Visual Separation Page: 8 of 13

alf5071h
February 09, 2025, 17:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825027

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot .
Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident..

\x93Rather than being the main instigators of an accident, operators tend to be the inheritors of system defects created by poor design, incorrect installation, faulty maintenance and bad management decisions. Their part is usually that of adding the final garnish to a lethal brew whose ingredients have already been long in the cooking.\x94 James Reason

Subjects ATC Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

11 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

deltafox44
February 09, 2025, 18:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825063

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Just to put the things back into perspective : whether the controller had a radar display in front of him or not ,, whether there should have been a separate controller in the Heli frequency ,both would not have changed anything in this case since he delegated separation to the helicopter , The visual identification by the helicopter was confirmed ( twice) , instruction to pass behind was confirmed = controller no longer responsible , standard procedure in DC since the guys worked there , and he had a lot of other traffic to attend to.

To discuss what he could or should have done is just playing " Captain hindsight "

The procedure was wrong , the safety case botched , and as I understand, the " book " allowing all this was followed by both the controller and the helicopter pilot .
Let's discuss the procedures and visual separation delegation at night in busy airports instead on focusing on what the controller should have done , implying indirectly some form of responsibility in this accident..

Not implying any form of responsibility to anyone, the "book" says that in the case of a visual separation, if the 2 traffics converge, the controller should advise the other pilot. Perhaps the same controller on both frequencies was too busy to do so, and a second controller would have helped.

cf FAA Order JO 7110.65AA 7.2.1.a.2 Pilot-applied visual separation

Quote:

(d) If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
(e)Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge.

Last edited by deltafox44; 9th February 2025 at 19:04 . Reason: adding source

Subjects ATC FAA Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Radar Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

island_airphoto
February 09, 2025, 19:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825080

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

There is a general lesson and a specific lesson:
The specific one only applies to DCA, so unless you fly there for your job or want to fill out 1001 forms to get your own airplane in there, no worries, no one else does crazy stuff like that with helos.
The general one for me so far is how easy it is to see the wrong traffic at night and the next "do you see X" I get at night I am going to be triple-redundant sure and then some before saying I do.

Subjects ATC DCA Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Radar Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

3 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

YRP
February 09, 2025, 20:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825106

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Absolutely agree.

A second controller -might- have had more time to observe the conflict. They -might- have twigged and second guessed the helo's separation. But they very well might not have. The spacing might have been close enough to the every day occurances that the controller might not have been able to tell.

Having the helicopters on a separate frequency from the fixed wing would certainly not have helped anyone's situational awareness.

Subjects ATC Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Radar Separation (ALL) Situational Awareness Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

ATC Watcher
February 09, 2025, 21:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825124

Quote:

Originally Posted by deltafox44

Yes ,you are right regarding the federal rules book , I would however like to see what the local procedures addendum says````` ,and what were the standard operating best practices being used to train people in DC TWR , Because assuming the Heli position was opened in the TWR , from the R/T exchange, it looks like asking for visual separation was kind of standard , and would in that case the info be passed to the TWR controller who will then advise the aircrfat on final APP , as both were then on different frequencies ? sounds improbable to me . But speculating of course. .

Quote:

@ YRP : Having the helicopters on a separate frequency from the fixed wing would certainly not have helped anyone's situational awareness.

Absolutely .

Subjects ATC FAA Separation (ALL) Situational Awareness Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Wide Mouth Frog
February 10, 2025, 18:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825666

Quote:

Originally Posted by deltafox44

+1
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?

Quote:

Originally Posted by spornrad

NYT has attempted a reconstruction of the visual picture from the Blackhawk at the time of the first traffic alert, with the CRJ just south of Wilson Bridge.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.

This simulation, if correct, is harrowing. The accident aircraft is actually almost superimposed over the following aircraft AA3130 at exactly the time of the tower's first notification of traffic to the helicopter. The helicopter's response is so quick, so reflexive. Then when the second notification is received, even though PAT25 knows he has just asked for visual separation and been granted he asks again, further suggestion that this is reflexive behavior.

At the same time the accident aircraft peels off to the right to swing around and line up to 33, thus taking his (smaller) lights out of the helicopter's direct line of vision and leaving 3130's (brighter) lights still heading to 01 to decoy the pilot. The reflexive nature of the helicopter's responses suggest to me that the full implication of 'circling to 33' in the tower's first call was missed, and also sort of implies that the helicopter could not conceive that following (nearly) the published heliroute could lead him into conflict with an aircraft on final. Me neither.

Quote:

NOTAM 5/1069 for DCA, valid from 07 Feb 0200 UTC until 31 March 2359 UTC

I'd push the expiry date of that one out a little.

Last edited by Senior Pilot; 10th February 2025 at 21:22 . Reason: Quote

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60) CRJ DCA New York Times PAT25 Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

4 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Wide Mouth Frog
February 10, 2025, 20:51:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825711

Helicopter heading would affect where the picture appeared in the windows, but the actual picture itself is invariant under heading. Of course if the heading was such that the picture was behind the window pillar, then it would raise even further questions about the reflexive requests for visual separation and reinforce the notion that the helicopter had a reasonable assumption that a published heliroute would keep it deconflicted from landing traffic.

I'm more familiar with the London Heliroutes (see earlier posts on this thread) where the only time you'd be asked to accept visual separation is from opposite direction helicopter traffic also on the routes. You simply wouldn't get a clearance to start on any route unless all helicopters involved had already accepted visual separation. A helicopter would never need or ask for visual separation from fixed wing traffic, because the routes are designed and operated to achieve procedural separation.

Subjects Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

DIBO
February 11, 2025, 13:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11826087

Quote:

Originally Posted by SLFstu

Everything above 200 feet was their airspace.

as indicated by several others (but without formal proof ufn) the Route4 / RWY33 APP combination was never designed to give any vertical separation nor protection. So "their airspace" (=CRJ's) was the normal approach sector/path for a RWY 33 approach, without any relation to the 200ft max (recommended?) on the Heli route

Quote:

Originally Posted by SLFstu

Otherwise according to your graphic even at 200 feet max elevation, being that distance from the east bank any helicopter not maintaining visual separation could collide if an AC was still positioning itself from being low on the glideslope .

my underline could well be the correct conclusion, hence the "no vertical protection" of the route design

Subjects Separation (ALL) Vertical Separation Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

3 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

airplanecrazy
February 11, 2025, 19:28:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11826281

Quote:

Originally Posted by SLFstu

I’m not sure your quoting FAA helicopter routes as having no defined centreline or width would strictly apply in DC versus what they wrote about the North Shore of Long Island route in NYC where they are required to be 1 mile off the shoreline. As shown on the published helo chart (DIBO’s post #863, and your little chart insert) and in writing (BuzzBox’s post #998) Route 4 directs traffic to track “via the east bank of the Potomac” from the Wilson Bridge to Anacostia River. If the impact point was 1000 feet or so (give or take some trig) from the east bank of a 3000 feet wide river at that point wouldn’t this mean that PAT25 was not only too high but off track too? Otherwise according to your graphic even at 200 feet max elevation, being that distance from the east bank any helicopter not maintaining visual separation could collide if an AC was still positioning itself from being low on the glideslope.

My understanding is that the FAA depicted width of a helicopter route is governed by the following doc: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flig...2-complete.pdf . It specifies that on a fully printed chart the route should be 0.1 inches wide regardless of chart scale. The chart I pulled from was 1:125,000 scale (full chart size is 51x33 inch poster), which would mean the routes "appear" to be 125,000 * 0.1 / 12 = 1,042 ft wide. In the same FAA chart package https://aeronav.faa.gov/visual/12-26...-Wash_Heli.pdf , the third page is a "Washington Inset" with a scale of 1:62,500. In that inset the routes "appear" to be 62,500 * 0.1 /12 = 521 ft wide. Also, if you look at the centerlines of the routes depicted on those two pages (which I "drew in" below), they do not exactly match. For example, look at how the full chart shows the route going east of Hains Point while the inset shows it very close to Hains Point.

DCA Helicopter Routes

Given these chart differences, I wonder how far a helicopter can stray from the various depictions of a route before it is considered a pilot deviation? Perhaps the NTSB will give us some insight with their accident report.

