July 16, 2025, 11:10:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923642
I wonder if the people who are so adamant that mistaken operation of the wrong control is simply impossible have ever had a windscreen wipe in a car while intending to use an indicator light. And if they have, have some of these occasions happened at higher than average stress moments, such as someone else behaving oddly at a junction.
(Of vehicles with two sets of stalk mounted switches adjacent to the steering wheel, some have lights on the left, and some have lights on the right. This may be, but isn't always, related to whether the home market of the car design drives on the left or the right. British drivers and owners of some Japanese cars may have more experience of both than Europeans only ever driving cars from their home country.)
(Of vehicles with two sets of stalk mounted switches adjacent to the steering wheel, some have lights on the left, and some have lights on the right. This may be, but isn't always, related to whether the home market of the car design drives on the left or the right. British drivers and owners of some Japanese cars may have more experience of both than Europeans only ever driving cars from their home country.)
When the fuel needs to be cut because of an engine failure there is a strict procedure before the switch is set to CUTOFF. Both pilots need to confirm the location (left or right) of the engine. No pilot will without consent switch off the fuel. However this is what happened.
1 user liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 16, 2025, 12:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11923719
"...but the switches were found in the on position" doesn't hold water.
Just because they were found in the On position doesn't mean they were in that position when fuel to the engines failed.
One of the pilots accused the other of switching them off; human instinct would be to push them fully forward.
Just because they were found in the On position doesn't mean they were in that position when fuel to the engines failed.
One of the pilots accused the other of switching them off; human instinct would be to push them fully forward.
1 user liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 17, 2025, 12:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924351
WSJ being leaked to again and they are not even trying to hide the fact that it is US officials doing the leaking as with the leaks in the days before the preliminary report
it\x92s hard to justify this and it does just make the AAIB\x92s job more difficult, would the NTSB appreciate Indian entities leaking to the Indian media before a preliminary and then final report?
im not saying it\x92s correct but it does only fuel the simmering Indian (domestic) audience\x92s views of a US/Boeing \x91coverup\x92
what new details were actually revealed here, it didn\x92t counter the facts laid out by the AAIB prelim at all so it\x92s not like we can claim the AAIB is covering up and the US has to issue counter factuals (as with the China Eastern 737)
it\x92s hard to justify this and it does just make the AAIB\x92s job more difficult, would the NTSB appreciate Indian entities leaking to the Indian media before a preliminary and then final report?
im not saying it\x92s correct but it does only fuel the simmering Indian (domestic) audience\x92s views of a US/Boeing \x91coverup\x92
what new details were actually revealed here, it didn\x92t counter the facts laid out by the AAIB prelim at all so it\x92s not like we can claim the AAIB is covering up and the US has to issue counter factuals (as with the China Eastern 737)
It is important to know who asked ' why did you cutoff'. Because it confirms that captain, who had both hands free, set both switches to CUTOFF for no reason.
2 users liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 17, 2025, 12:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924361
I can fully understand and appreciate the leaking. I have been studying the bull!!!! reporting by India media about the cause of this crash. Former senior pilots, some who flew the B787, tell complete utter nonsense about possible technical issues. Like the engines failed and that was the reason to set both switches to cutoff.
It is important to know who asked ' why did you cutoff'. Because it confirms that captain, who had both hands free, set both switches to CUTOFF for no reason.
It is important to know who asked ' why did you cutoff'. Because it confirms that captain, who had both hands free, set both switches to CUTOFF for no reason.
im not sure how that justifies those with privileged information clearly on the US side leaking undermining the official investigation that is being run with international observers from multiple countries and in line with ICAO guidance
I\x92m not saying it is but it gives off more fuel to idea that Boeing has deep sway inside the US elites and institutions
your last paragraph is conjecture, we can speculate but the job of the investigators is to be 100% accurate, it\x92s easy for us to sit on the sidelines and throw out whatever theories we like but their responsibility is much higher
if US entities aren\x92t happy with the tone/substance of the preliminary report their is a mechanism for them to provide there own findings at a later date, this cloak and dagger selective leaking stuff really is uncalled for
3 users liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 17, 2025, 12:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924362
To those who find it difficult to accept certain suicide scenarios, the objection often stems from the perceived irrationality. As others have explained, the answer is that rationality is not present - or not in a form that the rest of us would recognise. I once came up with a thought exercise that helped explain it in a way that might satisfy a rational mind.
I have not posted on here in many years, but I feel compelled to do so now. I am a current 787 pilot and I have previously flown most Boeing types and an Airbus too. I also have an extensive background and qualifications in human factors, training and assessment. Before anybody reads any further, perhaps acquaint yourself with the notion of Occam's razor. That is, the simplest explanation is the most likely explanation. I was certain that after the preliminary report was released the preposterous conspiracy theories would finally cease, but no! It's 2025 and humans can no longer help themselves. In my opinion the captain committed suicide here. Simple.
