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| ATC Watcher
February 02, 2025, 10:42:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819672 |
I the idea that while the extra airspace capacity afforded by visual separation at night may come at the price of occasional accidents such as this, that price is worth paying for passenger, government and economic benefit. Those kind of ideas don't tend to be well received or understoood by the public, or by extension by elected representatives, so a prediction of my own: every single agency and authority involved will go out of its way to avoid acknowledging that idea, and instead will pretend that visual separation at night is a fundamentally sound practice let down by poor procedure design and/or ATC at DCA.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| ATC Watcher
February 02, 2025, 10:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819676 |
Heavens above!
Just because the helilane has a cieling of 200ft and the glideslope is 325 or whatever does not imply that helos can, would or might pass 125 ft under an aircraft on finals. That would be insane, as surely common sense tells you? Have you not read/heard the ATC transcripts? Helos are held short until landing traffic is clear - ie until it has passed unless the incoming is sufficiently far away for there to be no possible confliction. How far off minimums (actually maximum) - you've already answered that question yourself. 125ft. Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Easy Street
February 02, 2025, 11:55:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819724 |
I earnestly (perhaps naively) hope that the NTSB has and continues to have the corporate competence and the corporate integrity to investigate the circumstances of this tragedy, comprehensively, and to make frank and fearless findings and recommendations based on the objective facts and objective risks.
Regrettably, I suspect we will see the NTSB take the same approach to the question of visual separation at night. It can't so much as mention the resulting risks without putting the FAA (and as you rightly infer, politicians) in the position of having to admit that safety is not always king. On the evidence of Austin, they won't do that. Last edited by Easy Street; 2nd February 2025 at 13:05 . Subjects
FAA
Findings
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| island_airphoto
February 02, 2025, 13:57:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819813 |
and from island air photo :
Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra . Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance. I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this . 1.The bat-s### crazy way they run helicopters around DCA. 2. The usual practice of visual approaches and spacing in good weather. It has been that way for as long as I have been flying and I am having a hard time even visualizing all IFR spacing to the pavement on a clear day. Maybe asking an American about this is like asking a fish if water is wet? The OTHER unrelated (?) issue of sorting out ground traffic. I was one on the same trip cleared to take off with an aircraft on short final and then cleared to land with an airplane just pulling out onto the active. To make that one better, I knew the person flying that plane and couldn't resist being snarky: "Ah XYZ tower, we'll be going around, Bob says not to wreck his airplane by landing on it". Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
IFR
Land and Hold Short
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| smith
February 02, 2025, 14:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819840 |
So when the helicopter pilot requests visual separation and is granted it by ATC does that mean he can go above 200\x92 and the responsibility lies on him to see and avoid or should he still maintain 200\x92?
Subjects
ATC
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| 10 DME ARC
February 02, 2025, 15:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819849 |
I don't think visual separation would relax the height altitude for the route?? If you listen a little longer request visual separation and visual separation approved were requested and given so matter of factly almost without thought? Only my opinions....
If the reports of NVG's being used in such airspace this could be a factor? Plus instead of "confirm you have the CRJ in sight" a "confirm you have the CRJ in your left 10 O'clock 3 miles insight?" But it's easy with hindsight! Subjects
CRJ
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| NIBEX2A
February 02, 2025, 15:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819865 |
Once again, looking at the safety reports below. How many of these may have been caused by the helicopter having the wrong aircraft in sight when applying visual separation?