Last edited by airplanecrazy; 14th February 2025 at 23:53 . Reason: Emphasize the route "appear"

Subjects DCA FAA NTSB PAT25 Route 4 Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

ATC Watcher
February 12, 2025, 16:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11826805

Quote:

Originally Posted by bill fly

Hi, ATC Watcher,
I am sorry you see a witch hunt in my post. It was supposed to be an idea for a future improvement, rather than a criticism of the very hard worked man who was on the job. On the flying end, there is quite a rigid procedure to follow if a TCAS RA goes off. From posts since I see, that there seems to be one for for STCA triggers too. It seems to me that the gravity of the situation is brought faster to a pilot's attention if the Conflict warning is announced on the RT.
That is just one factor in this sad affair of course. Both TCAS and STCA are last ditch saviours but only if full attention can be paid to them.

Hi Bill , understood, I was a bit too harsh maybe, but I get upset to continuously read what the controller should have done. Remember he was trained like this , to follow procedures that were basically unsafe in order to move the traffic . I can say unsafe because they were removed immediately after the accident , not waiting for the NTSB to recommend it . No everyone is stupid in the FAA , they knew this route was in conflict with 33 Visual arrivals. And did not pass any safety case, but the procedure was kept , most probably due political or military pressures , relying on controllers and pilots to mitigate the risks.

Now on the Conflict alert on the BRITE display . I have no first hand info on the SOPs in DCA on how a TWR controller uses the BRITE and if STCA are even displayed . `, but if they are, seen the charts and the routes , I guess STCA alerts are very common .especially when you delegate separation and you then play with a couple of hundred feet, vertical separation Too many unnecessary alerts equals normalization of deviance, . Look at the Haneda preliminary report , same ..

Finally since you mention TCAS RAs , there is a major difference with STCA , it is not the same as a TCAS RA . With an RA , as a pilot you have to react and follow , it is mandatory , for a controller a STCA is just an alert , just like a TCAS TA , if in your judgement it will pass you will not do anything , and if you have already issued a correcting instruction ( heading, level , etc,,) or here delegate visual separation , the STCA just becomes a nuisance. .

I sincerely hope the DC Controller will not be made the scapegoat of this accident . Not so sure it will not.

Subjects ATC DCA FAA NTSB Preliminary Report Separation (ALL) TCAS (All) TCAS RA Vertical Separation Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

9 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

PJ2
February 12, 2025, 19:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11826918

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

Concur. Scapegoating stochastically guarantees a repeat incident/accident of the same kind under "rhyming" circumstances.

Rarely does the "bad apple" theory of accident causation survive the scrutiny of a robust, honest investigation.

Last edited by Senior Pilot; 12th February 2025 at 23:14 . Reason: Quote was unreadable

9 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

FullWings
February 13, 2025, 10:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11827259

Quote:

Originally Posted by YRP

I am not a US controller but as I understand it their conflict alert is not a last minute save in the way TCAS is.

TCAS RA says that a collision is imminent (within the accuracy of the system, ie it probably means the system can\x92t prove the planes won\x92t hit).

Conflict alert is to notify the controller well in advance \x97 maybe a few minutes for en-route. It isn\x92t a loss of separation, it is so they can avoid a loss of separation (3 or 5 miles for radar).

I would say that TCAS is designed to issue guidance on a projected loss of separation, not necessarily an imminent collision (although it does that too). A highly simplistic explanation would be that it projects a nested set of egg-shaped volumes around the aircraft, which if it looks like they will be infringed can generate a TA or RA, depending on where the intruder is projected to make its closest approach. These volumes have nothing whatsoever to do with ATC separation standards.

The problem with conflict alerting is that in mixed-use airspace you will get a lot of warnings; I hesitate to say false as they are defined by preset parameters that may or may not be relevant to the potential conflict. Talking to controllers in the UK, they often turn this feature (STCA) off as GA traffic happily avoiding each other by visual and/or electronic means can fill the screen with so many alerts it distracts from the main job, especially if you are not in communication with either aircraft.

I would expect, given the traffic density around DCA, that CAs are so commonplace they have become unremarkable, indeed expected. Twice the controller was told that the traffic was in sight, so in their mind they are applying visual separation (no minima, just don\x92t collide). The takeaway has to be that IFR/VFR separation at night by visual means is inherently risky and so a questionable pursuit.

Subjects ATC DCA Radar Separation (ALL) TCAS (All) TCAS RA Traffic in Sight Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

3 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Downwind_Left
February 13, 2025, 22:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11827672

I just can\x92t help compare the general situation to London, where it\x92s again very busy airspace, and the helicopter routes generally follow the river. You have Heathrow at western end and London City at the eastern end.