All known cases of pilot suicide have indicators that are not present here. In some cases (like the often mentioned Germanwings incident) those indicators were such strong evidence that the criminal case was open and shut in days or weeks. Those weren't "simple" cases either, but they had the evidence one would expect from a pilot suffering such a complex condition. Nothing of the sort is known about either the Captain or the FO.
Suicide is almost always the last step in a long history of suffering from (mental) illness. Suicidal ideation is what the medical field calls thoughts (ideas about) suicide. It's a comparably common symptom shown in around 5-20% of adults worldwide with strong variation correlating with external factors, such as economic well being, occupation, stress, etc. Assessed globally Pilots, as far as relevant studies are available, seem to fall into the lower bracket of prevalence of suicidal ideation with a lower than expected prevalence when compared to the general population from their respective country of origin down to the rate observed in the general population of economically stable and strong countries.
Cases where pilot suicide is suspected (any case where at least some level of evidence is present but either no or only an officially disputed final assessment exists) also generally follow the same patterns. Attempts at concealment are known to happen, but make up only 10%-30% of completed suicides in the general population. This does include the gray area of potentially successful concealment which would lead to the assumption of an accidental death.
In almost all cases a recurring pattern is also the topic of certainty. In suicidal ideation it is a very common theme that any issues are projected into the future and the uncertainty of those issues generates anxiety. Many survivors of suicide attempts reveal that they considered the certainty of their own death to be preferable over the continuance of uncertainty and the associated anxiety. While we are far from being able to authoritatively call this a definitive mechanism in the psychological conditions related to suicide it is strongly implicated and subject of ongoing research. My personal way of explaining this to someone unfamiliar with depression is that your brain is quite literally poisoning you and generating so much trauma that the idea of ending it becomes preferable. Patients in this stage of major depression show a determination and rationality in their drive towards that goal that is often the primary source of perceived irrationality from the outside. They routinely ignore any and all information that is not relevant to their goal. The means are often chosen with preference of perceived certainty over any other motivation, including harm to others.
Summarizing:
1. Suicide is overwhelmingly the last step in a history of mental illness and almost exclusively presents without that in cases of immediate, significant and obvious trauma.
2. Attempts of concealment are of low probability in a suicide.
3. Methods of suicide are commonly chosen based on perceived certainty of success.
These indicators are all negative for the Air India accident. There is no indication of a prolonged history of mental illness, there is no immediate, significant or obvious trauma. Theorizing an attempt at suicide by either of the pilots requires the assumption of a major attempt at concealment. And most importantly: The method chosen is not following the pattern of maximizing certainty, the probable reason why all confirmed and even all suspected cases of pilot suicide happened in cruise flight.
The theory of suicide is thus, in this particular case, a bad fit.
If we are assuming an (intentionally) concealed medical condition there are much simpler and more likely candidates available. Any type of cardiac issue could lead to a clot and a stroke. A stroke fully explains what happened here. A clot triggered by the acceleration of the takeoff run could very reasonably present as a stroke in the timeframe given here. If the victim belatedly realizes what happened he may develop the wish to stop the situation, which in a stroking brain could absolutely lead to the shortcut of "turning off the engines is done at the end of flight". Or the stroke victim is trying to hold onto something and grabs the switches relatively close to the relaxed hand position after releasing the thrust levers at V1. Other conditions can rapidly present and impact judgement, motor function, or both. If we are willing to attribute the Captains recent decision to retire and be with his father as a potential change in character we might even fall into a number of neurological conditions that may be causal.
But there are even simpler explanations than a concealed medical condition. Maybe one of the pilots had previously finished recurring training for evacuations on the runway and had discussed this with his colleague ahead of the flight. The final memory item for those is turning off the fuel pumps. This kind of Action Slip is well documented. It's not very likely, thus I have no issue believing no one reported observing that type of a slip in a simulator, but it's not like accidents with this level of weirdness are common. There is however a good indicator here fitting the situation of at least one of the pilots: The Captain may have been preoccupied with his wish to retire soon and spending time with his father. While the latter makes absolutely no sense in a suicide it could be part of the causality for an action slip. Also note this post about inadvertent activation of switches despite majorly different modes of activation.
In the end here are three observations based on the preliminary report:
1. Any type of mechanical fault is unlikely and no immediately supporting evidence has been found.
2. A human factor is currently the most likely candidate for the cause of the accident.
3. The type of human factor is not being speculated upon in the preliminary report.
Note that the report specifically states:
Complete analysis of postmortem reports of the crew and the passengers is being undertaken to corroborate aeromedical findings with the engineering appreciation.
Attribution of an unclear accident to suicide is contributing to a problematic pattern of stigmatization and increases the likeliness of concealment of (mental) health issues associated with that stigma. In addition it precludes proper analysis of a potential inadvertent mishandling of controls. Both Airbus and Boeing commonly utilize this position and type of guarded switch. Both are sufficiently protected against accidental movement but nothing else. In many smaller aircraft setting the Master Switch to Off would not lead to engine shutdown. There are even reports of what we could consider negative training, by flight instructors demonstrating this fact by turning the Master Switch off in flight. Other commercial aircraft utilize different schemes, Embraer was mentioned right at the beginning of this thread by moosepileit as requiring Throttle Levers at idle for Fuel Cutoff as well as positioning those switches on the overhead panel .
