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| nojwod
February 01, 2025, 11:39:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818951 |
According to CNN, the crash was waiting to happen.
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/30/u...nvs/index.html
Captain Steeve has a good analyis and probably quite close to what actually happened. I agree with the comment on the video that
at the point which PAT25 initially requests visual separation and confirms traffic in sight, it looks like the AA5324 CRJ had already commenced right turn for circling approach at which point the brightest landing lights would be the aircraft behind as AA5324s would no longer be pointing directly at the helicopter. The brightest landing light is now the No.2 traffic which PAT25 identifies as their traffic and will probably now be fixated on due to confirmation bias. Terribly tragic and could happen to any pilot at night.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfgllf1L9_4 If they were using NVG as speculated, the failure to see the landing lights of the approaching aircraft might be explained by a scenario where : Crew mistakenly identified the following aircraft, either with NVG on or temporarily off. Happy with the separation, the NGV gear goes back on and with the limited field of view from the goggles, focused ahead and down as visual flight demands, the landing lights, so bright in the videos, were just never seen, but without the goggles the peripheral vision of the crew might have had some warning. Subjects
CNN
CRJ
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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| MarkD
February 01, 2025, 14:03:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819042 |
It may be a military discipline of responding quickly and pushing your needs forward, but it gives an impression of \x93if we give ATC time to decide, they may tell us to orbit rather than be the ones who assume the risk\x94
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Lascaille
February 01, 2025, 14:16:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819056 |
Many of the liveatc.net feeds do in fact monitor more than one frequency. So there are overlaps and missed traffic.
That’s why using their recordings leads to comments on pprune that the controller was cut off or didn’t say something or the aircraft didn’t acknowledge. It can be just the scanner not picking it up, because it focuses on one transmission at a time. That’s not to comment on whether they had VHF or not. The tower was transmitting on both frequencies - I believe - simultaneously. So the CRJ would have heard only the tower's transmissions to the helo ('visual separation approved' x 2) and not the helo's transmissions. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| YRP
February 01, 2025, 14:37:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819062 |
Talk of it being difficult to pick out aircraft nav lights is a red herring. The heli was, initially, several hundred feet below the CRJ and should have been able to easily see the lights against the night sky.
Blaming the airspace design is also a non starter. Are we really going to say that just because the airspace is poorly designed then I'm just going to fly in to that regional jet over there? First rule of airmanship anyone? Keep a good lookout. Seems like the helicopter crew failed to do so having been given their requested visual separation. Should have had eyes on stalks. No the airspace does not take the blame. Apparently the hello pilots missed the lookout. And the controller could have been clearer, instead of \x93still in sight?\x94 perhaps \x93the RJ is now 1/2 mile 10 o\x92clock, confirm you have him?\x94. (not criticizing him, guessing that he saw them closer than expected, was concerned, and made a very quick call) But the airspace & procedure seems to not tolerate mistakes. There ought to be some safety margin. While not the primary fault, it could be improved. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| YRP
February 01, 2025, 14:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819074 |
I guess - as the culprit here - I should clarify that I was wrong; both the VASAviation youtube video and the LiveATC recordings were two different radio channels spliced together, the helo was transmitting on a separate frequency.
The tower was transmitting on both frequencies - I believe - simultaneously. So the CRJ would have heard only the tower's transmissions to the helo ('visual separation approved' x 2) and not the helo's transmissions. It is not always understood on pprune (and again not you, mostly casual posters) that liveatc.net is just hobbyist / enthusiast stuff. It\x92s not reliable. The antenna placement is often poor, so some transmission sounds bad. Same with using ads-b data from various sources and plotting tracks. Sometimes it is meaningful and sometimes the position is way too undersampled. And don\x92t get me started on taking derivatives / differences on noisy undersampled signals to get things like wow look at that vertical speed here. Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| jumpseater
February 01, 2025, 19:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819244 |
I guess - as the culprit here - I should clarify that I was wrong; both the VASAviation youtube video and the LiveATC recordings were two different radio channels spliced together, the helo was transmitting on a separate frequency.
The tower was transmitting on both frequencies - I believe - simultaneously. So the CRJ would have heard only the tower's transmissions to the helo ('visual separation approved' x 2) and not the helo's transmissions. Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 00:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819398 |
The CRJ were asked by ATC if they were able to accept an approach onto R33, they replied they could. They were well within their rights to refuse it, apparently one of the previous aircraft ahead of them had refused a request to to switch to R33.
