Posts about: "Engine Failure (All)" [Posts: 489 Pages: 25]

I'm really trying to resist engaging here, but anyone who states what pilots, 'would', do in a given situation, simply hasn't grasped the most elementary, 1.01, fundamentals of human behaviour.

Again and again, I've listened to CVRs, or looked at FDR plots, or sat next to people in a flight deck or crew room, or restaurant, or anywhere (but especially in the back of a simulator)... and pondered what on earth led competent individuals to do what I had just witnessed. Of course, if the individuals aren't competent to start with (and that is NOT directed at this crew, but embellishes my point) there may be less mystery.

Also worth remembering, for those of us who do, the ludicrous training delivered by Airbus on the A320 family at the start, when they told people that, (a) pulling the stick back and holding it there will save you, and, (b) you don't need unusual attitude training in an FBW aircraft. I think we know how that played out. I'll add an element of my briefing for a departure in a single-engined aircraft, if a forced landing was not an option (eg Rochester, Biggin Hill), which also covers what I have always thought I would do faced with total power loss in a bigger machine, 'I will manoeuvre the aircraft to hit the softest thing I can, as slowly as possible'. Very glad I never had to see that through.

Regardless of FBW on the Boeings the pilot can stall the aircraft. The 787 and 777 don't have hard protection like the Airbus. You will get force feedback as you approach the stall, but keep pulling on the yoke and the plane will stall.

Which is why the aircraft flew a very sweet descent, nose up, increasing pitch until the Stall.

The only thing that could cause me to touch anything at that altitude is if they had already had a dual engine failure, which becomes a circular argument.

In the take off video I think there is a subtle yaw to the right at lift off (the moment it begins being obscured by the building in the foreground). There is then a massive blast of dust on the airfield on the left side of the aircraft as it lifts off. Later video audio suggests the engines were not at full power ( or even operating - just wind noise) and that the RAT was whirring. It also shows the fuselage wheel bogies were tilted forward - so wheels up has commenced - but the gear doors are not open.

Possible sequence: right engine failure at rotation, firewalling of left engine, lift off and positive rate, gear up lever activated, wheels tilt forward, left engine failure, RAT deployed, insufficient hydraulics to Open gear doors to complete gear up sequence, ongoing dual engine failure?

The speed at which there was a complete loss of thrust and electrical power degrading to the point of flickering lights and RAT deployment suggests to me an actual engine shutdown rather than anything linked to auto thrust or fuel contamination. There are not many things which can cause an engine to shut down: LP valves, FADEC incl TCMA, crew action\x85

We're all shouting each other down with two main different theories on why the aircraft lost lift so shortly after takeoff.

1) Incorrect flap retraction causing the aircraft to lose lift and unable to recover the energy in time. (Not unheard of and plenty of reports where this has happened - albeit usually not to a crash).

2) Loss of engine thrust backed up two potential pieces of evidence that back up the RAT was deployed (apparent RAT sound, potential RAT seen on low res video).

It is impossible to know which of these is the case. Considering this summary of memory items is there the potential for a combination of both theories to have taken place?

Inadvertant flap retraction by PNF leading the PF to sense a sink and loss of lift. Pushes the thrust levers forward to the firewall and still the aircraft sinks. PF looking through the HUD and so very much 'outside focused' and doesn't realise that PNF has instead moved the flaps. PF defaults to memory items for loss of thrust on both engines before PNF can realise or communicate to PF what they've done, start switches are cut off which drops the RAT and from that point they're only heading one way. This would satisfy the strongly held belief that the RAT was extended, whilst also following the more likely initial cause of an action slip by PNF starting the sequence, rather than a dual engine failure.

I agree it is helpful to seek a consensus on some of these matters.

The most productive responses would be along the lines of:-
(1) I too have read all previous posts and agree that your summary reflects the current consensus,
(2) I too have read all previous posts and agree your summary reflects the consensus HOWEVER I challenge that consensus because... [ [i]EITHER (a) reference to previous post that merits greater credence, OR (b) new evidence supplied],
(3) I too have read all previous posts but I do NOT agree your summary reflects the consensus [explanation required].

It is not necessary for everyone who thinks (1) to say it (although some initial feedback would be useful!). However, if any of the more experienced and informed PPRuNers are thinking either (2) or (3) then it would be instructive to hear that.

