July 13, 2025, 22:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921757
While this is thread is still deeply into hamster wheel status, there are some valuable inputs being made. I'll try to continue with that...
Thrust lever position post-accident - it takes very little force to move the thrust levers, a little more than one pound-force at the knob. I'd be very surprised if the post impact position was the same as pre-impact (and lever angle is recorded on the FDR, so the investigators know where they were). In short - the post-accident lever position is not meaningful.
Fuel condition switch position detents - if the Indian investigators had any reason to believe that a failed or inoperative detent was a contributing fact, the authorities would have ordered a fleet-wide inspection (especially since it literally takes only seconds to do the inspection - the paperwork would take many times longer than the actual inspection).
Engine restart (i.e. "Quick Windmill Relight"): Even if the igniters were firing, at high power they won't actually spark (the electrical resistance or the air at several hundred psi prevents a spark) - so they won't spark until you get down somewhere near idle if you're close to sea level. Once the engine has dropped below the min idle, it takes a long time for it accelerate back to even an idle condition. At takeoff power, the compressor components get very hot - do a power cut the air coming in the compressor gets heated by the residual heat in the compressor. This in turn limits how fast you can add fuel in the burner without excessively back pressuring the compressor and causing a compressor stall. So it actually takes longer for the engine to accel to idle that it would during a normal (cold engine) start. The 5 seconds to 95% accel requirement referenced earlier is from a stable 'high' idle (we typically call it 'approach idle' since it's automatically selected when landing flaps are selected). Approach idle is ~10% N2 higher than the in-flight minimum idle, so that takes several more seconds. Bottom line, after initiating the Quick Windmill Relight, you're not going to have usable thrust for at least 30 seconds - probably closer to 60 seconds.
For all the complaining about this preliminary report, it actually goes into more detail than is typical.
BTW, my money is still on the 'muscle memory/action slip' or whatever you want to call it. I can easily imagine a scenario along the line of 'why did you turn off the fuel' - 'I didn't - oh wait - oh
...
Thrust lever position post-accident - it takes very little force to move the thrust levers, a little more than one pound-force at the knob. I'd be very surprised if the post impact position was the same as pre-impact (and lever angle is recorded on the FDR, so the investigators know where they were). In short - the post-accident lever position is not meaningful.
Fuel condition switch position detents - if the Indian investigators had any reason to believe that a failed or inoperative detent was a contributing fact, the authorities would have ordered a fleet-wide inspection (especially since it literally takes only seconds to do the inspection - the paperwork would take many times longer than the actual inspection).
Engine restart (i.e. "Quick Windmill Relight"): Even if the igniters were firing, at high power they won't actually spark (the electrical resistance or the air at several hundred psi prevents a spark) - so they won't spark until you get down somewhere near idle if you're close to sea level. Once the engine has dropped below the min idle, it takes a long time for it accelerate back to even an idle condition. At takeoff power, the compressor components get very hot - do a power cut the air coming in the compressor gets heated by the residual heat in the compressor. This in turn limits how fast you can add fuel in the burner without excessively back pressuring the compressor and causing a compressor stall. So it actually takes longer for the engine to accel to idle that it would during a normal (cold engine) start. The 5 seconds to 95% accel requirement referenced earlier is from a stable 'high' idle (we typically call it 'approach idle' since it's automatically selected when landing flaps are selected). Approach idle is ~10% N2 higher than the in-flight minimum idle, so that takes several more seconds. Bottom line, after initiating the Quick Windmill Relight, you're not going to have usable thrust for at least 30 seconds - probably closer to 60 seconds.
For all the complaining about this preliminary report, it actually goes into more detail than is typical.
BTW, my money is still on the 'muscle memory/action slip' or whatever you want to call it. I can easily imagine a scenario along the line of 'why did you turn off the fuel' - 'I didn't - oh wait - oh
...
The EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained
forward (takeoff thrust) until the impact.
Would that position be consistent with a restart attempt?