ATC do a fantastic job of managing the flow, basically by issuing helicopter traffic clearance limits based on the VRPs - usually based on Thames bridges. The Eastbound clearance limit is usually the Isle of Dogs\x85. Before London City Tower take over to manage traffic closer to the airport. At the Western end the heli routes go nowhere near the LHR approaches due or traffic density.

ATC will not in my experience clear any helicopter traffic to visually proceed behind airline traffic based on the helicopters visual perception. Day or night. They do a great job of keeping both airline and rotary traffic advised about each other, and prioritise air ambulance and police helicopters as required. But, they keep control over the overall traffic flow and it works.

I just fail to see why the FAA couldn\x92t employ a similar system, where helicopter traffic is issued a clearance limit - pending a gap in traffic - either a natural one or an ATC created gap. Before being cleared to continue.

I have also been in the situation having started engines at London City and police helicopter then was tasked to something going on off the departure end of the runway. All departures and arrivals suspend. Indefinite delays. It\x92s part of the bigger picture. CAVOK day but no possibility of visual separation. So the London system gives priority to helicopters where appropriate. But seems infinitely safer for both airline and helicopter traffic.

Subjects ATC FAA Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

deltafox44
February 14, 2025, 22:44:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828270

Quote:

Originally Posted by Lonewolf_50

No, hence the tower telling the Blackhawk to pass behind.
Seems to me like a reaction to seeing the Blackhawk right before impact and a reflex/reaction with intent to avoid.

The subtext for me is that the Blackhawk crew never saw them...but there's more for the NTSB to sort out, as the lady was VERY CLEAR about.

NTSB did not say (and nobody asked

) if there had been any discussion in the black hawk cockpit about the CRJ (where it was, whether the PF did see it or not) when PM requested visual separation

Last edited by deltafox44; 14th February 2025 at 23:19 .

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60) CRJ NTSB Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Stagformation
February 14, 2025, 23:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828293

Quote:

Originally Posted by deltafox44

NTSB did not say (and nobody asked

) if there had been any discussion in the black hawk cockpit about the CRJ (where it was, whether the PF did see it or not) when PM requested visual separation

NTSB didn\x92t mention much in the way of cross cockpit intercom chatter. Must be a lot more that could have been said about the SA on both aircraft, eg altimeter checks, visual lookout, intentions, perceptions, checklists\x85etc.

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60) CRJ NTSB Separation (ALL) Situational Awareness Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Commando Cody
February 15, 2025, 05:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828365

Quote:

Originally Posted by Lead Balloon

It appears from the NTSB's most recent press conference that the instruction "pass behind the CRJ" was not heard in the helo's CVR and, therefore by inference, not heard by the crew. Am I correct in assuming that there is no requirement to readback an instruction like that in the USA? ATC appeared not to expect one.

The Aeronautical Information Manual lists a number of instructions that should be read back, but there are none that must be read back (unless the controller specifically requests). "Pass behind..." is not even one of the "should" be read back instructions, so ATC wouldn't be bothered by not getting a read back. Frankly, if there was a requirement to fully read back all things like "Pass behind..." the frequency would be constantly full. In any case, whether PAT25 heard the "Pass behind" or not, it had already said that it was providing its own visual separation, so not hearing an instruction to pass behind does not take away the requirement to maintain separation.

Last edited by Commando Cody; 15th February 2025 at 07:45 . Reason: precision

Subjects ATC CRJ PAT25 Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

3 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Easy Street
February 15, 2025, 10:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828489

Quote:

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher

absolutely . the altimeter talk is just a distraction or at best contributing factor, Not the cause .. which brings us back to the safety assessment of the procedure , which the NTSB did not mention at all,, but I am sure , or at least I hope they will go into in their final report.

+1 to everything you and Wide Mouth Frog said.

I sincerely hope the NTSB can avoid being distracted by the distractions of altimetry and the missing ATC words on the Blackhawk CVR.

