Posts about: "Authority Gradient" [Posts: 9 Pages: 1]

I think most line pilots, upon noticing that the fuel levers were in cutoff right after rotation, would immediately turn them back on. I don't think it would take 10 seconds--or even 5--to get that handled as I imagine most professional pilots would quickly grasp the seriousness of the problem. The only explanation I can think of for even that short delay--one that may have made a big difference--is the authority gradient between Captain and FO. But the preliminary report doesn't give us the level of detail we'd all like to have so it probably isn't possible to 100% support any specific conclusion just yet.

What a relief and about time for PPRUNE commenters to become just a tad more serious. Technical issues bla bla bla for thousands of comments and no mention of the most important factor in modern aviation - human errors. Because that is tabu. The preliminary accidentreport is so clear that we cannot avoid discussing it. I know most here are not professional pilots here as the mods have mentioned and many of those who are - are probably children of the magenta line, but there are also serious aviators here and they know. The fact is that most accidents today are caused by mismanagement of the cockpit and by pilots who do not know how to fly an aircraft outside of the dailyday routines because they were sent from scratch direct into a modern airliner. And it is only going to be worse. We should be brave enough to discuss this - also from the beginning of discussions of an accident. Human factors, cultural factors, authority gradient, startling factors and many other. These matters are the cause for a much higher percentage of accidents than before - because technical issues have become scarse and flying has become much more safe. Keep going...

Trying to read it all, don't think I saw this coming by

How would the (steep) authority gradient impact the sequence of critical events and associated timing?
Wouldn't the sequence of actions + timings be substantially different, depending on the critical mistake being discovered by the:

PIC/PM = instant recovery action (incl. expletives), assessing recovery, .... only then questioning FO's actions
FO = questioning PIC's actions.... assess response for a few seconds (physical/mental state).... only if clearly unsatisfactory, initiate critical recovery actions

For me the 2nd scenario it what matches best with the facts being presented.

Yeah, that's a part of the CM piece I am still puzzling over: authority gradient.

The released FDR data is quite detailed. Enough to answer what, when & how beyond all reasonable doubt

The released CVR data is conspicuously less detailed.Herein lies who & maybe why

The next phase of the investigation may need to be led by other investigative bodies.

Authority gradients likely significant

Did Captain cut fuel, get challenged by FO, and then fuel turned back on too late?

Or did Captain cut fuel, accuse FO to get it on the record, and then fuel turned back on too late?

If FO cut fuel, would expect a more assertive comment and faster intervention.

Don't underestimate the strength of the authority gradient.

If - hypothetically - it was the PF who noticed the switches had been pulled and who then asked the question, he may have been reluctant to challenge a senior and more experienced colleague in such an assertive manner.

787 has RDC's - Remote Data Concentrators. Doing the same function. Two of the switch pole-sets go each to one of 2 different RDC's, that feed the EAFR's / QAR, and the common core network so that any system that wants to know, can. The wiring is positive voltage from the RDC's to the switch and to GND through the common pin. So the RDC's would be able to detect anomalies such as both contacts open, or both contacts closed. The EAFR will see two independent channels per switch.
The other 2 contact sets feed latching relays (again driven each coil independently by dropping to GND at the switch) that then drive spar valves and reset signals to the FADEC Channels. (and more).

So - for the benefit of those that hang on to the 'possibility' of electrical gremlins and 'ghost' switch signals.

Each switch has 4 mechanically separated 'channels' - 2 of which do electromechanical things to the engines through separate paths, the other 2 feed through independent paths the FDR and the rest of the computer systems. The results of the electromechanical actions also feed back to the FDR.

Thus the readout from the EAFR will PROVE that the switches MUST have been PHYSICALLY MOVED.

And - I'm nervous to challenge you tdracer - there's quite the authority gradient and I know I'm at the bottom end, but I can't let this fly...
Its 'Deefer Doo'. Fight me.

No easy answers.