Having just done a full review of this entire thread with regard to human factors I find it a bit sad to note that from the start there were multiple people with backgrounds in accident investigation present that pointed out human error and gave proper reasoning or even corroborating evidence in the form of accident reports. There are also multiple people repeatedly injecting their theory of pilot suicide either without providing any evidence or referring to baseless rumors from media reports. Notably those same people often rejected any other possibility of human error. They also repeatedly make statements of fact that are contradicted or not covered by the preliminary report. Any discussion of mental health seems pointless at this moment in time since there is no actual interest in the topic beyond occasionally going "It's suicide, duh". If anyone is interested in the topic I can once again only recommend taking a look at the Pilot Mental Health Campaign Research Page and other resources presented there.
I think the other worthwhile takeaway from this thread has been stated rather early, with the very applicable nod to a better layout regarding critical functionality that has no reason to be present in close proximity to regularly used flight controls.
9 users liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 17, 2025, 13:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924400
Your argument goes like this:
1) There was a switch failure on a 737 that disabled the gate mechanism.
2) The switch on the 787 is of similar construction.
3) Therefore, it is impossible that the accident 787 had a switch issue.
Do you understand that this is not logical?
And then you go on to cajole people who look forward to the AAIB thoroughly examining the switches they have in front of them, to generate actual evidence on whether these specific switches have an issue or not.
I agree that it is unlikely that the switches have an issue, but I still want the AAIB to look, so they can state it as a fact, instead of relying on guesswork.
1) There was a switch failure on a 737 that disabled the gate mechanism.
2) The switch on the 787 is of similar construction.
3) Therefore, it is impossible that the accident 787 had a switch issue.
Do you understand that this is not logical?
And then you go on to cajole people who look forward to the AAIB thoroughly examining the switches they have in front of them, to generate actual evidence on whether these specific switches have an issue or not.
I agree that it is unlikely that the switches have an issue, but I still want the AAIB to look, so they can state it as a fact, instead of relying on guesswork.
The faulty switch on same Boeing 737 aircraft is a red herring. It has nothing to do with the Boeing 787. This aircraft has a different type of switch (see partnumber). There is not a single issue ever reported. There was not a single issue found after the crash.
It is extremely clear both switches were set to CUTOFF by someone in the cockpit. At the worst possible moment just after liftoff. While there was no reason at all to touch these switches.
There was thrust, there was no engine failure, there was no agreement between both pilots to set both switches to CUTOFF. Because why would one of the pilots ask why the other set to cutoff.
2 users liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 17, 2025, 16:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924501
She told utter nonsense.
This is the person who said the stuff quoted below. I hope you agree with me the ANA B787 uncommanded dual engine shutdown in 2019 *** after landing *** had nothing to do with a ' similar fuel cut-off malfunction during final approach".
There is also no Boeing software issue in the case of AI171. The ANA B787
ASN wrote: A Boeing 787-8 of All Nippon Airways operating ANA/NH985 from Tokyo/Haneda to Osaka/Itami stuck on runway 32L while landing at Itami due to sudden shut-down of both engines after Thrust Reverser actuation.
Ms Schiavo said:
"As fresh scrutiny surrounds Boeing after the Air India AI 171 crash, aviation expert Mary Schiavo reveals that a similar fuel cut-off malfunction plagued a Japanese Boeing 787 in 2019 \x97 with pilots never touching the controls. Investigators now face mounting questions on why warnings were missed and why Boeing\x92s software may still pose a global threat."
and
Mary Schiavo revealed that a near-identical incident occurred in 2019 on a Boeing 787 operated by ANA during its final approach to Osaka. \x93The investigation revealed the plane software made the 787 think it was on the ground, and the Thrust Control Malfunction Accommodation (TCMA) system cut the fuel to the engines,\x94 she said.
On that occasion, both engines shut down simultaneously, but the crew landed safely. The Japanese aviation authority and Boeing traced the incident to a software fault, not human error. ANA\x92s Dreamliner, carrying 118 people, had to be towed off the runway.
3 users liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 18, 2025, 03:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924822
I posted a week or so ago, on the forums generally, suggesting that the moderation of the Air India threads had gotten excessive, and at that particular point, it might even be an opinion I stand by. But reading through the last 100+ posts, other than the above few comments, it's just garbage. I'm sorry, to those who think they're saying something meaningful, but it's just hot garbage.
For the legal types - stop quoting what is, and isn't, the burden of proof. This is a forum on the Internet. The topic being discussed is an international investigation into a plane crash. For both of those things, there is no possible relevance to the burden of proof in legal cases in <whatever your country is>.