July 13, 2025, 23:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921779
There have been a few cases that I know about where the flight crew did a normal ground start with the thrust lever at mid-power, and the engine simply continues to accelerate to the 'commanded' N1 or EPR. In one case (a 777), this happened during pushback. As the engine continued to accelerate above idle, the thrust caused the aircraft to jackknife around the tug, causing the tug driver to have to dive for cover to prevent serious injury. That even happened while we were doing the development of the 747-8 - it prompted me to ask the 747 Chief Pilot if we wanted to consider a 'start inhibit' in the FADEC logic that would prevent a ground start attempt if the thrust lever wasn't at idle (ground starts only - for what should be obvious reasons). He didn't like the idea, and it went no further...
July 14, 2025, 08:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11921971
Recording images/videos is prevented by similar union/regulator agreements AFAIK . It might take this accident to change that, of note the GE EAFR fitted to the 787 has the capability:
The EAFR is capable of providing combinations of any or all of the mandatory crash protected recorder functions in a single Line Replaceable Unit (LRU). The EAFR functions include the Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) function, the Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) function, the Data Link recording function,
and Image Recording function growth
Includes growth for Image recording (5 Gigabytes Crash Protected Memory) .
The Image Recorder growth function is used to record visual images of the flight deck instruments, flight deck, the aircraft structures, and engines as required. The Image Recorder function is capable of receiving a digital 10/100 Mbit Ethernet data stream of cockpit images and stores this data in the Crash Protected Memory in a separate partition. Even though the image recording duration will be governed by regulations , the EAFR Crash Protected Memory capacity has the storage capacity for two hours of image data recording per EUROCAE ED-112 requirements. Data in the Image Recording Crash Protected Memory partition can only be downloaded when the EAFR is off the aircraft.
Includes growth for Image recording (5 Gigabytes Crash Protected Memory) .
The Image Recorder growth function is used to record visual images of the flight deck instruments, flight deck, the aircraft structures, and engines as required. The Image Recorder function is capable of receiving a digital 10/100 Mbit Ethernet data stream of cockpit images and stores this data in the Crash Protected Memory in a separate partition. Even though the image recording duration will be governed by regulations , the EAFR Crash Protected Memory capacity has the storage capacity for two hours of image data recording per EUROCAE ED-112 requirements. Data in the Image Recording Crash Protected Memory partition can only be downloaded when the EAFR is off the aircraft.
July 14, 2025, 21:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922503
Again, not familiar with the specifics of the 787, but on the 747-400/-8, one pole of the fuel switch feeds EICAS - which uses it in various message logic - and sends it out to any other aircraft systems that use it. There is "Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit) DFDAU .... that takes all the various system digital signals, sorts them and provides them to the DFDR and QAR. The 787 has something similar to the DFDAU but I don't recall what it's called.
The other 2 contact sets feed latching relays (again driven each coil independently by dropping to GND at the switch) that then drive spar valves and reset signals to the FADEC Channels. (and more).
So - for the benefit of those that hang on to the 'possibility' of electrical gremlins and 'ghost' switch signals.
Each switch has 4 mechanically separated 'channels' - 2 of which do electromechanical things to the engines through separate paths, the other 2 feed through independent paths the FDR and the rest of the computer systems. The results of the electromechanical actions also feed back to the FDR.
Thus the readout from the EAFR will PROVE that the switches MUST have been PHYSICALLY MOVED.
And - I'm nervous to challenge you tdracer - there's quite the authority gradient and I know I'm at the bottom end, but I can't let this fly...
Its 'Deefer Doo'. Fight me.
July 14, 2025, 22:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922550
Switching off the engines would cut power. (the RAT deployed before they overflew the end of the runway) The HUD would go blank. As would most of the display units. The lighting would change. The hissing of conditioned air would stop. Various 'noises' would cease. The engines sound would change dramatically, and they would feel the deceleration. The one EICAS screen remaining would be generating all sorts of messages. It would be obvious that power was lost.
I cant speak for how long it would take to connect the dots though.
