I would rule out bird strike for lack of audio visual signatures of such an event and fuel contamination due to symmetry of events. Due to my trust in the profession and my distrust in modern engineering practices, my money is on Seattle.

I had wondered about TCMA being involved. Software is extremely complex and there have
been examples in the past where it does something it wasn't supposed to do, causing an incident.

Edit: How do we know it happened at 100ft?

I'm trying to explain the appearance of the RAT and the onboard green/white flashing lights. The alternatives right now are dual engine failure with no birds around.

I said below 100 feet, it didn't get higher than that. Are there any memory items, or indeed emergency checklists, to complete between V1 and 400 feet?

Related question: I asked earlier at what speed the 787's RAT becomes effective in providing hydraulic power. Is it possible that by the time the RAT deployed, the aircraft had lost airspeed to the point that it would have struggled to produce an adequate amount of pressure? Taking the Gimli Glider incident as an example, my understanding (could be wrong, this was from a magazine article) is that as they bled off speed to land, they ended up short enough of hydraulic power that they started to experience control difficulties, with the plane responding fairly sluggishly. If that's the case and this poor crew was going through something similar, it might explain why they seem to do very little about their situation.

Presumably a dual engine shutdown under TMCA (i.e. similar to the ANA incident) would cause the RAT to deploy.

Obviously difficult to envisage what could cause an TMCA activation on both engines simultaneously given the safeguards in place (weight on wheels etc). However maybe the time delay from an erroneous TMCA activation on the runway/at rotation would lead to a loss of power 10 seconds later.

Let\x92s be careful about absolutes. Emirates 521 and Turkish 1951 are both examples of crews not firewalling the thrust levers despite low energy. The late pitch up could be due to the onset of a stall not an order from the crew.

TCMA is function which can reduce thrust on both engines simultaneously. It had done so in error in the past resulting in an AD. It uses air/ground logic so that it only operates on the ground, however note that at the point of thrust loss the gear is still down without any movement of the gear or doors. I would expect gear retraction to start before that height. Could we imagine an air/ground logic fault inhibiting gear retraction and allowing TCMA, which triggered (for whatever reason!) causing dual thrust loss? I would expect this to be in the realms of a combination of failures shown to be extremely impossible, but\x85

The problem with the flap handle/gear handle mix-up theory is that it would appear in the original video that the gear up sequence has started based on the main gear leading axle pointing downwards, which is the first thing that happens (hydraulically) when the gear handle is moved.

This was handled in this PPrune thread:
ANA 787 Engines shutdown during landing
and in AvHerald:
https://avherald.com/h?article=4c2fe53a&opt=0

Just to clarify one point: the ANA B787 was powered with RR Trent 1000 engines while the Air India had GEnx-1B67 engines.
So, the Air India thrust failure may still have its source in the TCMA system, however, if it's the case, the logical path must be somewhat different than for the thrust reversers of the ANA airplane.

A long while ago I posted on the Rumour thread about a ban on drinks on the flight deck sent to a BA, A350 mid Atlantic. It was prompted by 2 separate instances of uncommanded unrecoverable engine shut downs due to drink spills across the fuel cut off switches. It was widely mocked by the professional pilots on here until proven to be absolutely factually correct. If we are into speculation why not a drink left on the flight deck tips on aircraft pitch up and spills across both fuel cut-switches. Just sayin

Hutch

Former Boeing Engineer, actually worked on this specific airplane prior to delivery. To me this all comes down to if the RAT was actually out. If not, lots of different factors people have already debated and likely some sort of pilot error that I'll let the pilots on this forum debate.

If the RAT did come out, then we are looking at simultaneous dual engine failure basically at V2 which is so improbable (without bird strikes or purposeful actions) that it is basically impossible. This is a 330 Min ETOPS aircraft. I saw no rudder deflection or yaw indicating 1 engine failed first and then they shut down the second one on accident.

Only two realistic options for me in that case are:
1. cutoff of the engines by the pilots. Either on purpose or accidental.
2. maintenance actions by the Air India ground team that caused issues with the engine system or power generation system.

2 is the only one I haven't seen mentioned here and I say this as a no longer Boeing employee. We STRUGGLED with AI during the EIS. They were notorious for just parking airplanes and then using them as spare parts and then screaming for help when they had to go back and get the planes ready to fly again.

Still think 1 is much more likely but will just throw out that 2 since there were complaints from previous flights about IFE and AC which to me speaks to issues with the power generation possibly being neglected.

Why are people still considering a flap/gear mix-up? If that were the case, I\x92d expect that with both engines running, one should be able to compensate for the loss of lift by increasing angle of attack and thrust - the latter might not even needed with TO thrust.

At this point, a dual engine failure seems like a much more plausible explanation. As for what might have caused it, I honestly don\x92t know.

There's two things which are unlikely to be related to this accident, but thought I'd mention them because they both concern software bugs that impacted 1.) The Electrical System and 2.) The Engines (both of them at the same time!)

US aviation authority: Boeing 787 bug could cause 'loss of control'

https://www.theguardian.com/business...oss-of-control

ANA Boeing 787 Dreamliner Suffers Dual Engine Failure On Landing:

https://simpleflying.com/ana-dual-en...re-on-landing/

Not yet seen a response to my question about which engine parameters are recommended by the FDR and what is the sample rate.
Hopefully you might be able to answer this.
Many thanks.
I am a retired gas turbine engineer who worked on safety systems and assessments and assisted on a number of accident investigations (military fast jets) and would be interested to know this.

I'm pretty convinced that everyone is watching different videos, which wouldn't surprise me in the least given how much images and footage can get mangled from being downloaded/re-uploaded to different services. Personally I've seen at least two different videos (and slightly different variants of each): one that's a direct recording of the aircraft and one that's a recording of a phone playing a recording of the aircraft. The buzz of a propeller was quite audible in the former but not in the latter, and the engines are notably quiet compared to any 787 takeoff I've ever been close to.

I do think that at this point people are working backwards from the cause being retracting the flaps, rather than working forwards from the evidence towards an explanation. If everything else was as it should be apart from flaps being retracted instead of gear, you'd at the very least expect the aircraft to reach a higher speed than is suggested by how little distance there is between the end of the runway and the crash site. Coupled with the apparently parabolic trajectory seen in the airport CCTV video, the crew (allegedly) reporting engine problems on the radio, the surviving passenger testifying about flickering cabin lights, the plausible deployment of the RAT, the fact that the ADS-B data cuts out well before impact...surely at some point one must consider a lack of thrust, no matter how improbable. Recognising the what doesn't need a full thesis on the how .

I wonder if (given all the facts and rumours about the situation so far) the flaps would be so high on everyone's minds if they weren't already a hot topic from the initial, largely baseless speculation that they somehow took off with flaps retracted.

SLF here, retired physicist, but with much engineering (esp. systems engineering) background and considerable interest/experience in fault-finding in complex (not aircraft) systems.

I think it is helpful here to work through some possible failure scenarios in some detail. You could usefully partition these into two separate groups: “RAT was deployed” and “RAT was not deployed.” I’ll mostly follow the former here.

\xb7 By following this path, I think we can exclude incorrect flaps setting or premature flap retraction as the primary cause of the crash. It’s difficult to see how improper use of the flaps would be correlated with RAT deployment. Everything in this case points to a loss of engine thrust.

\xb7 The first question is, why did the RAT deploy? As I understand it, manual deployment by a pilot is possible, or automatic deployment caused by detection of major electrical or engine failures. I haven’t found an authoritative, detailed discussion of this, or about the time to deployment, which is relevant here as there is so little time involved.

\xb7 According to tdracer , if the primary issue was a major electrical failure, that should not have caused any engine rollback. Thus, absent pull back of the throttles (which surely would have been corrected by the pilots), there should not have been a loss of thrust.

\xb7 Thus we are left with engine rollback as the likely underlying problem. Absent other issues, a single engine rollback should not have been a major problem, so dual rollback, unlikely as it might be, seems a reasonable conclusion.

\xb7 This is consistent with the reported mayday call, although that report needs confirmation.

\xb7 It is difficult to understand a dual engine rollback. Various causes have been suggested but ruled “unlikely” here. However, it is not possible to rule out a unicorn event, like the dual engine rollback experienced by BA 38. Leaving aside the cause, it is useful to look at the consequences.

\xb7 There would have been a major loss of electrical power (apart from battery backup), assuming the APU was not running. I don’t know if is possible the APU might be used at takeoff (e,g., to unload the main engines), or if any evidence from the tail photo at the crash site provides a meaningful indication (e.g., intake door status).

\xb7 Are there other indications of loss of electrical power? The reported statements of the surviving passenger may have some relevance, but I would want to see the results of an interview by crash investigators.

\xb7 What about the loss of Flight Aware ADS-B data shortly after takeoff? There have been a few mentions of this, but not much discussion. Could this indicate loss of electrical power?



I hope this is of some use. I’m happy to defer to professionals or others here for better information/analysis.

The nose gear angle suggest that the "gear-up" was selected and a dual engine failure happened at the same time, with the hydraulics failing and possible RAT deployment.. The APU was not running and everything, except the flight recorders, might be powered down and restarted at a very low altitude.

Very scary.

In summary,

Flaps were extended, possibly flaps 5 or 15. Looks like it in the video and clearly shown post crash.

Aircraft reached a height of just over 100\x92 AGL (possibly 200\x92 if you compare wingspan to height in videos)

RAT was deployed. Seen on videos and heard conclusively.

Aircraft rotated at \x91usual\x92 spot. Comparing FR24 data from previous flights over the past week.

Aircraft took off at \x91usual\x92 speed. Comparing other flights.

FR24 data stopped being sent shortly after take off. Possibly indicating electrical fault.

Green and white flashing light reported by survivor. Possibly indicating electrical fault.

Gear bogies were at unusual angle indicating Gear selected up and then interrupted.

No smoke or flames to indicate bird strike. (Edit - still debate about this in the video above where the aircraft is behind a building)

No rudder input to indicate single engine failure.


All speculation but hopefully a pretty balanced summary from the thread so far. It would be great if there was more focus now on what might have caused above rather than talking flaps, birds, 625\x92, etc.

Can I just clarify: the 787 has FBW and certain flight envelope protections. If the pilots suffered a dual engine failure after takeoff, they would pull back to stretch the glide as the computers will not allow the aircraft to stall. This is effectively what Sully did when he kissed it into the Hudson like a pro.

In any other aircraft, if you lose thrust in all your engines, you would be pushing the nose down immediately!

I have now watched a number of "normal" 787 takeoffs online and in none of them does the gear go up super early, certainly not before the 10 seconds or so where this one seems to loose power. I think the flap/gear raising is wrong personally