For the psychologists (both actual ones and those pilots who are moonlighting as one) - stop quoting psychological theory. Many of us know it, others don't, but we all have such an incredible lack of information about the pilots concerned that it's pointless mentioning it, except in passing. No one has time for pages of guesswork or instructions to the investigators on what they should be looking at.
For the tech guys who are still talking about the possibility of malfunctioning switches, please, stop. The pilot saying "why did you do x" is not consistent with a switch failure, you don't say that just because of an unexpected run-down, you say something more generic, like "holy smokeballs, dual engine failure". The specificity of the comment implies clearly observed action, specific to the switches, which aligns with the data record.
For everyone - just because something isn't absolutely mathematically impossible does not mean you can or should bring it out and eat up pages doing so. Investigations do not have to cover every single possible "what if", because in an unlimited universe no investigation would ever conclude. What they have to do is come up with the most likely scientifically derived assessed outcome for an already fairly unlikely event. I can accept people saying "We don't know for sure that the switches were operated deliberately" even though that's probably more likely than not. I can't accept the kind of argument which isn't dissimilar to: "Maybe there was a flaw with the switch detent, and a book fell off the console, and the previous crew had spilled water on it, making it slippery, and before that when the console was installed it was 1.5 degrees more inclined than it should be, and that caused the rollback. I accept that we're already in "unlikely event" scenario, but once the impossible has been eliminated, refusing to accept that there's probably 2-3 likely scenarios left, and instead inserting incredibly unlikely theoretical stuff... well that's just bad faith.
Finally, it's personal taste, but I remain a bit disappointed with the deliberate blindness being applied to inconvenient truths by some on here. The two currently most likely rational explanations are simple - deliberate pilot action, accidental pilot action. Either way, it's pilot action . As frustrating as some of the wild theories are, the obfuscation being pushed out by the "circle the wagons" brigade is just as bad. Any pilot knows that their life - and those of their passengers - relies on clear sightedness and not avoiding uncomfortable data points. So let's trust our instruments. There should be no absurd rush to judgement but also, please, let's not hide behind the "they were professionals, treat them with respect" stuff, endlessly. Someone selected fuel on both engines to cut-off, mere moments after they left the ground. It won't be an engine restart procedure (too low, too early), it won't be some bizarre technical problem that hasn't happened in millions of flight hours on other 787s worldwide. The CVR says "why did you do X" and the data recorder says "X happened". The two line up. What we don't know for absolute certain is why, so the only sensible things now being examined are:
1) Deliberate pilot action (can only assume harmful intent at Vr + 3 sec)
2) Accidental pilot action (due to severe cognitive disconnect, or "wallet in freezer" stuff)
I'm one of many being frustrated by the lack of CVR recording being released, because that will almost certainly identify whether it was 1 or 2. But it would be abnormal for that to happen, and I respect that until they're sure, if the CVR points to something, they will want it confirmed before releasing it, because whether it's 1 or 2, it's bad news for the families of that particular pilot.
Oh, and to whoever said "Ask yourself if we are ready to hear it?".... come on. Hundreds of people died. Ignoring a piece of evidence related to that because it might be uncomfortable hearing it is unacceptable, and a bit childish. It might be uncomfortable, but professionals follow the evidence, wherever it may lead, however uncomfortable it might be.
Sorry this sounds so angry. The cause is that having stuck my neck out and said "Why are you guys moderating so much" to the mods, a free run of the thread has revealed such nonsense being posted that I'm embarrassed about having said anything. Lock away, I say!
For the legal types - stop quoting what is, and isn't, the burden of proof. This is a forum on the Internet. The topic being discussed is an international investigation into a plane crash. For both of those things, there is no possible relevance to the burden of proof in legal cases in <whatever your country is>.
For the psychologists (both actual ones and those pilots who are moonlighting as one) - stop quoting psychological theory. Many of us know it, others don't, but we all have such an incredible lack of information about the pilots concerned that it's pointless mentioning it, except in passing. No one has time for pages of guesswork or instructions to the investigators on what they should be looking at.
For the tech guys who are still talking about the possibility of malfunctioning switches, please, stop. The pilot saying "why did you do x" is not consistent with a switch failure, you don't say that just because of an unexpected run-down, you say something more generic, like "holy smokeballs, dual engine failure". The specificity of the comment implies clearly observed action, specific to the switches, which aligns with the data record.
For everyone - just because something isn't absolutely mathematically impossible does not mean you can or should bring it out and eat up pages doing so. Investigations do not have to cover every single possible "what if", because in an unlimited universe no investigation would ever conclude. What they have to do is come up with the most likely scientifically derived assessed outcome for an already fairly unlikely event. I can accept people saying "We don't know for sure that the switches were operated deliberately" even though that's probably more likely than not. I can't accept the kind of argument which isn't dissimilar to: "Maybe there was a flaw with the switch detent, and a book fell off the console, and the previous crew had spilled water on it, making it slippery, and before that when the console was installed it was 1.5 degrees more inclined than it should be, and that caused the rollback. I accept that we're already in "unlikely event" scenario, but once the impossible has been eliminated, refusing to accept that there's probably 2-3 likely scenarios left, and instead inserting incredibly unlikely theoretical stuff... well that's just bad faith.