I cant speak for how long it would take to connect the dots though.
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/Documen...man-Master.PDF )
Last edited by D Bru; 14th July 2025 at 22:39 .
July 15, 2025, 09:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922785
From post #918 (number as at the time of this post):
I've desperately grasped at technical rather than human factors as the explanation for this tragedy, but have had to abandon that hope.
So - for the benefit of those that hang on to the 'possibility' of electrical gremlins and 'ghost' switch signals.
Each switch has 4 mechanically separated 'channels' - 2 of which do electromechanical things to the engines through separate paths, the other 2 feed through independent paths the FDR and the rest of the computer systems. The results of the electromechanical actions also feed back to the FDR.
Thus the readout from the EAFR will PROVE that the switches MUST have been PHYSICALLY MOVED.
Each switch has 4 mechanically separated 'channels' - 2 of which do electromechanical things to the engines through separate paths, the other 2 feed through independent paths the FDR and the rest of the computer systems. The results of the electromechanical actions also feed back to the FDR.
Thus the readout from the EAFR will PROVE that the switches MUST have been PHYSICALLY MOVED.
I've desperately grasped at technical rather than human factors as the explanation for this tragedy, but have had to abandon that hope.
July 15, 2025, 10:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922804
One thing that is confusing from the report is the fact that the thrust levers were found in the idle position yet the EAFR data recorded them in the takeoff thrust position.
July 15, 2025, 10:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922807
The fuel switch discrete doesn't really get used except for engine start - if it falsely indicates shutdown (on one or both channels), the FADEC won't do anything if the engine is already running. All this will set maintenance faults - and associated EICAS Status messages (L/R ENGINE CONTROL or ENGINE C1). I doubt that would be recorded on the DFDR - it would go to the QAR but that's unlikely to survive a crash. It would also be logged in the FADEC NVM - but again no guarantee that would survive either (although when the Lauda 767 crashed due to the thrust reverser deployment, the DFDR was destroyed but the FADEC NVMs both survived - much of what we know about that crash came from the FADEC NVM.)
Again, not familiar with the specifics of the 787, but on the 747-400/-8, one pole of the fuel switch feeds EICAS - which uses it in various message logic - and sends it out to any other aircraft systems that use it. There is "Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit) DFDAU (pronounced Daff Du) that takes all the various system digital signals, sorts them and provides them to the DFDR and QAR. The 787 has something similar to the DFDAU but I don't recall what it's called.
Again, not familiar with the specifics of the 787, but on the 747-400/-8, one pole of the fuel switch feeds EICAS - which uses it in various message logic - and sends it out to any other aircraft systems that use it. There is "Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit) DFDAU (pronounced Daff Du) that takes all the various system digital signals, sorts them and provides them to the DFDR and QAR. The 787 has something similar to the DFDAU but I don't recall what it's called.
I would assume from your statement, that if a mismatch in the NC/NO signal on the switch was detected the FADEC would not direct the Fuel Cutoff Valves to close (as far as the types you are familiar with are concerned), is that correct?
The report states:
[...] at about 08:08:42 UTC [...] the Engine 1 and Engine 2 fuel cutoff switches transitioned from RUN to CUTOFF position one after another with a time gap of 01 sec. The Engine N1 and N2 began to decrease from their take-off values as the fuel supply to the engines was cut off.
The report then states:
As per the EAFR, the Engine 1 fuel cutoff switch transitioned from CUTOFF to RUN at about 08:08:52 UTC. [...] Thereafter at 08:08:56 UTC the Engine 2 fuel cutoff switch also transitions from CUTOFF to RUN.
July 15, 2025, 10:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11922820
The thrust lever quadrant sustained significant thermal damage. Both thrust levers were found near the aft (idle) position. However, the EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained forward (takeoff thrust) until the impact. Both fuel control switch were found in the \x93RUN\x94 position. (fig.13) The reverser levers were bent but were in the \x93stowed\x94 position.
