July 17, 2025, 14:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924438
Quite right. The NTSB upbraided, warned and sanctioned Boeing over unauthorized release of information (with a somewhat self-defensive spin) in the Alaska 1282 investigation just last year. .....
I'm sure that the WSJ believes that its sources are qualified and knowledgeable and that the sources probably believe what they are leaking, but it's a terrible and damaging practice in accident investigations, in this case serving no purpose other than clickbait taking advantage of public curiosity. And there really is nothing new in the "breaking news" story, at least nothing of substance.
I'm sure that the WSJ believes that its sources are qualified and knowledgeable and that the sources probably believe what they are leaking, but it's a terrible and damaging practice in accident investigations, in this case serving no purpose other than clickbait taking advantage of public curiosity. And there really is nothing new in the "breaking news" story, at least nothing of substance.
"An NTSB spokesman said Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight-data recorder.
Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was 'to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.'" (internal quotation as in original)
It's quite unlikely the NTSB spokesman would have said more than Chair Homendy had authorized. The content as to the scope of her review isn't the substantive part, but it does set the context for the quote from Ms. Homendy. Her statement refers to "quickly" making a determination about "immediate safety concerns." I read this as not referring only to the time after the Prelim Rpt was released, but all of NTSB's interactions with AAIB as of July 12.
We know no emergency (or other similar labels) ADs have been issued. Early on, when no such emergency ADs were issued, some people speculated that cover-up could be the reason why. And, recalling back to the first days as of July 12, there was wide recognition that a grounding order would have immense impact and consequences, given the widespread numbers in airline fleets.
But now, the Board Chair provides an attributable on-the-record statement about the need for immediacy, had there been an aircraft or engine problem. What I read as substantive is the confirmation from such an official source that no such problem has been shown to exist. Not a large segment of the "traveling public" let alone the public at large reads Accident Board reports, let alone preliminary editions. So in her giving an attributable statement, I read an intention to reach a wider and more general audience with the message, in effect, that the causal chain of this accident does not stem from an aircraft or engine problem implicating safety of flight.
July 17, 2025, 15:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924450
No that is not what I mean,
The faulty switch on same Boeing 737 aircraft is a red herring. It has nothing to do with the Boeing 787. This aircraft has a different type of switch (see partnumber). There is not a single issue ever reported. There was not a single issue found after the crash.
.
The faulty switch on same Boeing 737 aircraft is a red herring. It has nothing to do with the Boeing 787. This aircraft has a different type of switch (see partnumber). There is not a single issue ever reported. There was not a single issue found after the crash.
.
July 17, 2025, 15:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924460
Why would AAIB include that red herring in the prelim when they had the switches in their possession and included pics of them in the report? I have to admit that I took a bite of that herring and still have a nagging issue with myself not being able to see a dog on the lower part of the left switch. But I'm more inclined to think badly of the AAIB for including the herring.
To not detail the background would have been to omit a clearly pertinent fact which would have left others questioning the authority of the report for not covering it. The report itself then clearly states: "At this stage of investigation, there are no recommended actions to B787-8 and/or GE GEnx-1B engine operators and manufacturers." to ensure it is known that no defects were found at the time of the report being issued.
I suspect it is written as it is because at this point, there is no evidence the investigation can provide as to how the switches 'transitioned', let alone why.
July 17, 2025, 15:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924461
Why would AAIB include that red herring in the prelim when they had the switches in their possession and included pics of them in the report? I have to admit that I took a bite of that herring and still have a nagging issue with myself not being able to see a dog on the lower part of the left switch. But I'm more inclined to think badly of the AAIB for including the herring.
July 17, 2025, 16:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924511
It's the last sentence which prompts me to comment further. First, the relevant excerpt from the Journal item:
"An NTSB spokesman said Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight-data recorder.
Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was 'to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.'" (internal quotation as in original)
It's quite unlikely the NTSB spokesman would have said more than Chair Homendy had authorized. The content as to the scope of her review isn't the substantive part, but it does set the context for the quote from Ms. Homendy. Her statement refers to "quickly" making a determination about "immediate safety concerns." I read this as not referring only to the time after the Prelim Rpt was released, but all of NTSB's interactions with AAIB as of July 12.
We know no emergency (or other similar labels) ADs have been issued. Early on, when no such emergency ADs were issued, some people speculated that cover-up could be the reason why. And, recalling back to the first days as of July 12, there was wide recognition that a grounding order would have immense impact and consequences, given the widespread numbers in airline fleets.
But now, the Board Chair provides an attributable on-the-record statement about the need for immediacy, had there been an aircraft or engine problem. What I read as substantive is the confirmation from such an official source that no such problem has been shown to exist. Not a large segment of the "traveling public" let alone the public at large reads Accident Board reports, let alone preliminary editions. So in her giving an attributable statement, I read an intention to reach a wider and more general audience with the message, in effect, that the causal chain of this accident does not stem from an aircraft or engine problem implicating safety of flight.
"An NTSB spokesman said Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight-data recorder.
Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was 'to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.'" (internal quotation as in original)
It's quite unlikely the NTSB spokesman would have said more than Chair Homendy had authorized. The content as to the scope of her review isn't the substantive part, but it does set the context for the quote from Ms. Homendy. Her statement refers to "quickly" making a determination about "immediate safety concerns." I read this as not referring only to the time after the Prelim Rpt was released, but all of NTSB's interactions with AAIB as of July 12.
