Posts about: "APU" [Posts: 151 Pages: 8]

KSINGH
July 11, 2025, 20:40:00 GMT
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Post: 11919771
- fuel cut offs were found in the RUN position

- on take off roll both engines lost power as the fuel cut offs went from RUN to cutoff

- CVR recorded one pilot asking why they had gone to CUTOFF

- within 10 seconds the fuel cutoff was moved back to RUN

-RAT was deployed, APU had begun auto start

- 32 seconds after Vr the MAYDAY was called



This should also dispel a lot of the comments about AAIB-India, Indian culture in general and general competence. For a preliminary report this is far more thorough and extensive than what would normally be expected and they\x92ve kept Boeing, GE, FAA and investigators from US, UK, Canada and Portugal in the loop from the start



They have also clarified why it took so long to do the EAFR download- because of the extensive damage they had to source specialist equipment from the NTSB that only arrived on the 23rd of June (they downloaded on the 24th) so all that talk of a \x91coverup\x92 is pretty embarrassing now

of course the big question is why/how those switches were commanded into cutoff in the first place the exact sequence at Vr is the most critical, there hasn\x92t been much scrutiny at all that I can see in the Indian/international media of the personal
background of the flight deck crew which has happened in other suspected pilot initiated disasters in the past, I guess this is an avenue investigators will have been doing themselves
Engineless
July 11, 2025, 20:40:00 GMT
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Post: 11919772
The aircraft achieved the maximum recorded airspeed of 180 Knots IAS at about 08:08:42
UTC and immediately thereafter, the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned
from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1
and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut
off.
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The CCTV footage obtained from the airport showed Ram Air Turbine (RAT) getting deployed
during the initial climb immediately after lift-off (fig. 15). No significant bird activity is observed
in the vicinity of the flight path. The aircraft started to lose altitude before crossing the airport
perimeter wall.

As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC

As per the EAFR data both engines N2 values passed below minimum idle speed, and the
RAT hydraulic pump began supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47 UTC.
RAT in extended position
15
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about
08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with
the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also
transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to
RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC)
automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction.
The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1’s core
deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to
relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to
increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11
UTC
At about 08:09:05 UTC, one of the pilots transmitted “MAYDAY MAYDAY MAYDAY”.
What the hell happened in the cockpit?

08:08:42 Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position.
One of the pilots asks the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
08:08:52 Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN
08:08:56 Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN

Who (or what?) operated the cutoff switches?

Last edited by Engineless; 11th July 2025 at 20:53 .
9 lives
July 11, 2025, 22:02:00 GMT
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Post: 11919869
The report includes:

. The APU air inlet door (fig. 10), which was intact, was found open.
Was the door open? Or partly open?




Was the APU inlet door screwjack opening operation interrupted - at the point of the crash? Timing the jackscrew time to operate )closed to open) would give an idea of when its automated operation began. The APU self starting becomes a time stamp of other electrical events during the pre crash sequence. Page 15 touches on this, and I think there's more to it...


The normally full open door looks more open to me than the accident airplane's apparent partly open APU door.

Musician
July 11, 2025, 22:09:00 GMT
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Post: 11919886
Seconds count:
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN. When fuel control switches are moved from CUTOFF to RUN while the aircraft is inflight, each engines full authority dual engine control (FADEC) automatically manages a relight and thrust recovery sequence of ignition and fuel introduction. The EGT was observed to be rising for both engines indicating relight. Engine 1's core deceleration stopped, reversed and started to progress to recovery. Engine 2 was able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery. The EAFR recording stopped at 08:09:11 UTC.
That was with 10 seconds delay vs. 13 seconds for engine 2.

Time was spent with the verbal exchange, and then perhaps each pilot expected the other to put the switch back?

Anyway, the preliminary report also establishes that the aircraft had only 3-4 seconds of powered flight. (Would the gear lever be operated that early?) Everyone who saw that from the CCTV video, pat yourselves on the back.

Mayday call, dual engine failure, RAT deployment all confirmed.
TCMA was a red herring, the aircraft was firmly in air mode as the accident unfolded, and the thrust levers were at takeoff thrust the whole time.
unmanned_droid
July 11, 2025, 22:11:00 GMT
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Post: 11919887
Originally Posted by 9 lives
The report includes:



Was the door open? Or partly open?




Was the APU inlet door screwjack opening operation interrupted - at the point of the crash? Timing the jackscrew time to operate )closed to open) would give an idea of when its automated operation began. The APU self starting becomes a time stamp of other electrical events during the pre crash sequence. Page 15 touches on this, and I think there's more to it...


