Posts about: "ADSB" [Posts: 116 Pages: 6]

If TCMA cut fuel flow while still on the runway the aircraft would have been decelerating from the moment it lifted off, which is not what the ADS-B data indicates. The kinetic energy in the rotating parts of the engine wouldn't add much speed to the aircraft as the engines run down with no more energy being added via fuel.

No, they did not climb that high. Latest FR24 ADS-B report was indeed 625 ft, but that is based on 1013 (STD). With the local QNH being 1000, that 625ft becomes roughly 300ft MSL. Corrected for airport elevation, this is just above 100ft. The last recorded altitude of the aircraft was roughly 100ft AGL, which does not mean it didn\x92t climb a bit higher, but the aircraft reaching 400ft is pure speculation.

This is the best theory of TCMA activation so far, but it\x92s still very remote. In this theory there is no need for a TCMA anomaly, it needs only(!) two simultaneous engine anonalies (and sn improper crew action) that would trigger the TCMA as designed. If there are safeguards preventing this happening, they are not mentioned in this thread.

It also doesn\x92t explaine the ADS-B data showing acceleration after lift off.

Flightradar24 (I know, I know) has a short blog on the (very minimal) ADS-B data available. There's only around 4s of useful data available from 21ft o 71ft altitude (last packet received 0.8s later), But: it's odd seeing the speed DROPPING shortly after takeoff. Even if you calculate total energy (kinetic + potential) it's falling, i.e. the engines aren't producing thrust. (In fairness reported speed doesn't match my calculated speeds, but even with mine I don't see power). Also: if you assumed no thrust from 71ft AGL @ 172kt you'd reach 250ft at 160kt. Isn't that roughly where they ended up? Noisy data, but this suggests the engines stopped producing power almost as soon as the wheels left the ground. (If someone could download a CSV of another similar flight and send to me I can do a compare and contrast of Total Energy)

I'm reading a lot of the comments, speculation is something we all like, but some things just do not add up, even with a RAT deployed

if they had dual engine failure around 50 feet where you raise the gear, how can they still find the energy to climb, since they would be at VR/V2 speed (not V2+20 at that altitude, what VNAV would command after take off, especially with a take off weight of around 205/210 tons, the 787 wings are amazing but not miracles

if they had a normal departure, why did they not raise the gear, they had a positive rate since they were climbing and the speed according to ADS-B was a constant. if they were single engine ! this would have saved them with this weight and weather, one of the first things you learn when EFATO with a 787, raise the gear, your climb performance increases dramatically

Intersection take off can be ruled out:
if they did an intersection departure with they're genex 64-70K engines, they would have had a take off limited weight of around 172 tons, I estimate that they were close to 205/210 tons, (max zfw of around 161 tons and around 45/50 tons of fuel) even full length would have been a stress for the engines, with the prevailing weather conditions, they would have never made it, full length is already difficult.


When we see the video, the airplane is still climbing / flying straight and level (not losing altitude), yet we hear what we think might be the RAT, I can't imagine that they had the kinetic energy to do this with no engines. if they had dual engine failure, they would have been a brick, Hot and High, no thrust, flaps 5, zero chance.

flickering of lights etc. seen by the survivor and the loud bang heard, I would not trust pax observations, because of the things they had to go through, also and I've said this before, if it was a loud bang, where is the smoke and fire in the engines, or in the video, its not audible

lets see what the report will say, but it it could be a lot to swallow for some

I would take that with a pinch of salt.. Did a 'government official' say that, or is it an official announcement by the government? Big difference..
Additionally, ADS-B data and the triangulation of the video showing the takeoff would lead you to a different conclusion.

If you wanted to an analyse this further:
1. You might mathematically start at TE=0 at start of takeoff-roll, and treat drag as minimal until rotation.
2. Typically rotation will be to say 15deg nose up, but flight path will be much less (5deg? for heavy hot 787). Once that rotation is complete, aircraft will stop accelerating. Therefore engine thrust (energy gain) equals gain in PE - drag x time.
3. This might give a better insight into where energy gain/loss became unusual?

Looking at the raw data in your post, and given the speeds are likely IAS based i.e. can be affected by wind, I don't see the IAS loss as equating to dual engine failure i.e. zero thrust - but could be wrong. Once a heavy airliner gets to lift off the acceleration is reduced (drag) and the decays to zero as PE gain kicks in.

Ditto a time / distance to the crash site might give some energy info? Looks like the crash site is 50' (?) below the airfield (Google Earth will give more).

I think you are doing an interesting study on the absence of other info

What pilot action is positively ruled in and what pilot action is positively ruled out at this stage?

From the comfort of my couch, I would contend that this crew have had a condition that was extraordinary (in the full meaning of the word) and have acted in a timely and correct manner. There is nothing in the flight path other than the fact the aircraft isn't at a gate in London that indicates otherwise. The fact the aircraft is not sitting in London does not have any characteristic event in the available information to conclude other than through the general assumption that pilots always cause problems, and having done nearly half a century in flight safety investigation in the military and airlines, I would contend that on balance flight crew save aircraft far more often than they cause losses. "It takes a computer to really stuff up something..."


