July 14, 2025, 12:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922137
We wouldn't have the video for MH370 even if a camera was installed, so, no, it wouldn't.
Does it make sense to have the data stored only on the plane, and then flown to the scene of the crash? Once crashed, the data may never be found (MH370 thus far), may take years to find (AF447), or may be found to be damaged / compromised.
July 14, 2025, 12:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922149
I suspect the other push will be for some streaming to a ground station. CVR / FDR have served us well. But the world and technology have both moved on a lot these last 70 years.
Does it make sense to have the data stored only on the plane, and then flown to the scene of the crash? Once crashed, the data may never be found (MH370 thus far), may take years to find (AF447), or may be found to be damaged / compromised.
Does it make sense to have the data stored only on the plane, and then flown to the scene of the crash? Once crashed, the data may never be found (MH370 thus far), may take years to find (AF447), or may be found to be damaged / compromised.
July 14, 2025, 12:35:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922163
You seem to be advocating a "pilot proof" recording and streaming system in real time? Whilst possible, it is a big step from today, and even if the regulators / airlines / unions agreed, it would be a long time before all aircraft flying were fitted.
The current systems are designed for accident investigations, not unlawful interference by pilots. The cockpit door again is designed for unlawful interference by others than the crew (including cabin crew), and despite Germanwings and maybe MH370 (where the door was used by the crew unlawfully enabling the accident), no changes have (to my knowledge) been proposed.
July 14, 2025, 12:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922173
Sorry - disagree. Even with FDRs and CVRs, pilots are ultimately controlling the aircraft, including power to the CVR/FDR etc (and CVR erase).
You seem to be advocating a "pilot proof" recording and streaming system in real time? Whilst possible, it is a big step from today, and even if the regulators / airlines / unions agreed, it would be a long time before all aircraft flying were fitted.
You seem to be advocating a "pilot proof" recording and streaming system in real time? Whilst possible, it is a big step from today, and even if the regulators / airlines / unions agreed, it would be a long time before all aircraft flying were fitted.
The current systems are designed for accident investigations, not unlawful interference by pilots.
The cockpit door again is designed for unlawful interference by others than the crew (including cabin crew), and despite Germanwings and maybe MH370 (where the door was used by the crew unlawfully enabling the accident), no changes have (to my knowledge) been proposed.
The earliest threats to commercial aviation were hijackers and bombs and guns. Countered by airport security and scanners and chemical sniffers.
The next threat was 9/11 with unauthorised access to flight deck. Countered by impregnable doors - which has been exploited twice.
The current threat is the authorised pilots operating behind an impregnable door. Does anyone really think the industry is going to simply say "that's bad, but there is nothing we can do about it"
July 14, 2025, 18:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922428
I think anyone still positioning a possibility other than physical movement of the switches at this point needs to bear in mind the following.
- The investigators and authors of the preliminary report clearly have more information than has been released in that report, a lot more. This includes, as per the report, the full recorded audio of the flight.
- With that additional information comes a greater ability to rule in or out certain possibilities, if we presume competence (which we clearly should).
- With all of that additional information and knowledge, *all* of the involved parties have explicitly stated there are no recommended actions regarding the airplane. This would be a pretty low threshold to issue even a precautionary advisory to check x,y,z if it was still deemed a possible cause.
It is reasonable to say, I would say, that the investigators have largely ruled out the switches themselves or the electronics around them as a cause here. They are as aware as anyone on this forum of previous SAIB relating to these switches, and explicitly reference them in the report, and haven't even taken the incredibly easy step of "re-suggesting" this. This is telling and should be very carefully considered before further suggestions in this direction.
I'd then suggest that everyone else also bears in mind the following. The investigators, with the information they have, have decided not to share some of that information. In my view, there are two likely reasons for this (combined):
1. They do not believe that releasing that information provides any additional safety benefit at this time *to other aircraft*.
2. The likely cause (or options of likely causes) demands exhaustive investigation to further check what the investigation is pointing to to date, and be positive of the cause to the highest possible threshold before even implying it. It may be frustrating that this leaves ambiguity, but this ambiguity is likely both intentional and necessary.
In my mind, this alone (but especially when taken in conjunction with other evidence) likely rules out the option of an object causing the movement in the switches. It also probably rules out an incorrectly followed procedure as this again would likely be fed out.
This really only leaves two options - completely erroneous action taken by a pilot (completely abnormal in its nature), or deliberate action taken by a pilot. Either of these demands full validation prior to concluding them publicly. The investigators, like us, probably have their views already on which is more likely (especially given the full CVR).
The preliminary report, as has been said, is actually more detailed than normal, but there are, as others have said, some interesting omissions. When you think about what the purpose of the preliminary report is, and what the objectives are of those authoring it, looking at why certain information is there (and why some isnt), combined with what they are suggesting as next steps, it does in fact tell us almost all of the story here in my view, in terms of the overall picture (not the low level detail).
Which doesn't mean the investigation may not ultimately take a different path - this is why they explore every possible avenue.
- The investigators and authors of the preliminary report clearly have more information than has been released in that report, a lot more. This includes, as per the report, the full recorded audio of the flight.
- With that additional information comes a greater ability to rule in or out certain possibilities, if we presume competence (which we clearly should).
- With all of that additional information and knowledge, *all* of the involved parties have explicitly stated there are no recommended actions regarding the airplane. This would be a pretty low threshold to issue even a precautionary advisory to check x,y,z if it was still deemed a possible cause.
It is reasonable to say, I would say, that the investigators have largely ruled out the switches themselves or the electronics around them as a cause here. They are as aware as anyone on this forum of previous SAIB relating to these switches, and explicitly reference them in the report, and haven't even taken the incredibly easy step of "re-suggesting" this. This is telling and should be very carefully considered before further suggestions in this direction.
I'd then suggest that everyone else also bears in mind the following. The investigators, with the information they have, have decided not to share some of that information. In my view, there are two likely reasons for this (combined):
1. They do not believe that releasing that information provides any additional safety benefit at this time *to other aircraft*.
2. The likely cause (or options of likely causes) demands exhaustive investigation to further check what the investigation is pointing to to date, and be positive of the cause to the highest possible threshold before even implying it. It may be frustrating that this leaves ambiguity, but this ambiguity is likely both intentional and necessary.
In my mind, this alone (but especially when taken in conjunction with other evidence) likely rules out the option of an object causing the movement in the switches. It also probably rules out an incorrectly followed procedure as this again would likely be fed out.
This really only leaves two options - completely erroneous action taken by a pilot (completely abnormal in its nature), or deliberate action taken by a pilot. Either of these demands full validation prior to concluding them publicly. The investigators, like us, probably have their views already on which is more likely (especially given the full CVR).
The preliminary report, as has been said, is actually more detailed than normal, but there are, as others have said, some interesting omissions. When you think about what the purpose of the preliminary report is, and what the objectives are of those authoring it, looking at why certain information is there (and why some isnt), combined with what they are suggesting as next steps, it does in fact tell us almost all of the story here in my view, in terms of the overall picture (not the low level detail).
Which doesn't mean the investigation may not ultimately take a different path - this is why they explore every possible avenue.
Last edited by Mrshed; 15th July 2025 at 09:39 .
July 14, 2025, 19:04:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922436
Upfront: Sorry for my initial post on the topic, like some other people in this thread it obviously touches a nerve and was rightly removed for exceeding the rules of civil discussion.
This is my attempt to shed a bit of light on why I find pushing theories of suicide very objectionable at this point in time.
Let's actually run some numbers here.
https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/b...df/statsum.pdf gives us a nice statistic over the last 20 years and also has this little tidbit:
"965 million departures since 1959. 63% of those departures were on Boeing airplanes. (609 million on Boeing airplanes)"
For the last 20 years I'd eyeball an average of between 20-25 million departures per year. So 400-500 million flights in just 20 years. Maybe let that sink in for a moment. We have doubled the total number of flights in the 20 years since 2005.
In that timeframe we have:
Nov 2013, LAM 470, 33 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
Mar 2015, Germanwings 9525, 150 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
There are additionally these:
Mar 2014, MH370, 239 fatalities, no final report, no information available
Mar 2022, CES5735, 132 fatalities, no final report, media reports claiming pilot suicide, strong counter by the investigating agency: "CAAC has previously said speculation surrounding the crash had "gravely misled the public" and interfered with accident investigation work."
Both confirmed cases in that time have a very clear pattern that does in no way resemble the Air India Crash.
Even beyond that timeframe no confirmed pilot suicide involved any measures against discovery by the departed.
There is speculation regarding Silk Air 185 because the CVR failed to record the relevant part of the accident, but it is firmly in the "debated" category.
But we can ignore all of that. Even if we put any theoretically possible Pilot Suicide into the equation one fact remains: The actual likeliness of pilot suicide has not changed. There were 2 confirmed prior to 2005 and 2 after and 2 suspected prior to 2005 2 and after. And that is despite a higher sensitivity and a more stressful job as well as significantly increased environmental stress factors. Obviously we are talking about, statistically speaking, numbers too small for analysis, but all of this is actually well within expected parameters. The recent years have seen a focus on mental health in general in many countries worldwide, and mental healthcare availability is growing in most countries. And here the US is a great example as far as aviation goes: https://casten.house.gov/media/press...tion-committee With this bill whose merit can be assessed by the people supporting it: " The legislation is endorsed by the Pilot Mental Health Campaign, Air Line Pilots Association, Airlines for America, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, National Flight Training Alliance, the National Business Aviation Association, and NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP)."
Summing up I would like to point out that there are good indications that there are no mental health issues involved here. Taking the aforementioned accidents as reference the issues were usually quite obvious once any kind of scrutiny was placed on the individuals involved. The individuals also made little to no effort of concealment in all confirmed cases and while the absence of evidence can be interpreted as indicative of successful concealment it is not proof and cannot be treated as such. Especially when it is documented that the overwhelming majority of suicides do not involve any element of concealment, and the psychological mechanisms at work commonly preclude any thought about what happens after, as far as medical study of the issue is concerned. This does not mean it does not happen, cases of concealment attempts or even partial successes are well documented, but it is a lot less prevalent. In this case estimates range mostly from between 10% to 30% of all suicides being misreported as unintentional injury with massive variation depending on multiple factors like country, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, etc.