Safety reports, if assessed and promulgated correctly, act as another line of defence. They identify any deficiencies in procedures which may have been overlooked (or underestimated) in the original procedure safety assessment. Hopefully the crash investigation will delve into these aspects to identify what action was taken on receipt of the reports below by the respective organisations. I found it chilling to read how many factors associated with this accident had repeatedly occurred and been reported over the previous 20+ years. I’ve condensed the reports [see spoiler- mods] and highlighted in bold many of these deficiencies, identified by pilots. Common Themes
Spoiler
Last edited by Saab Dastard; 2nd February 2025 at 17:15 . Reason: Make it legible Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
DCA
FAA
Frequency 119.1
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
Visual Separation
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| Sven Sixtoo
February 02, 2025, 19:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820054 |
I have 2 questions regarding DCA ATC procedures.(they are probably related)
1) If PAT25 had said they were unable to identify the inbound CRJ, how would ATC have dealt with it? 2) Why was PAT25 requesting \x93Visual Separation\x94? What advantage did that give to PAT25? Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| patrickal
February 02, 2025, 23:05:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820185 |
Regarding the collision of American Eagle JIA342 and Army Blackhawk PAT25, I lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of both the FAA and the United States Army Aviation Branch. If the NTSB in any way blame the pilots in the incident, they are not doing their job. Let’s look at all of the holes in this swiss cheese:
1. In an effort to maximize commercial air traffic in and out of DCA, the FAA has created the “deviate to RWY 33 procedure” for air traffic in-bound to RWY 01. This requires a right-hand turn from the RWY 01 approach followed by an immediate hard left-hand turn to line up on RWY 33. FAA criteria for a stabilized approach states that you have to be stable at 500 feet AGL on final in VMC or perform an immediate go-around. But on this particular approach, you will be at or below 400 feet AGL as you come out of the left turn to final. So the FAA has granted an exception to the “stabilized requirements” at DCA to allow for this maneuver. This allows ATC to shorten the distance between arriving and departing aircraft that are utilizing conflicting RWYs. The FAA in essence violates its own safety standards on stabilized approaches for the sake of expediency. 2. The FAA creates the Route 1/4 helicopter route through the DCA airspace as a VFR route with constantly changing altitude requirements. The lowest limit is at 200 ft MSL through the area east of DCA. Any pilot will tell you that flying that low over water at night is a best a tense experience. Try not to break that limit flying at night while also trying to communicate with ATC and simultaneously searching for possible conflicting aircraft. 3. The United States Army Aviation Branch deems it acceptable to allow training missions for Army Reserve pilots with limited flying experience to fly these helicopter routes through this complex and extremely active airspace. Compounding this, training flights at night using night-vision goggles are deemed “safe” in spite of the fact that using said goggles severely limits peripheral vision and makes it difficult if not impossible to perceive any color other than green and white. Picking out particular lights against the background of urban lighting is challenging, as is depth perception. Scanning key cockpit instruments is also made more difficult, making it challenging to accurately maintain altitude. Add to that workload the need to be in constant communication with ATC as well as monitoring all other comms traffic not directed to you but necessary in order to maintain good situational awareness. Given the density of commercial air traffic on this route, common sense would dictate that this route be flown by only the most experienced pilots and only when absolutely necessary. Reasonable logic would understand that conducting training missions should not be using final approach areas with heavy commercial traffic. 4. The Army crew on PAT25 are flying a mission they have been ordered to fly, at night and using night vision goggles. Although they may feel it is difficult and may be anxious about it, their command structure has determined that it is an appropriate training procedure and as such must meet minimum safety requirements. They do not have the authority to question the mission or the orders to fly it. 5. JIA342 is on approach for RWY 01, but is asked at the last minute by ATC to deviate to RWY 33, requiring the “circle to land” maneuver. Therefore, they are now on approach different from what they briefed for. 6. Any aircraft following the “circle to land” approach to RWY 33 will most likely have both pilots focused on RWY 33 as they come out of the left turn to final, especially if it was a last-minute request by ATC. In this case they will be looking to make sure that AA1630, which has just been given clearance to depart from RWY 01, is clear of the intersection with RWY 33 as they complete their final approach, and be ready for a go-around if it is not. In addition, this left bank makes it extremely difficult for the first officer to see any conflicting traffic coming towards them from the 1 to 2 o’clock position, as that traffic will probably be below the right window level. For the pilot, who is on the left side of the cockpit, visibility of such conflicting traffic will be nearly impossible. 7. For whatever reason, ATC is working with “split frequencies while controlling this airspace, so that although the controller hears both the aircraft on approach and the helo traffic south-bound on “Route 1”, the pilots of those respective aircraft only hear information directed at them. Thus they are not aware of all that is going on around them, and as such their situational awareness is limited by factors outside of their control. 