Not at all, the system including the OEM and Regulator have duty of care obligations that they tend to take seriously, mores than the public gives them credit for normally. In this case, the investigators have data that will shortly be sufficient to determine the immediate actions that would be necessary to mitigate risks to the public. My own opinion is that action is shortly coming, it doesn't need the EAFR, and it will cause its own political fall out.

The B735 crash event was evident from the first access to the ADSB data. The kinematics told the story, which is usually the case. In this case, the flight path is sufficiently clear to be of concern. Specifically, this event from a human-in-the-loop is a binary outcome. There is zero grey areas in the involvement of the flight crew, and I contend that there is no reason to consider their actions as being anything other than exemplary. If the area mic shows otherwise, I will amend my position, but right now, I have greater concerns with the continued operation of the B787. This event is an either/or, a binary event, like Kev Sullivan's QF072, and I fear we are seeing a similar family of causation. Kev's a former squadron mate and friend from the airline, and the pax were fortunate to have him on board that day.

The untidy truth related to this event is that either causation will have ramifications to the industry for the foreseeable future; there is nothing trivial about this event from a systems viewpoint, apart from the devastating loss to every person concerned in the tragedy. Not than many accidents are so consequential in their impact, this will be one of those.

I think this is as interesting a line of inquiry as I've seen recently. The problem is getting the data and theory close enough to be meaningful.

For instance, what about induced drag (admittedly much complicated, I imagine, by varying ground effect) once rotation begins? A comparison with another 787-8 flight from the same runway and under similar conditions (meteorological, load, etc.) might be ideal.

Are there not tools accessible to ordinary users for making detailed such simulations, rather than a back of the envelope calculation? I daresay Boeing has made such simulations already, and have a pretty good idea of whether and when thrust loss might have occurred.

Me thinks one cannot depend on ADS-B da6a at such low altitude. Lots of errors.

There is no reason to doubt the ADS-B data captured for this event. It was failure to understand it that led to erroneous assumptions (for example that the aircraft had taken off from an intersection).

IMO, I don't know if that is trustworthy - the FR24 ADSB data seems to show that the aircraft was at 21ft AGL between the 1500ft and 2000ft markers from the end of the runway.

https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/

I don't know if I'm allowed to post pictures - my last post with a picture didn't show up, so I'll try adding it separately from this one. It's basically an overlay of the FR24 blogpost map on a google maps satellite view of VAAH.

I was not aware that we have granular ADS-B data from the a/c itself showing airspeed post rotation (rather than speed interpolated from GPS). Apologies if I have missed it. If it does show acceleration after takeoff I tend to agree with you.

In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread:

If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground.

As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems.

Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not).

Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact.

In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms.

In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known.

Thank you to the mods for an excellent job.

Would moving the levers to idle during t/o not engage RTO? I.e. we would see spoilers deployed and maximum braking applied if that were the case?

Or are you suggesting the levers moved back but not exactly to idle for RTO to kick in?

The 787 in particular has a system that is fully automated for takeoff calculation. That includes Takeoff Distance, all relevant airspeeds, etc and uses combined sensor data to make pilot error in calculations exceedingly unlikely.

In addition the valid settings for takeoff flaps simply begin at 5\xb0, so anything less isn't even offered. The corresponding alarms will thus always trigger if you don't have at least 5\xb0 flaps set upon setting takeoff thrust, possibly requiring a higher setting depending on the calculated takeoff configuration. As mentioned before in this thread the loading of the accident aircraft should have been far below its maximums, so a 5\xb0 flaps takeoff is quite ordinary, and the aircraft left the runway well short of its end.

Also the aircraft used the entire runway after backtracking along it since there are no taxiways going that far. This information has been corrected by FR24 a while ago and stems from the incomplete GPS positional data that is inherent in ADS-B tracking, especially on the ground.

It's the elephant in the room regarding the audio, isn't it, but I am not prepared to say either way. There simply is too much city background noise/ambience to discern this from the engine noise from a landing 787.

Of course one taking off would have a different signature. If anyone can point point to one taking off with the rat out we could compare.

What I find interesting is that I don’t see any evidence in the audio of the engine spooling down, which would leave a recogniseable pattern in the audio one should think. So either it is down so much that the fan rpm is down to windmilling already, or it is simply low enough in volume to be already masked by the ambience.

So taking this and moving into speculative territory for a moment, I think I read somewhere that the video with audio starts 17 seconds after the wheels left the ground.

Provided the engines were windmilling the video audio since I haven't been able to find any obvious spool down, can anyone say anything meaningful on how long it takes for the engines to spool down to windmilling rpm?

we can then backtrack from the point the video starts. How does that timing then coincide with the ADS-B data ceasing to transmit, for instance?

Putting back in the more strictly data-driven hat, I am not prepared to say so far anything about the engine working or not. You guys know more anout why the rat is out.

I was not aware that we have granular ADS-B data from the a/c itself showing airspeed post rotation (rather than speed interpolated from GPS). Apologies if I have missed it. If it does show acceleration after takeoff I tend to agree with you.