In final conclusion: Anyone can make mistakes. It is possible one or both of these pilots made a mistake. It is also possible that a combination of bad luck lead to an alignment of the holes. In my opinion the inability to receive urgently required medical support is as much a hole in the Swiss Cheese as the worst maintenance or design error imaginable. We know from the previous discussions in all threads on this Accident and the report itself that the pilots were flying their aircraft until they ran out of time and airspace. One cannot demand more from a human being, no matter what the final cause is ultimately determined to be.
This is my attempt to shed a bit of light on why I find pushing theories of suicide very objectionable at this point in time.
https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/b...df/statsum.pdf gives us a nice statistic over the last 20 years and also has this little tidbit:
"965 million departures since 1959. 63% of those departures were on Boeing airplanes. (609 million on Boeing airplanes)"
For the last 20 years I'd eyeball an average of between 20-25 million departures per year. So 400-500 million flights in just 20 years. Maybe let that sink in for a moment. We have doubled the total number of flights in the 20 years since 2005.
In that timeframe we have:
Nov 2013, LAM 470, 33 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
Mar 2015, Germanwings 9525, 150 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
There are additionally these:
Mar 2014, MH370, 239 fatalities, no final report, no information available
Mar 2022, CES5735, 132 fatalities, no final report, media reports claiming pilot suicide, strong counter by the investigating agency: "CAAC has previously said speculation surrounding the crash had "gravely misled the public" and interfered with accident investigation work."
Both confirmed cases in that time have a very clear pattern that does in no way resemble the Air India Crash.
Even beyond that timeframe no confirmed pilot suicide involved any measures against discovery by the departed.
There is speculation regarding Silk Air 185 because the CVR failed to record the relevant part of the accident, but it is firmly in the "debated" category.
But we can ignore all of that. Even if we put any theoretically possible Pilot Suicide into the equation one fact remains: The actual likeliness of pilot suicide has not changed. There were 2 confirmed prior to 2005 and 2 after and 2 suspected prior to 2005 2 and after. And that is despite a higher sensitivity and a more stressful job as well as significantly increased environmental stress factors. Obviously we are talking about, statistically speaking, numbers too small for analysis, but all of this is actually well within expected parameters. The recent years have seen a focus on mental health in general in many countries worldwide, and mental healthcare availability is growing in most countries. And here the US is a great example as far as aviation goes: https://casten.house.gov/media/press...tion-committee With this bill whose merit can be assessed by the people supporting it: " The legislation is endorsed by the Pilot Mental Health Campaign, Air Line Pilots Association, Airlines for America, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, National Flight Training Alliance, the National Business Aviation Association, and NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP)."
Summing up I would like to point out that there are good indications that there are no mental health issues involved here. Taking the aforementioned accidents as reference the issues were usually quite obvious once any kind of scrutiny was placed on the individuals involved. The individuals also made little to no effort of concealment in all confirmed cases and while the absence of evidence can be interpreted as indicative of successful concealment it is not proof and cannot be treated as such. Especially when it is documented that the overwhelming majority of suicides do not involve any element of concealment, and the psychological mechanisms at work commonly preclude any thought about what happens after, as far as medical study of the issue is concerned. This does not mean it does not happen, cases of concealment attempts or even partial successes are well documented, but it is a lot less prevalent. In this case estimates range mostly from between 10% to 30% of all suicides being misreported as unintentional injury with massive variation depending on multiple factors like country, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, etc.
In final conclusion: Anyone can make mistakes. It is possible one or both of these pilots made a mistake. It is also possible that a combination of bad luck lead to an alignment of the holes. In my opinion the inability to receive urgently required medical support is as much a hole in the Swiss Cheese as the worst maintenance or design error imaginable. We know from the previous discussions in all threads on this Accident and the report itself that the pilots were flying their aircraft until they ran out of time and airspace. One cannot demand more from a human being, no matter what the final cause is ultimately determined to be.
July 14, 2025, 19:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922454
Upfront: Sorry for my initial post on the topic, like some other people in this thread it obviously touches a nerve and was rightly removed for exceeding the rules of civil discussion.
This is my attempt to shed a bit of light on why I find pushing theories of suicide very objectionable at this point in time.
Let's actually run some numbers here.
https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/b...df/statsum.pdf gives us a nice statistic over the last 20 years and also has this little tidbit:
"965 million departures since 1959. 63% of those departures were on Boeing airplanes. (609 million on Boeing airplanes)"
For the last 20 years I'd eyeball an average of between 20-25 million departures per year. So 400-500 million flights in just 20 years. Maybe let that sink in for a moment. We have doubled the total number of flights in the 20 years since 2005.
In that timeframe we have:
Nov 2013, LAM 470, 33 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
Mar 2015, Germanwings 9525, 150 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
There are additionally these:
Mar 2014, MH370, 239 fatalities, no final report, no information available
Mar 2022, CES5735, 132 fatalities, no final report, media reports claiming pilot suicide, strong counter by the investigating agency: "CAAC has previously said speculation surrounding the crash had "gravely misled the public" and interfered with accident investigation work."
Both confirmed cases in that time have a very clear pattern that does in no way resemble the Air India Crash.
Even beyond that timeframe no confirmed pilot suicide involved any measures against discovery by the departed.