The normally full open door looks more open to me than the accident airplane's apparent partly open APU door.
Is normal on the ground sitting still the same as normal in flight at 180 knots?
Diff Tail Shim
July 11, 2025, 22:40:00 GMT
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Post: 11919931
Originally Posted by ROCCO SIFFREDI
Theoretical possible if something was spilled over the pedestal and caused a short but still unlikely
Switches reset to run and engines restarted on APU is in the report? Just didn't have the height to regain speed.
exBng Pilot
July 11, 2025, 23:14:00 GMT
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Post: 11919977
The report states that "the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec" . It doesn't say at the start of the paragraph but if following from the previous paragraph then this information is sensed from the data recorder.

Again, from the report "As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. The APU Inlet Door began opening at about 08:08:54 UTC, consistent with the APU Auto Start logic. Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN.". Again this is sensed from the data recorder.

I would be interested to know whether sounds consistent with the actual fuel control switch being moved have been picked up on the voice recorder.
9 lives
July 11, 2025, 23:25:00 GMT
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Post: 11919990
There is mention of fire damage or thermal damage to the centre pedestal, perhaps enough to identify the position of the switches but not to be able to determine their internal physical state relating to the detent mechanisms.
The photo of the engine switches in the report shows the toggle of both switches pretty clearly, with the caps burned off (to be expected, has zero effect on function, nor detent locking). The fact that the toggles and lower mechanism of each switch appears in the photo is pretty conclusive (a) to the position of the switches at the time of crash, and (b) that the locking detent function of the switch was functional as intended. I've worked with these switches for decades, and they are very robust. Their lesser cousin design, which also has a center detent lock position (double throw) are less robust that these (single throw) switches, and they last well too. Though I have seen them worn, I have never seen the locking function worn to the point of not functioning as a lock. And these switches would be too new to have experienced wear/damage to that point.

For myself, I have total confidence that the switches functioned as intended. Obviously they commanded the fuel valve as intended, and can be seen intact (other than the plastic caps), and in the run position, so it is safe to conclude that a mechanical/electrical fault of both independent switches at the same moment is unlikely in the extreme. The FDR data states that they were moved to "off" position, which caused the engine shutdown, then returned to "run", so they obviously were mechanically and electrically functional.

The automatic deployment of the RAT is an indicator of the airplane systems sensing an engine shutdown, as is the APU autostart. Pax 11A mentioned the green cabin lights, which, if I understand correctly is an indication of a complete electrical generation failure.The time of all these events can be plotted from recorded data, which I expect we'll see in a full report later. In the mean time, it all makes unfortunate sense.
physicus
July 12, 2025, 00:08:00 GMT
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Post: 11920029
Timeline of known events with source attribution from the preliminary report:

08:07:33 ATC: Takeoff clearance
08:07:37 A-SMGCS: Aircraft starts rolling
08:08:33 EAFR: V1 153kts
08:08:35 EAFR: Vr 155kts
08:08:39 EAFR: Gnd-Air mode transition
08:08:42 EAFR: Max IAS 180kts, Eng 1/2 Cutoff switches activate within 1 second of each other
08:08:42 CVR: "Why did you cut off", "I did not" (exact time not specified)
08:08:42 A-SMGCS: RAT deployed (exact time not specified)
08:08:47 EAFR: Both engine N2 below min idle. RAT hyd pwr commences
08:08:52 EAFR: Eng 1 cutoff to RUN
08:08:54 EAFR: APU inlet door opens (auto start logic)
08:08:56 EAFR: Eng 2 cutoff to RUN
08:09:05 ATC: Mayday call
08:09:11 EAFR recording stops

Fuel cutoff switches operated within 1 second of each other suggests to me that the locking mechanism wasn't working as per (SAIB) No. NM-18-33. Any loose item could have accidentally (or not) operated the switches (including hands).

Last edited by physicus; 12th July 2025 at 00:24 .
BrogulT
July 12, 2025, 00:16:00 GMT
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Post: 11920034
Originally Posted by medod
I imagine that what happened with engine 2 ("able to relight but could not arrest core speed deceleration and re-introduced fuel repeatedly to increase core speed acceleration and recovery") will be a major part of the investigation.
It won't be an issue, the cause is simply that they were below the airspeed needed for a successful airstart, the engine had spooled down too far to recover without being cranked and there was no power available from the APU yet. As far as knowing how long they were from #1 providing meaningful thrust, you'd need to have a lot more data to know. Another 30 seconds probably would have helped a lot.
Pilot DAR
July 12, 2025, 00:50:00 GMT
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Post: 11920045
08:08:52 EAFR: Eng 1 cutoff to RUN
08:08:54 EAFR: APU inlet door opens (auto start logic)
08:08:56 EAFR: Eng 2 cutoff to RUN
08:09:05 ATC: Mayday call
If I recall correctly, the Mayday call was wording to the effect "thrust not achieved". That sounds like a phrase which could be expected from a pilot who had just frantically tried to restart an engine, and realized that it was not a success, and there would not be an opportunity for another attempt. The pilot aviated, (forget navigation), then communicated - over a period of 13 seconds.
appruser
July 12, 2025, 01:28:00 GMT
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Post: 11920070
Can someone with the engineering knowledge build a timeline/timeframe for fuel cutoff switch RUN to CUTOFF -> fuel stops -> engine flameout -> N2 drops to ? -> VFSGs quit -> RAT deployment starts -> RAT full power -> APU deployment start?
Does the RAT really start providing power in 4 seconds from the E2 fuel cutoff switch RUN -> CUTOFF?


