Posts about: "AAIB (All)" [Posts: 151 Pages: 8]

GroundedSpanner
June 30, 2025, 22:21:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11913922
Originally Posted by za9ra22
What configuration, specifically?

Caused by what? /
Didn't I read somewhere in the wiki, that the engines will continue to suck fuel? / Which is?
Contaminated with what, and how? And why were no other aircraft affected?
Which specific circumstances?
Here's an answer I typed earlier, that covers most of the questions. Was written before today though.

Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner
OK - Fair Challenges - good post, I'll have a go at answering and simultaneously expanding my own thoughts. In fact I'm not having a go at you, I'm more working my theory....

Experience. Without wishing to dox myself, I've worked in engineering at a major airline from apprentice through (in no particular order) Line Maintenance, Heavy and Light Maintenance, to technical support and maintenance control on both Boeing and Airbus products, with various qualifications and authorisations along the way. [Hmm - Scrap this sentence?]On the day 9/11 occurred, I should have been making modifications inside a fuel tank instead of staring at the TV with mouth on the floor.
However, I would describe my experience as broad, yet shallow in respect to this incident. Some of my fleet I know every rivet. Some of my fleet I've only ever seen from a distance. I don't touch airplanes for a living any more. B787 though - is not my area of specialty. I'll dig in, but am not the expert. I am not a systems design engineer, so precise numbers and flow rates, are not what I do. But what the systems do, how they operate, what they look like, smell and taste like... yeah, I'm not a muggle. And I do have access to all the manuals and know how to use them. And - let me be clear, I am speculating. I was advancing a theory. It WILL be some flavour of wrong. The investigation will reveal all.

I Agree, Water in fuel is not a novel concept. Aircraft fuel tanks attract water - fact. How much? It varies. I've sumped tanks and got no water, I've seen drops of water beading about in the bottom of a gallon jug, I've seen gallons of water. I've been so covered in fuel I cant smell it or think straight and taken gallon after gallon not being able to tell if its fuel or water. I also agree that 57% humidity doesn't seem particularly high - its not south east Asian jungle levels - but I'm not an expert at humidity, 32Deg c at 57% humidity at 02:30 am is not going to be comfortable for me though. I looked at recent weather in DEL, and those values were at the higher end of the range.
Further, I believe the prevailing weather conditions on the ground are less important when it comes to the volume of water getting in. Fuel is cold, or gets damn cold during a 9 Hr flight. Fuel Temperature Management is an issue for our Drivers. So as the fuel is used at altitude, Air enters the tank through NACA Ducts in the outboard end of the wing. Its beneficial to maintain a slight positive pressure, amongst other things to reduce evaporation. (Added complication, there is also the Nitrogen Enrichment system due to TWA800 - but that's more about processing the air in the tank to change the properties and make it non-explosive). Then as the aircraft descends, more air enters as the air pressure increases. Its the humidity of that air in the descent that is going to determine the volume of water entering the tank and potentially the fuel. The water in the air condenses on the sides of the tank because of the cold post-flight fuel. It doesn't dissolve into the fuel, but sinks to the bottom. Ground temperature / humidity and time will likely affect how much water condenses out of that air while on the ground. There won't be a huge amount of air exchange on the ground. Likely if the AC landed at 2am, then from sunrise as the tank warmed up, there would actually be a flow out of the vents.

What Features and procedures are there to mitigate Water? I apologise if my post gave the impression that there are no mitigation processes. There are. Water is well understood in the industry.
Well for a start, Features / Design. The Aircraft has a water scavenge system. Water doesn't mix with fuel, it sinks to the bottom being about 20% denser than fuel, so at the very lowest point in the tank, the water scavenge system (Powered by the Aft Fuel Pump through a jet pump, a venturi like system) will suck up the 'fluid' at the very lowest point, where the water would collect and in Boeings words 'drip' that fluid into the path of the pump pickup inlet (but I'd describe it more as a 'squirt'). The idea being that a small amount of water injected into the fuel will be consumed by the engines harmlessly.
There is also agitation. The wing tank pumps are pretty much running constantly, from before engine startup to after engine shutdown. The pumps are quite violent to the fuel and supply more pressure then the engine could ever need. Any excess pressure is dumped right back into the tank, quite close to the pump, in a direction that would further stir up the fuel and help break up any water into suspended droplets.
This all works if there is a small amount of water in the fuel. The water scavenge pickup is right next to the pump inlet, but a bit lower. Little bits of water get managed. Looking at the pictures of the system, I'd say a couple of gallons of water would do no harm at all.
But if there was significantly more water in that tank. Guessing 10-30 + gallons, then the pump would be circulating water, or highly water rich fuel.