There is speculation regarding Silk Air 185 because the CVR failed to record the relevant part of the accident, but it is firmly in the "debated" category.
But we can ignore all of that. Even if we put any theoretically possible Pilot Suicide into the equation one fact remains: The actual likeliness of pilot suicide has not changed. There were 2 confirmed prior to 2005 and 2 after and 2 suspected prior to 2005 2 and after. And that is despite a higher sensitivity and a more stressful job as well as significantly increased environmental stress factors. Obviously we are talking about, statistically speaking, numbers too small for analysis, but all of this is actually well within expected parameters. The recent years have seen a focus on mental health in general in many countries worldwide, and mental healthcare availability is growing in most countries. And here the US is a great example as far as aviation goes: https://casten.house.gov/media/press...tion-committee With this bill whose merit can be assessed by the people supporting it: " The legislation is endorsed by the Pilot Mental Health Campaign, Air Line Pilots Association, Airlines for America, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, National Flight Training Alliance, the National Business Aviation Association, and NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP)."
Summing up I would like to point out that there are good indications that there are no mental health issues involved here. Taking the aforementioned accidents as reference the issues were usually quite obvious once any kind of scrutiny was placed on the individuals involved. The individuals also made little to no effort of concealment in all confirmed cases and while the absence of evidence can be interpreted as indicative of successful concealment it is not proof and cannot be treated as such. Especially when it is documented that the overwhelming majority of suicides do not involve any element of concealment, and the psychological mechanisms at work commonly preclude any thought about what happens after, as far as medical study of the issue is concerned. This does not mean it does not happen, cases of concealment attempts or even partial successes are well documented, but it is a lot less prevalent. In this case estimates range mostly from between 10% to 30% of all suicides being misreported as unintentional injury with massive variation depending on multiple factors like country, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, etc.
In final conclusion: Anyone can make mistakes. It is possible one or both of these pilots made a mistake. It is also possible that a combination of bad luck lead to an alignment of the holes. In my opinion the inability to receive urgently required medical support is as much a hole in the Swiss Cheese as the worst maintenance or design error imaginable. We know from the previous discussions in all threads on this Accident and the report itself that the pilots were flying their aircraft until they ran out of time and airspace. One cannot demand more from a human being, no matter what the final cause is ultimately determined to be.
This is my attempt to shed a bit of light on why I find pushing theories of suicide very objectionable at this point in time.
Let's actually run some numbers here.
https://www.boeing.com/content/dam/b...df/statsum.pdf gives us a nice statistic over the last 20 years and also has this little tidbit:
"965 million departures since 1959. 63% of those departures were on Boeing airplanes. (609 million on Boeing airplanes)"
For the last 20 years I'd eyeball an average of between 20-25 million departures per year. So 400-500 million flights in just 20 years. Maybe let that sink in for a moment. We have doubled the total number of flights in the 20 years since 2005.
In that timeframe we have:
Nov 2013, LAM 470, 33 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
Mar 2015, Germanwings 9525, 150 fatalities, confirmed by CVR
There are additionally these:
Mar 2014, MH370, 239 fatalities, no final report, no information available
Mar 2022, CES5735, 132 fatalities, no final report, media reports claiming pilot suicide, strong counter by the investigating agency: "CAAC has previously said speculation surrounding the crash had "gravely misled the public" and interfered with accident investigation work."
Both confirmed cases in that time have a very clear pattern that does in no way resemble the Air India Crash.
Even beyond that timeframe no confirmed pilot suicide involved any measures against discovery by the departed.
There is speculation regarding Silk Air 185 because the CVR failed to record the relevant part of the accident, but it is firmly in the "debated" category.
But we can ignore all of that. Even if we put any theoretically possible Pilot Suicide into the equation one fact remains: The actual likeliness of pilot suicide has not changed. There were 2 confirmed prior to 2005 and 2 after and 2 suspected prior to 2005 2 and after. And that is despite a higher sensitivity and a more stressful job as well as significantly increased environmental stress factors. Obviously we are talking about, statistically speaking, numbers too small for analysis, but all of this is actually well within expected parameters. The recent years have seen a focus on mental health in general in many countries worldwide, and mental healthcare availability is growing in most countries. And here the US is a great example as far as aviation goes: https://casten.house.gov/media/press...tion-committee With this bill whose merit can be assessed by the people supporting it: " The legislation is endorsed by the Pilot Mental Health Campaign, Air Line Pilots Association, Airlines for America, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association, National Flight Training Alliance, the National Business Aviation Association, and NetJets Association of Shared Aircraft Pilots (NJASAP)."
Summing up I would like to point out that there are good indications that there are no mental health issues involved here. Taking the aforementioned accidents as reference the issues were usually quite obvious once any kind of scrutiny was placed on the individuals involved. The individuals also made little to no effort of concealment in all confirmed cases and while the absence of evidence can be interpreted as indicative of successful concealment it is not proof and cannot be treated as such. Especially when it is documented that the overwhelming majority of suicides do not involve any element of concealment, and the psychological mechanisms at work commonly preclude any thought about what happens after, as far as medical study of the issue is concerned. This does not mean it does not happen, cases of concealment attempts or even partial successes are well documented, but it is a lot less prevalent. In this case estimates range mostly from between 10% to 30% of all suicides being misreported as unintentional injury with massive variation depending on multiple factors like country, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, etc.