Timeline from AAIB and the public CCTV video:

08:08:33 v1 153 kts
.
08:08:35 vr 155 kts
.
.
.
08:08:39 Liftoff, A/G Air Mode, rotation at 00:18 in public CCTV video
.
.
08:08:42 E1 Fuel Cutoff Switch RUN -> CUTOFF, 180 kts
08:08:43 E2 Fuel Cutoff Switch RUN -> CUTOFF
.............? N1 N2 begin to decrease
.............? "Why did you cutoff", "I didn't"
.............? Airport CCTV shows RAT
.............? N2 < idle speed
08:08:47 RAT hydraulic power
.
08:08:49 Public CCTV video: visible loss of thrust, Alt < 200ft using wingspan
.
.
08:08:52 E1 Fuel Cutoff Switch CUTOFF -> RUN, CCTV video: visible descent
.
08:08:54 APU inlet door begins opening
.
08:08:56 E2 Fuel Cutoff Switch CUTOFF -> RUN
08:09:05 MAYDAY
08:09:11 EAFR Recording stops
08:14:44 Crash Fire Tender leaves airport

Last edited by appruser; 12th July 2025 at 01:29 . Reason: readability
sorvad
July 12, 2025, 07:42:00 GMT
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Post: 11920296
Originally Posted by physicus
Timeline of known events with source attribution from the preliminary report:

08:07:33 ATC: Takeoff clearance
08:07:37 A-SMGCS: Aircraft starts rolling
08:08:33 EAFR: V1 153kts
08:08:35 EAFR: Vr 155kts
08:08:39 EAFR: Gnd-Air mode transition
08:08:42 EAFR: Max IAS 180kts, Eng 1/2 Cutoff switches activate within 1 second of each other
08:08:42 CVR: "Why did you cut off", "I did not" (exact time not specified)
08:08:42 A-SMGCS: RAT deployed (exact time not specified)
08:08:47 EAFR: Both engine N2 below min idle. RAT hyd pwr commences
08:08:52 EAFR: Eng 1 cutoff to RUN
08:08:54 EAFR: APU inlet door opens (auto start logic)
08:08:56 EAFR: Eng 2 cutoff to RUN
08:09:05 ATC: Mayday call
08:09:11 EAFR recording stops

Fuel cutoff switches operated within 1 second of each other suggests to me that the locking mechanism wasn't working as per (SAIB) No. NM-18-33. Any loose item could have accidentally (or not) operated the switches (including hands).
Really? It suggests to me and I would imagine the vast majority of us who have flown modern Boeings that they were physically moved, by one of the crew, one at a time, the question is why.

Last edited by sorvad; 12th July 2025 at 08:03 . Reason: Clarification
atakacs
July 12, 2025, 09:56:00 GMT
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Post: 11920444
Believe I have read through all messages in this thread and the interim report twice.

Few points I have not seen mentioned / discussed:
  • At no point was gear up commanded (and obviously initiated) ? Did we have a PRC call out ? Assuming they would have commanded gear up does the RAT (plus APU that was also powering up) produce enough hydraulics to perform it ? Assuming so, one might thing it would have given them those few extra seconds they needed for the engine to actually start pushing for real.
  • From the satellite pictures and impact points it would seem they could have, by deviating slightly left or right, ended up into a forest / vegetation vs a building. Obviously a very easy call in hindsight but I guess worth mentioning.
vilas
July 12, 2025, 10:04:00 GMT
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Post: 11920450
Originally Posted by atakacs
Believe I have read through all messages in this thread and the interim report twice.

Few points I have not seen mentioned / discussed:
  • At no point was gear up commanded (and obviously initiated) ? Did we have a PRC call out ? Assuming they would have commanded gear up does the RAT (plus APU that was also powering up) produce enough hydraulics to perform it ? Assuming so, one might thing it would have given them those few extra seconds they needed for the engine to actually start pushing for real.
  • From the satellite pictures and impact points it would seem they could have, by deviating slightly left or right, ended up into a forest / vegetation vs a building. Obviously a very easy call in hindsight but I guess worth mentioning.
RAT doesn't help retracting the gear. Full conversation hasn't come out. First thing should have been positive rate but it appears engines started winding down as they got airborne so attention shifted to engines.
nachtmusak
July 12, 2025, 10:43:00 GMT
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Post: 11920474
SLF: I have a small observation but I'm not sure what it means or if it has any relevance to the accident.