If they had held the Helo short of the runway approach until enough radar separation to cross the approach path was available the Helo would have been orbiting for hours. When the helicopter crew confirmed they had the aircraft in sight they accepted responsibility they had identified the correct aircraft and could remain visual with it as they they crossed the approach path. If they had any doubt to this they should have stated so. ATC intended for the helicopter to pass behind that CRJ not below it. Actually ATC asked the Helicopter twice if they had the CRJ visual about 40 seconds apart, both times the helicopter replied yes, and the helicopter crew, not ATC, asked to maintain visual separation. Yes, the CRJ could have not accepted ATC's request to divert to 33. They would have then been set to go around to set up again for Runway 1, the usual runway. ATC put the CRJ on an intersecting runway, which added complexity to the pattern picture. The helo would have only had to hold for a short time to wait for the CRJ that was diverted to a runway not normally used for commercial air carriers. Knowing that, they asked the helo to maintain visual separation, placing everything on that crew to see and avoid the CRJ. I have read that they didn't even tell them where to actually look to see the traffic, no bearing, no altitude. The helo likely saw traffic, just not where they were supposed to look. There were plenty incoming and departing Runway 1, which is why the CRJ was asked to divert. Add to that, both aircraft were low and operating over an urban area at night where it is difficult to see other aircraft. Worse even if the helo crew was using NVG. ATC should have held the helo short, waiting for an unusual approach to a runway not used normally, so to let the CRJ pass. The CRJ crew was already saturated in tasks at the time I have not hear ATC asking them to look out for the helo. IMO, ATC created a "single point of failure" relying on the helo to see and avoid the CRJ. Had they held the helo, and helos can hover, for even a minute, this doesn't happen. ATC's main purpose is to keep aircraft from occupying the same place at the same time. In this case, they didn't. I am sure that the helo pilots made]mistakes. But, this appears to be a massive failure of ATC. Last edited by Denflnt; 2nd February 2025 at 00:46 . Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Hover
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 00:13:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819402 |
There is a reason for redundancy. Have we learned nothing since PSA Flight 182? And that was in daylight. Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| photonclock
February 02, 2025, 00:21:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819407 |
Just finished watching the NTSB briefing, which stated that the CRJ was at 325 feet AGL, and helicopter max allowed altitude is 200 feet.
Assuming the CRJ was at an expected/typical altitude at that point in it's approach, if the helicopter was at 200 feet, or lets say for their benefit 175 feet, then they would have avoided collision by a mere 150 feet of vertical separation if everything else about the position of the two aircraft remained the same. Is 125 feet of vertical separation (with no horizontal separation) considered acceptable? If the CRJ movement is controlled by ATC, and the helicopter is responsible for avoiding all other aircraft, then there is no question the helicopter was at fault here as the primary cause, and ATC as the secondary. Given the collision course these aircraft were clearly on, why wouldn't ATC have diverted one of them prior to impact? Does ATC have any reason to believe that the helicopter sees everything with the same degree of detail and accuracy as ATC? This is not a sarcastic question. I'm genuinely curious. Would ATC, hearing the helicopter twice affirming visual separation, have had any plausible reason to doubt that the helicopter was unaware of the impending collision? What's the point of having Air Traffic "Control"...if they're not actually in control? Subjects
ATC
CRJ
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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| Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 00:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819416 |
Just finished watching the NTSB briefing, which stated that the CRJ was at 325 feet AGL, and helicopter max allowed altitude is 200 feet.
Assuming the CRJ was at an expected/typical altitude at that point in it's approach, if the helicopter was at 200 feet, or lets say for their benefit 175 feet, then they would have avoided collision by a mere 150 feet of vertical separation if everything else about the position of the two aircraft remained the same. Is 125 feet of vertical separation (with no horizontal separation) considered acceptable? If the CRJ movement is controlled by ATC, and the helicopter is responsible for avoiding all other aircraft, then there is no question the helicopter was at fault here as the primary cause, and ATC as the secondary. Given the collision course these aircraft were clearly on, why wouldn't ATC have diverted one of them prior to impact? Does ATC have any reason to believe that the helicopter sees everything with the same degree of detail and accuracy as ATC? This is not a sarcastic question. I'm genuinely curious. Would ATC, hearing the helicopter twice affirming visual separation, have had any plausible reason to doubt that the helicopter was unaware of the impending collision? What's the point of having Air Traffic "Control"...if they're not actually in control? The helo should have been told to hold some half mile away and wait for crossing traffic to clear. The NTSB is going to have a field day with the FAA on this. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
FAA
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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| YRP
February 02, 2025, 01:59:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819443 |
A red collision alert was flashing at this point on the controllers screen, the instruction should\x92ve been for the CRJ to go around, not wasting time on the helicopter pilots.