People are understandably circumspect about disclosing medical issues to life insurers, travel insurers, employers, the authority issuing their driving licence... The oft-quoted solution is to quarantine whatever is disclosed to AVMED. Then again, if the physician treating Lubitz had reported his poor state of mental health, Germanwings may have been prevented. The distinction between confidentially and reporting due to an "overriding public interest" is a broad and fuzzy grey zone - not a sharp dividing line. Damned if you report, and damned if you don't.

The reality is we are poor at assessing mental health and the risk of suicide at the individual level. There are a number of risk assessment tools - the fact there are a number of these tools tells you that none of them are particularly accurate. .

The data however is absolutely rock solid at a population level. The demographics that are relevant to aviation are
1. Males are higher risk than females
2. Older males are higher risk than younger males - and here the flight deck authority gradient is important, CRM notwithstanding
3. Males utilise more violent means to suicide - and are more likely to take others with them.
Several recent deliberate crashes reflect these demographics - SilkAir, MH370, and (I believe) this crash. Germanwings was obviously an exception.

One additional risk factor for pilots (and physicians and other authority figures) is they are used to mostly getting their way. When broader life doesn't go their way, it can be very tough and unfamiliar..

I find that statement problematic. I have my own reasons to be skeptical of the field, mostly because of its continued lagging behind the evidence on neurodivergence. But the tools used for suicide risk assessment are surprisingly solid at this point. Of course application of those tools is where it usually falls flat. There are specific and proven tests for assessing general depression and its severity as well as specific and proven tests for assessing suicide risk. Nothing is ever certain in this field, especially since the veracity of any kind of self reporting is basically impossible to determine, but for cooperating individuals as well as for certain types of masking we have tools that are very accurate if applied correctly.
The issue in the context of Aviation is the stigmatization and risk of job loss...

We have to be a bit more careful with wording here. Prevalence of Major Depression is roughly twice as common in women than in men. [1] While it is correct that more men than women commit suicide, depending on what study you prefer somewhere between 2 and 4 times as many, the number of attempts however is skewed in the other direction with more women attempting suicide than men by a similar margin. [2] The difference is commonly attributed to the utilization of different means.
Notably, and as I wrote earlier, the prevalence of depression in pilots does _not_ show a significant difference between women and men, with female pilots even having a lower prevalence for moderate depression as measured in the aforementioned study. Same disclaimer applies obviously: The utilized PHQ-9 test is not useful for the assessment of suicide risk. It is however very reliable in detecting and gauging severity of depression or conditions presenting with similar symptoms. This is strongly indicative of an anomaly and needs to be examined. My personal suspicion would be the misattribution of a stress related condition like Burnout to depression. Note that Occupational Burnout also comes with the potential for suicidal thoughts but has a much lower actual suicide risk. [3]

The number of pilot suicides is thankfully far too small to be useful for any kind of statistical analysis. I have no idea why you would exclude the only actually confirmed pilot suicide where we have a psychotherapists treatment data as evidence. The evidence for MH370 is entirely circumstantial and treating it as a confirmed pilot suicide is very unhelpful for a discussion based on facts. The SilkAir incident classification by the NTSB is similarly based on circumstantial evidence exclusively. Without personally analyzing either report and reinspecting the evidence I again find it unhelpful to simply treat it as confirmed.

That being said, I fail to see the similarities of either case and the Air India accident. All known pilot suicides and all suspected ones happened in cruise, not during takeoff. All known or suspected cases have some kind of evidence of one or more causal psychological events (notably not with MH370). And that is evidence as opposed to company rumor mills. Evidence that is notably absent in any way shape or form in this instance. In case of the Germanwings accident the police was investigating the murder-suicide and informed the public within a week of the accident.

In the case of MH370 there is a single notable similarity: The theory of pilot suicide is being thrown around despite the complete absence of hard evidence towards a mental crisis. There is highly circumstantial evidence based on supposedly reconstructed "waypoints" that are very roughly similar to the theorized course the airplane may have taken. A theorized course on which we have continued to not actually find the wreckage. And even that circumstantial evidence is entirely absent here. The best explanation for the known facts in the Air India case would be human error.