In final conclusion: Anyone can make mistakes. It is possible one or both of these pilots made a mistake. It is also possible that a combination of bad luck lead to an alignment of the holes. In my opinion the inability to receive urgently required medical support is as much a hole in the Swiss Cheese as the worst maintenance or design error imaginable. We know from the previous discussions in all threads on this Accident and the report itself that the pilots were flying their aircraft until they ran out of time and airspace. One cannot demand more from a human being, no matter what the final cause is ultimately determined to be.
ANY Boeing pilot who grabs for the FCSs immediately after takeoff has SOME type of mental health issue. It might be suicidal, it might be cognitive, it might be a stroke, it might be some type of blood interruption to the brain, chemical imbalance, drug reaction, or whatever.
It’s not a simple mistake.
I’m not saying it’s necessary deliberate or homicidal (which it could be) but there is some type of impairment there. Everyone knows the consequences of shutting off a FCS or pulling a fire handle. The switches aren’t easily confused with others. Bumping them doesn’t cause them to go to cut off. And have dire consequences if actuated at the wrong time.
I guess there might theoretically be a way to snag them with loose clothing (like having a very frayed sweater with holes in the sleeve putting one’s arm in a really strange place) somehow and while pulling to free it manage to pull them out and down but I’m going to put this in the asteroid hitting earth category.
July 14, 2025, 19:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922462
I find it hard to believe that, in this instance, there is anything inherently wrong in the aircraft or its associated powerplants. The report appears to indicate that all the correct parameters had been met with regard to W&B and performance planning whilst the aircraft was performing normally until just after rotate.
The apparent lack of information with regard to the CVR transcript appears to be telling. If the F/O was handling pilot using a mixture of visual references and the HUD, one wonders what he would have seen or sensed to make him ask the question ‘why did you do that ?’ when it became apparent through Eicas or simple loss of thrust that the engines had shut down - his remark is very specific and not perhaps the normal expletive ridden response that one might expect.
Again, here, I am making as assumption that the initial remark was made by the FO because the report does not tell us who said what. Whilst it may be easy to jump on the bandwagon of the deliberate and premeditated act I would still give some credence to the idea that the fuel control switches were actioned in a completely erroneous act if for no other reason that I have seen similar faux pas in the simulator on multiple occasions.
There may of course be a cultural issue in play here with the relationship between the two pilots which has been seen in many previous accidents/incidents. Equally the strange timing of the releasing of the report potentially raises a question or two though maybe that is a conspiracy theory too far !
The apparent lack of information with regard to the CVR transcript appears to be telling. If the F/O was handling pilot using a mixture of visual references and the HUD, one wonders what he would have seen or sensed to make him ask the question ‘why did you do that ?’ when it became apparent through Eicas or simple loss of thrust that the engines had shut down - his remark is very specific and not perhaps the normal expletive ridden response that one might expect.
Again, here, I am making as assumption that the initial remark was made by the FO because the report does not tell us who said what. Whilst it may be easy to jump on the bandwagon of the deliberate and premeditated act I would still give some credence to the idea that the fuel control switches were actioned in a completely erroneous act if for no other reason that I have seen similar faux pas in the simulator on multiple occasions.
There may of course be a cultural issue in play here with the relationship between the two pilots which has been seen in many previous accidents/incidents. Equally the strange timing of the releasing of the report potentially raises a question or two though maybe that is a conspiracy theory too far !
July 14, 2025, 21:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922500
I'm not surprised though it gets frustrating when folk start defaulting to the most remote possibilities instead of the more likely ones. The flight data recorder logged the fact that the switches were moved to cutoff, 1 second apart, very soon after airborne, then some seconds later moved back to run. None of that fits with any realistically conceivable mechanical failure nor automated system fault. Both of those are physical actions taken by a pilot. The first action was to shut them down, and the second action was an attempt to start them up again (tragically close to being successful). Nor does it fit with a muscle memory mistake or confusion with another switch.
Which leads to a very unpleasant possibility that many people would rather not consider, and some even refuse to consider, despite there being at least one historical precedent that I can think of (a pilot for a particular airline many years ago who had an undiagnosed mental health condition and admitted to struggling with impulsive thoughts of shutting down all 4 engines on a B747).
Which leads to a very unpleasant possibility that many people would rather not consider, and some even refuse to consider, despite there being at least one historical precedent that I can think of (a pilot for a particular airline many years ago who had an undiagnosed mental health condition and admitted to struggling with impulsive thoughts of shutting down all 4 engines on a B747).
July 15, 2025, 10:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922796
Preliminary Report - another possibility?
I agree that the Preliminary Report will have been a very carefully chosen synopsis, but I don't think it precludes a system behaviour that might or might not even be categorised as either an electrical or mechanical malfunction, as such.
Consider that the Preliminary Report only references the CVR contents to indicate one crew querying why he (the other) cutoff, and the other denying it. Clearly very pertinent data to this investigation, so I'm not ruling out both of the crew being sincere, until I understand the aircraft system better.
