Posts about: "EICAS" [Posts: 79 Pages: 4]

Originally Posted by Tu.114

How does a 787 react to low speed? What are the protections on this type?

Originally Posted by nolimitholdem

Hmm. B787 pilot also and with respect, on the B787 (-9 tho) in the sim anyway, wanting an answer to this very question we experimented with setting a flap setting other than the one in the CDU and received no config warning. I believe the config warning system reads the flap position sensors, not the CDU. I am completely willing to be corrected but was quite surprised myself. 🤔

Originally Posted by nolimitholdem

Hmm. B787 pilot also and with respect, on the B787 (-9 tho) in the sim anyway, wanting an answer to this very question we experimented with setting a flap setting other than the one in the CDU and received no config warning. I believe the config warning system reads the flap position sensors, not the CDU. I am completely willing to be corrected but was quite surprised myself. 🤔

Originally Posted by Kenny

777 guy but you’re talking about two different things. Unless I’m mistaken. You’re talking about the Take Off Config EICAS warning. He’s talking about the Before Take Off checklist showing as complete, if the selected flaps aren’t in agreement with the entered CDU value.

Originally Posted by makobob

This is what happens with a flaps up take-off. Human error strikes again! Additionally, pilots were so distracted by loss of lift, forgot to raise gear. Boeing is vindicated. God bless all of their souls!

Originally Posted by Util BUS

I believe the loud bang that survivor heard was a (BTB) Bus Tie Breaker short.

Based on the comments made by the passenger who travelled on the aircrafts previous sector, speaking about air conditioning that was going on and off, I think a faulty (CAC) Cabin Air Compressors may have contributed.

The B787 FCOM has information about the about only two of four CAC\x92s being used for ground operation, maybe B787 crew can confirm.

I am curious if the increased electrical demand of the CAC\x92s shortly after take-off somehow contributed to this potential short.

If such a short did occur then the next question would be how this may influence the engine controls, but given the 248 day AD for electrical issues, it could potentially affect the engines.

I was also surprised to learn that the B787 EICAS actually has a ENG THRUST caution, so not a totally unexplored issue.

Originally Posted by HumbleDeer

Default setup is left tank left engine, right tank right engine. Each engine also has two redundant pumps feeding it, meaning it can operate fully and normally on one operational engine fuel pump.

Furthermore, the engines cannot run from the center tank. There's no such thing. The center tank transfers to the outer tanks, when necessary or when running low or to resolve imbalances, either automatically or manually initated by the pilot for whatever reason. The engine fuel pumps only ever draw from their respective tank.
It is as thus impossible for the center tank being empty to cause engine shutdown unless the main tanks were also empty, in which case we would: be in a lot of trouble, shouldn't be taking off, and wouldn't have a massive orange fireball.

Originally Posted by kristofera

Just a thought regarding the possibility of some kind of sensor failure: mud wasps.

Since this was a short stopover, perhaps pitot covers were not used. Mud wasps can build their nests in a very short timespan, and they have been known to block pitot tubes and static pitot ports in the past.

Just throwing this out there as one additional possible hole in one of the slices of cheese.

Originally Posted by BugBear

Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).

Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..

Originally Posted by BugBear

Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).

Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..first it bangs for awhile, then it burns itself up, then ...

Originally Posted by MaybeItIs

Thanks for answering the question I hadn't yet asked but wanted to confirm!

I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions.

As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load.

If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault.

Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature.

Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking.

As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it.

It's going to be difficult to prove though.

Originally Posted by ILS27LEFT

Best post until now in my view. We will find out very soon I think. Gear up command triggered the instant lack of fuel to both engines. I'm not sure on how the fuel flow is dependant on the power supplies on the 787 but I genuinely believe you are very very close to what might have happened here.

Originally Posted by MaybeItIs

Yes, thanks, I've seen a few comments to this effect, and I have to accept most of what you say. I understand that they have their own dedicated generators and local independent FADECs (or EECs), but I'm trying to use what I do know to attempt to figure this out. I know that there are Fuel Cutoff switches in the cockpit. Somehow, if switched to Off, these will cut off the fuel to the engines, "no matter what". Of course, even that's not true, as the Qantas A380 engine burst apparently (comment in this thread) showed.

Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can.

You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve?

Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so.

Originally Posted by lucille

What\x92s the usual time frame for the release of preliminary data and report from the FDR and CVR? Is it around 6 months?

I guess if no directives come from Boeing or the FAA in the next 2 weeks, it can be presumed that a systems failure from which recovery was impossible was unlikely.