Finally, it's personal taste, but I remain a bit disappointed with the deliberate blindness being applied to inconvenient truths by some on here. The two currently most likely rational explanations are simple - deliberate pilot action, accidental pilot action. Either way, it's pilot action . As frustrating as some of the wild theories are, the obfuscation being pushed out by the "circle the wagons" brigade is just as bad. Any pilot knows that their life - and those of their passengers - relies on clear sightedness and not avoiding uncomfortable data points. So let's trust our instruments. There should be no absurd rush to judgement but also, please, let's not hide behind the "they were professionals, treat them with respect" stuff, endlessly. Someone selected fuel on both engines to cut-off, mere moments after they left the ground. It won't be an engine restart procedure (too low, too early), it won't be some bizarre technical problem that hasn't happened in millions of flight hours on other 787s worldwide. The CVR says "why did you do X" and the data recorder says "X happened". The two line up. What we don't know for absolute certain is why, so the only sensible things now being examined are:
1) Deliberate pilot action (can only assume harmful intent at Vr + 3 sec)
2) Accidental pilot action (due to severe cognitive disconnect, or "wallet in freezer" stuff)
I'm one of many being frustrated by the lack of CVR recording being released, because that will almost certainly identify whether it was 1 or 2. But it would be abnormal for that to happen, and I respect that until they're sure, if the CVR points to something, they will want it confirmed before releasing it, because whether it's 1 or 2, it's bad news for the families of that particular pilot.
Oh, and to whoever said "Ask yourself if we are ready to hear it?".... come on. Hundreds of people died. Ignoring a piece of evidence related to that because it might be uncomfortable hearing it is unacceptable, and a bit childish. It might be uncomfortable, but professionals follow the evidence, wherever it may lead, however uncomfortable it might be.
Sorry this sounds so angry. The cause is that having stuck my neck out and said "Why are you guys moderating so much" to the mods, a free run of the thread has revealed such nonsense being posted that I'm embarrassed about having said anything. Lock away, I say!
1 user liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 20, 2025, 18:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11925921
The full Flight Global article; those here who chose to put PPRuNe and themselves at risk of legal action by their accusations and emotive language may like to reflect and be more accurate in their contributions to this professional pilots forum in future.
US safety chief supports India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau in urging media to avoid ‘premature narratives’ about the 12 June disaster that killed 260 people
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 24, 2025, 01:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11927536
Further update:
https://www.airindia.com/in/en/newsr...spections.html
and
http://https://www.flightglob...163888.article
https://www.airindia.com/in/en/newsr...spections.html
PRESS RELEASE
STATEMENT ON COMPLETION OF FUEL CONTROL SWITCH INSPECTIONS
JUL 22, 2025
ANNOUNCEMENTS. July 22, 13:20 hours
Air India has completed precautionary inspections on the locking mechanism of Fuel Control Switch (FCS) on all Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 aircraft in its fleet.
Boeing 737 aircraft are part of the fleet of Air India Express, Air India’s low cost subsidiary. With this, the two airlines have complied with the directives of the DGCA issued on July 14, 2025.
In the inspections, no issues were found with the said locking mechanism. Air India had started voluntary inspections on 12 July and completed them within the prescribed time limit set by the DGCA. The same has been communicated to the regulator.
Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members.
STATEMENT ON COMPLETION OF FUEL CONTROL SWITCH INSPECTIONS
JUL 22, 2025
ANNOUNCEMENTS. July 22, 13:20 hours
Air India has completed precautionary inspections on the locking mechanism of Fuel Control Switch (FCS) on all Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 aircraft in its fleet.
Boeing 737 aircraft are part of the fleet of Air India Express, Air India’s low cost subsidiary. With this, the two airlines have complied with the directives of the DGCA issued on July 14, 2025.
In the inspections, no issues were found with the said locking mechanism. Air India had started voluntary inspections on 12 July and completed them within the prescribed time limit set by the DGCA. The same has been communicated to the regulator.
Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members.
‘No issues’ found after fuel-switch lock checks on Air India 787 fleet
By David Kaminski-Morrow 23 July 2025
Air India states it has found no issues with the fuel-control switch locking mechanisms on its Boeing 787 fleet, after inspections prompted by the crash at Ahmedabad last month.Preliminary findings from the inquiry had noted a US Federal Aviation Administration safety bulletin from 2018 referring to the possibility that fuel-control switches had been installed on various models – including all 787 variants – with the locking feature disengaged.
This lock prevents the switches being inadvertently moved to the ‘cut-off’ position, which would halt the fuel-flow to the aircraft’s engines.
Given that the initial inquiry findings point to activation of both the left- and right-hand fuel switches, the status of the lock on the 787 involved in the 12 June accident has been a subject of uncertainty.
While investigators have yet to disclose details of the switch locks on the crashed aircraft, Air India has found “no issues” with the mechanism on remaining 787s – or the Boeing 737s of Air India Express – after completing precautionary inspections.
This reduces – although does not eliminate – the probability of inadvertent activation, as outlined in the FAA bulletin, given that it would require a highly-unusual slip on the only aircraft with a faulty switch.
The inspections mean the two carriers have complied with an Indian DGCA regulatory directive issued on 14 July.
“Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members,” says the airline.
Source: AirTeamImages
Air India initiated checks on its 787s and 737s after investigators highlighted a potential fuel-switch lock issue
The Federation of Indian Pilots has rejected the possibility of the crew’s involvement, insisting that transitioning both switches sequentially to the ‘cut-off’ position within 1s – as the inquiry states – would be “humanly impossible”.
“Attributing such a catastrophic engine shutdown sequence to deliberate pilot action, while ignoring manufacturer-documented vulnerabilities, is unwarranted and unjust in the absence of incontrovertible evidence,” said the federation’s president, CS Randhawa, in a 16 July communication to the Indian ministry of civil aviation.
It argues that a potential software fault or sensor anomaly could “simulate pilot action” and trigger an automated engine shutdown.
The federation refers to the 787’s thrust-control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) system, which is designed to prevent uncommanded high-thrust activation while on the ground by reducing engine power.
Although the federation uses an All Nippon Airways 787’s dual-engine shutdown after touchdown at Osaka to justify its concerns, the protective system is designed to activate only on the ground, under specific circumstances, with checks on air-ground status, engine speed and thrust-lever position.
The ANA aircraft was also fitted with Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines, while the Air India 787 had GE Aerospace GEnx-1B powerplants.
Boeing discovered a logic error in the GEnx-1B version of the TCMA system prior to the ANA occurrence, mentioned in an FAA document of September 2016. This stated that Boeing planned to address the error – limited to a “certain single failure” – by the end of 2018, implementing it into production aircraft and issuing retrofit instructions.
While the Federation of Indian Pilots has offered little direct evidence that a software issue might have contributed to the Ahmedabad crash, it says the inquiry “must include all plausible failure paths” and avoid “premature attribution of motive or intent” until system malfunctions – including problems with the fuel-control switch locks – are “conclusively ruled out”.
By David Kaminski-Morrow 23 July 2025
Air India states it has found no issues with the fuel-control switch locking mechanisms on its Boeing 787 fleet, after inspections prompted by the crash at Ahmedabad last month.Preliminary findings from the inquiry had noted a US Federal Aviation Administration safety bulletin from 2018 referring to the possibility that fuel-control switches had been installed on various models – including all 787 variants – with the locking feature disengaged.
This lock prevents the switches being inadvertently moved to the ‘cut-off’ position, which would halt the fuel-flow to the aircraft’s engines.
Given that the initial inquiry findings point to activation of both the left- and right-hand fuel switches, the status of the lock on the 787 involved in the 12 June accident has been a subject of uncertainty.
While investigators have yet to disclose details of the switch locks on the crashed aircraft, Air India has found “no issues” with the mechanism on remaining 787s – or the Boeing 737s of Air India Express – after completing precautionary inspections.
This reduces – although does not eliminate – the probability of inadvertent activation, as outlined in the FAA bulletin, given that it would require a highly-unusual slip on the only aircraft with a faulty switch.
The inspections mean the two carriers have complied with an Indian DGCA regulatory directive issued on 14 July.
“Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members,” says the airline.
Source: AirTeamImages
Air India initiated checks on its 787s and 737s after investigators highlighted a potential fuel-switch lock issue
The Federation of Indian Pilots has rejected the possibility of the crew’s involvement, insisting that transitioning both switches sequentially to the ‘cut-off’ position within 1s – as the inquiry states – would be “humanly impossible”.
“Attributing such a catastrophic engine shutdown sequence to deliberate pilot action, while ignoring manufacturer-documented vulnerabilities, is unwarranted and unjust in the absence of incontrovertible evidence,” said the federation’s president, CS Randhawa, in a 16 July communication to the Indian ministry of civil aviation.
It argues that a potential software fault or sensor anomaly could “simulate pilot action” and trigger an automated engine shutdown.
The federation refers to the 787’s thrust-control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) system, which is designed to prevent uncommanded high-thrust activation while on the ground by reducing engine power.
Although the federation uses an All Nippon Airways 787’s dual-engine shutdown after touchdown at Osaka to justify its concerns, the protective system is designed to activate only on the ground, under specific circumstances, with checks on air-ground status, engine speed and thrust-lever position.
The ANA aircraft was also fitted with Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines, while the Air India 787 had GE Aerospace GEnx-1B powerplants.
Boeing discovered a logic error in the GEnx-1B version of the TCMA system prior to the ANA occurrence, mentioned in an FAA document of September 2016. This stated that Boeing planned to address the error – limited to a “certain single failure” – by the end of 2018, implementing it into production aircraft and issuing retrofit instructions.