If the cutoffs weren't triggered by the crew moving the switches, then the most likely thing was that both FADECs encountered a situation that invoked cutoff, practically at the same moment. That might suggest that the data from independent Run/Cutoff switches via independent poles that possibly route via a PIP or PIPs to various RDCs and in turn the CCS (which means these paths have a common mode) resulted in data to both FADECs "failing" in a critical manner simultaneously.
The only CCS vulnerability I'm aware of is what happens if the CCS is kept powered for 51 days, shortly after which, the Time Manager data integrity for ARINC 664 messages is compromised, possibly only considered critical n conjunction with a CDN Switch failure. AD 2020-06-14 therefore requires a maintenance action of cycling the CCS power at least once every 25 days.
Two such omitted, or incorrectly executed maintenance actions in a row would have to happen for that known issue to be relevant. Perhaps there is some other input in the CCS system that influences both lanes of data to the FADECs for the Cutoff to be triggered, but I'm not aware of such.
If the data to both FADECs became good again around the same time (perhaps no longer Stale Data, or an alternative source selected, or other mechanism), and given the unavailability of APU power at this point, might Engine 1 restart be initiated first, and might Engine 2 restart be triggered 4 seconds later by the FADECs? Is that possible without the crew cycling the switches?
Regarding AD 2020-06-14, which was approved quickly, Boeing subsequently offered revised wording, which changed "may" to "will", see FAA Docket 2020-0205-0004, but as it did not alter the maintenance action, it was not adopted. A fuller description of possible consequences was in FAA Docket 2020-0205-0001_content, but it was quite wide ranging, and didn't attempt to characterise specific aircraft systems behaviour.
For anyone wanting more information on the CCS, in the context of that Airworthiness Directive, I recommend reading A Reverse Engineer’s Perspective on the Boeing 787 ‘51 days’ Airworthiness Directive at IOActive.
As a non-professional pilot, please accept that my knowledge of much beyond the CCS is patchy, but I welcome this scenario being critiqued.
Thank you for your time, and I'm just donning my hard hat and flack jacket.
Last edited by T28B; 15th July 2025 at 13:56 . Reason: formatting for easier reading
July 15, 2025, 15:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923035
If I'm not mistaken, someone thoughtfully up thread somewhere posted an analysis which showed that pilot suicide is really not at all common, statistically. To which I'd add that for reasons also discussed up thread, this method would be totally atypical of previously chosen methods.
That said, I'd agree pretty much entirely that the probability of two, four pole/double throw switches failing within a second of each other is vanishingly remote too.
Of course, that dichotomy is why we are on the hamster wheel.
That said, I'd agree pretty much entirely that the probability of two, four pole/double throw switches failing within a second of each other is vanishingly remote too.
Of course, that dichotomy is why we are on the hamster wheel.
Again I'm not even saying its suicide, you prob may only know if you heard the CVR and even then their could be a question. What I'm saying is anyone downplaying that as an option because it's "rare" but then goes down the path of concocting some crazy failure scenario has now come up with a situation that is orders of magnitude more improbable, just because its uncomfortable for them to think of the suicide as being a possibility.
July 15, 2025, 15:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923045
The facts of the case are: that the FDR recorded that the switches were moved from RUN to CUTOFF, that the engines shut down, that one pilot accused another of having set the switches to CUTOFF, and that subsequently they were set back to RUN and that at least one engine had started to recover before impact.
Think what it would take for you to verbally accuse your colleague of having shut the engines down seconds after liftoff. I hope you agree that looking and seeing that the switches are set to CUTOFF is a bare minimum for you to say something like that.
Any theory where there is some sort of short-circuit or anything like that is a non-starter for this reason. It does not accord with what is on the CVR. The one and only thing that jibes with both the FDR and CVR is that the switches were physically moved from RUN to CUTOFF. The only remaining argument is whether this was done deliberately or as part of some monumental brain fart. I just don't see how it is possible to argue anything else. Even in some incredibly unlikely event where two switches malfunction at once, it is near impossible that one pilot would accuse another of cutting off fuel to the engines without visual evidence to back him up. Either the switches were in fact switched to CUTOFF or you are left explaining not one but two independent and virtually impossible events.
Think what it would take for you to verbally accuse your colleague of having shut the engines down seconds after liftoff. I hope you agree that looking and seeing that the switches are set to CUTOFF is a bare minimum for you to say something like that.
Any theory where there is some sort of short-circuit or anything like that is a non-starter for this reason. It does not accord with what is on the CVR. The one and only thing that jibes with both the FDR and CVR is that the switches were physically moved from RUN to CUTOFF. The only remaining argument is whether this was done deliberately or as part of some monumental brain fart. I just don't see how it is possible to argue anything else. Even in some incredibly unlikely event where two switches malfunction at once, it is near impossible that one pilot would accuse another of cutting off fuel to the engines without visual evidence to back him up. Either the switches were in fact switched to CUTOFF or you are left explaining not one but two independent and virtually impossible events.
July 15, 2025, 16:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923060
I'm not saying pilot suicide is common, its exceedingly rare. But the likelihood of this cooked up scenario that you would have to come up with is infinitesimally small (i would say impossible but nothing is impossible). It literally has never in modern day aviation happened, and we would probably have to fly for hundreds more years to even possibly approach a likelihood of a single event happening. Suicides while rare have happened and not just 1.
