposite direction runways. That would indeed be possible from a flight procedure design point of view (TERPS or PANS-OPS).
The only safe way is to cross behind traffic on final laterally . In some ways it would be better for the heli to be at a higher altitude if on 33 but for simplicity of procedure they may have just made it a blanket 200ft regardless.
Our procedure has laterally separated holding points either side of final which is the clearance limit where the heli can orbit or delay as necessary until confirming the aircraft to pass behind is in sight. The heli is also advised where the next aircraft in the sequence is to further verify the correct aircraft is in sight and what margin they need to leave behind the one crossing behind. Again, being higher is better as they can avoid wake turbulence by remaining well an above the glide path and pass closer behind, well ahead of the following.
There is no doubt night time makes this a far more critical operation and requires full attention. In our operation the heli is also on the same frequency as the approach aircraft, so having separate positions to control fixed wing and helis wouldn\x92t have any benefit.
This controller was hugely busy however, handling departures as well. I can\x92t believe the speed of his transmissions - even as a controller for over 30 years I have trouble with all the abbreviated phrases- of course local pilots would be used to it and expecting clipped frequencies etc\x85
The trouble with a lot of these types of procedures is a lot is carried out as a box ticking exercise - heli calls requesting to cross the final ✅, LC provides the position of the aircraft to pass behind ✅, heli reports sighting and requests own visual separation ✅, approved ✅.
LC is no doubt expected to monitor compliance visually although hugely busy with other traffic on the runway. It does sound like he was doing so, especially when the CA goes off in the background audio and puts doubt in his mind the heli is passing clear of the CRJ. He asks again immediately.
The heli confirms, so difficult to further challenge the pilot.
In my view a poorly designed procedure which was guaranteed to place the 2 aircraft in the same position if an error was made.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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February 01, 2025, 02:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818713
Captain Steeve has a good analyis and probably quite close to what actually happened. I agree with the comment on the video that
at the point which PAT25 initially requests visual separation and confirms traffic in sight, it looks like the AA5324 CRJ had already commenced right turn for circling approach at which point the brightest landing lights would be the aircraft behind as AA5324s would no longer be pointing directly at the helicopter. The brightest landing light is now the No.2 traffic which PAT25 identifies as their traffic and will probably now be fixated on due to confirmation bias. Terribly tragic and could happen to any pilot at night.
Subjects
CRJ
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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February 01, 2025, 03:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818738
1. The CRJ was on approach to 1 and then was asked to divert to 33. They complied, which added to their workload. From what I understand, that runway is rarely used for commercial aircraft. So, ATC added to the CRJ's workload while introducing and "unusual event." The CRJ crew appears to have acted professionally in changing their approach.
2. ATC didn't hold the helo short of the runway path, instead relied on them to correctly identify an aircraft, at night, over an urban area. That introduced a "single point of failure" to an already complex situation.
3. There was no way for the helo to pass safely under the CRJ at the altitude of impact.
3. I don't recall hearing ATC asking the CRJ if they could see the helo, though they already overtasked them. At that point, I don't think they could do anything at that point to prevent the collision.
Other factors may come into play, such as if ATC was properly staffed that night. I've read that DCA had two incidents that week where an aircraft had to perform a "go around" because of helo traffic. Also, was the CRJ's TCAS system operational?
This was completely preventable if things work they way they're supposed to.
Everything else is moot, really...
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
FAA
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
Visual Separation
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