FWIW, yours strikes me as a reasonable summary of the best consensus I have been able to discern (as of ~30 minutes ago). There are multiple caveats to each line item, but I presume you've deliberately left those out for the sake of readability, so I'll do the same!

The only comments I would add are:-

- It's a stretch to say the RAT is seen or heard "conclusively". Doubts have been expressed about the video quality and there are dissenting views regarding the audio. If a few more people were able to wade in on the audio point in particular, this could be very beneficial in moving the discussion forward because the presence or otherwise of the RAT is significant to several competing theories.

- On the subject of audio, I am surprised there has not been more discussion regarding engine noise. In the primary eye witness video the (alleged) RAT can be heard distinctly, as can the sounds of distant impact. If the engines were working as expected when overflying the camera and then flying directly away from it, do we really not think the engine noise would be more conclusive, i.e. louder (notwithstanding quiet engines and derated takeoffs)?

Whichever way readers are leaning in the flaps versus power loss debate, surely these two points are pivotal, and we have actual evidence available to discuss?

- Gear bogies: I'm not sure a consensus has yet been reached regarding the angle of the bogies. (I am not personally qualified to comment on this - I am purely saying I don't see a clear consensus just yet among those who are)

- Mayday call: I don't recall seeing a confirmed source for the widely reported mayday. Others have brought this up in the thread but nobody appears to be able to confirm one way or the other. If accurate, its contents are informative. Am I right to presume that you have left it out of your summary due to a lack of confirmation?

The recordings are simply of too low quality to draw any conclusions from.

If it was dual engine failure shortly after rotation, that is very bad luck and I doubt any crew could recover from something like that.

I could speculate further but I think it\x92s just too hard to say without better quality footage or FDR data.

very bad luck, or a common root cause. It remains to be seen.

Why the need to make the two theories fit in such a convoluted manner? Inadvertent flap retraction was theorised because people assumed that was most likely to have caused the loss of lift - hardly anyone believed dual engine failure was possible. Now we know that the loss of lift was indeed almost certainly caused by a loss of engine power, why all these awkward attempts to reverse engineer it to still fit the flap retraction theory? People need to realise they are only trying to make the flap retraction theory fit because of cognitive biases. If we had all been told immediately, there was dual power loss and the RAT deployed, no-one would even be considering flaps. Its confirmation bias of past assumptions, that's all.

As has been said many times as well, the landing gear retraction process appears to start as the bogies tilt, and then suddenly stops. Which rather suggests they did pull the gear lever. Based on the videos and the amount of speed the plane lost in the very brief sequence ovents, I'd say that the plane lost power a lot earlier than it would have in your theory.

How do we \x91know\x92 that, exactly?

Reports say that one of the black boxes have been recovered and the search continues for the other one. Apparently the B787 flight recorders log voice as well as data so only one is suffice if not damaged.

At this stage, at least two scenarios seem highly plausible:

1. Technical issue

Airliners rely on air/ground logic , which is fundamental to how systems operate.

There have been numerous crashes and serious incidents linked to this logic functioning incorrectly.

Some engineering tests require the air/ground switch to be set in a particular mode. If it's inadvertently left in engineering mode—or if the system misinterprets the mode—this can cause significant problems.

• On the ground , if the aircraft is incorrectly in air mode , some systems may be unavailable—such as wheel brakes, reverse thrust, or ground spoilers.
  
• In the air , if the aircraft is mistakenly in ground mode , flaps might auto-retract, and various layers of system protection may be disabled.
  

In the case of the ANA 787, it appears the engine shutdown occurred during the landing roll, possibly when the TCMA system activated.

2. Pilot misselection of fuel control switches to cutoff

This is still a very real possibility. If it occurred, the pilot responsible may not have done it consciously—his mindset could have been in a different mode.

There’s precedent: an A320 pilot once inadvertently shut down both engines over Paris. Fortunately, the crew managed to restart them. Afterward, the pilot reportedly couldn’t explain his actions.

If something similar happened here, then when the pilots realized the engines had stopped producing thrust, pushing the levers forward would have had no effect. It’s easy to overlook that the fuel switches are in the wrong position—they're far from the normal scan pattern. And with the ground rushing up, the view outside would’ve been far more commanding.