8. ATC informs PAT25 of the conflicting aircraft on approach for RWY 33 at 1200 feet MSL, but at the time, PAT25 is heading almost due east towards the Jefferson Memorial on Helo Route 4 while JIA342 (the CRJ) is executing its right turn departing from the RWY 01 approach and is now heading in a northeast direction as it prepares to make a hard left onto the RWY 33 short final approach. From their respective positions, PAT25 in all likelihood sees the landing lights of AA3130 which is trailing JIA342 and whose landing lights are pointed almost directly in his direction, and mistakenly identifies it as the aircraft approaching RWY 33. At no time does it appear that ATC notifies JIA342 of the conflicting helo traffic. They are most likely focused on their approach to RWY 33, which was just handed to them. 9. As JIA342 rolls out of its left hand turn to final on RWY 33, completing the deviation they were just handed and had not briefed for, it is now approaching the 9-11 o’clock position of PAT25. Since the pilot of PAT25 is on the right-hand side of the Blackhawk, visibility of the CRJ may be limited. Both pilots of PAT25 are now most likely visibly fixated on passing to the rear of AA3130, which is in their 1-3 O’clock position, and which is the conflicting aircraft they perceive as the one ATC initially warned them about. 10. ATC, now receiving a conflicting aircraft warning, asks PAT25 if they have JIA342 in sight. In the absence of any obvious difference from the first mid-identification of the conflicting traffic, confirmation bias raises its ugly head. The voice response from the training pilot is calm and confident in stating that they do have it in sight and claim visual separation, probably proving once again that he mistakenly has AA3130 in sight slightly to his right directly in front of him and more than a mile away. Both pilots are totally unaware of JIA342 which is now arriving in front of them from their left. 11. The collision occurs. In my humble opinion, the crews of both aircraft involved were set up by both the FAA and the Army Department of Aviation through a series of poorly based decisions which focused on expediency and departed from any appropriate utilization of a rational use of risk assessment. Consider the following: 1. Approval of the circling to RWY 33 maneuver which violates normal stabilized approach standards. 2. The establishment of a series of complex VFR helicopter track complex and heavily restricted air space as well as through final approach paths. 3. A 200 foot maximum altitude requirement over water and required even at night, which may result in a less than 200 foot vertical separation between aircraft on approach to RWY 33 and those traveling on Helo Route 1/4. 4. The decision to conduct military training missions in this complex and busy airspace with an abundance of commercial passenger traffic either arriving to or departing from DCA. 5. The use of split frequencies by the FAA which negatively impacts the situational awareness of all of the pilots in the airspace. 6. The use of night vision goggles to place even more limitations on the pilots. Granted, all pilots involved may not have had the thousands of hours senior commercial and military pilot possess. But even the most senior individuals when placed in the task saturated environments these two crews faced would have at the very least felt their “pucker factor” increase through this. And there is probably an equal chance that the lack of common sense and appropriate safety design exhibited by the controlling entities would have resulted in a similar outcome. The odds were significantly stacked against these two flight crews, and unfortunately, against the passengers and flight attendants as well. If ever there were an example of an accident waiting to happen, this is it. Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
DCA
FAA
NTSB
PAT25
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
VFR
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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| vegassun
February 03, 2025, 01:06:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820211 |
and from island air photo :
Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra . Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance. I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this . The \x93single point of failure\x94 thing has been around forever. Reminds me of when ATC decided it was OK to start using land and hold short procedures at major air carrier airports. My airline immediately put out ALL CAPS memo that we were not to accept LAHSO clearance under any circumstances. It wasn\x92t long after that I was operating into BOS landing 27, when controller says \x93______ 123 you are cleared to land 27, ________ XYZ will be landing 22L and holding short of your runway.\x94 I politely said we can\x92t accept that clearance. Controller got PO\x92ed a bit and wanted to debate it, but in the end he removed the LAHSO clearance from the other aircraft/cancelled our landing clearance/told us to continue then subsequently cleared us to land after the other aircraft landed. The gist of all that is that ATC was miffed because everybody else was going along with their questionable tactics until I came along. In my mind it was clear: technically we would not have been accepting a land and hold short clearance, but we would all be cemetery dead if the other guy screwed up. We would be \x93dead right.\x94 Over the course of the next few weeks/months I queried every check airman/chief pilot I came across and got differing opinions from nearly every one. The majority of them leaned towards the \x93 it\x92s ok you are not landing/holding short,\x94 idea. When I would point out the \x93dead right\x94 concept they would just look at me like I was speaking Mandarin Chinese. It seems like most pilots (myself included) have a can do attitude and are willing to help ATC out whenever they can so long as it\x92s \x93legal.\x94 There was an old captain I flew with years ago that said \x93We get paid the big bucks to say no.\x94 Subjects
ATC
FAA
IFR
Land and Hold Short
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| galaxy flyer
February 03, 2025, 14:43:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820596 |
Using visual separation, the system will generate CAs, they’re issued to alert the controller, not to provide guidance. Thats why the controllers ask, “do you have the traffic in sight?”
Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| ATC Watcher
February 03, 2025, 15:42:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820640 |
the controller does not have enough information to use a heading
flight recorder show the collision occurred at an altitude of about 325 feet, plus or minus 25 feet.