While the Federation of Indian Pilots has offered little direct evidence that a software issue might have contributed to the Ahmedabad crash, it says the inquiry “must include all plausible failure paths” and avoid “premature attribution of motive or intent” until system malfunctions – including problems with the fuel-control switch locks – are “conclusively ruled out”.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 24th July 2025 at 01:04 . Reason: URLs again
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
July 25, 2025, 14:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11928262
https://aviationweek.com/air-transpo...N1000041876164
From the article by Guy Norris of Aviation Week... Air India 787 Crash Being Investigated As ‘Criminal Act,’ Says Safety Expert
Guy Norris July 23, 2025
If / when we get confirmation that India is indeed going ahead with a criminal investigation, we'll re open this thread.
From the article by Guy Norris of Aviation Week... Air India 787 Crash Being Investigated As ‘Criminal Act,’ Says Safety Expert
Guy Norris July 23, 2025
LAS VEGAS—India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is now looking into the June 12 crash of an Air India
Boeing
787-8 as an intentional act, says
veteran safety consultant and former NTSB investigator Greg Feith
. The AAIB’s preliminary report on July 12 revealed that fuel cutoff switches for the 787’s two GE Aerospace GEnx-1B engines were transitioned from “run” to “cutoff” around three seconds after takeoff from Ahmedabad Airport. Although both fuel switches were turned back on within a further 14 sec., the aircraft was too low to recover and impacted trees and buildings, killing 241 of 242 occupants on the 787 and 19 on the ground.The AAIB has criticized subsequent western media reports as “irresponsible” for indicating the fuel cutoff switches were likely deliberately moved by one of the pilots.
However, Feith says: “It has become very apparent, especially now with information I know and what's come out about the cockpit voice recorder—where the question is heard ‘why did you cut off the fuel?’—[that] somebody had to have seen that action to make that statement. You just wouldn’t have a dual-engine failure.”
Speaking at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Aviation forum here in Las Vegas, Feith says: “Something had to prompt that type of comment. Now we get into the psychology part of it, and that's really where this investigation is going to go. “And oh, by the way, it's no longer an accident. It's investigated as a criminal event, just like EgyptAir, just like Germanwings, just like SilkAir. These are criminal events—intentional acts,” he adds, referring to three fatal crashes deemed to have been deliberately caused which occurred in 1999, 2015 and 1997 respectively.
Feith, who participated in the investigation into the SilkAir crash—where a Boeing 737-300 traveling from Jakarta to Singapore was downed—says other theories continue to persist in the face of contradictory evidence provided by the AAIB. “To this day, people are still talking about this as a dual-engine failure, despite the fact that the AAIB came out with a preliminary report which gave some initial findings. They said at this stage of the investigation, there are no recommended actions for the 787-8 or the engines. They just exonerated the airplane. They just exonerated the engines.”
“The junior investigators and the trolls are still making a big deal about engine failure, software issues, FADEC problems. They're not part of the process,” Feith continues. The AAIB “had a team of subject matter experts dissecting all of this in that 30-day period. You think they didn't look at that? It makes no logical sense,” he adds.
“The fact is that now we have people all spooled up looking at the wrong thing instead of looking at, 'is this an isolated problem or a systemic event?' It's the first major accident for a brand-new airplane [type]. This is the kind of controversy that gets stirred up and distracts us from really looking at where we need to be and what we need to be doing to enhance aviation safety,” Feith says.
Referencing the SilkAir accident, he says: “I've been down this road. I spent two years working on SilkAir in Palembang, Sumatra. I took a team of investigators over with me from Boeing and the engine manufacturer, the FAA and a variety of others, and we determined in concert with their National Transportation Safety Committee, that this was an intentional act.”
However, Feith says: “It has become very apparent, especially now with information I know and what's come out about the cockpit voice recorder—where the question is heard ‘why did you cut off the fuel?’—[that] somebody had to have seen that action to make that statement. You just wouldn’t have a dual-engine failure.”
Speaking at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Aviation forum here in Las Vegas, Feith says: “Something had to prompt that type of comment. Now we get into the psychology part of it, and that's really where this investigation is going to go. “And oh, by the way, it's no longer an accident. It's investigated as a criminal event, just like EgyptAir, just like Germanwings, just like SilkAir. These are criminal events—intentional acts,” he adds, referring to three fatal crashes deemed to have been deliberately caused which occurred in 1999, 2015 and 1997 respectively.
Feith, who participated in the investigation into the SilkAir crash—where a Boeing 737-300 traveling from Jakarta to Singapore was downed—says other theories continue to persist in the face of contradictory evidence provided by the AAIB. “To this day, people are still talking about this as a dual-engine failure, despite the fact that the AAIB came out with a preliminary report which gave some initial findings. They said at this stage of the investigation, there are no recommended actions for the 787-8 or the engines. They just exonerated the airplane. They just exonerated the engines.”
“The junior investigators and the trolls are still making a big deal about engine failure, software issues, FADEC problems. They're not part of the process,” Feith continues. The AAIB “had a team of subject matter experts dissecting all of this in that 30-day period. You think they didn't look at that? It makes no logical sense,” he adds.
“The fact is that now we have people all spooled up looking at the wrong thing instead of looking at, 'is this an isolated problem or a systemic event?' It's the first major accident for a brand-new airplane [type]. This is the kind of controversy that gets stirred up and distracts us from really looking at where we need to be and what we need to be doing to enhance aviation safety,” Feith says.
Referencing the SilkAir accident, he says: “I've been down this road. I spent two years working on SilkAir in Palembang, Sumatra. I took a team of investigators over with me from Boeing and the engine manufacturer, the FAA and a variety of others, and we determined in concert with their National Transportation Safety Committee, that this was an intentional act.”
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
August 06, 2025, 15:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11934214
Our training assumes that we always act in the manner that we trained, and that is an optimistic view of life. A review of most serious incidents and accidents leaves an impression that we are all subject to error and action slips. It is also quite true that in more events, the human is the variable that is able to adapt due to the ability to apply heuristics and occasionally intuitive responses to a condition that is outside of their training. Those are the saves, and they tend to be overlooked in our rush for judgement and certainty, and to have some level of assurance that an event cannot occur to us. The defence against error is monitoring system performance, to confirm that when we turn off a say, fuel pumps on an A340-300 to balance fuel (needless action, but sometimes eyepleasing is assumed to be better than leaving stuff alone) and accidentally turn off the HYD pumps, leading to a wild ride, our deliberate actions and cross checking of our movement of any switch, lever, coffee cup etc., is followed by the correct response. All of that is fine, until we do not have time to correct an accidental movement of a system control. FCS are considered to be "irreversible" due to the time to correct an action, and the criticality of the response to the system change, and so we have great checklists and design to ensure that procedurally we check before actioning a switch. That kind of works for engine failure and fire checklists, it gives little comfort to the case of selecting the gear up instead of flaps up, etc., and here is my concern with our assumption of intent from evidence of action.
It may well be that the investigation provides irrefutable and overwhelming proof that the FCS were placed to cutoff. That is looking likely. That in itself does not give the reasoning as to why that occurred.
Collectively we have been flicking the wrong switches (A340 wild rides) and levers, (DC8 etc.,) with lousy outcomes, for quite some time, presumably that is why we take inordinate efforts to check/verify actioning of irreverible systems, and yet, we also misplace keys, put wallets into fridges, etc as we are human. It is one thing to be human, most (not all of us) are, but it is another to understand what the intent of the person involved was, and that means we are a long way from assuming malfeasance or deliberate aforethought.
I do a fair amount of flight testing, and that involves some odd activity, and I don't trust myself to not make slips or errors, to the extent that for one aircraft, I carry a tennis ball that fits neatly over the end of the emergency shutdown handle of the engines that I am not intending to shutdown and subsequetly relight. I don't expect that alone stops making an error, it is simply a procedural step and an opportunity to differentiate between systems that may be worthwhile. We have had similar guards on FCS in the past, due to congnitive lapses leading to red faces, the P3 fuel and ignition switches being an elegant example. The intent of a guard that takes deliberate action is to increase the time available to comprehend what is about to occur, just as putting a post-it note over the LEM jettison is not a bad idea for the late senator of Colorado to have done on Apollo 13.
Just because something happened, doesn't give the reason why, and without that, there can be no "mens rea". It is appropriate to work to understand the why, that is the whole intent of Annex 13.
16 users liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
August 06, 2025, 19:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11934341
T
I do a fair amount of flight testing, and that involves some odd activity, and I don't trust myself to not make slips or errors, to the extent that for one aircraft, I carry a tennis ball that fits neatly over the end of the emergency shutdown handle of the engines that I am not intending to shutdown and subsequetly relight.
I do a fair amount of flight testing, and that involves some odd activity, and I don't trust myself to not make slips or errors, to the extent that for one aircraft, I carry a tennis ball that fits neatly over the end of the emergency shutdown handle of the engines that I am not intending to shutdown and subsequetly relight.
But even Flight Test pilots can have a brain fart. Didn't happen to me, but it did happen to one of my best friends. They were doing in-flight start testing of the 757/RB211-535 (and the Rolls engine is a bit notorious for being a fickle in-flight starter). They were doing a corner point condition when the test engine went into a hot start. One of the observers said something like 'it's gone hot, shut it down'. The left seat pilot calmly reached down and shutdown the good engine
. Fortunately they were at about 30k, and they were able to recover and get both engines restarted before losing to much altitude.
I was told the Flight Test pilot in question was immediately demoted from "Experimental Flight Test" to "Production Flight Test" (where they do routine shakedown flights of new production aircraft prior to delivery).
5 users liked this post.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.