In no particular order, here are some more thoughts on TCMA having caught up on the thread:

If you cut the fuel from two big engines at take-off power, there must be some delay before n2 decays below the threshold for generation (below idle n2), the generators disconnect and RAT deploys. GEnx have relatively long spool up/down times as the fan is so large (and would be exposed to 170+kts of ram air). Perhaps someone has a view on how long this would be, but I imagine it could easily be 10s or more between fuel cut off and RAT deployment. On AI171 the RAT appears to be already deployed at the beginning of the bystander video. That starts c. 13s before impact and around 17s after rotation. This does not prove anything except that the supposed shut down must have happened very close to rotation and could have happened just before rotation while the a/c was on the ground.

As a thought experiment, imagine if ANA985 in 2019 had decided to go around. The a/c rotates and is ~50 ft above the runway, suddenly both engines spooling down, very little runway left to land on and no reverse thrust available. I am struck by how similar this scenario is to AI171. This theory would require there to have been unexpected thrust lever movement in the moments before rotation - but plausibly one pilot moving to reject, followed by an overrule or change of heart - or even a simple human error such as the recent BA incident at LGW - could achieve this. This is perhaps more likely that any sensor fault that you would expect to only impact a single engine given the redundancy of systems.

Tdracer writes that a key requirement of TCMA is to identify an engine runaway in the event of an RTO, in order to allow the a/c to stop on the runway. This will have been tested extensively - it is a big leap to imagine a false activation could be triggered. It did happen on ANA985 but through a very unusual set of inputs including application of reverse (albeit this latter point may not be relevant if TCMA logic does not distinguish between the reverser being deployed or not).

Incidentally there is an assumption the TCMA software version in place on the ANA flight had already been patched and fixed on AI171. That probably is the case but I am not sure it is a known fact.

In summary I remain baffled by this tragic accident. I have not yet read anything that explicitly rules out TCMA activation and it remains a possibility due to the vanishingly small number of factors that could shut down two engines at apparently the exact same moment when they have fully redundant systems. Fuel contamination, for example, has typically impacted each engine a few minutes (at least) apart. I am also cautious (as others have pointed out) of a form of confirmation bias about Boeing software systems with four-letter acronyms.

In my mind the cause could equally well be something completely different to anything suggested on this thread, that will only become clear with more evidence. All of the above also incorporates a number of theories, i.e. that there was an engine shutdown - that are not conclusively known.

Thank you to the mods for an excellent job.

The 787 in particular has a system that is fully automated for takeoff calculation. That includes Takeoff Distance, all relevant airspeeds, etc and uses combined sensor data to make pilot error in calculations exceedingly unlikely.

In addition the valid settings for takeoff flaps simply begin at 5\xb0, so anything less isn't even offered. The corresponding alarms will thus always trigger if you don't have at least 5\xb0 flaps set upon setting takeoff thrust, possibly requiring a higher setting depending on the calculated takeoff configuration. As mentioned before in this thread the loading of the accident aircraft should have been far below its maximums, so a 5\xb0 flaps takeoff is quite ordinary, and the aircraft left the runway well short of its end.

Also the aircraft used the entire runway after backtracking along it since there are no taxiways going that far. This information has been corrected by FR24 a while ago and stems from the incomplete GPS positional data that is inherent in ADS-B tracking, especially on the ground.

Looking at the detailed ADS-B data released by FR24 and the June 10 AI171 data, I noticed that the two flights show the following data at similar points in the takeoff phase
Height :575ft
Speed :182kts
Even though it is impossible that the takeoff weight and outside air conditions are the same on the two flights, we guess that there was nothing wrong at this moment.

Agreed.
Also, I expect the airport would've sent a car out to check the runway for evidence. Since we agree that the engine failure occurred near rotation, and that rotation occured well inside the runway ( see e.g. fdr here , or the granular ADS-B data), that car would've encountered a bloody mess, and we'd all know about it by now.

The problem with these reports is that the Indian AAIB and DGCA websites ( aaib.gov.in www.dgca.gov.in ) are mute on the subject of this crash, so even the DGCA inspection mandate quoted above is shakily sourced. On Friday, AvHerald had already updated with "On Jun 13th 2025 the DGCA reported, that initial preliminary findings rule out a bird strike as no bird carcasses have been found." I searched for a source for this, and found an "exclusive" which read, "The initial probe report of the Ahmedabad Air India crash, accessed by CNN-News18, reveals key findings from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation\x92s assessment led by the director of security." Other media simply quoted News18. There are two reasons to be skeptical here:
\x95 first, we have seen fake reports circulating;
\x95 secondly, News18 rates badly on mediabiasfactcheck.com: "Launched in 2005, CNN-News18 (formerly CNN-IBN) is an English-language Indian news television channel based in India. We also rate them Questionable based on a poor fact-checking record with numerous false claims."
That leads me to consider that this "exclusive" might be sloppy reporting based on a fake\x97I have no way to know whether it is legitimate or not.

At this point, I feel we can only rely on information being official if it's published through an official website, or if there's independent reporting or a video clip from an official press briefing.

I do believe the accident was not caused by an animal strike, for many reasons.
But I wouldn't believe it based on unsourced reporting alone.