Speaking personally, when I shut down engines at the end of a flight, I consciously force myself to operate each fuel switch independently and with full attention. I avoid building muscle memory that might lead to switching off both engines in a fast, well-practiced habit.

If this is a technical issue, I assume we’ll know soon enough.

On item 1, the TCMA issue should have been fixed, it does fit the sort of issue that occurred here. TDRACER can talk to that, and has done in 2019 and again in post 792. As to flap auto retraction, the B787 like all Boeings has a gated flap lever, and the flaps are only able to move independent of the lever by flap load relief. That would not have caused a loss of thrust, and in this case it is evident that the event is a thrust loss not a CL loss.

On item 2, the video shows no asymmetry at any time, so there is only a symmetric failure of the engines possible. Back on a B747 classic, you could chop all 4 engines at the same time with one hand, on a B737, also, not so much on a B777 or B787. I would doubt that anyone used two hands to cut the fuel at screen height. Note, there was a B744 that lost one engine in cruise when a clip board fell off the coaming. Didn't happen twice, and it only happened to one engine.


​​​​​
Neila83 is correct, the gear tilt pre retraction is rear wheels low, and at the commencement of the selection of the retraction cycle (generally), the first thing that happens is the inboard MLG doors start to open below the wheel well and then the bogie is driven to front wheels low. (There is also an option that the inboard gear doors start to open early as a result of WOW sensing to improve the SSL climb limit). [my bad, for the B788 Capt Bloggs informs us the gear door sequence is after the tilt, not before, the B789 has the before tilt, the option for the door open at rotate is separate]

The inboard doors do not appear to have opened in this case, yet, the gear is forward wheels down. This appears to be out of sequence. TD may have better knowledge on the options that exist with the B788, but this is not looking good at this time.

There is enough in the way of anomalies here to end up with regulatory action, and airlines themselves should/will be starting to pore over their systems and decide if they are comfortable with the airworthiness of the aircraft at this moment. A latent single point of failure is not a comfortable place to be. Inhibiting TCMA might be a good interim option, that system could have been negated by having the ATR ARM switches....(Both)... ARM deferred to the before takeoff checks. The EAFR recovery should result in action within the next 24-48 hours. Boeing needs to be getting their tiger teams warmed up, they can ill afford to have a latent system fault discovered that is not immediately responded to, and the general corporate response of "blame the pilots" is not likely to win any future orders.

I think we are about to have some really busy days for the OEM.


Not sure that Neila83 is that far off the mark at all.

Speaking as a B787 Captain..... There is so much rubbish and stupid suggestion being written here.

This aircraft was airborne for a grand total of 22 seconds, half of which was climbing to no more than 150' aal.

- No Flaps? Due to the setup of the ECL it is physically impossible to go down the runway without some sort of take-off flap set. The T/o config warning would have been singing it's head off. Despite assertions to the contrary I have seen no video clear enough to detect a lack of flaps.

- RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long.
- Flaps up instead of gear? The B787 flaps are slow both in and out. Given that the 'Positive rate' call is not made the second the wheels leave the ground, a mis-selection of flaps up would not cause any loss of lift for at least 20 seconds, by which time they had already crashed. I believe the gear remained down not because of mis-selection but because of a major distraction on rotate.

Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain:

1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or....
2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft.

It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope.

How would 'all the power come off' at 150ft AAL when the Autothrottle would still be in HOLD mode (until 400ft) and therefore be unable to move?

And should't a genuine B787 captain know this?

I have no knowledge about 787, but every landing gear system I\x92ve worked with did not sequence Left and Right MLG to retract and extend with each other. In fact it is typical for left and right side to move at slightly different speed due to different friction etc. Retraction assymmetry is probably not a clue to this mystery.

No argument on the flaps.

The engines, however: yes they take a long time to wind down fully , but they don't take long to stop providing thrust if you shut them down or cut the fuel (or indeed have a bird strike). I don't understand why you consider a loss of thrust to be an impossible hypothesis.

There's also a still image above which appears to show a deployed RAT; that's even if we discount the sound track, which might indeed be something else than a RAT, and ignore the sound of the crash being clearly audible despite the lack of engine noise earlier in the video.

People should be made to read this before posting!