Posts about: "Dual Engine Failure" [Posts: 270 Pages: 14]

The report says '01 seconds'. You mind has put in the decimal point.

Given sampling rates, it's been established here that this is anything up to 2 seconds.

OODA - loop.

https://oodaloop.com/the-ooda-loop-e...-environments/

Keep in mind the critics of the \x91Miracle on the Hudson\x92. If they would have anticipated a dual engine failure and turned immediately they would have made a runway.
Thats not how things work in reality.

It takes times to analyze and come up with a response and look for a response.
Just keep in mind this was not occurring in an air conditioned simulator under training conditions.

Replicating the accident scenario in a G650 over on a another forum,

There\x92s a shock value there. Recognizing what happened then doing something about it. As the engines lose thrust it does take some time to analyze what happened. None of this is expected nor trained to \x97 dual engine failure after breaking ground.

No pilot is expecting to see the FCSs in cut off right after rotation. And is busy flying.

So I can see it taking a bit to be recognized and acted upon. There\x92s also the disbelief factor for the person remedying the situation.

I am in agreement with you.
At first I also found the time to react to FCSs being set to cut-off and switching them back on to be surprising -10 seconds is an awfully long time to do something that would appear to be a natural reaction to seeing the switch conditions.
At that stage there had not been an indication of who was the PF and PM.
With the information that the co-pilot was PF, it made me rethink that assumption, based on the experience gradient in the cockpit.
My gut feeling is that if the roles were reversed and a much less experienced FO either accidentally or deliberately selected the FCSs off , an experienced Captain would almost instantly recognize the issue and switch them back on in a flash, perhaps with a heap of abuse and admonishment.
In this case however, it now looks like we have an FO, who maybe in his peripheral vision saw the Captain reach for the switches and so his first reaction was "why did you turn them off??!". The Captain's reply "I didn't" now has him totally befuddled and perhaps some reluctance to override something that he is sure the Captain did but doesn't make sense. I now could completely conceive why he took so long to get them back on - all too late unfortunately....

The deployment of RAT has announced Double Engine failure. Also the AutoStart of APU pretty much indicates the same thing . Release of CVR will definitely help.

Replace 'failure' in your quoted text by 'cutoff' and it becomes correct.

If the vast majority of flights have been made without anyone performing this particular action slip previously, without dismissing it, but giving it due consideration as a risk with potentially deadly consequences on every flight, is there a case for reviewing the procedure at the end of the flight, to cutoff one, count to 5 or 10, and cutoff the other, or have each crew member take care of "their" engine at that point?

I'm assuming that isn't an original idea, so how is it already addressed by Boeing, or the airlines, or pilots?

Can you explain me Dave why the industry needs more like her?

She told utter nonsense.

This is the person who said the stuff quoted below. I hope you agree with me the ANA B787 uncommanded dual engine shutdown in 2019 *** after landing *** had nothing to do with a ' similar fuel cut-off malfunction during final approach".
There is also no Boeing software issue in the case of AI171. The ANA B787

ASN wrote: A Boeing 787-8 of All Nippon Airways operating ANA/NH985 from Tokyo/Haneda to Osaka/Itami stuck on runway 32L while landing at Itami due to sudden shut-down of both engines after Thrust Reverser actuation.

Ms Schiavo said:

"As fresh scrutiny surrounds Boeing after the Air India AI 171 crash, aviation expert Mary Schiavo reveals that a similar fuel cut-off malfunction plagued a Japanese Boeing 787 in 2019 \x97 with pilots never touching the controls. Investigators now face mounting questions on why warnings were missed and why Boeing\x92s software may still pose a global threat."

and
Mary Schiavo revealed that a near-identical incident occurred in 2019 on a Boeing 787 operated by ANA during its final approach to Osaka. \x93The investigation revealed the plane software made the 787 think it was on the ground, and the Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation (TCMA) system cut the fuel to the engines,\x94 she said.
On that occasion, both engines shut down simultaneously, but the crew landed safely. The Japanese aviation authority and Boeing traced the incident to a software fault, not human error. ANA\x92s Dreamliner, carrying 118 people, had to be towed off the runway.

I posted a week or so ago, on the forums generally, suggesting that the moderation of the Air India threads had gotten excessive, and at that particular point, it might even be an opinion I stand by. But reading through the last 100+ posts, other than the above few comments, it's just garbage. I'm sorry, to those who think they're saying something meaningful, but it's just hot garbage.

For the legal types - stop quoting what is, and isn't, the burden of proof. This is a forum on the Internet. The topic being discussed is an international investigation into a plane crash. For both of those things, there is no possible relevance to the burden of proof in legal cases in <whatever your country is>.

For the psychologists (both actual ones and those pilots who are moonlighting as one) - stop quoting psychological theory. Many of us know it, others don't, but we all have such an incredible lack of information about the pilots concerned that it's pointless mentioning it, except in passing. No one has time for pages of guesswork or instructions to the investigators on what they should be looking at.

For the tech guys who are still talking about the possibility of malfunctioning switches, please, stop. The pilot saying "why did you do x" is not consistent with a switch failure, you don't say that just because of an unexpected run-down, you say something more generic, like "holy smokeballs, dual engine failure". The specificity of the comment implies clearly observed action, specific to the switches, which aligns with the data record.

For everyone - just because something isn't absolutely mathematically impossible does not mean you can or should bring it out and eat up pages doing so. Investigations do not have to cover every single possible "what if", because in an unlimited universe no investigation would ever conclude. What they have to do is come up with the most likely scientifically derived assessed outcome for an already fairly unlikely event. I can accept people saying "We don't know for sure that the switches were operated deliberately" even though that's probably more likely than not. I can't accept the kind of argument which isn't dissimilar to: "Maybe there was a flaw with the switch detent, and a book fell off the console, and the previous crew had spilled water on it, making it slippery, and before that when the console was installed it was 1.5 degrees more inclined than it should be, and that caused the rollback. I accept that we're already in "unlikely event" scenario, but once the impossible has been eliminated, refusing to accept that there's probably 2-3 likely scenarios left, and instead inserting incredibly unlikely theoretical stuff... well that's just bad faith.

Finally, it's personal taste, but I remain a bit disappointed with the deliberate blindness being applied to inconvenient truths by some on here. The two currently most likely rational explanations are simple - deliberate pilot action, accidental pilot action. Either way, it's pilot action . As frustrating as some of the wild theories are, the obfuscation being pushed out by the "circle the wagons" brigade is just as bad. Any pilot knows that their life - and those of their passengers - relies on clear sightedness and not avoiding uncomfortable data points. So let's trust our instruments. There should be no absurd rush to judgement but also, please, let's not hide behind the "they were professionals, treat them with respect" stuff, endlessly. Someone selected fuel on both engines to cut-off, mere moments after they left the ground. It won't be an engine restart procedure (too low, too early), it won't be some bizarre technical problem that hasn't happened in millions of flight hours on other 787s worldwide. The CVR says "why did you do X" and the data recorder says "X happened". The two line up. What we don't know for absolute certain is why, so the only sensible things now being examined are:

1) Deliberate pilot action (can only assume harmful intent at Vr + 3 sec)
2) Accidental pilot action (due to severe cognitive disconnect, or "wallet in freezer" stuff)

I'm one of many being frustrated by the lack of CVR recording being released, because that will almost certainly identify whether it was 1 or 2. But it would be abnormal for that to happen, and I respect that until they're sure, if the CVR points to something, they will want it confirmed before releasing it, because whether it's 1 or 2, it's bad news for the families of that particular pilot.

Oh, and to whoever said "Ask yourself if we are ready to hear it?".... come on. Hundreds of people died. Ignoring a piece of evidence related to that because it might be uncomfortable hearing it is unacceptable, and a bit childish. It might be uncomfortable, but professionals follow the evidence, wherever it may lead, however uncomfortable it might be.

Sorry this sounds so angry. The cause is that having stuck my neck out and said "Why are you guys moderating so much" to the mods, a free run of the thread has revealed such nonsense being posted that I'm embarrassed about having said anything. Lock away, I say!