Again I'm not even saying its suicide, you prob may only know if you heard the CVR and even then their could be a question. What I'm saying is anyone downplaying that as an option because it's "rare" but then goes down the path of concocting some crazy failure scenario has now come up with a situation that is orders of magnitude more improbable, just because its uncomfortable for them to think of the suicide as being a possibility.
Again I'm not even saying its suicide, you prob may only know if you heard the CVR and even then their could be a question. What I'm saying is anyone downplaying that as an option because it's "rare" but then goes down the path of concocting some crazy failure scenario has now come up with a situation that is orders of magnitude more improbable, just because its uncomfortable for them to think of the suicide as being a possibility.
I can't say I'm enamored of statistics much, because there's always room for the unexpected/unplanned/unthought of, but the things that puzzle me in this situation is that we don't have any evidence of aircraft faults or failures that could contribute to the circumstances of this accident, yet we also have no indications of medical issues with either pilot, and no historical pointers to the kind of mental health issues which could explain what happened. We also have an accident which is highly improbable as a suicide method, and switches that really are hugely UNlikey to have 'transitioned' to OFF on their own.
We do have lots of noise from media sources claiming knowledge which seems likely not to actually exist - if as one 'expert' claimed, the captain was known for mental health and/or behavioural issues - how does he know and the investigating team don't? And much uncertainty, coupled with sparsity of factual knowledge among the rest of us, which leads to wild theories feeding on themselves.
Personally, I'm not buying pilot suicide because it's such a totally improbable way to do it in the psychological sense - though I could see how it might have been the manifestation of an ideation, which was jerked back to reality by being asked why he pulled the switches. Ideations are a form of fantasy so can lead almost anywhere because the person doesn't really mean them to.
But there's also the potential for psychoses in one of the pilots, which often remain disguised and unknown, but can result in highly egregious behaviours when triggered.
All in all though, there's not enough 'knowns' to really make sense of it, and while we may gain better insights further down the investigatory path, there's a possibility that even when we know the 'what' of what happened, we may never get near the 'why' it did.
July 15, 2025, 16:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923081
I'm not saying pilot suicide is common, its exceedingly rare. But the likelihood of this cooked up scenario that you would have to come up with is infinitesimally small (i would say impossible but nothing is impossible). It literally has never in modern day aviation happened, and we would probably have to fly for hundreds more years to even possibly approach a likelihood of a single event happening. Suicides while rare have happened and not just 1.
Again I'm not even saying its suicide, you prob may only know if you heard the CVR and even then their could be a question. What I'm saying is anyone downplaying that as an option because it's "rare" but then goes down the path of concocting some crazy failure scenario has now come up with a situation that is orders of magnitude more improbable, just because its uncomfortable for them to think of the suicide as being a possibility.
Again I'm not even saying its suicide, you prob may only know if you heard the CVR and even then their could be a question. What I'm saying is anyone downplaying that as an option because it's "rare" but then goes down the path of concocting some crazy failure scenario has now come up with a situation that is orders of magnitude more improbable, just because its uncomfortable for them to think of the suicide as being a possibility.
We are looking at a selected, specific event , not "all flights". From what we know about this event, there appear to be only two likely explanations: pilot error (brain fart or whatever), and deliberate, malicious pilot action.
Some may still argue that we should prefer the "brain fart" explanation as "pilot suicide is so rare". I hope that is the case, but extensive discussion here seems to consider that the "brain fart" explanation, given the specific circumstances and information we know as perhaps comparably unlikely. One of these two "unlikely" explanations is likely true.
Last edited by andihce; 15th July 2025 at 17:38 . Reason: Removed reference to Germanwings
July 15, 2025, 17:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923088
After all the analysis on PPRuNE, fuel switch failure (well, dual switch failure, at practically the same time) seems so unlikely it's no longer worthy of consideration. However, I'm still open to the idea of a failure elsewhere that may have signalled the fuel switches had transistioned from Run to Cutoff wthout physical movement of either switch. Why? Firstly, because of this (taken from the preliminary report)
The STAB cutout switches are located next to the Fuel cutoff switches. What did Air India’s on duty AME do as part of their troubleshooting? Were panels removed to gain access to the rear of the switches and wiring? What about wiring and data connections elsewhere? What may have been disconnected/disturbed as part of this process? Do the STAB cutout switches and Fuel cutoff switches share any connectors that could have been inadvertantly cross-connected? Etc. It would not be the first time that an engineer had innocently done something that later caused an accident. And I haven't read anything about possible nefarious action by a (disgruntled?) engineer - but I've seen lots of accusations directed at the pilot(s)...
Secondly, the preliminary report's version of (part of) the conversation in the cockpit -
Until proven beyond reasonable doubt I'm chosing to take the cockpit conversation at face value, because I really don't want to believe any of the following scenarios:
A) one of the pilots lied
B) one of the pilots attempted to deflect blame onto the other pilot for the benefit of the CVR
C) One of the pilots unknowingly operated the fuel cutoff switches.
D) One of the pilots deliberately operated the fuel cutoff switches.