July 15, 2025, 17:49:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923123
The STAB cutout switches are located next to the Fuel cutoff switches. What did Air India\x92s on duty AME do as part of their troubleshooting? Were panels removed to gain access to the rear of the switches and wiring? What about wiring and data connections elsewhere? What may have been disconnected/disturbed as part of this process? It would not be the first time that an engineer had innocently done something that later caused an accident. And I haven't read anything about possible nefarious action by a (disgruntled?) engineer - but I've seen lots of accusations directed at the pilot(s)...
Wires or wiring is mentioned twice in the report:
The wiring from the TO/GA switches and autothrottle disconnect switches were visible, but heavily damaged.
The aft EAFR was located on the roof top of Building A on 13th June 2025. The EAFR had impact and thermal damages to the housing. The wires were protruding from the housing and the connectors were burnt.
While severely burnt the switches are still solidly in place and anything that was lodged in the switch housing itself would likely still be there. And I guess it would also be unlikely for FOD to equally impact both switches. I think I just talked myself out of the FOD theory.
I find option C to be at least a productive train of thought because it may provide methods of mitigation. That is after all what we're trying to achieve in discussing this kind of accident. I would expect or at least look positively on a suggestion to use the Embraer model for operating the cutoff valves. While it introduces a secondary element that may fail, requiring the Throttle Control Levers to be at idle just seems like a good idea. How is this handled by Airbus?
July 15, 2025, 18:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923148
For Dr Bru and Engineless:
I think that there is a thread about hacking of airliners somewhere on PPRuNe, might want to take that discussion there.
(Here is one, there are others)
A short response to you both:
1. Note that the article was from 2019
2. I am very doubtful that this occurred, beyond estimating the efficacy of any protections Boeing and Honeywell will have come up with since that article was published.
I doubt that either company sat on their hands after that Black Hat conference.
3. Caveat: yes, hackers never sleep .
= So some kind of sabotage is supposedly done, you think? = (I'll put the speculation into the spoiler)
But I think that you are both grasping at straws, for a variety of reasons, among which are:
1. No evidence to date.
2. Nothing in the report (but then, it's a prelim report)
3. If that kind of thing was going on, I don't think that the report would appear to lean so hard toward the human factors piece.
4. Unless that is part of the deception plan!
5. Yeah, right, we are back to the Hollywood thriller that neither of you have gotten a producer to try and get filmed.
6. Fear
7. Surprise
8. A fanatical devotion to Saint Bernoulli.
Please take any further discussion of this line of inquiry to a thread involving hacking.
Thank you all in advance.
T28B
(As an aside: if you took a look at the debris field, and the fact of the post impact fire, finding any evidence of something like what you are alluding to would be tough unless there's a way to parse EAFR information to detect the intrusion into the system of spurious / outside signals).
I think that there is a thread about hacking of airliners somewhere on PPRuNe, might want to take that discussion there.
(Here is one, there are others)
A short response to you both:
1. Note that the article was from 2019
2. I am very doubtful that this occurred, beyond estimating the efficacy of any protections Boeing and Honeywell will have come up with since that article was published.
I doubt that either company sat on their hands after that Black Hat conference.
3. Caveat: yes, hackers never sleep .
= So some kind of sabotage is supposedly done, you think? = (I'll put the speculation into the spoiler)
Spoiler
But I think that you are both grasping at straws, for a variety of reasons, among which are:
1. No evidence to date.
2. Nothing in the report (but then, it's a prelim report)
3. If that kind of thing was going on, I don't think that the report would appear to lean so hard toward the human factors piece.
4. Unless that is part of the deception plan!
5. Yeah, right, we are back to the Hollywood thriller that neither of you have gotten a producer to try and get filmed.
6. Fear
7. Surprise
8. A fanatical devotion to Saint Bernoulli.
Please take any further discussion of this line of inquiry to a thread involving hacking.
Thank you all in advance.
T28B
(As an aside: if you took a look at the debris field, and the fact of the post impact fire, finding any evidence of something like what you are alluding to would be tough unless there's a way to parse EAFR information to detect the intrusion into the system of spurious / outside signals).