(*) I mean control input to maintain visual separation . not last second collision avoidance maneuver. Subjects
ATC
FAA
ICAO
Radar
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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| island_airphoto
February 03, 2025, 16:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820688 |
Not 100% sure about the US FAA situation where everything seems to be possible , at least in DC, but in ICAO land Tower controllers cannot give headings, while they might have a copy of the Approach radar picture on a TV monitor somewhere , it is to verify actual positions not to issue vectors.. In addition some TWR controllers are just TWR rated, not Approach radar rated.
25 ft is the accuracy of mode S, transmit data so let's take 300 ft , Heli was apparently 100 ft higher than its altitude restriction , doing a separation maneuver ? (*) question to my US friends , : when delegating separation VFR to an aircraft does that automatically cancels its previous altitude restrictions ? (*) I mean control input to maintain visual separation . not last second collision avoidance maneuver. Subjects
ATC
FAA
ICAO
Radar
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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| JohnDixson
February 03, 2025, 19:05:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820804 |
From the FAA website:\x93When Radar Came to Town
On January 7, 1952, after five years of testing and modifications to a radar system used by the Army and Navy in World War II, the Civil Aeronautics Administration inaugurated radar departure control procedures at its Washington National Airport. Six months later it began radar approach control procedures at the airport.\x94 How do we connect the dots from 1952 to the tragedy described in this thread? 72 years later we have devolved to visual separation. Subjects
FAA
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| flash8
February 03, 2025, 20:05:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820851 |
How do we connect the dots from 1952 to the tragedy described in this thread? 72 years later we have devolved to visual separation.
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| ATC Watcher
February 03, 2025, 20:19:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820865 |
From the FAA website:“When Radar Came to Town
On January 7, 1952, after five years of testing and modifications to a radar system used by the Army and Navy in World War II, the Civil Aeronautics Administration inaugurated radar departure control procedures at its Washington National Airport. Six months later it began radar approach control procedures at the airport.” How do we connect the dots from 1952 to the tragedy described in this thread? 72 years later we have devolved to visual separation. But remember , here the APP radar controllers with the proper ratings and radar tools ( including Conflict alerts) are not in the TWR cab in DC, , they are located in Potomac TRACON , another town , in Warrenton , Virginia , .
Jumseater
A UK Tower/LC can’t give headings unless they are radar qualified and current, and have the appropriate equipment. Last edited by ATC Watcher; 3rd February 2025 at 20:24 . Reason: adding comment to jumpseater post Subjects
FAA
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| galaxy flyer
February 03, 2025, 20:22:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820867 |
Subjects
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| SAM 2M
February 04, 2025, 00:28:00 GMT permalink Post: 11821044 |
Suggested policies for review in the investigation
Whilst the rules differ between different countries, I am sure the following will be evaluated during the investigation:
- Any policy that permits visual separation from traffic at NIGHT should be reviewed. - Any policy that permits routes - especially with such minimal planned separation - that cross final approach tracks should be reviewed. - Any policy that permits 'band-boxing' of UHF and VHF radio communication frequencies should be reviewed, especially as it does not enable the crew of the UHF and VHF aircraft to hear the transmissions of the other crew. This reduces flight crew situational awareness (SA). Some other items not directly related to this incident, but that could lead to collisions are: - Land and Hold Short (LAHSO) operations should be reviewed. - Clearing aircraft to land with traffic ahead but yet to land, should be reviewed. (e.g. "XXXX123 number 4 cleared to land") - Having Ramp areas uncontrolled by ATC. - Encouraging crew to 'report visual' (and thus becoming completely responsible for their own separation from that moment) should be reviewed. 787 Capt / SE / TRI / TRE Subjects
ATC
Land and Hold Short
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
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| Equivocal
February 04, 2025, 00:44:00 GMT permalink Post: 11821056 |
Suggested policies for review in the investigation
There are many comments in this thread which say procedure X should not be allowed. The procedures that were applied by ATC immediately before the accident are \x91standard\x92 and used the world over. None are intrinsically unsafe but their application (as with all the other rules that need to be followed) needs to be appropriate. Visual separation at night is likely to be fine on a clear night with just two or three aircraft in the sky but, as others have pointed out, it\x92s not in any way appropriate in high traffic density environments. Just because there\x92s a rule that says you can do something doesn\x92t mean it\x92s necessarily a good idea. Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| 21600HRS
February 04, 2025, 08:47:00 GMT permalink Post: 11821199 |
There is a problem in the system if you don\x92t react to CA. The visual avoidance should be aborted when the technically calculated separation is lost.
Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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