It is all too easy to blame one of the pilots when in reality no one outside of the official investigation may yet know what most likely happened.
The crew of the previous flight (AI423) had made Pilot Defect Report (PDR) entry for status
message “STAB POS XDCR” in the Tech Log. The troubleshooting was carried out as per
FIM by Air India’s on duty AME, and the aircraft was released for flight at 0640 UTC.
message “STAB POS XDCR” in the Tech Log. The troubleshooting was carried out as per
FIM by Air India’s on duty AME, and the aircraft was released for flight at 0640 UTC.
The STAB cutout switches are located next to the Fuel cutoff switches. What did Air India’s on duty AME do as part of their troubleshooting? Were panels removed to gain access to the rear of the switches and wiring? What about wiring and data connections elsewhere? What may have been disconnected/disturbed as part of this process? Do the STAB cutout switches and Fuel cutoff switches share any connectors that could have been inadvertantly cross-connected? Etc. It would not be the first time that an engineer had innocently done something that later caused an accident. And I haven't read anything about possible nefarious action by a (disgruntled?) engineer - but I've seen lots of accusations directed at the pilot(s)...
Secondly, the preliminary report's version of (part of) the conversation in the cockpit -
In the cockpit voice recording, one of the pilots is heard asking the other why did he cutoff.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
The other pilot responded that he did not do so.
A) one of the pilots lied
B) one of the pilots attempted to deflect blame onto the other pilot for the benefit of the CVR
C) One of the pilots unknowingly operated the fuel cutoff switches.
D) One of the pilots deliberately operated the fuel cutoff switches.
It is all too easy to blame one of the pilots when in reality no one outside of the official investigation may yet know what most likely happened.
July 15, 2025, 18:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923153
After all the analysis on PPRuNE, fuel switch failure (well, dual switch failure, at practically the same time) seems so unlikely it's no longer worthy of consideration. However, I'm still open to the idea of a failure elsewhere that may have signalled the fuel switches had transistioned from Run to Cutoff wthout physical movement of either switch. Why? Firstly, because of this (taken from the preliminary report)
The STAB cutout switches are located next to the Fuel cutoff switches. What did Air India’s on duty AME do as part of their troubleshooting? Were panels removed to gain access to the rear of the switches and wiring? What about wiring and data connections elsewhere? What may have been disconnected/disturbed as part of this process? Do the STAB cutout switches and Fuel cutoff switches share any connectors that could have been inadvertantly cross-connected? Etc. It would not be the first time that an engineer had innocently done something that later caused an accident. And I haven't read anything about possible nefarious action by a (disgruntled?) engineer - but I've seen lots of accusations directed at the pilot(s)...
Secondly, the preliminary report's version of (part of) the conversation in the cockpit -
Until proven beyond reasonable doubt I'm chosing to take the cockpit conversation at face value, because I really don't want to believe any of the following scenarios:
A) one of the pilots lied
B) one of the pilots attempted to deflect blame onto the other pilot for the benefit of the CVR
C) One of the pilots unknowingly operated the fuel cutoff switches.
D) One of the pilots deliberately operated the fuel cutoff switches.
It is all too easy to blame one of the pilots when in reality no one outside of the official investigation may yet know what most likely happened.
The STAB cutout switches are located next to the Fuel cutoff switches. What did Air India’s on duty AME do as part of their troubleshooting? Were panels removed to gain access to the rear of the switches and wiring? What about wiring and data connections elsewhere? What may have been disconnected/disturbed as part of this process? Do the STAB cutout switches and Fuel cutoff switches share any connectors that could have been inadvertantly cross-connected? Etc. It would not be the first time that an engineer had innocently done something that later caused an accident. And I haven't read anything about possible nefarious action by a (disgruntled?) engineer - but I've seen lots of accusations directed at the pilot(s)...
Secondly, the preliminary report's version of (part of) the conversation in the cockpit -
Until proven beyond reasonable doubt I'm chosing to take the cockpit conversation at face value, because I really don't want to believe any of the following scenarios:
A) one of the pilots lied
B) one of the pilots attempted to deflect blame onto the other pilot for the benefit of the CVR
C) One of the pilots unknowingly operated the fuel cutoff switches.
D) One of the pilots deliberately operated the fuel cutoff switches.
It is all too easy to blame one of the pilots when in reality no one outside of the official investigation may yet know what most likely happened.
July 15, 2025, 18:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923174
Again I'm not even saying its suicide, you prob may only know if you heard the CVR and even then their could be a question. What I'm saying is anyone downplaying that as an option because it's "rare" but then goes down the path of concocting some crazy failure scenario . . .
July 15, 2025, 20:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923245
"( the investigators will know the mics)"
It is a cockpit voice recorder CVR not a mic recorder, I do believe
It is a cockpit voice recorder CVR not a mic recorder, I do believe
July 15, 2025, 20:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923252
Given the degraded power state at that moment, the only mic powerd by the RISP will be the CAM, thus the only remaining channel being recorded on the CVR of the (forward only) EAFR. Some audio forensics will be needed to identify individual persons' words (in the final moments).
July 15, 2025, 21:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923299
Other than the report stating (by implication of IAS etc) no issue with thrust until the switches were moved, as well as the CVR exchange shared makes basically no sense in that scenario.