Upthread, Luca Lion calculated the 3 degree PAPI approach path as crossing the eastern riverbank at 270ft. If that's correct, then the CRJ's 313ft radar height 2 seconds before collision puts it at least 43ft above the approach path, so the Blackhawk's radio height deviation of 78ft would have contributed only about 35ft to the erosion of any intended "procedural separation" (*) between the aircraft. Or, to put it another way, the same outcome would have resulted if the Blackhawk had been at 235ft radio and the CRJ on the glide. Height keeping of plus or minus 35ft can only be achieved by instrument flying, which is obviously not compatible with visual separation (or indeed VFR) so cannot be reasonably cited as part of a safety case for the procedure. And of course a landing aircraft could easily be below the glide. Altimetry and height keeping are not the cause of this accident.

Missing the word "circling" wouldn't have influenced the helo crew getting visual with the CRJ at the time of the trasnmission. At best, it would have given them an extra nudge that "runway 33" (which was audible) meant the CRJ would be taking an easterly flight path. Missing "pass behind" with only a few seconds to collision was irrelevant if, as seems likely, the helo crew did not see the CRJ at that point.

(*) The quotes around "procedural separation" are intended to convey a tone of disgust and sarcasm.

Last edited by Easy Street; 15th February 2025 at 10:47 .

Subjects ATC Blackhawk (H-60) CRJ Final Report NTSB Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Radar Separation (ALL) VFR Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Winterapfel
February 15, 2025, 10:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828510

Quote:

Originally Posted by Easy Street

Following "5*why", keep asking...
Why did the did miss part of the message
Why was the incomplete read back missed
Why does missing a few words lead to this disaster within seconds.

Does this lead an answer like: helicopter in a very busy airspace, busy controllers (insufficient time to be fully focused on full read backs) being by default too close to (and even needing to cross) the glideslope.

Subjects ATC Blackhawk (H-60) CRJ NTSB Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Radar Separation (ALL) VFR Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Easy Street
February 15, 2025, 12:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828596

Quote:

Originally Posted by Winterapfel

I hadn't intended to go all the way along the causal chain in my post. But since you ask, I think your answer only goes one step further. There are more steps to take.

Helicopters in busy airspace are not a problem if a safe system exists for separating them from airline traffic.

There is no evidence yet of the controller having made a mistake. He was undoubtedly busy, but that was not his fault. What could be done about it? The answers to that question take us another step along the causal chain:

The FAA could have provided more controllers. We know the helicopter controller position was unoccupied, and it's likely that closer monitoring and earlier intervention could have changed the outcome (notwithstanding point 3).
Controller workload could have been reduced by implementing effective procedural separation . If the DCA ATC rulebook allowed this segment of Route 4 to be in simultaneous use with Runway 33 landings, then procedural separation did not exist , however much anyone thought it did. At least 1.5nm or 500ft between flight paths would be needed to meet the least restrictive FAA separation standards, and this would have forced constraints to be applied to Route 4 or Runway 33 utilisation.
Regulations allowed the helo pilots to assume responsibility for separation. This is what happened, with the consequences which flow from the inherent difficulty of identifying and separating visually at night (especially while wearing NVG).

The authorities (by which I mean FAA and DoD) have questions to answer on all three points. Why was the helicopter controller position vacant? Did the ATC rulebook or staffing requirements rely on a false assumption that procedural separation existed? How did any such assumption remain in place after previous near misses? Is visual separation between helicopters and airline traffic a reasonable thing for regulations to permit, at night and using NVG? Ultimately it seems to have routinely been used as a release valve for the pressure building in the system due to the failure to address points 1 and 2.

Hopefully the investigation will be bold enough to ask these questions, which expand the potential scope of responsibility well beyond the individual controller and pilots.

Last edited by Easy Street; 15th February 2025 at 13:36 .

Subjects ATC Close Calls DCA FAA Night Vision Goggles (NVG) Route 4 Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

4 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

MPN11
February 15, 2025, 18:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828759

Whilst these are valid observations, it is also micro-managing a procedure whose altitude separation was always totally flawed. I cannot personally attribute any blame to ATC or either pilot when the scenario was so badly devised ... and that means not only the infamous Route 4 but the concept of visual separation in the dark.

It was doomed to fail, eventually, but sadly someone [other than those directly impacted] never saw it coming. THEY are the culprits.

MPN11, former Mil ATCO

Subjects ATC ATCO Route 4 Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

12 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Posts about: "Visual Separation" [Posts: 250 Page: 8 of 13]¶