Then there's the suction pickup. Its in the same 'bay' as the aft fuel pump and located a little 'higher' than the pump inlet and water scavenge inlet. But also located between stringers that can separate out the settled water ( I wish I could share the pictures, but more than my job is worth ) I can imagine the suction pickup being in a pool of 'stagnant' water.

I also saw a post from Metcha about the scavenge system blocking with Algae - I don't know about that (B787 not my fleet). But possible that could aggravate things. There's also the reports of the Indian AAIB looking at the Titan Biocide incident. Its possible that might be related and could modify the theory.

Procedures - There's the (at my airline weekly I think) procedure to 'sump' the tanks. There are drain points in the tank. Valves that you can push in with a tool and fluid drains. As described earlier (and videos exist on YouTube), you drain about a gallon of fluid and examine it for water. Most often in temperate climates (my experience), there's a few 'beads' of water in the bottom of the jug, moving about like mercury. Except when there's more. Sometimes there's a clear line in the jug, half water, fuel above. And sometimes a gallon of water, that smells like fuel. You drain it until you are sure there's no water.

Could 'that much' water have condensed in the tank? Well - There's the question. I guess the basis of the theory is that on descent into DEL, the wing tanks picked up some very humid air, which settled water into the tanks through the night. Then, as the theory I posited must work, the wing pumps must have circulated and suspended that water into the fuel.
By design, the water from the CDG-DEL arrival should have been consumed in the DEL-AMD Sector. But desperately clinging to defending my theory (I appreciate this is a hole), lets assume that at DEL the pumps were running for a long time. Lets assume that the pumps allowed the water to be dispersed within the tank prior to being used through the engines. Then - in the DEL-AMD sector, the wing tanks could have picked up more water.

How much water would cause a sustained flameout? I never posited a sustained flameout. I posited a significant reduction in thrust. Listening back to the rooftop video, which at first we were all listening for evidence of RAT, there's also a rhythmic pop-pop-pop of engines struggling. I think the engines were running, albeit badly. Heavily water contaminated fuel will do that. It doesn't have to be 100% water. Just enough water to make the engine lose thrust. Your 2 gallons per second figure assumes the engine running at full flow. I'm not a figures man, I'll not challenge that, I do recall flowmeters at max thrust spin like crazy. But an engine struggling due to a high perrcentage of contamination, is that using 2 gal/sec? or just trying to? What happens if there is e.g. 20% water in the fuel?

There are also reported incidents of engine flameout / thrust reduction that have all happened at altitude. Incidents that have been recovered due to the altitude and time available. I Posited that the engines would have eventually regained full thrust once the contamination worked though. But 30 seconds of rough engine is very different at 40,000 feet than it is at 100 feet.

The theory also relies on a second part - the electrical failure. That the electrical failure causes the fuel supply to switch, a few seconds after the failure. We go, at the point of electrical failure from a pumped centre tank supply to a sucked wing tank supply. It takes time for that different fuel to reach the engine.

Ive written enough and am tired. Must stop now.

