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KSINGH
2025-06-12T12:16:00 permalink Post: 11899150 |
To nip any talk of intersection take off (it’s been said a lot on social media) from someone on the ground that seems to know what they are talking about
:
interestingly he also seems to have been around to witness the TO roll and is mentioning a possible EFATO: |
L8ngtkite
2025-06-12T15:39:00 permalink Post: 11899361 |
AD compliance?
aviationweek.com/aerospace/aircraft-propulsion/faa-boeing-787s-need-be-powered-every-120-days
aviation.stackexchange.com/questions/14494/in-what-circumstances-could-a-787-stay-powered-on-continuously-for-248-days Loud bang heard by pax 11A suggests otherwise. (ie EFATO) but still\x85 Could It have been a compressor stall / flow reversal at the point of EEC shutdown? Loss of thrust on both engines? The odds are slim but would the RAT deploy in such a scenario? (or has the RAT deployment observation been debunked?) 1 user liked this post. |
Screamliner
2025-06-14T12:04:00 permalink Post: 11901414 |
I'm reading a lot of the comments, speculation is something we all like, but some things just do not add up, even with a RAT deployed
if they had dual engine failure around 50 feet where you raise the gear, how can they still find the energy to climb, since they would be at VR/V2 speed (not V2+20 at that altitude, what VNAV would command after take off, especially with a take off weight of around 205/210 tons, the 787 wings are amazing but not miracles if they had a normal departure, why did they not raise the gear, they had a positive rate since they were climbing and the speed according to ADS-B was a constant. if they were single engine ! this would have saved them with this weight and weather, one of the first things you learn when EFATO with a 787, raise the gear, your climb performance increases dramatically if they did an intersection departure with they're genex 64-70K engines, they would have had a take off limited weight of around 172 tons, I estimate that they were close to 205/210 tons, (max zfw of around 161 tons and around 45/50 tons of fuel) even full length would have been a stress for the engines, with the prevailing weather conditions, intersection take off can be ruled out, they would have never made it, full length is already difficult. When we see the video, the airplane is still climbing / flying straight and level (not losing altitude), yet we hear what we think might be the RAT, I can't imagine that they had the kinetic energy to do this with no engines. if they had dual engine failure, they would have been a brick, Hot and High, no thrust, flaps 5, zero chance. flickering of lights etc. seen by the survivor and the loud bang heard, I would not trust pax observations, because of the things they had to go through, also and I've said this before, if it was a loud bang, where is the smoke and fire in the engines, or in the video, its not audible lets see what the report will say, but it it could be a lot to swallow for some 2 users liked this post. |
Screamliner
2025-06-15T15:11:00 permalink Post: 11902541 |
I'm reading a lot of the comments, speculation is something we all like, but some things just do not add up, even with a RAT deployed
if they had dual engine failure around 50 feet where you raise the gear, how can they still find the energy to climb, since they would be at VR/V2 speed (not V2+20 at that altitude, what VNAV would command after take off, especially with a take off weight of around 205/210 tons, the 787 wings are amazing but not miracles if they had a normal departure, why did they not raise the gear, they had a positive rate since they were climbing and the speed according to ADS-B was a constant. if they were single engine ! this would have saved them with this weight and weather, one of the first things you learn when EFATO with a 787, raise the gear, your climb performance increases dramatically Intersection take off can be ruled out: if they did an intersection departure with they're genex 64-70K engines, they would have had a take off limited weight of around 172 tons, I estimate that they were close to 205/210 tons, (max zfw of around 161 tons and around 45/50 tons of fuel) even full length would have been a stress for the engines, with the prevailing weather conditions, they would have never made it, full length is already difficult. When we see the video, the airplane is still climbing / flying straight and level (not losing altitude), yet we hear what we think might be the RAT, I can't imagine that they had the kinetic energy to do this with no engines. if they had dual engine failure, they would have been a brick, Hot and High, no thrust, flaps 5, zero chance. flickering of lights etc. seen by the survivor and the loud bang heard, I would not trust pax observations, because of the things they had to go through, also and I've said this before, if it was a loud bang, where is the smoke and fire in the engines, or in the video, its not audible lets see what the report will say, but it it could be a lot to swallow for some Last edited by T28B; 15th Jun 2025 at 16:30 . Reason: cleaned up formatting 1 user liked this post. |
kit344
2025-06-15T22:59:00 permalink Post: 11902936 |
TCMA Logic
Retired RAF avionics technician, PPL / Glider pilot with ~ 700 hrs. VC10 double EFATO survivor.