Originally Posted by old dawg

Retired engineer here. Following my post a while ago on the avionics electrical system I have read all the posts and also noticed mention of the hydraulics system.
Returning to my original source, which is Book 1 Introduction to B787 Avionic/Electrical, I read on p. 96 that the RAT will deploy if any of three condions are met.
Maybe the URL will work this time
https://fliphtml5.com/quwam/qhdw/Boo...ics_Electrical
These conditions for deployment of the RAT specifically are:
Loss of both engines
Loss of power to the instrument buses
Loss of all three hydraulic systems

The latter one may be worth a close look because it would appear that problems took place when the wheels left the runway and I assume there was a change of states in various sensors. I surmise these sensors are different from the engine systems where both commands and power are needed to force a change of state in, say, fuel pumps. Is it the same for thrust control?
It says there are three hydraulic systems but is there a common reservoir? I'm not an expert in that field but google tells me that B787 has a bootstrap reservoir system which I understand to mean that a pressure of 5000 psi is maintained using a piston arrangement.

At this point think timeline, and changes of states.
There is an operational change when the wheels leave the ground. The associated sensors would send that data to the CCS. What was sent? Maybe the CCS read Hydraulic L + Hydraulic R + Hydraulic C = incorrect or fail, which would trigger deployment of the RAT. What would the electrical and control system do then? More importantly what exactly did all the systems do on this aircraft following such an event.
Was there a problem with the fluid in the hydraulics? Does hydraulic fluid ever 'go off' in very hot conditions. Or maybe there wasn't as much fluid in there than there should have been? How would hydraulics systems be compromised if indeed that was the case.
All speculation - but forensic system analysis is a bit like that

Originally Posted by matiagr

The biggest news site in Greece claims to have the results of a kind of preliminary report from India AAIB which say that as the plane rotated, the pilot's seat malfunctioned (broken pin) and went suddenly far back forcing the captain to accidentally lower the thrust lever as he already had his hand on it and despite the co-pilots effort to help increase the thrust it was already to late to avoid the stall. I dont believe they would have posted something as serious as this without any credible source cause they are supposed to be a serious news outlet but you never know when stupidity takes over validity. Source is the protothema dot gr site

Originally Posted by fdr

Water ingress into the E/E bay is a serious issue. The B744 had this issue in the past causing serious problems, one of which was fortunate to not lead to a loss of the aircraft, on a B744F. The B744 pax aircraft had a number of water problems related to the toilets and the galley. The forward galley on the B742/3s had many issues.

Any large aircraft going through maintenance is interesting to observe the extent of corrosion that occurs near toilets and galleys, and from water lines.

Water accumulations on the B744 came to light at rotate, and took out a lot of electrical services.

My suspicion is some cause such as this will come to light shortly.

Both of the E/E bays contain stuff that is nice to keep dry and operating, and prior events have shown that multiple system failures can and have occurred when a flood is added to all the black boxes sitting innocently on their racks.

The ADs are not necessarily directly related to the specific cause, they highlight the potential for water damage and that bad stuff happens. In two cases I investigated, the event occurred at rotate. Both were B744's one pax, one F.

Compound, unrelated system failures at rotate? Single cause? Water in the E/E bay.

Originally Posted by Bleve

I recommend that everyone look at the video posted by Sawbones62 in this post . The video (Stig Shift #76) is by a qualified B787 engineer and he looks at the various aircraft systems that are being discussed in the Air India accident. With respect to the landing gear, he concludes that the landing gear handle must have been selected up for the bogies to have been tilted front down.

Originally Posted by Aerospace101

I too watched his explanation with interest. However I believe he is not considering the possibility of C hydraulics failure prior to wheels lift-off, because I speculated this is the more likely reason the gear trucks remained in a forward tilt position, see my earlier post here . I believe the crew never got as far as calling for the Gear Up... many possible reasons for this, flickering instrument screens during the electrical switchover to battery power, flurry of EICAS messages. For any of those things happening around time of rotation, I would be advocating delaying gear up decision until safely climbing away above AA and as a crew you have chance to discuss safest course of action. Not putting the gear up shouldn't kill you.

Point is the gear truck tilt is a clue of a C hydraulics failure, but we cant determine if hydraulics failed prior to wheels off runway or prior to gear doors opening in retraction sequence.

Originally Posted by rigoschris

In terms of power, each FADEC has its own alternator driven by the engine. But there\x92s a failover connection to the AC bus of the plane. Not sure if there\x92s a physical relay keeping it disconnected in normal operations.