Previously I had assumed that the ADS-B data cut out at the same time as power was lost, so I imagined that whatever caused the fairly clear loss of thrust would have happened not too long before. But this report throws a bit of a wrench in my understanding of that.

According to the report, the fuel cutoff switches transition from RUN to CUTOFF at or very shortly after 08:08:42 UTC. Both engines' N2 values pass below minimum idle speed and the RAT begins supplying hydraulic power at about 08:08:47. Does this not imply that the generators have already been lost? With the APU also being off (the APU inlet door is noted to start opening at 08:08:54), I would have expected ADS-B data to cut out at or before 08:08:47. But curiously FlightRadar24 at least claims to have received data frames from the aircraft until 08:08:51.640970, almost five seconds later and almost ten seconds after the transition to CUTOFF (though the last frame containing coordinates comes at 08:08:50.871005).

Could anyone with relevant experience confirm how long it would take for AC power to be lost in this situation? Also, is it usual/unusual for a preliminary report like this to mention if/when the flight recorder switched to its independent power supply? I imagine it would definitely be in the final report, but I'd hoped it would be easily observable enough to be in this one.

Beyond idle curiosity I'm asking because the report also says the no. 1 engine's cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at "about 08:08:52", which oddly coincides with the last ADS-B data frame at 08:08:51.640970, and that seems important somehow. Or more likely I'm just ignorant of some quirk of the 787's electrical system.

For reference FR24's CSV containing all ADS-B frames supposedly received from the aircraft can be found in their post here: https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/
ajd1
July 12, 2025, 18:54:00 GMT
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Post: 11920748
Couple of things.
If the red stab trim guards are closed, the switches are in the correct position.
After a 78 dual eng failure the RHS instruments return after the APU comes on line and even then it\x92s slowish as all the previous load-shedding gets reversed.
There would have been no time anyway.
KSINGH
July 12, 2025, 19:32:00 GMT
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Post: 11920776
Originally Posted by ajd1
Couple of things.
If the red stab trim guards are closed, the switches are in the correct position.
After a 78 dual eng failure the RHS instruments return after the APU comes on line and even then it\x92s slowish as all the previous load-shedding gets reversed.
There would have been no time anyway.

I feel foolish for not having considered this part of it

of course when both engines spool down they\x92ll be left in the Boeing equivalent of EMER ELEC, I can\x92t say I know but I would assume this episode take out everything in front of the FO who was PF at the time, the RAT would\x92ve taken time to come online

it would\x92ve been a truly startling event, I wonder if that is when the FO went \x91heads inside\x92 and saw the position of the cut offs or cycled them?
GroundedSpanner
July 12, 2025, 20:09:00 GMT
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Post: 11920799
Question - For those of you with good simulator access.

What - Exactly - are the Flight Deck Effects that would be seen (and in what order?) in the scenario that PM Operated #1 then #2 to cutoff, whilst in flight with APU not running?
e.g. - What screens would blank? for how long? Master Caution? EICAS Messages? Chimes/Aural Alerts?

Intent behind this question is, If PF Does not see the switches operated, what reasonably is the amount of time it would take to look at those switches? Where is the attention initially directed?
tdracer
July 12, 2025, 20:23:00 GMT
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Post: 11920812
Originally Posted by GroundedSpanner
Question - For those of you with good simulator access.

What - Exactly - are the Flight Deck Effects that would be seen (and in what order?) in the scenario that PM Operated #1 then #2 to cutoff, whilst in flight with APU not running?
e.g. - What screens would blank? for how long? Master Caution? EICAS Messages? Chimes/Aural Alerts?

Intent behind this question is, If PF Does not see the switches operated, what reasonably is the amount of time it would take to look at those switches? Where is the attention initially directed?
No simulator access, but I do know this much:

One EICAS and one PFD is on the battery (most likely the left seat PFD) - they might momentarily flicker but will not 'blank'.

You get an EICAS message when you set the fuel switch to CUTOFF - something like "ENGINE X CUTOFF" (not sure of the 787 wording, but it would be something to that effect.

While I doubt the PF would be actively monitoring EICAS during TO, with the sudden audio change to the engine noise as well as the sudden loss of acceleration, I'd expect him to take a quick look at EICAS to see what the ( ) the engines are doing. Plus, if the PF was in the right seat and his PFD blanked - I'd expect him to look across to see what's on either the standby or the left seat PFC, and perhaps EICAS.