Last edited by T28B; 15th July 2025 at 19:52 . Reason: Alert to move hacking discussion elsewhere
July 15, 2025, 20:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923252
Given the degraded power state at that moment, the only mic powerd by the RISP will be the CAM, thus the only remaining channel being recorded on the CVR of the (forward only) EAFR. Some audio forensics will be needed to identify individual persons' words (in the final moments).
July 15, 2025, 22:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923307
After all the analysis on PPRuNE, fuel switch failure (well, dual switch failure, at practically the same time) seems so unlikely it's no longer worthy of consideration. However, I'm still open to the idea of a failure elsewhere that may have signalled the fuel switches had transistioned from Run to Cutoff wthout physical movement of either switch. Why? Firstly, because of this (taken from the preliminary report)
Inspired by the mention in the
PR
about a MEL on the ‘core network’, I came across the polemics between Boeing and IOActive a few years ago about the alleged vulnerability of 787 core systems to outside interference (hacker attack from within a/c and/or ground), including the highly sensitive CDN module, from where also the fuel cut-off module can be accessed. It’s definitely not my specialty, but I thought to flag it in case someone has more informed ideas about this. To my mind it could potentially “outshine” intentional crew action. Boeing at the time denied such options, of course. Obviously also in good faith, moreover it seems to be Honeywell &GE code anyhow, but who knows where we are 6 years on.
https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-7...ecurity-flaws/
https://www.wired.com/story/boeing-7...ecurity-flaws/
July 15, 2025, 22:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923308
That's on the EAFR. With their headsets on, are B787 pilots even able to hear the engines on the flight deck, over the wind noise and their headset sidetone? Genuinely asking - I don't know.
July 15, 2025, 22:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923330
The overall sound environment of the 787 is surprisingly quiet, but at takeoff thrust the engines are easily heard, even with the headsets on - these are typically light-weight over-ear units. Aerodynamic noise is not really significant until the aircraft is faster/higher.
In this accident case, the engine spool-down should have been a noticeable sound cue.
- GY
July 16, 2025, 01:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923383
Since the preliminary report neglected including when the RAT deployment occurred, I've tried to estimate it based on the picture they did include:
Baro altitude should be around 150ft; using the public cctv video, I estimate this picture was taken between 4-7 seconds after rotation. A wide range, but that was the best estimate I could come up with. Maybe someone else could narrow it down further.
Baro altitude should be around 150ft; using the public cctv video, I estimate this picture was taken between 4-7 seconds after rotation. A wide range, but that was the best estimate I could come up with. Maybe someone else could narrow it down further.
1. ADSB readouts - according to FlightRadar24, the last ADSB transmission was at 71ft AGL. Is that significant given the RAT is seen already deployed at 150ft AGL per the estimate above? At 71ft AGL, the wheels are about 40-50ft off the ground, assuming aircraft attitude is unchanged between there and this image. Is that 1 or 2 seconds after rotation? Does this imply electrical issues?
1a. The timings for ADSB transmissions outlined by MrShed are not in sync with the estimates above - people have talked about a time shift in this thread. I do believe ADSB timestamps are by the receiving station.
2. The preliminary report timings from the EAFR for E2 fuel cutoff switch RUN -> CUTOFF to the RAT supplying hydraulic power disagree with the lower end of the 4-7s estimate above, and are only consistent if this picture was taken 6-7 seconds after rotation, in my opinion, because of the time (4-5s) it would take to cut off the fuel to E2, spool down to where the VFSGs stop providing AC power, and RAT deployment.
3. The Preliminary Report mentions that the RAT deployed "immediately after" lift-off. Again, I have to wonder, why didn't they provide the RAT deployment timestamp, even relative to rotation? If this is in fact the case, does this imply electrical issues, in line with the last ADSB altitude reading?
FR24 article https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/
Last edited by appruser; 16th July 2025 at 01:57 . Reason: Added link to FR24 blog post
July 16, 2025, 03:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923409
This was posted sometime ago, but if anyone would still find it useful to pinpoint the location of the aircraft in the 'new' photo from the Preliminary Report (with RAT deployed) I made a crude attempt which placed it roughly midway between the two sets of identical touchdown zone markings, ~245m (803 ft) from the displaced threshold of RW05.
The deemed position of the CCTV camera is only an estimate, based on visual cues. I'm happy to share my workings, should anyone find it useful to cross-reference this with other data they are working on, but I will avoid cluttering up the thread any further until/unless it becomes relevant.
You're looking for the point where the LEFT of the two white lines intersects the runway (ignore the white dots):
The deemed position of the CCTV camera is only an estimate, based on visual cues. I'm happy to share my workings, should anyone find it useful to cross-reference this with other data they are working on, but I will avoid cluttering up the thread any further until/unless it becomes relevant.
You're looking for the point where the LEFT of the two white lines intersects the runway (ignore the white dots):
Generally don't think it's a good idea to reply to own posts, but in this case wanted to keep things in context. A few interesting items of note:
1. ADSB readouts - according to FlightRadar24, the last ADSB transmission was at 71ft AGL. Is that significant given the RAT is seen already deployed at 150ft AGL per the estimate above? At 71ft AGL, the wheels are about 40-50ft off the ground, assuming aircraft attitude is unchanged between there and this image. Is that 1 or 2 seconds after rotation? Does this imply electrical issues?
1a. The timings for ADSB transmissions outlined by MrShed are not in sync with the estimates above - people have talked about a time shift in this thread. I do believe ADSB timestamps are by the receiving station.
2. The preliminary report timings from the EAFR for E2 fuel cutoff switch RUN -> CUTOFF to the RAT supplying hydraulic power disagree with the lower end of the 4-7s estimate above, and are only consistent if this picture was taken 6-7 seconds after rotation, in my opinion, because of the time (4-5s) it would take to cut off the fuel to E2, spool down to where the VFSGs stop providing AC power, and RAT deployment.
3. The Preliminary Report mentions that the RAT deployed "immediately after" lift-off. Again, I have to wonder, why didn't they provide the RAT deployment timestamp, even relative to rotation? If this is in fact the case, does this imply electrical issues, in line with the last ADSB altitude reading?
FR24 article https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/
1. ADSB readouts - according to FlightRadar24, the last ADSB transmission was at 71ft AGL. Is that significant given the RAT is seen already deployed at 150ft AGL per the estimate above? At 71ft AGL, the wheels are about 40-50ft off the ground, assuming aircraft attitude is unchanged between there and this image. Is that 1 or 2 seconds after rotation? Does this imply electrical issues?
1a. The timings for ADSB transmissions outlined by MrShed are not in sync with the estimates above - people have talked about a time shift in this thread. I do believe ADSB timestamps are by the receiving station.
2. The preliminary report timings from the EAFR for E2 fuel cutoff switch RUN -> CUTOFF to the RAT supplying hydraulic power disagree with the lower end of the 4-7s estimate above, and are only consistent if this picture was taken 6-7 seconds after rotation, in my opinion, because of the time (4-5s) it would take to cut off the fuel to E2, spool down to where the VFSGs stop providing AC power, and RAT deployment.
3. The Preliminary Report mentions that the RAT deployed "immediately after" lift-off. Again, I have to wonder, why didn't they provide the RAT deployment timestamp, even relative to rotation? If this is in fact the case, does this imply electrical issues, in line with the last ADSB altitude reading?
FR24 article https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/
Note that the good folks at FR24 did not apply temperature correction to the barometric altitude (they corrected for air pressure and runway elevation); pilots on pprune have done the corrections themselves and arrived at slightly different values, so take those altitude numbers with a grain of salt. Note also that the 787 sends altitude in 25 ft. increments, and I don't know how these are rounded (up, down, nearest).
We do not know how long the RAT has been deployed in this photo, we only know it can't have been deployed later. I have learned on this thread that the CUTOFF switch will also cause the VFSGs to disconnect, i.e. the B787 systems will electrically isolate the engine from the power buses before it has spooled down. With a dual failure, this would leave the main buses unpowered in short order, so if all of this is correct, the RAT would have clonked into place very soon after the second engine was cut off. This would not depend on the turbine speed.
I personally do not know what items are logged on the flight recorder, but I imagine RAT deployment was not among them. If so, the conditions for its deployment would be logged, but it requires an analytical step to conclude it did, and a preliminary report typically has no analysis at all. Hydraulic pressure to the flight controls is likely logged, so the RAT delivering hydraulic power would be a matter of record.
Where is the RadAlt antenna on a 787? Is it in the nose, or further back between the main gears?
Last edited by Musician; 16th July 2025 at 04:02 .
July 16, 2025, 17:13:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923863
From the information so far available, the ones on the accident aircraft was not installed the wrong way, else the conclusion that they were in the RUN position would not be there. You don't have a theory, you don't have a hypothesis, you have an (as yet) unsupported assertion.
Now, if a friend of your who works at Air India has sent you a text message, or spoken to you, and advised you privately that someone at that company had installed those switches improperly on that aircraft, then perhaps you can forward that info to the accident investigators (in whatever non attribution method you can figure out).
Further that point: had the installation been faulty, or presented evidence of that, that fact would have been in the report because they found the switches intact (albeit somewhat worse off due to the post crash fire).
See page 10 of the prelim, figure 13:
The thrust lever quadrant sustained significant thermal damage. Both thrust levers were found near the aft (idle) position. However, the EAFR data revealed that the thrust levers remained forward (takeoff thrust) until the impact. Both fuel control switch were found in the “RUN” position. (fig.13) The reverser levers were bent but were in the “stowed” position. The wiring from the TO/GA switches and autothrottle disconnect switches were visible, but heavily damaged"
But I'll throw you a bone: since I don't think that they have completed 100% all of their digging into the maintenance side of this, someone may turn up something odd before they issue a subsequent report, or the final report.
Beyond that, thank you for your concise response to my overly long post.
Last edited by Lonewolf_50; 16th July 2025 at 17:50 .
July 16, 2025, 19:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923936
There is no secrecy. There simply is nothing to release yet as the actual investigation is just getting started with the preliminary gathering of evidence nearing completion.
July 16, 2025, 21:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924011
787 has RDC's - Remote Data Concentrators. Doing the same function. Two of the switch pole-sets go each to one of 2 different RDC's, that feed the EAFR's / QAR, and the common core network so that any system that wants to know, can. The wiring is positive voltage from the RDC's to the switch and to GND through the common pin. So the RDC's would be able to detect anomalies such as both contacts open, or both contacts closed. The EAFR will see two independent channels per switch.
The other 2 contact sets feed latching relays (again driven each coil independently by dropping to GND at the switch) that then drive spar valves and reset signals to the FADEC Channels. (and more).
So - for the benefit of those that hang on to the 'possibility' of electrical gremlins and 'ghost' switch signals.
Each switch has 4 mechanically separated 'channels' - 2 of which do electromechanical things to the engines through separate paths, the other 2 feed through independent paths the FDR and the rest of the computer systems. The results of the electromechanical actions also feed back to the FDR.
Thus the readout from the EAFR will PROVE that the switches MUST have been PHYSICALLY MOVED.
The other 2 contact sets feed latching relays (again driven each coil independently by dropping to GND at the switch) that then drive spar valves and reset signals to the FADEC Channels. (and more).
So - for the benefit of those that hang on to the 'possibility' of electrical gremlins and 'ghost' switch signals.
Each switch has 4 mechanically separated 'channels' - 2 of which do electromechanical things to the engines through separate paths, the other 2 feed through independent paths the FDR and the rest of the computer systems. The results of the electromechanical actions also feed back to the FDR.
Thus the readout from the EAFR will PROVE that the switches MUST have been PHYSICALLY MOVED.