The TCMA system should be inhibited when Air / Ground logic is in Air mode. I understand that it has Inputs from RadAlt, Weight on Wheels, etc. This airframe was reported to have had a history of significant electrical / electronic problems, including on the prior inbound flight. There may have been water ingress in the E&E bay, likely causing corrosion or other damage. Chafed or damaged wiring / cable insulation within looms is possible. Including the landing gear microswitches. The landing gear may have been interrupted in the cycle. BOTH engines are reported to have shut down, so whatever happened is a system common to both engines. TCMA failing at the moment of gear retraction appears to fit with the available evidence. Last edited by kit344; 15th Jun 2025 at 23:03 . Reason: they there replacement 3 users liked this post. |
T28B
2025-06-15T23:14:00 permalink Post: 11902946 |
I do not intend to single you out, but I want to illustrate something with this response. A lot of discussion on this thread has pointed toward two engines failing - or losing power - for a variety of reasons. PPRuNe members are analysing and discussing this tragedy. When a credible report comes out that says
"Based on FDR data, the two donks quit at {such and such a time} and {x event} associated with this indicates that they {failed or shut down} by time {XX:XX:XX}"
you, or we, can say that engines were shut down or failed.
Using unconfirmed news reports, social media, or PPruNe analysis as a basis of "fact" is hazardous. A number of posters succumbed to this: see the obsession over white and green lights at the exit door (near seat 11A) as but one example. As an aside: your EFATO story might be of interest on the Mil Av forum. ![]() 5 users liked this post. |
EDLB
2025-06-18T14:48:00 permalink Post: 11905303 |
FADEC Power supply: The Safran FADEC used on the GEnx-1B here is most likely a Generation 3 FADEC. The same Generation as used for CFM56-5 and -7 in A320 etc. So with high probability the same overall topology with independent 3 Phase alternator supply for the FADEC is used because similar certification standards are required and nobody develops a FADEC from scratch if he has a proven and qualified one.
Detail form Airbus here: https://studylib.net/doc/27601211/51...british-cfm-56 Safran FADEC Gen 3 uses: https://www.safran-group.com/product...engine-control - CFM56-5B de CFM International - CFM56-7B de CFM International - CF6-80C2L1F de General Electric - CF6-80C2K1F de General Electric - GE90-115B de General Electric - GEnx-1B de General Electric - GEnx-2B de General Electric - GP7200 d’Engine Alliance - TP400-D6 d’Europrop International. So if there is a latent failure in the design or software of this FADEC generation which can lead to a dual EFATO most of the current airliners worldwide have to be grounded. 3 users liked this post. |
Icarus2001
2025-06-21T07:20:00 permalink Post: 11907542 |
Only a reset of the Altitude Module or manual override of the Auto Trust would overcome this uncommented descent.
So no, the AAI does not need to be changed to commence a climb.
Where the meme has come from that jet pilots have to shut down engines as quickly as possible I don’t know but it is incorrect.
Last edited by Icarus2001; 21st Jun 2025 at 07:27 . Reason: Fat fingers. |
CharlieMike
2025-06-21T08:23:00 permalink Post: 11907570 |
EFATO handling is similar on most types too\x85in essence, contain any yaw, rotate, get the gear up and either trim it out or (787) let the aircraft trim it out\x85.AP in and once safely climbing away at a defined altitude diagnose followed by memory items if applicable. 787 you don\x92t action any drills until above 400ft so it would be extremely unlikely this crew actually got the stage of touching a fuel control switch. 7 users liked this post. |
EDLB
2025-06-21T14:30:00 permalink Post: 11907801 |
Some assumed numbers about normal biotreatment.
https://www.biobor.com/wp-content/up...ation-IATA.pdf If we assume 50 tonnes fuel load a 100ppmw biotreatment will be 5kg of biocide total in all tanks. The GEnx-1B will burn about 4,5kg/s fuel each on a take off run (give or take a bit) so 9kg/s in both donks for about 20s until rotate. So the total nominal biocide dose could be pumped in about half a second through both engines on take off power if it where not mixed at all and arrives in both engines at the same time. This gives you an idea that with the nominal amount of biocide dose not much could have happened. If biocide is the source of this dual EFATO than an extreme overdose in addition to wrong application preventing mixture with the fuel had to be the case. Last edited by T28B; 21st Jun 2025 at 14:34 . Reason: Formatting assistance and punctuation 3 users liked this post. |
JPI33600
2025-06-21T15:52:00 permalink Post: 11907864 |
Some assumed numbers about normal biotreatment.
https://www.biobor.com/wp-content/up...ation-IATA.pdf If we assume 50 tonnes fuel load a 100ppmw biotreatment will be 5kg of biocide total in all tanks. The GEnx-1B will burn about 4,5kg/s fuel each on a take off run (give or take a bit) so 9kg/s in both donks for about 20s until rotate. So the total nominal biocide dose could be pumped in about half a second through both engines on take off power if it where not mixed at all and arrives in both engines at the same time. This gives you an idea that with the nominal amount of biocide dose not much could have happened. If biocide is the source of this dual EFATO than an extreme overdose in addition to wrong application preventing mixture with the fuel had to be the case. First, the problem involves the valves (notably but not exclusively FMV and FSV), not the combustion of the product:
It is highly probable that Residue primarily composed of magnesium salts accumulated in FMV spool and FSV spool, which meter engine combustion fuel, restricted movement of spools, caused inadequate fuel metering, thereby led to engine rpm oscillation that occurred from the first flight after conducting biocide treatment.