Secondly, why shouldn\x92t we criticise the controller? Imho his actions need to be criticised. Not the individual but the environment, procedures and training he operated in. The mission of ATC is to prevent exactly this from happening and they failed in their mission. It would happen all the time with visual separation. It\x92s nothing like the RA must-follow-without-question alert. Issuing a go around would often be the exact wrong thing to do. In this case the controller was aware they were close. The accepted procedures look like quite likely the culprit here. They seem to allow a single mistake (misidentifying visual traffic) to become catastrophic. The controller\x85 he\x92s required to use the accepted procedures. If the procedure after safety analysis is to allow helicopters to visually separate from jets, he can\x92t just say not on his shift. He can double check of course, and imho that\x92s what his \x93still got \x91em in sight\x94 call was about, since it clearly concerned him. Anyway my point about not criticizing him was just that my post was not intended that way. I don\x92t have access to listen to the full conversation. If you do, then go ahead. And certainly the environment/procedures/etc are all in question here. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| gretzky99
February 02, 2025, 03:00:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819475 |
It almost seems backwards to me. Late runway changes should only be applied in quiet environments, allowing plenty of room for manoeuvring without separation issues. The same for visual separation, where only one or two aircraft in the area make misidentification of traffic an improbability. Unfortunately the reverse is true. The busier and more congested the airspace, the more likely these procedures are to be used. From a risk identification and management perspective, I just don't see how operating like this can ever have been deemed acceptable. Again though, it's used because it's the only way to squeeze an extra 1% out of an over burdened system. And worst of all, everyone involved, from pilots to ATC, think they're the worlds best for making it "work". Last edited by gretzky99; 2nd February 2025 at 03:24 . Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| galaxy flyer
February 02, 2025, 03:16:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819484 |
I agree completely.
It almost seems backwards to me. Late runway changes should only be applied in quiet environments, allowing plenty of room for manoeuvring without separation issues. The same for visual separation, where only one or two aircraft in the area make misidentification of traffic an improbability. Unfortunately the reverse is true. The busier and more congested the airspace, the more likely these procedures are to be used. From a risk identification and management perspective, I just don't see how operating like this can ever have been deemed acceptable. Again though, it's used because it's the only way to squeeze an extra 1% out of an over burdened system. And worse of all, everyone involved, from pilots to ATC, think they're the worlds best for making it "work". All that said, the plan for DCA, particularly the helicopter ops, were hazardous in the extreme. The Route 4/33 operations is just plain dangerous, nothing less. The politics of DCA are going to drive a band-aid fix is my prediction. Visual separation won\x92t go away. FAA will get crucified over manning. DCA may lose some significant service, if we closed 33 permanently. If I read the NOTAM correctly, closing 4 and 33, the pain will become known, interestingly, I read elsewhere that the helicopter altitudes were raised to 200\x92 in 2023 due to noise complaints. Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| fdr
February 02, 2025, 03:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819485 |
FAA Order JO 7110.65AA - Air Traffic Control7.9.4 SEPARATIONa. Standard IFR services to IFR aircraft. b. VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than: 1. 1 \xbd miles separation, or 2. 500 feet vertical separation, or 3. Visual separation, as specified in paragraph 7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph 7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing. 7.2.1 VISUAL SEPARATION a.2. Pilot-applied visual separation. (a) Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved and ensure there is an ability to communicate with the other aircraft. (b) The pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft as follows (1) Tell the pilot about the other aircraft. Include position, direction, type, and, unless it is obvious, the other aircraft's intention. (2) Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the other aircraft is in sight. (3) Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from that aircraft. Subjects
FAA
IFR
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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| aox
February 02, 2025, 03:31:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819492 |
I was reading the reaction of some posters, almost certainly Americans, to the Lufthansa SFO incident where they refused a visual approach, on the thread for that incident on this forum and some other aviation forums:
You really cannot expect to operate into a busy US airport with that sort of restriction. Lufthansa and all their daughter airlines still uses SOPs born in the 60s, it's godawful. This whole thing is just ignorant on the part of LH. The SFO ATC is busy and can\x92t baby these unnecessary special requests I get the no visual approaches at night policy but the no visual separation from other aircraft at night is asinine. Keeping visual from other a/c is easier at night cause of all the blinky stuff. The answer is if Lufthansa are unable to comply with local procedures then SFO should initiate an approach ban on operators who cannot comply or withdraw their operating permit. There does seem to be a bit of a \x93we do things differently over here because we\x92re (quote/unquote) better pilots\x94 attitude. Maybe this will be a wake up call, but given the reluctance to change culture I doubt it. However this incident is crossing or converging traffic People outside aviation, such as Donald Trump as quoted, don't understand that the helicopter is not looking straight ahead at the airliner in the centre of its view for several seconds. Other people think that the other moving across the field of view should make it easier to notice. But neither is true. One possibility that represents a collision risk is the one a bit out to one side that keeps the same relative direction in the view of the other, just getting bigger From pictures I found, this helicopter type seems to have four vertical bars in the frame of the front screen, two at the edges, two nearer the middle. So it might be possible for a collision risk aircraft to be hidden behind one of these for some time ​​​​​​ Subjects
ATC
President Donald Trump
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| island_airphoto
February 02, 2025, 03:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819493 |
I’m not in job of defending the US system, but there needs to be some perspective. The US airspace operates about 40%-50% of all global aviation. Only half of daily flights are air carrier. For lot of reasons outside this discussion, air carriers are the default transport, trains and buses are a tiny fraction of long distance transport. Apply EASA aviation standards and the US network would grind to halt or create huge gaps in service. We’ve gone 16 years without a fatal US carrier major accident, which isn’t different than the rest of the world, especially when the US has a 50% share. Our economy would suffer greatly and passengers revolt at what would required.
All that said, the plan for DCA, particularly the helicopter ops, were hazardous in the extreme. The Route 4/33 operations is just plain dangerous, nothing less. The politics of DCA are going to drive a band-aid fix is my prediction. Visual separation won’t go away. FAA will get crucified over manning. DCA may lose some significant service, if we closed 33 permanently. If I read the NOTAM correctly, closing 4 and 33, the pain will become known, interestingly, I read elsewhere that the helicopter altitudes were raised to 200’ in 2023 due to noise complaints. And yes, trying to do EU IFR for everything all the time would create some epic traffic jams. * IMHO they need the dedicated helicopter controller on at ALL times the helicopters are flying and they need to be held for crossing traffic. They also all need ADS-B, no private pilot that wasn't totally skint would be running around with the lack of situational awareness the helos seem to have in an area like that. Subjects
ADSB (All)
ATC
DCA
FAA
IFR
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
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| photonclock
February 02, 2025, 05:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819528 |
7.2.1 VISUAL SEPARATION
a.2. Pilot-applied visual separation. (a) Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved and ensure there is an ability to communicate with the other aircraft. (b) The pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft as follows (1) Tell the pilot about the other aircraft. Include position, direction, type, and, unless it is obvious, the other aircraft's intention. (2) Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the other aircraft is in sight. (3) Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from that aircraft. So that means this collision occurred entirely within all established protocls? These aircraft crashed, as per the system specifications. So the system is, to put it plainly...FUBAR? That's not good.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| BuzzBox
February 02, 2025, 06:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819535 |
The procedures effectively abdicate separation responsibility to a single point of failure, where failure is not unlikely and, as a consequence of the airspace design, failure results in high probabilities of collision.
The difficulties of identifying a specific aircraft, at night, in a background of stationary and moving lights, when moving objects on a collision course will always appear stationary to each other, are well known, as are the probabilities of mis-identification. The airspace design 'squeezes' inbound aircraft and transiting helicopters to practicality the same altitude, when instrument and other tolerances are taken into consideration. Subjects
FAA
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| ATC Watcher
February 02, 2025, 09:27:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819621 |
And yes, trying to do EU IFR for everything all the time would create some epic traffic jams
Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance. I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this . Subjects
FAA
IFR
Land and Hold Short
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Easy Street
February 02, 2025, 10:30:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819666 |
Apply EASA aviation standards and the US network would grind to halt or create huge gaps in service ... Our economy would suffer greatly and passengers revolt at what would required.
... The politics of DCA are going to drive a band-aid fix is my prediction. Visual separation won\x92t go away. FAA will get crucified over manning. DCA may lose some significant service, if we closed 33 permanently. [I think of the Austin investigation, which did not even mention, let alone question the practice of issuing runway clearances to multiple aircraft at the same time, which IMHO is the root cause of most of the recent near misses.] Last edited by Easy Street; 2nd February 2025 at 10:50 . Subjects
ATC
Close Calls
DCA
FAA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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