Page Links: First Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Next Last Index Page
Shep69
2025-06-20T13:55:00 permalink Post: 11906990 |
One fact that alters things substantially is whether the survivor's impression is correct that possibly the engines started to spool up again just before impact. If that's the case then what does that do to the possibility or otherwise that the TMCA system caused a dual engine shutdown? There may have been other electrical and systems malfunctioning. But if whatever happened, let’s say the auto throttle simply pulled power to idle —or a low power setting—at a critical time. Perhaps on its own perhaps with other systems failures. We like to think it basic that we’d slam the throttles forward. Right away. But Asiana didn’t. And neither did Air Florida years ago. |
Propellerhead
2025-06-20T14:06:00 permalink Post: 11907000 |
Sorry if this has been covered in the previous 1 million posts, but do we know if the training captain or trainee was handling the takeoff? The one thing that does change at V1 is PF\x92s hand comes off the thrust levers and joins the other hand on the control column. How long until people then put their hand back on the thrust levers varies a lot. Especially if turbulent or there is a perception of difficult handling ie) engine failure which often delays it. If your hand is on the thrust lever then should be able to feel them moving - unless gripping them so firmly it over rides the clutches.
Oh, and the FDRs haven\x92t been read yet as they were damaged in the fire. |
draglift
2025-06-20T15:41:00 permalink Post: 11907068 |
Sailvi767 wrote
Shutting down the wrong engine below 400 AGL is extremely rare. So rare in fact that I believe it has not happened in a jet transport class aircraft.
https://aerossurance.com/safety-mana...human-factors/ 3 users liked this post. |
Capn Bloggs
2025-06-20T15:49:00 permalink Post: 11907075 |
Disclaimer: the numbers I mention are from publicly available sources, namely Wiki (for the ZFW weight calculation) and a Boeing FCOM dated 2010, and my own estimations.
Strange, as I would have estimated this quite differently based on layman's intuition. If one assumes average values, then the approximate flight profile of AI171 according to layman's guidance certainly fits a situation in which the engines failed at or even very shortly before rotation.
​​​​​​​
Is VR about 20 to 30 knots above the landing speed?
​​​​​​​
Would these 20 to 30 knots of additional energy be sufficient to lift the aircraft to a good 200 ft during and after rotation?
​​​​​​​
If the angle of attack is then successively reduced, wouldn't the airplane still have enough lift to glide for a few seconds before losing all or nearly all lift?
​​​​​​​
Wouldn't it be the case that if the thrust had only ceased five seconds after rotation, the aircraft would then have reached a good 250 ft with the engines still running and then another good 200 ft in normal conditions before the speed was used up to about 150 kn?
​​​​​​​
AI171 probably didn't reach an altitude of 400 to 500 ft above ground (in relation to the airport), did it?
@Brace , I think you're exaggerating the residual thrust effect at lower RPMs. Of course 70% would get you round the pattern but you're at a much lower drag config and you're going much faster, again less drag. And are improved-climb takeoffs in the 787-8 even a thing? I can't see a two-stage rotation. I've made up a YT combo video: 10 users liked this post. |
MarineEngineer
2025-06-20T15:53:00 permalink Post: 11907080 |
Sailvi767
" The fan never stops rotating in a normal engine loss. Having been through a catastrophic engine failure in a 767 I can tell you that trust stops almost instantly." I can well believe that "trust" stops instantly ![]() Last edited by MarineEngineer; 20th Jun 2025 at 16:03 . 4 users liked this post. |
NOC40
2025-06-20T16:04:00 permalink Post: 11907092 |
In the CSV data set that can be downloaded from that link the first point with altitude data is 1630 ft short of the departure threshold. That point is 575. The highest alt recorded in the data set is 625. All the points with altitude data overlay the departure runway. I do not understand how anyone is using this data set to determine the maximum altitude which was way past the departure end.
![]() Edit to add - I have made no attempt to correct the raw ADS-B altitude data. There is no need to make any correction to see altitude gain. I've had a bit more time to analyse now. Those ADS-B data points (and particularly the rate of deceleration) are EXACTLY what you would expect to see from a total engine failure at or very shortly after TAKE-OFF (it implies a 13:1 L/D which must be pretty close for gear down and flaps 5). It places takeoff at 700m before the runway end @ ~185kt Based on those, max altitude was c250ft @ 140kt (or the equivalent total energy equivalent), 500m after the end of the runway. 13:1 L/D would also get you groundspeed on impact of 120kt Do those numbers make sense? |
Yo_You_Not_You_you
2025-06-20T16:39:00 permalink Post: 11907121 |
I posted my first-cut analysis in the earlier thread.
I've had a bit more time to analyse now. Those ADS-B data points (and particularly the rate of deceleration) are EXACTLY what you would expect to see from a total engine failure at or very shortly after TAKE-OFF (it implies a 13:1 L/D which must be pretty close for gear down and flaps 5). It places takeoff at 700m before the runway end @ ~185kt Based on those, max altitude was c250ft @ 140kt (or the equivalent total energy equivalent), 500m after the end of the runway. 13:1 L/D would also get you groundspeed on impact of 120kt Do those numbers make sense? ![]() Exact location of house, Approx distance of 1.5 km from end of runway to crash site . Coordinates of the camera : 23\xb003'42.3"N 72\xb037'03.5"E The Approx Camera location of the Balcony is the Red Mark . Can the speed be calculated . Does the speed line up with the ADS B data , Does it Gain Any speed after this Balcony point ? Co-incidently Another Witness is the Grand Mother of the Balcony Teen, she was closer to the airport as per her . she is saying that the engine was silent after it passed over (but making sound , when it was Over , RAT already deployed?? ) and made offhand comment it was gonna crash . Found that out later . |
ams6110
2025-06-20T16:51:00 permalink Post: 11907131 |
... The generally held theory for each engine\x92s FADEC failure (due to a common software error related to a ground-air sensing failure) is not supported by the cumulative hours over many years without such a failure. So, if you then look around for another component that can shut down two engines simultaneously you end up with the fuel shut-off valves (FSOV). Why? On each engine It is fail-safed to close off fuel-feed flows by a spring that is held
open
by a solenoid. If that solenoid loses electrical power, the FSOV closes and the engine shuts down after a short period.
18 users liked this post. |
BraceBrace
2025-06-20T19:56:00 permalink Post: 11907263 |
The fan never stops rotating in a normal engine loss. Having been through a catastrophic engine failure in a 767 I can tell you that trust stops almost instantly. Certainly no more than 2 seconds. It also needs to be understood that thrust is not linear to engine speed in a jet. Very little thrust is generated below 70% RPM and thrust increases rapidly above 85%.
70% is not "very little", it is almost the required thrust in level flight with intermediate flaps out and gear down at those altitudes (depending on the weight). Without the gear, 60% is enough to keep level flight. If you want to descend, 55% is enough to keep speed with flaps full landing configuration and gear down on a 3\xb0 glide. So even at 55% N1, the aircraft wouldn't stall, it would gradually descend if the pitch would be correct. It is what is between 70 and max rated that is needed for the initial climbout and that thrust is "excess" as it is there needed for the second segment in case of engine out. Considering the fact that the climb only lasted 10 seconds, 2 seconds is 20% of that time where the engines were still pushing. It is not because it is "significantly less" that it is nothing (that's why when you apply full reverse and don't let the engines slow down with idle selected, you will feel the kick forward.) If you look at the takeoff video, you will see that the aircraft does a very rotation that some pilots prefer to avoid tailstrike: first initial rotation, constant pitch to allow the aircraft to become airborne avoiding tailstrike, second increase in pitch at which point the rate of climb quickly disappears. At that point, the "parabolic" maneuver with constant nose up is created, very typical for a loss of thrust (loss of airspeed with constant pitch). Which begs the question why they never lowered the nose... Last edited by BraceBrace; 20th Jun 2025 at 20:11 . 1 user liked this post. |
Zionstrat2
2025-06-20T21:33:00 permalink Post: 11907338 |
GA guy who's been reading the thread from the beginning..
I'm assuming my question is moot because I don't believe it's been mentioned in the entire thread, however is there any possible maintenance issue that could affect two engines over time? This is certainly happened before, I'm thinking of N334EA where all three engines were lost due to maintenance replacing all three chip detectors with defective detectors before the flight. Of course it took 40 something minutes before the first engine oil was drained and the other two engines failed at different times after that. So that pattern doesn't fit, but my question is are there other things that could be replaced on both engines that could theoretically take a relatively long time to fail but might do so under TOGA? In other words are there any devices that could have been changed on both engines before the previous flight that were defective and didn't fail until full power on both engines on take off on the accident flight? Obviously this is pure speculation, I don't claim to know anything and I'm just curious. 1 user liked this post. |
M.Mouse
2025-06-20T22:29:00 permalink Post: 11907367 |
he autopilot would NOT be engaged below 400’ (or 200’ in the 78–although I doubt anyone engages it that low. The autopilot and autothrottles are separate systems but do interact. The autothrottles typically WOULD be engaged from the start of the takeoff roll; using the TOGA levers to set takeoff thrust).
I am guessing because although I flew the 777 I never tried a low altitude capture before VNAV engaged — and it`s been a few years). But think it probably would. As one goes through 50’ LNAV engages; VNAV is normally armed prior to the EFIS check if it`s to be used (which it usually is). So in this scenario LNAV would have been engaged but since VNAV is armed but never engages my guess is that the automatics would engage in SPD/LVAV/ALT.
HOLD is present in many other regimes of flight; all it means is that the auththrottle (right now) is not controlling the throttles and they stay where they are—and the PF can move them if desired at will. Fr` instance, when descending in FLCH or even VNAV SPD the throttles will usually be in HOLD. (To me this usually meant `hold` the throttles—and tweek them in descent as required). Thrust can be modulated to adjust rate of descent (the throttles become vertical speed levers). On altitude capture in the case of FLCH or path capture in the case of VNAV SPD (in descent) the auththrottles kick in and it becomes SPD/xxx/ALT (or VPTH or VALT as the case might be).
Most everyone knew the autothrottles would not engage below 400` and that FLCH in descent at very low altitudes was not an appropriate mode — and they did not activate providing low speed protection in the case of Asiana.
Since the Asiana accident many airlines prohibit use of FLCH below 1,000' and the lowest altitude setting when using FLCH is then, of course, 1.000'
IIRC our throttles went into HOLD at 60 knots and stayed there until VNAV activated (THR REF—takeoff thrust). It was also possible that the autothrottles under some environmentals wouldn`t fully achieve takeoff thrust setting (EPR or N1 depending on which engines) and they could be manually moved in HOLD to achieve it. Although I don`t remember that as ever happening.
2 users liked this post. |
MaybeItIs
2025-06-20T22:57:00 permalink Post: 11907382 |
Hello, this is my first post on pprune; as a 787 pilot I\x92m also puzzled by this accident. All seem to agree that for some reason there was a complete electrical failure and RAT deployment. With a complete electrical failure all six main fuel pumps fail. Each engine also has two mechanically driven fuel pumps. On takeoff, if there is fuel in the center tank, it will be used first, pumped by the two center tank pumps.
My airline\x92s manuals don\x92t go into much detail, but I read on another site that if both the center tank pumps fail, the engine driven pumps aren\x92t able to suction feed well enough from the center tanks to sustain engine operation. If there was fuel in the center tanks, a complete electrical failure would soon lead to center tank fuel pumps failure (all fuel pumps failure as stated previously) and fuel starvation of both engines. A rescue from this situation would be an immediate selection of both center tank fuel pumps OFF (not if my airline\x92s non-normal checklists) and waiting for successful suction feed from the L and R main tanks to occur, this would take a number of seconds. FWIW, according to earlier posts, the fuel load was about 50T, leaving about 18T in the centre tank, so (I think) about 25-30% full. A full centre tank might allow engine pump suction to work fine, but this might not? (Contrary to what some have said.) Anyway, FWIW, not everyone agrees with RAT Deployment - see recent post by shep69. Would love to know why he doesn't go with RAT deployment... |
Shep69
2025-06-20T22:59:00 permalink Post: 11907385 |
Both the B777 and B787 have a minimum autopilot engage height of 200'. I would suggest it is often the best course of action after an engine failure to engage the autopilot at 200' to dramatically reduce the workload!
When talking about low altitude capture below the 400' VNAV engagement height, although it has been talked about, would mean (mis) setting the MCP altitude to less than 400'. I really find that implausible. You are correct though that the modes would be SPD | LNAV | ALT should this occur. All correct. The lack of autothrottle automatic activation when the autothrottles are in HOLD mode and the speed has decayed below minimum manouevring speed has been addressed. The autothrottle will now automatically activate if, when in HOLD mode, the speed decays below minimum manouevring speed with FMC software after BP4 on the B787 and after AIMS V17B on the B777. Since the Asiana accident many airlines prohibit use of FLCH below 1,000' and the lowest altitude setting when using FLCH is then, of course, 1.000' Almost fully correct, the speed when autothrottles transition to HOLD on takeoff is 80kts. on both the B777 and B787. 1 user liked this post. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-21T00:41:00 permalink Post: 11907411 |
10 users liked this post. |
MaybeItIs
2025-06-21T01:21:00 permalink Post: 11907432 |
For those postulating the RAT was not deployed, what counter explanations do you have for the following clues?
1 user liked this post. |
lpvapproach
2025-06-21T06:13:00 permalink Post: 11907514 |
Hoover from the generally respected Pilot Debrief channel put up his analysis.
He analyses the point of rotation looking at the airport layout and using the video with the shack showing the aircraft rotate behind it, in that case the aircraft rotates at a reasonably normal place. That being the case what is the "cloud of particles" that appear to the left of the aircraft ? He discounts electrical failure affecting both engines due 787 design, and fuel contamination due both engines fed from separate tanks unlikely to affect both engines at the same time. The possibility that one engine failure occurred at a critical point in the take off and that possibly the wrong engine fuel cutoff switch was pulled. ![]() camera angle with shack and suggested point of rotation ![]() whats this.. 1 user liked this post. |
Senior Pilot
2025-06-21T06:36:00 permalink Post: 11907525 |
Hoover from the generally respected Pilot Debrief channel put up his analysis.
He analyses the point of rotation looking at the airport layout and using the video with the shack showing the aircraft rotate behind it, in that case the aircraft rotates at a reasonably normal place. That being the case what is the "cloud of particles" that appear to the left of the aircraft ? He discounts electrical failure affecting both engines due 787 design, and fuel contamination due both engines fed from separate tanks unlikely to affect both engines at the same time. The possibility that one engine failure occurred at a critical point in the take off and that possibly the wrong engine fuel cutoff switch was pulled. camera angle with shack and suggested point of rotation whats this.. I repeat, do NOT post repeats of discussions already had unless there is something of value which may change or enhance previous posts. This is a prime example of a post which should be vetted and dismissed before pressing Submit Reply 🙈 6 users liked this post. |
FullWings
2025-06-21T07:19:00 permalink Post: 11907541 |
The possibility that one engine failure occurred at a critical point in the take off and that possibly the wrong engine fuel cutoff switch was pulled.
Where the meme has come from that jet pilots have to shut down engines as quickly as possible I don\x92t know but it is incorrect. If you left a failed engine without securing it for 5 minutes, little to no harm would come of it. Even if it was on fire (which is not necessarily flames, just higher than normal temperatures inside the nacelle) they are certified to be in this condition for some considerable time before it becomes a problem. Yes, I think the phrase \x93without undue delay\x94 could be used for a fire indication but that\x92s a minimum of 400\x92AGL in Boeings and does not absolve you of all the cross-checking and CRM that should happen with an engine shutdown. This is practiced/checked at the least every 6 months in EASA land and any attempt to rush a shutdown at low level would lead to a debrief and more training/checking. To put it this way, control of the aeroplane and lateral/vertical navigation is far more important than doing stuff with a failed power plant. Something like an ET should be absolutely prioritised over engine drills. 8 users liked this post. |
Icarus2001
2025-06-21T07:20:00 permalink Post: 11907542 |
Only a reset of the Altitude Module or manual override of the Auto Trust would overcome this uncommented descent.
So no, the AAI does not need to be changed to commence a climb.
Where the meme has come from that jet pilots have to shut down engines as quickly as possible I don’t know but it is incorrect.
Last edited by Icarus2001; 21st Jun 2025 at 07:27 . Reason: Fat fingers. |
CharlieMike
2025-06-21T08:23:00 permalink Post: 11907570 |
EFATO handling is similar on most types too\x85in essence, contain any yaw, rotate, get the gear up and either trim it out or (787) let the aircraft trim it out\x85.AP in and once safely climbing away at a defined altitude diagnose followed by memory items if applicable. 787 you don\x92t action any drills until above 400ft so it would be extremely unlikely this crew actually got the stage of touching a fuel control switch. 7 users liked this post. |
Page Links: First Previous 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Next Last Index Page