Investigation into similar cases revealed that there were six cases reported in which both engines could not start in twin engine aircraft, and one case each in which all engines could not start in four-engine aircraft and engine thrust could not be adjusted. Any of these cases were presumed to have been caused by concentration ratio of biocide (Kathon FP1.5) that was set at higher values (about 1,000 ppm) than specified ones during biocide treatments.
From the biocide test result, it is probable that Magnesium salts contained in biocide did not dissolve in fuel, but dissolved in water contained in fuel and were accumulated in spools as crystals through the engine fuel system.
![]() ![]() These "rpm oscillations", leading to substantial loss of thrust, could as well have occurred simultaneously, and 81 seconds (for the RH engine) is an awfully long time. According to the report, Kathon FP1.5 is not used anymore for biocide treatment, but another contributor ( nachtmusak , who seems to be a petrol specialist) suggested that other products may have similar effects . Therefore, regarding the case we are discussing at large (thanks again, mods!), I think we shouldn't overlook the hypothesis of fuel contamination by biocide, since it is a single point of failure (among a very limited number of SPoFs) from a system analysis point of view. 2 users liked this post. |
Gary Brown
2025-06-21T16:31:00 permalink Post: 11907891 |
Some assumed numbers about normal biotreatment.
https://www.biobor.com/wp-content/up...ation-IATA.pdf If we assume 50 tonnes fuel load a 100ppmw biotreatment will be 5kg of biocide total in all tanks. The GEnx-1B will burn about 4,5kg/s fuel each on a take off run (give or take a bit) so 9kg/s in both donks for about 20s until rotate. So the total nominal biocide dose could be pumped in about half a second through both engines on take off power if it where not mixed at all and arrives in both engines at the same time. This gives you an idea that with the nominal amount of biocide dose not much could have happened. If biocide is the source of this dual EFATO than an extreme overdose in addition to wrong application preventing mixture with the fuel had to be the case. Neither incident reports make for pretty reading. But, in neither case did they experience near-simultaneous engine failure (not far off that, but still assymetric). Last edited by Gary Brown; 22nd Jun 2025 at 08:19 . Reason: Correcting math error from 100 x to 10 x ... 3 users liked this post. |
Abbas Ibn Firnas
2025-06-30T13:32:00 permalink Post: 11913628 |
Thank you for that answer, edge cases do abound in complex systems, but would not moving the throttles forward by hand (as the thrust was beginning to reduce {for that strange reason}) overcome that and restore thrust?
(As I don't fly the 787, I may be missing something basic on how the systems work). THRUST Asymmetry PROTECTION. "For an engine-out condition, Thrust Asymmetry Protection (TAP) reduces thrust on the operating engine to ensure there is sufficient rudder for directional control. TAP reduces thrust when the airspeed decreases below approximately V2 on a takeoff or below approximately VREF on a go-around. Once speed is increased above V2/VREF, TAP increases thrust." From what we know so far, it does seem the engines were not producing sufficient thrust, during a period when it would also be crucial to maintain electrical output for the electro-hydraulic systems and critical electrical loads. Reduced electrical output could explain the failure of the gear to complete retraction, maybe caused by a generator failing at the worst possible moment. If there was an EFATO, the ability of the remaining generators to provide sufficient power might become questionable, as is highlighted with the load shedding system. Other features which are unique to the 787 could be contributing factors in explaining the accident. It is known the 787 will generally employ an extended take-off roll, and a relatively higher V1 and Vr, and also climb out less steeply than other aircraft. Using more of the runway would reduce the margin for aborted take offs. With the evident lack of thrust early in the climb out, and failure to retract the gear, if V2 had not been maintained, the TAP system would have reduced thrust even further. Manually increasing thrust will be inhibited. |
Sailvi767
2025-06-30T18:57:00 permalink Post: 11913849 |
I found descriptions on the systems of the 787 were easily discovered online, and while I have no hands-on experience of aircraft related matters, I do have experience in wider electrical theory and maintenance.
THRUST Asymmetry PROTECTION. "For an engine-out condition, Thrust Asymmetry Protection (TAP) reduces thrust on the operating engine to ensure there is sufficient rudder for directional control. TAP reduces thrust when the airspeed decreases below approximately V2 on a takeoff or below approximately VREF on a go-around. Once speed is increased above V2/VREF, TAP increases thrust." From what we know so far, it does seem the engines were not producing sufficient thrust, during a period when it would also be crucial to maintain electrical output for the electro-hydraulic systems and critical electrical loads. Reduced electrical output could explain the failure of the gear to complete retraction, maybe caused by a generator failing at the worst possible moment. If there was an EFATO, the ability of the remaining generators to provide sufficient power might become questionable, as is highlighted with the load shedding system. Other features which are unique to the 787 could be contributing factors in explaining the accident. It is known the 787 will generally employ an extended take-off roll, and a relatively higher V1 and Vr, and also climb out less steeply than other aircraft. Using more of the runway would reduce the margin for aborted take offs. With the evident lack of thrust early in the climb out, and failure to retract the gear, if V2 had not been maintained, the TAP system would have reduced thrust even further. Manually increasing thrust will be inhibited. 2 users liked this post. |
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