Last edited by Senior Pilot; 30th June 2025 at 23:01 . Reason: Quote from a week ago; this is not a Hamsterwheel thread, thanks!
Musician
July 09, 2025, 14:58:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11918444
Originally Posted by Magplug
Given the iron-grip that the government appears to have over the media, one wonders how the truth will ever surface?
What are you talking about? Sources have already leaked information. NTSB (USA), AAIB (UK) and ICAO have sent people who have access, not to mention the aircraft and engine manufacturers. There's going to be a final report in about a year, and when that's out you can complain. (There has been precedent for a national accident board making a release about an investigation when the official report came up short, but I don't remember the details.) The ICAO-prescribed process is designed to produce this kind of participation, because air safety can't be a political issue.
Musician
July 09, 2025, 15:37:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11918467
Originally Posted by Gino230
UN stated that it is up to the Country leading the investigation on wether to release the report at all- a frightening thought.
I'm fairly certain that's a misquote. Annex 13 requires ICAO countries to produce a preliminary report in 30 days\x97which India's AAIB seems to be doing\x97and a final report in a year.

I've seen a quote saying, "In accordance with international protocols, release of information on the air crash probe rests solely with the Indian authorities." This means that while there are other parties to the investigation, India's AAIB has the final say over what goes in these reports, in accordance with Annex 13. But ICAO would not say that India has the option not to release a report.

WillowRun 6-3
July 09, 2025, 15:48:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11918471
Originally Posted by za9ra22
With all due respect, do you have any idea how a large scale investigation of this kind actually works, because it would appear not so much.

Not only are there agencies and personnel from outside governmental influence directly involved in the investigation, and playing an active as well as observational role, which makes it almost impossible to hide or obscure critical pieces of information or data, but other than a frenzy of any-nonsense-goes in the name of hits, clicks and ad revenue, the media play no role whatsoever in any part of the investigation.

The team itself will operate largely within a bubble, and team members don't talk to media or politicians - however much the media or politicians still need to flap their jaws because to both classes, silence is anathema. Furthermore, everyone who does this kind of work is a professional, well aware that any unofficial commentary is capable of severely compromising the investigation and other members of the team. Just as pilots who fly these aircraft are professionals with a hard job deserving of respect, so are those who investigate when things go wrong.
Annex 13 is held in high regard among attorneys practicing in international civil aviation legal matters. And by other types of professionals as well. So it was in a sense validating to read, in a number of posts way upthread, about the strict confidentiality obligations imposed on the individuals conducting or otherwise participating in the investigation. Also validating (in the same sense) to read the quoted post by za9ra22.

Without so much as hinting at approving of unauthorized leaks of information or statements purporting to be information from or about the investigation, the context which this accident has yielded is important. The first accident involving this type, and the different design fundamentals of the type (heavier use of electrical systems), would make any investigation authority especially careful not to issue incorrect statements. Perhaps the AAIB in India could be credited with understanding the high regard in which Annex 13 is held, and wanting, ..... perhaps desperately wanting, not to screw this up, not only in general terms but especially given the context. And add in the seemingly mystifying answers to what happened to Flight 171. If Annex 13 had a sentient presence, I'm convinced (mere SLF and attorney as I am) that it would concur with a "be careful, be very careful" approach to anything outside the tight circle of confidentiality within which the investigation occurs.

When I saw the article in The Air Current, on one hand I hoped for the sake of the reputation of the publisher that the unnamed sources were legitimately informed, but at the same time, would not anyone legitimately informed have been subject to rather strict confidentiality and nondisclosure obligations?
za9ra22
July 09, 2025, 16:12:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11918484
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
When I saw the article in The Air Current, on one hand I hoped for the sake of the reputation of the publisher that the unnamed sources were legitimately informed, but at the same time, would not anyone legitimately informed have been subject to rather strict confidentiality and nondisclosure obligations?
I can't speak to the practices of the AAIB in India, but as a person involved in large scale investigations (albeit only one airline accident) in the UK, I can say that I am still bound by NDAs even now, many years on. These aren't in place to protect involved parties, as shown by the fact that resulting accident reports can and do lay blame and responsibility where it is found to be due, but to ensure the investigative process itself is protected from external pressures which would otherwise almost inevitably undermine it.

I can say that even in the days when the media were not so desperate for self promotion, it was often quite alarming to witness the absolute nonsense it was capable of inventing and perpetrating as fact, often implying insider knowledge or inside sources, when their reports were so far off the mark they might as well have been commenting on a Star Trek plot line.

To add also that there never was a shortage of external pressures, but that does not mean that in any sense these pressures actually worked. I still regard the people I worked with over the years as amongst the most professional and dedicated I have ever met.
grizzled
July 09, 2025, 16:26:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11918499
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
The first accident involving this type, and the different design fundamentals of the type (heavier use of electrical systems), would make any investigation authority especially careful not to issue incorrect statements. Perhaps the AAIB in India could be credited with understanding the high regard in which Annex 13 is held, and wanting, ..... perhaps desperately wanting, not to screw this up, not only in general terms but especially given the context. And add in the seemingly mystifying answers to what happened to Flight 171. If Annex 13 had a sentient presence, I'm convinced (mere SLF and attorney as I am) that it would concur with a "be careful, be very careful" approach to anything outside the tight circle of confidentiality within which the investigation occurs.
If this thread was a private discussion between experienced accident investigators, all participants would understand and agree with WillowRun's point above. But, his post would likely have been unnecessary on such a thread / forum, as it was in response to assertions about the Indian investigation process and agenda that are uninformed, and seemingly "Western" biased.

I am a "Western" born and raised former aircraft accident investigator who, later in life, lived and worked in India (and a dozen other "non-Western" countries). The allusions to lack of transparency, experience or professionalism on the part of the AAIB of India are uncalled for. They also show a lack of understanding of Indian rules and regulations as well as ICAO SARPS.

Enough said
Engineless
July 11, 2025, 20:26:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11919763
Preliminary Air India crash report published

AAIB Preliminary Report

Last edited by Saab Dastard; 11th July 2025 at 21:40 . Reason: Fixed link
blimey
July 11, 2025, 22:12:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11919890
Is 'transitioned' a standard AAIB phrase rather than 'selected', and would that have any reference to the physical position of the switch being recorded or just inferred?
appruser
July 12, 2025, 01:28:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920070
Can someone with the engineering knowledge build a timeline/timeframe for fuel cutoff switch RUN to CUTOFF -> fuel stops -> engine flameout -> N2 drops to ? -> VFSGs quit -> RAT deployment starts -> RAT full power -> APU deployment start?
Does the RAT really start providing power in 4 seconds from the E2 fuel cutoff switch RUN -> CUTOFF?


Timeline from AAIB and the public CCTV video:

08:08:33 v1 153 kts
.
08:08:35 vr 155 kts
.
.
.
08:08:39 Liftoff, A/G Air Mode, rotation at 00:18 in public CCTV video
.
.
08:08:42 E1 Fuel Cutoff Switch RUN -> CUTOFF, 180 kts
08:08:43 E2 Fuel Cutoff Switch RUN -> CUTOFF
.............? N1 N2 begin to decrease
.............? "Why did you cutoff", "I didn't"
.............? Airport CCTV shows RAT
.............? N2 < idle speed
08:08:47 RAT hydraulic power
.
08:08:49 Public CCTV video: visible loss of thrust, Alt < 200ft using wingspan
.
.
08:08:52 E1 Fuel Cutoff Switch CUTOFF -> RUN, CCTV video: visible descent
.
08:08:54 APU inlet door begins opening
.
08:08:56 E2 Fuel Cutoff Switch CUTOFF -> RUN
08:09:05 MAYDAY
08:09:11 EAFR Recording stops
08:14:44 Crash Fire Tender leaves airport

Last edited by appruser; 12th July 2025 at 01:29 . Reason: readability
Someone Somewhere
July 12, 2025, 01:47:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920083
Spoiler
 
Originally Posted by Finalveridict
It seems like people are jumping to conclusions about the pilots and letting Boeing off the hook without proper investigation. Instead of providing a professional, detailed transcript of the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), we’re just getting casual comments about what the pilot allegedly said. Critical information—like the timing of transmissions, the checklist items completed before takeoff, and other key details that should be on the CVR—are essential for understanding what happened in the cockpit, especially since the crash occurred so soon after takeoff. In my view, the preliminary report feels too convenient for certain parties involved.
This is a preliminary report. It is quite detailed for a preliminary report.

Examining the before-takeoff checklists seems like it would be akin to examining the re-arrangement of the deckchairs before the titanic even hit the iceberg.

The engines were switched off. Unlike Embraer, B & A have no protections stopping you switching an engine off inadvertently. From everything in the report, everything operated exactly as designed. I am not certain of how long the relight window is without windmilling speed, but +- 10 seconds seems entirely reasonable.

The outstanding question that presumably requires much more in-depth investigation of the wreckage items and CVR audio is whether:
  • the cutoff switches were operated deliberately (and by who)
  • the cutoff switches were operated inadvertently (and by who)
  • the cutoff switches were bumped (by what) and the guards failed or weren't installed
  • some electrical failure perfectly mimicked both many-pole switches being operated, then being operated again (seems unlikely)
Gupeg
July 12, 2025, 08:15:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920329
Originally Posted by Saab Dastard
(Admin/Mod)Folks, it appears that the message isn't getting through.
There were two professional pilots on that flight deck.
It is not acceptable to effectively accuse both of a criminal act, because there is no evidence to identify which hand - if either - moved the fuel switches, or for what purpose or reason.
Unless and until any such evidence is published by the relevant authorities, kindly desist from doing so out of respect for your professional colleagues.
The Mods have stuck to this principle, which I shall try to adhere to.
This preliminary report is just that, but maybe consider the issues the Indian AAIB have had to address in publishing it. They will have a similar concern to the pP mods, maybe more so since any apparent accusations directed at the pilots may lead to physical retribution.
I therefore conclude great care has been taken to "sanitise" what the AAIB know, or at least strongly suspect, (from EAFR) into the report. They have conspicuously failed to identify which of the pilots was each half of the conversation they have not repeated the exact words, there's a lot missing (was positive rate ever called, was rotate ever called, any discussion about putting FC back to Run, who/how flying aircraft meanwhile). As a result we, the reader, should step back and not over-interpret this sanitised report.

Secondly, given the mod statement above, if a criminal act is suspected by the AAIB, this will likely trigger all sorts of 'primacy' issues in the investigation i.e. police? AAIB? or joint? and all the history that involves (SAS Linate?) - in Europe we have 996-2010 Article 12 para 2, but India?

Summary : For good reason I believe this report has been very carefully worded, sanitised with great care, and as such easy to inappropriately speculate what went on.
DavidncRobson
July 12, 2025, 08:17:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920331
Timing of Query Re Cut Off Switches

Originally Posted by Abbas Ibn Firnas
From the report, there is no indicated time stamp identifying the point when one pilot asked the other "why did you cut off"
This could explain the the assumption that it took ten seconds to reverse the switch positions.
Cut off could have been noticed at any point later than 08:08:42 but before 08:08:52.
From my reading of the AAIB report, the delay in noticing the cut off switch position could not have been any later than 08:08:47 because the reference to the verbal exchange was written before the reference to the RAT deployment and I assume the written narrative follows the chronological sequence of events. The delay in resetting those fuel switches might therefore have been no more than 5 seconds. It is a pity that the pilot making the challenge didn't simply reset the switches to run instead of challenging the other pilot. I frequently tell people who blow their horns at pedestrians or other motorists that blowing the horn isn't going to help them avoid an accident and that what they really need to do in the limited time available to them is concentrate on applying the brakes and turning the steering wheel.
InTheHighlands
July 12, 2025, 10:32:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920467
SLF. But I've read in full both original threads and this thread.

The Preliminary Report is written in excellent English, so I think one should pay close attention to what it says.

One thing I noticed is that at the bottom of P4 NTSB are stated as "..participated in the investigation". However UK AAIB are only stated as "visited the site". My reading is that UK AAIB are not participating?

Another is that some items on the timescale are v precise, others much more vague.

A question :

If the fuel switches were moved to cutoff, for whatever reason, what exactly would each pilot see as an EICAS warning. I'm still unclear why one pilot asked the other why he cut off - actual observation of the action, or message.
za9ra22
July 12, 2025, 19:16:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920766
Originally Posted by Gupeg
I am not trying to be disrespectful, just put forward a different point of view, and you may well be right...
By all means, I have no problem with that at all. I merely offered a perspective based around experience of this kind of investigative work - though I have said previously that I have no experience directly of the AAIB in India, just the way large scale investigations have typically functioned historically in the UK.
jimtx
July 12, 2025, 19:53:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920787
Originally Posted by Shep69
I flew the 777. The 78 switches are of similar design. They must be positively lifted and then moved with a robust over center block preventing them from moving after being bumped by something or other. Nothing I can think of in the cockpit could hit them with enough force to break the over center lock. IIRC none of our fleet had the side guard. It takes a conscious act to move them. The stabilizer trim cutouts are completely different red guarded switches.
They don't have to be positively lifted if the detent rounded out due to wear or if the switch installed was one that the SAIB referenced with the locking feature disengaged. I can't discern a raised boss on the body of the left switch in Fig.13, page 10 of the AAIB report. I assume those switches have some internal over center locking mechanism also besides the spring on the lever that would not be needed if there was no detent. I do remember writing up a 767 switch a long time ago when the Captain noticed the detent was worn and he could shut down without lifting.
Sailvi767
July 12, 2025, 20:28:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920815
Originally Posted by jimtx
They don't have to be positively lifted if the detent rounded out due to wear or if the switch installed was one that the SAIB referenced with the locking feature disengaged. I can't discern a raised boss on the body of the left switch in Fig.13, page 10 of the AAIB report. I assume those switches have some internal over center locking mechanism also besides the spring on the lever that would not be needed if there was no detent. I do remember writing up a 767 switch a long time ago when the Captain noticed the detent was worn and he could shut down without lifting.
It’s very easy to tell if the switch is wearing or defective. It’s also the norm for everyone operating the switches to give them a tug to insure they are in the detents. It’s simply inconceivable that both switches failed in exactly the same way at almost exactly the same time and no pilot who flew the aircraft in the last year or so noticed the issues. Add to that the CVR statement and it’s beyond inconceivable.
On the other hand pilots deciding to end their lives in a spectacular fashion is not inconceivable. In fact over the last 25 years it may be the single most numerous reason for a catastrophic loss of a transport category aircraft operated at a major airline.
Diff Tail Shim
July 13, 2025, 00:04:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920948
The Indian AAIB are avoiding a German wings event I fear. Actually I was in a flight deck of a EJR today. Start / stop switches are so bloody obvious on the overhead as main switches. Guarded and easy to observe by all. Control switches that are not required as a normal action put away from hidden positions and visible to all. Embraer actually design systems logically. Speaking to a Captain today, he confirmed that if the the thrust levers of an EJR are beyond flight idle, engines cannot be shut down by then engine start/stop switches being turned off! You need to drag the thrust levers back to idle to shut them down. First thing I was taught as an airframe engineer converting to dual trade is that the fuel system of a airframe should not restrict an engine to receive fuel from a commanded input by the pilot. Throttle position should drive that logic. Not a lazy Boeing combined FADEC and SOV switch.
Alty7x7
July 13, 2025, 00:15:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920953
Throttle position and fuel control switch

Originally Posted by Diff Tail Shim
The Indian AAIB are avoiding a German wings event I fear. Actually I was in a flight deck of a EJR today. Start / stop switches are so bloody obvious on the overhead as main switches. Guarded and easy to observe by all. Control switches that are not required as a normal action put away from hidden positions and visible to all. Embraer actually design systems logically. Speaking to a Captain today, he confirmed that if the the thrust levers of an EJR are beyond flight idle, engines cannot be shut down by then engine start/stop switches being turned off! You need to drag the thrust levers back to idle to shut them down. First thing I was taught as an airframe engineer converting to dual trade is that the fuel system of a airframe should not restrict an engine to receive fuel from a commanded input by the pilot. Throttle position should drive that logic. Not a lazy Boeing combined FADEC and SOV switch.
FADEC processes the fuel control switches as well as the throttle resolvers directly. Both dual-channel, separate and separated circuits. Additional logic between the two would have to be foolproof. Sometimes simpler is better, even if human actions can defeat it. There is no plausible explanation or expectation for cutting both switches three seconds after liftoff.
fdr
July 13, 2025, 02:44:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11920995
Originally Posted by Seamless
Spoiler
 

I wouldn't put too much significance in the "01 second" since this still is close enough for an unintentional cause.

No matter what: The design and position of the fuel cut off switches is potentially prone for mishaps.
Originally Posted by blimey
Is 'transitioned' a standard AAIB phrase rather than 'selected', and would that have any reference to the physical position of the switch being recorded or just inferred?
The 1 second is consistent with the fuel control switch sampling rate. I wouldn't read too much into that, it is anywhere from simultaneous to 2 seconds within the sampling rate. (The sampling used to be 1Hz for that discrete). The FADEC will give better information on the exact time that the engines fuel was shut off.

There is one known inadvertent shutdown with this type of switch, on a B744, many years ago, when the Rosen visor fell from the upper sun visor rail when being relocated. That managed to turn off 1 fuel switch.

The report is quite comprehensive for an interim report, and it does not draw any conclusions as yet as to how or why the fuel control discrete is recorded as OFF, however, it is troubling. I would reserve opinion until there is a clear spectral analysis that shows the selection of the fuel switches off, and then back on.

As to the time to react, the crew in this case if unaware of the causation will have a fair recognition time to assimilate the information that is presented, and then to determine that the cause is the switches being off is going to take some time to process, discover the system status and respond, if that is what happened. I remain concerned with liquid ingress to the control system, giving a change in the sensed switch position rather than the selected position. That is looking like a long shot, but then this event is way outside of the normal box.


Gupeg
July 13, 2025, 12:59:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 11921303
Originally Posted by LTC8K6
Remember that engine 1 had actually relit and began to recover and engine 2 had also relit.
To me it's amazing that those big engines were able to do that in the time allotted.
I'm not sure it is amazing? All I read into the report's words is that the FCSs were turned on, I assume that this will see fuel flow to the combustion chambers and ignitors within 1s, and if the fuel ignites (why not?) EGT rises and the report records this as "relit".
The low airspeed airflow through engine and HP RPM on Eng 1 were sufficient to allow HP RPM to increase. The longer delay between Eng 2 OFF then ON allowed HP RPM to decay more than #1, and although 'relit', I read a successful (unassisted) spool up was unlikely? (i.e. a detailed unassisted relight envelope including current HP RPM and IAS would have #1 in the envelope and #2 outside).

Originally Posted by LTC8K6
Why would a suicidal pilot even allow the attempt to restart within 10 seconds?
As a wild guess, if he knew it would not succeed (and it true, was correct and recovery was not even close to being possible)

Originally Posted by LTC8K6
Why wouldn't he yell out the other pilot's name and ask "What are you doing?" for the CVR theater performance?
To be frank, we do not know he did not. The report has been (IMHO) carefully sanitised to remove any evidence indicating it was (or not) a suicide attempt, which pilot said what, when they said it, no indication these were the exact words, and no indication that there is not plenty more conversation available.

If we want to speculate in this area, one could ask (my best guess):
  1. Do the AAIB know who said "why" and who "I did not"? (Yes)
  2. Are they the exact words? (No) Or a 'summary'? (Yes)
  3. Were other words spoken by one of both pilots? (Yes)
  4. Do the AAIB know whether there were or were not other cockpit occupants? (Yes) Were there? (No - since to fail to mention it casts assertions on just 2 named individuals)
  5. Are the AAIB fairly certain of the root cause of this accident (Yes i.e. mechanical issue, unintentional HF, unlawful interference) If yes, have the AAIB deliberately sanitised this report to conceal both the root cause, and other information that would lead to uninformed speculation that does not further flight safety (Yes)