We know no emergency (or other similar labels) ADs have been issued. Early on, when no such emergency ADs were issued, some people speculated that cover-up could be the reason why. And, recalling back to the first days as of July 12, there was wide recognition that a grounding order would have immense impact and consequences, given the widespread numbers in airline fleets.
But now, the Board Chair provides an attributable on-the-record statement about the need for immediacy, had there been an aircraft or engine problem. What I read as substantive is the confirmation from such an official source that no such problem has been shown to exist. Not a large segment of the "traveling public" let alone the public at large reads Accident Board reports, let alone preliminary editions. So in her giving an attributable statement, I read an intention to reach a wider and more general audience with the message, in effect, that the causal chain of this accident does not stem from an aircraft or engine problem implicating safety of flight.
Contents of the flight\x92s cockpit voice recorders have been tightly held by Indian authorities and seen as key to helping fill out the sequence of events in the flight\x92s final moments.
Jennifer Homendy, chairwoman of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, has sought to listen to the recording herself , according to people familiar with the matter.
An NTSB spokesman said that Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight data recorder. Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was \x93to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.\x94
Jennifer Homendy, chairwoman of the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, has sought to listen to the recording herself , according to people familiar with the matter.
An NTSB spokesman said that Homendy has been fully briefed on all aspects of the Air India investigation, including the cockpit voice recording and details from the flight data recorder. Homendy said her goal in working with Indian authorities was \x93to quickly determine whether the crash presented any immediate safety concerns to the traveling public.\x94
Could you share a citation to the article (s) that include the Homendy statements to which you refer, please?
July 17, 2025, 17:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924527
The switches are crucial in the investigation. This is a crash with a lot of politics. See how India media is reporting. It is almost a India versus the West discussion. I guess the AAIB included the SAIB to keep all options open, keep parties involved in the investigation happy and prevent that the investigation could be seen as biased. Hence to use of words like ' transitioned'.
July 17, 2025, 21:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924692
It really baffles me how the French prosecutor was able to come out
just
two days
after the Germanwings 9525 crash
and lay out the likely cause in remarkable detail \x97 even identifying it as an apparent suicide by the co‑pilot. Yet here we are with the Air India 171 crash: it took the AAIB an entire month to release a so‑called \x93preliminary\x94 report, and even then it\x92s vague, incomplete and raises more questions than it answers.
To me, this is unacceptable. If the French could piece things together and be honest about it in 48 hours, the AAIB should have been able to do better than this.
To me, this is unacceptable. If the French could piece things together and be honest about it in 48 hours, the AAIB should have been able to do better than this.
Ok, so they put in the preliminary report that the captain intentionally turned both fuel switches to CUTOFF, causing the crash. The Captain and his family is vilified, criminal investigations are launched. Vengeful relatives of those killed in the crash attack - perhaps even kill - members of the captain's family.
Then it turns out that it's NOT what happened... The captain's reputation and his family have already been destroyed - irreparable damage has been done, and no amount of retractions and apologies for the mistake are going to correct that.
Is it really too much to ask that we allow the investigation team to verify and validate their information before we throw someone to the wolves?
July 17, 2025, 22:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924716
We are all of course (perhaps rather morbidly) fascinated and curious about this incident, and trying to reason out what happened with insufficient data - well, at least I am. And to be honest, I am not nearly as concerned about "throwing someone [dead] to the wolves" (to put it rather harshly) than if the pilots had survived and their reputations and livelihoods would be threatened - I have read about plenty of cases where surviving pilots were innocent, even heroic and masterful in their efforts to save life, yet at least in the beginning, were falsely pilloried for what happened.
The difficulty with waiting for the Final AAIB Report comes with the possibility of malicious action. I don't know anything about Indian law, but I would imagine that if this incident had happened in the US, it would already be part of a criminal inquiry (not to mention lawsuits), and not simply under the jurisdiction of the NTSB.
July 17, 2025, 23:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924759
Exceptions to confidentiality are not untypically 'home' country investigation boards, so AAIB members may feed back to AAIB seniors, NTSB to the NTSB chairperson for example, but it's really rare for it go further. Reporters on the other hand want to get paid, and that means selling stories.
So yes, I think we do know.
July 18, 2025, 03:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924808
Yea DAR, it's time for another break. It's been days since anything really new has been posted - just hamster wheel arguments of the same theories, and even stuff that I thought had been thoroughly discredited, dead, and buried has come back to life (e.g. TCMA and the fuel condition switches both unilaterally changing state).
If something new comes up - then either reopen or someone can start a new one.
If something new comes up - then either reopen or someone can start a new one.
Spoiler
Last edited by T28B; 18th July 2025 at 13:32 . Reason: rant placed in the spoiler
July 20, 2025, 18:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11925921
The full Flight Global article; those here who chose to put PPRuNe and themselves at risk of legal action by their accusations and emotive language may like to reflect and be more accurate in their contributions to this professional pilots forum in future.
US safety chief supports India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau in urging media to avoid ‘premature narratives’ about the 12 June disaster that killed 260 people
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash