Posts about: "Engine Failure (All)" [Posts: 410 Pages: 21]

Shep69
2025-06-20T13:55:00
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Post: 11906990

One fact that alters things substantially is whether the survivor's impression is correct that possibly the engines started to spool up again just before impact. If that's the case then what does that do to the possibility or otherwise that the TMCA system caused a dual engine shutdown?
That’s what got me headed down the low altitude capture route. While the mind does really strange things post traumatic event — and memory and recollection are greatly affected by it — if true it means that thrust was lost but the engines stayed lit.

There may have been other electrical and systems malfunctioning. But if whatever happened, let’s say the auto throttle simply pulled power to idle —or a low power setting—at a critical time. Perhaps on its own perhaps with other systems failures.

We like to think it basic that we’d slam the throttles forward. Right away.

But Asiana didn’t.

And neither did Air Florida years ago.
Propellerhead
2025-06-20T14:06:00
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Post: 11907000
Sorry if this has been covered in the previous 1 million posts, but do we know if the training captain or trainee was handling the takeoff? The one thing that does change at V1 is PF\x92s hand comes off the thrust levers and joins the other hand on the control column. How long until people then put their hand back on the thrust levers varies a lot. Especially if turbulent or there is a perception of difficult handling ie) engine failure which often delays it. If your hand is on the thrust lever then should be able to feel them moving - unless gripping them so firmly it over rides the clutches.

Oh, and the FDRs haven\x92t been read yet as they were damaged in the fire.
draglift
2025-06-20T15:41:00
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Post: 11907068
Sailvi767 wrote
Shutting down the wrong engine below 400 AGL is extremely rare. So rare in fact that I believe it has not happened in a jet transport class aircraft.
It happened to a BAC 111 taking off from Linate Milan in 1969 when the wrong engine was shut down after a surge on takeoff. The plane never got above 250 feet and landed in a snow covered field gear up. The wrong engine identification was initiated by a Captain on the jumpseat!

https://aerossurance.com/safety-mana...human-factors/

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Capn Bloggs
2025-06-20T15:49:00
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Post: 11907075
Disclaimer: the numbers I mention are from publicly available sources, namely Wiki (for the ZFW weight calculation) and a Boeing FCOM dated 2010, and my own estimations.

Strange, as I would have estimated this quite differently based on layman's intuition. If one assumes average values, then the approximate flight profile of AI171 according to layman's guidance certainly fits a situation in which the engines failed at or even very shortly before rotation.
IMO, if those engines failed just after rotation, there is no way that jet would have got anywhere near 200ft, especially if the fuel was "cut off", as opposed to back to Idle.

​​​​​​​ Is VR about 20 to 30 knots above the landing speed?
At 420k lbs (310k lb ZFW+110k lb Fuel), the (takeoff) V2 Flap 5 is 157kts. The (landing) Vref for Flap 5 I estimate to be at least 160kts (the FCOM I have has no figures for Flap 5 landings; F20 Vref is 154; the manoeuvre speed for Flap 5 is 189). Typically, you'd probably be at V2+15 when you get established in the climb after rotation.

​​​​​​​ Would these 20 to 30 knots of additional energy be sufficient to lift the aircraft to a good 200 ft during and after rotation?
No. With a pitch attitude of around 15\xb0, that's quite a bit of weight being supported not only by the wings but by the engine thrust vector. Cut that and you stop going up very quickly. Note Sailvi's comment above.

​​​​​​​ If the angle of attack is then successively reduced, wouldn't the airplane still have enough lift to glide for a few seconds before losing all or nearly all lift?
ANY reduction in pitch attitude would cause the climb to cease immediately. These aircraft are going so slowly, relatively, and the drag is so high that any small change in pitch attitude will cause an increase in descent rate with very little increase in speed (or no lessening of deceleration).

​​​​​​​ Wouldn't it be the case that if the thrust had only ceased five seconds after rotation, the aircraft would then have reached a good 250 ft with the engines still running and then another good 200 ft in normal conditions before the speed was used up to about 150 kn?
Not IMO. Basically, the only reason this jet is flying is because of the whopping long thrust vector out the back. It's already almost back at minimum speed anyway for flap 5 so there is very speed to trade. In this case, I wouldn't be trading anything, because the speed reduction rate would be too fast.

​​​​​​​ AI171 probably didn't reach an altitude of 400 to 500 ft above ground (in relation to the airport), did it?
My estimate is around 200ft (one wingspan) and I hypothesise the engines were producing plenty of thrust until about 7 seconds, before it stops climbing at around 12 seconds after liftoff.

@Brace , I think you're exaggerating the residual thrust effect at lower RPMs. Of course 70% would get you round the pattern but you're at a much lower drag config and you're going much faster, again less drag. And are improved-climb takeoffs in the 787-8 even a thing? I can't see a two-stage rotation.

I've made up a YT combo video:

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MarineEngineer
2025-06-20T15:53:00
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Post: 11907080
Sailvi767
" The fan never stops rotating in a normal engine loss. Having been through a catastrophic engine failure in a 767 I can tell you that trust stops almost instantly."

I can well believe that "trust" stops instantly

Last edited by MarineEngineer; 20th Jun 2025 at 16:03 .

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NOC40
2025-06-20T16:04:00
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Post: 11907092
Originally Posted by EXDAC
In the CSV data set that can be downloaded from that link the first point with altitude data is 1630 ft short of the departure threshold. That point is 575. The highest alt recorded in the data set is 625. All the points with altitude data overlay the departure runway. I do not understand how anyone is using this data set to determine the maximum altitude which was way past the departure end.




Edit to add - I have made no attempt to correct the raw ADS-B altitude data. There is no need to make any correction to see altitude gain.
I posted my first-cut analysis in the earlier thread.
I've had a bit more time to analyse now.
Those ADS-B data points (and particularly the rate of deceleration) are EXACTLY what you would expect to see from a total engine failure at or very shortly after TAKE-OFF
(it implies a 13:1 L/D which must be pretty close for gear down and flaps 5).
It places takeoff at 700m before the runway end @ ~185kt
Based on those, max altitude was c250ft @ 140kt (or the equivalent total energy equivalent), 500m after the end of the runway.
13:1 L/D would also get you groundspeed on impact of 120kt
Do those numbers make sense?
Yo_You_Not_You_you
2025-06-20T16:39:00
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Post: 11907121
Originally Posted by NOC40
I posted my first-cut analysis in the earlier thread.
I've had a bit more time to analyse now.
Those ADS-B data points (and particularly the rate of deceleration) are EXACTLY what you would expect to see from a total engine failure at or very shortly after TAKE-OFF
(it implies a 13:1 L/D which must be pretty close for gear down and flaps 5).
It places takeoff at 700m before the runway end @ ~185kt
Based on those, max altitude was c250ft @ 140kt (or the equivalent total energy equivalent), 500m after the end of the runway.
13:1 L/D would also get you groundspeed on impact of 120kt
Do those numbers make sense?

Exact location of house, Approx distance of 1.5 km from end of runway to crash site .

Coordinates of the camera : 23\xb003'42.3"N 72\xb037'03.5"E

The Approx Camera location of the Balcony is the Red Mark . Can the speed be calculated . Does the speed line up with the ADS B data , Does it Gain Any speed after this Balcony point ?

Co-incidently Another Witness is the Grand Mother of the Balcony Teen, she was closer to the airport as per her . she is saying that the engine was silent after it passed over (but making sound , when it was Over , RAT already deployed?? ) and made offhand comment it was gonna crash . Found that out later .
ams6110
2025-06-20T16:51:00
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Post: 11907131
Originally Posted by bbofh
... The generally held theory for each engine\x92s FADEC failure (due to a common software error related to a ground-air sensing failure) is not supported by the cumulative hours over many years without such a failure. So, if you then look around for another component that can shut down two engines simultaneously you end up with the fuel shut-off valves (FSOV). Why? On each engine It is fail-safed to close off fuel-feed flows by a spring that is held open by a solenoid. If that solenoid loses electrical power, the FSOV closes and the engine shuts down after a short period.
Are you certain of that? Because tdracer (and perhaps others) have asserted that the valves are latching, and must be powered on OR off, precisely so that an electrical power loss does not close the valve (and shut down the engine).

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BraceBrace
2025-06-20T19:56:00
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Post: 11907263
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
The fan never stops rotating in a normal engine loss. Having been through a catastrophic engine failure in a 767 I can tell you that trust stops almost instantly. Certainly no more than 2 seconds. It also needs to be understood that thrust is not linear to engine speed in a jet. Very little thrust is generated below 70% RPM and thrust increases rapidly above 85%.
You are using explanations that are correct but with wrong appreciation for the values and how much thrust is available and what it is used for. Yes, the relation is not linear, far from, but the thrust required at low altitudes is for the initial climbout and acceleration, aka against gravity.

70% is not "very little", it is almost the required thrust in level flight with intermediate flaps out and gear down at those altitudes (depending on the weight). Without the gear, 60% is enough to keep level flight. If you want to descend, 55% is enough to keep speed with flaps full landing configuration and gear down on a 3\xb0 glide. So even at 55% N1, the aircraft wouldn't stall, it would gradually descend if the pitch would be correct.

It is what is between 70 and max rated that is needed for the initial climbout and that thrust is "excess" as it is there needed for the second segment in case of engine out. Considering the fact that the climb only lasted 10 seconds, 2 seconds is 20% of that time where the engines were still pushing. It is not because it is "significantly less" that it is nothing (that's why when you apply full reverse and don't let the engines slow down with idle selected, you will feel the kick forward.)

If you look at the takeoff video, you will see that the aircraft does a very rotation that some pilots prefer to avoid tailstrike: first initial rotation, constant pitch to allow the aircraft to become airborne avoiding tailstrike, second increase in pitch at which point the rate of climb quickly disappears. At that point, the "parabolic" maneuver with constant nose up is created, very typical for a loss of thrust (loss of airspeed with constant pitch).

Which begs the question why they never lowered the nose...

Last edited by BraceBrace; 20th Jun 2025 at 20:11 .

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Zionstrat2
2025-06-20T21:33:00
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Post: 11907338
GA guy who's been reading the thread from the beginning..

I'm assuming my question is moot because I don't believe it's been mentioned in the entire thread, however is there any possible maintenance issue that could affect two engines over time?

This is certainly happened before, I'm thinking of N334EA where all three engines were lost due to maintenance replacing all three chip detectors with defective detectors before the flight.

Of course it took 40 something minutes before the first engine oil was drained and the other two engines failed at different times after that.

So that pattern doesn't fit, but my question is are there other things that could be replaced on both engines that could theoretically take a relatively long time to fail but might do so under TOGA?

In other words are there any devices that could have been changed on both engines before the previous flight that were defective and didn't fail until full power on both engines on take off on the accident flight?

Obviously this is pure speculation, I don't claim to know anything and I'm just curious.

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M.Mouse
2025-06-20T22:29:00
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Post: 11907367
he autopilot would NOT be engaged below 400’ (or 200’ in the 78–although I doubt anyone engages it that low. The autopilot and autothrottles are separate systems but do interact. The autothrottles typically WOULD be engaged from the start of the takeoff roll; using the TOGA levers to set takeoff thrust).
Both the B777 and B787 have a minimum autopilot engage height of 200'. I would suggest it is often the best course of action after an engine failure to engage the autopilot at 200' to dramatically reduce the workload!

I am guessing because although I flew the 777 I never tried a low altitude capture before VNAV engaged — and it`s been a few years). But think it probably would. As one goes through 50’ LNAV engages; VNAV is normally armed prior to the EFIS check if it`s to be used (which it usually is). So in this scenario LNAV would have been engaged but since VNAV is armed but never engages my guess is that the automatics would engage in SPD/LVAV/ALT.
When talking about low altitude capture below the 400' VNAV engagement height, although it has been talked about, would mean (mis) setting the MCP altitude to less than 400'. I really find that implausible. You are correct though that the modes would be SPD | LNAV | ALT should this occur.

HOLD is present in many other regimes of flight; all it means is that the auththrottle (right now) is not controlling the throttles and they stay where they are—and the PF can move them if desired at will. Fr` instance, when descending in FLCH or even VNAV SPD the throttles will usually be in HOLD. (To me this usually meant `hold` the throttles—and tweek them in descent as required). Thrust can be modulated to adjust rate of descent (the throttles become vertical speed levers). On altitude capture in the case of FLCH or path capture in the case of VNAV SPD (in descent) the auththrottles kick in and it becomes SPD/xxx/ALT (or VPTH or VALT as the case might be).
All correct.

Most everyone knew the autothrottles would not engage below 400` and that FLCH in descent at very low altitudes was not an appropriate mode — and they did not activate providing low speed protection in the case of Asiana.
The lack of autothrottle automatic activation when the autothrottles are in HOLD mode and the speed has decayed below minimum manouevring speed has been addressed. The autothrottle will now automatically activate if, when in HOLD mode, the speed decays below minimum manouevring speed with FMC software after BP4 on the B787 and after AIMS V17B on the B777.

Since the Asiana accident many airlines prohibit use of FLCH below 1,000' and the lowest altitude setting when using FLCH is then, of course, 1.000'

IIRC our throttles went into HOLD at 60 knots and stayed there until VNAV activated (THR REF—takeoff thrust). It was also possible that the autothrottles under some environmentals wouldn`t fully achieve takeoff thrust setting (EPR or N1 depending on which engines) and they could be manually moved in HOLD to achieve it. Although I don`t remember that as ever happening.
Almost fully correct, the speed when autothrottles transition to HOLD on takeoff is 80kts. on both the B777 and B787.

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MaybeItIs
2025-06-20T22:57:00
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Post: 11907382
Originally Posted by Crossky
Hello, this is my first post on pprune; as a 787 pilot I\x92m also puzzled by this accident. All seem to agree that for some reason there was a complete electrical failure and RAT deployment. With a complete electrical failure all six main fuel pumps fail. Each engine also has two mechanically driven fuel pumps. On takeoff, if there is fuel in the center tank, it will be used first, pumped by the two center tank pumps.
My airline\x92s manuals don\x92t go into much detail, but I read on another site that if both the center tank pumps fail, the engine driven pumps aren\x92t able to suction feed well enough from the center tanks to sustain engine operation. If there was fuel in the center tanks, a complete electrical failure would soon lead to center tank fuel pumps failure (all fuel pumps failure as stated previously) and fuel starvation of both engines. A rescue from this situation would be an immediate selection of both center tank fuel pumps OFF (not if my airline\x92s non-normal checklists) and waiting for successful suction feed from the L and R main tanks to occur, this would take a number of seconds.
Great first post (IMMHO!) If this is correct, then I think you are onto something very significant. No expert, just an outside the box thinker who has been trying to see what ordinary (non-pilot-blaming) explanations there could be for a near simultaneous dual engine failure. I imagine a complete electrical failure leading to fuel starvation from lack of pump feed pressure from the centre tank would not result in apparently near simultaneous engine failure, but who knows? (Aren't there (suction) bypass valves here, but maybe they get stuck after long non-opening - instead long subject to closing pressures?) This could have been the case here as my experience suggests the probabilities aren't small.

FWIW, according to earlier posts, the fuel load was about 50T, leaving about 18T in the centre tank, so (I think) about 25-30% full. A full centre tank might allow engine pump suction to work fine, but this might not? (Contrary to what some have said.)

Anyway, FWIW, not everyone agrees with RAT Deployment - see recent post by shep69. Would love to know why he doesn't go with RAT deployment...

Shep69
2025-06-20T22:59:00
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Post: 11907385
Originally Posted by M.Mouse
Both the B777 and B787 have a minimum autopilot engage height of 200'. I would suggest it is often the best course of action after an engine failure to engage the autopilot at 200' to dramatically reduce the workload!



When talking about low altitude capture below the 400' VNAV engagement height, although it has been talked about, would mean (mis) setting the MCP altitude to less than 400'. I really find that implausible. You are correct though that the modes would be SPD | LNAV | ALT should this occur.



All correct.



The lack of autothrottle automatic activation when the autothrottles are in HOLD mode and the speed has decayed below minimum manouevring speed has been addressed. The autothrottle will now automatically activate if, when in HOLD mode, the speed decays below minimum manouevring speed with FMC software after BP4 on the B787 and after AIMS V17B on the B777.

Since the Asiana accident many airlines prohibit use of FLCH below 1,000' and the lowest altitude setting when using FLCH is then, of course, 1.000'



Almost fully correct, the speed when autothrottles transition to HOLD on takeoff is 80kts. on both the B777 and B787.
Thanks much; been a few years with other A/C in between.

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Aerospace101
2025-06-21T00:41:00
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Post: 11907411
Originally Posted by MaybeItIs
Anyway, FWIW, not everyone agrees with RAT Deployment - see recent post by shep69. Would love to know why he doesn't go with RAT deployment...
For those postulating the RAT was not deployed, what counter explanations do you have for the following clues?
  • Distinctive RAT sound in the rooftop video, audio analysis here .
  • RAT visible in rooftop video, example in this image .
  • APU door open suggesting auto APU start, suggestive of a full electrics failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment)
  • Loss of ADSB data suggestive of a full electrics failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment)
  • Unusual gear forward tilt position, suggestive of hydraulic failure and/or full electrics failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment).
  • Loss of all thrust, ie dual engine failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment)

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MaybeItIs
2025-06-21T01:21:00
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Post: 11907432
Originally Posted by Aerospace101
For those postulating the RAT was not deployed, what counter explanations do you have for the following clues?
  • Distinctive RAT sound in the rooftop video, audio analysis here .
  • RAT visible in rooftop video, example in this image .
  • APU door open suggesting auto APU start, suggestive of a full electrics failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment)
  • Loss of ADSB data suggestive of a full electrics failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment)
  • Unusual gear forward tilt position, suggestive of hydraulic failure and/or full electrics failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment).
  • Loss of all thrust, ie dual engine failure (one of the criteria for auto RAT deployment)
Great summary. I've already mentioned the first below, but I'd add another:
  • The existence (and timing) of the flyby video by a young lad who apparently lived where the footage was shot from. With planes flying past every few minutes, why would he choose to film this one, before he could even see it? The video starts with the plane still approaching, out of view, and his position suggests it was unplanned, before he could move to a better vantage point. I say he already knew it was extraordinary - from the sound.
  • Eye witness account from the mother of the lad who filmed the flyby, apparently said that the plane was "shaking". I'll assume she didn't know how to describe it properly, and that maybe it sounded like it was shaking, from hearing the noise from the RAT. Or it's a translation issue of a word/s with multiple meanings or used colloquially.
One question - are there two exterior doors to the APU compartment, one on top, one below, presumably inlet and outlet of cooling airflow? I've seen photos showing two open doors, but the lower one could be something else, and busted open during the crash.

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lpvapproach
2025-06-21T06:13:00
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Post: 11907514
Hoover from the generally respected Pilot Debrief channel put up his analysis.

He analyses the point of rotation looking at the airport layout and using the video with the shack showing the aircraft rotate behind it, in that case the aircraft rotates at a reasonably normal place. That being the case what is the "cloud of particles" that appear to the left of the aircraft ?

He discounts electrical failure affecting both engines due 787 design, and fuel contamination due both engines fed from separate tanks unlikely to affect both engines at the same time.

The possibility that one engine failure occurred at a critical point in the take off and that possibly the wrong engine fuel cutoff switch was pulled.


camera angle with shack and suggested point of rotation



whats this..

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Senior Pilot
2025-06-21T06:36:00
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Post: 11907525
Originally Posted by lpvapproach
Hoover from the generally respected Pilot Debrief channel put up his analysis.

He analyses the point of rotation looking at the airport layout and using the video with the shack showing the aircraft rotate behind it, in that case the aircraft rotates at a reasonably normal place. That being the case what is the "cloud of particles" that appear to the left of the aircraft ?

He discounts electrical failure affecting both engines due 787 design, and fuel contamination due both engines fed from separate tanks unlikely to affect both engines at the same time.

The possibility that one engine failure occurred at a critical point in the take off and that possibly the wrong engine fuel cutoff switch was pulled.

camera angle with shack and suggested point of rotation



whats this..
All of which has been discussed and for the wing vortices and the fuel feed has been explained quite comprehensively, along with the fuel cut offs: have you not read these posts only made recently?

I repeat, do NOT post repeats of discussions already had unless there is something of value which may change or enhance previous posts. This is a prime example of a post which should be vetted and dismissed before pressing Submit Reply 🙈

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FullWings
2025-06-21T07:19:00
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Post: 11907541
The possibility that one engine failure occurred at a critical point in the take off and that possibly the wrong engine fuel cutoff switch was pulled.
It\x92s a possibility (as is virtually anything that doesn\x92t break the laws of physics) but all the training, practicing and checking would have been to emphasise SOPs, which are to leave all the engine controls where they are until you have done a proper interactive diagnosis at a safe height with the flightpath assured.

Where the meme has come from that jet pilots have to shut down engines as quickly as possible I don\x92t know but it is incorrect. If you left a failed engine without securing it for 5 minutes, little to no harm would come of it. Even if it was on fire (which is not necessarily flames, just higher than normal temperatures inside the nacelle) they are certified to be in this condition for some considerable time before it becomes a problem. Yes, I think the phrase \x93without undue delay\x94 could be used for a fire indication but that\x92s a minimum of 400\x92AGL in Boeings and does not absolve you of all the cross-checking and CRM that should happen with an engine shutdown. This is practiced/checked at the least every 6 months in EASA land and any attempt to rush a shutdown at low level would lead to a debrief and more training/checking.

To put it this way, control of the aeroplane and lateral/vertical navigation is far more important than doing stuff with a failed power plant. Something like an ET should be absolutely prioritised over engine drills.

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Icarus2001
2025-06-21T07:20:00
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Post: 11907542
Only a reset of the Altitude Module or manual override of the Auto Trust would overcome this uncommented descent.
This is not true. The AAI could be at 50 feet and a pilot can set a suitable climb attitude and push the thrust levers forward to enter a “normal” climb. The flight director would be useless at this point as it is commanding the descent.
So no, the AAI does not need to be changed to commence a climb.

Where the meme has come from that jet pilots have to shut down engines as quickly as possible I don’t know but it is incorrect.
I completely agree. I imagine it relates to the ten minute max power limit on the live engine. Less and less relevant as the aircraft can give MCP easily. My current jet type does not have an engine failure memory item. I looked for a B787 EFATO memory item in the QRH but could not find one. Perhaps a current B787 pilot could confirm?

Last edited by Icarus2001; 21st Jun 2025 at 07:27 . Reason: Fat fingers.
CharlieMike
2025-06-21T08:23:00
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Post: 11907570
Originally Posted by Icarus2001
I looked for a B787 EFATO memory item in the QRH but could not find one. Perhaps a current B787 pilot could confirm?
I don\x92t really know what you are talking about. I\x92m current 787 and have flown many types including airbus prior to this. EFATO is normally an SOP handling exercise, not a memory item in itself. Memory items on nearly all types cover the specific drill for the engine only in all regimes of flight\x85ie severe damage/separation, engine limit exceedance/surge, engine fire. ie you\x92d never say \x93I\x92ll take the memory items for an engine failure after takeoff\x94.

EFATO handling is similar on most types too\x85in essence, contain any yaw, rotate, get the gear up and either trim it out or (787) let the aircraft trim it out\x85.AP in and once safely climbing away at a defined altitude diagnose followed by memory items if applicable. 787 you don\x92t action any drills until above 400ft so it would be extremely unlikely this crew actually got the stage of touching a fuel control switch.

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