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Shep69
2025-06-14T19:26:00 permalink Post: 11901751 |
We're all shouting each other down with two main different theories on why the aircraft lost lift so shortly after takeoff.
1) Incorrect flap retraction causing the aircraft to lose lift and unable to recover the energy in time. (Not unheard of and plenty of reports where this has happened - albeit usually not to a crash). 2) Loss of engine thrust backed up two potential pieces of evidence that back up the RAT was deployed (apparent RAT sound, potential RAT seen on low res video). It is impossible to know which of these is the case. Considering this summary of memory items is there the potential for a combination of both theories to have taken place? Inadvertant flap retraction by PNF leading the PF to sense a sink and loss of lift. Pushes the thrust levers forward to the firewall and still the aircraft sinks. PF looking through the HUD and so very much 'outside focused' and doesn't realise that PNF has instead moved the flaps. PF defaults to memory items for loss of thrust on both engines before PNF can realise or communicate to PF what they've done, start switches are cut off which drops the RAT and from that point they're only heading one way. This would satisfy the strongly held belief that the RAT was extended, whilst also following the more likely initial cause of an action slip by PNF starting the sequence, rather than a dual engine failure. On a flap 5 takeoff the FMS could be programmed to select climb power at flaps 1 which would seem like an apparent loss of thrust. Same as for F15 to F5 or further. I`m not sure if they would have cycled the FCS switches or not. But the airplane certainly would have experienced a loss of lift would the flaps been inadvertently retracted. As well as perceived loss of thrust. OTOH any castastophic failure which left the gear down would have essentially left the flaps where they were. They are hydraulically activated with electrical backup but it`s wayyyyy slow. |
1stspotter
2025-06-14T20:07:00 permalink Post: 11901788 |
There are more data messages than that, which FR24 shared on the day of the accident and which have been posted a few times in this thread. I'm pretty sure there's also been a comparison of this + previous flights posted in this thread that shows that while the coverage at the airport itself is spotty, it's reasonable to expect further messages to have been received before impact.
Not sure how permanent the content at this URL is, but here's a link to FR24's update which has a CSV with all frames received https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ Somebody on this forum did some analysis with FR24 data of this flight and other AI171 B787 flights. See this article for an overview of all scenarios. It all looks very like to an commanded dual engine shutdown. Why nobody knows. |
Flatiron220
2025-06-14T20:40:00 permalink Post: 11901814 |
Others have been asking if there were potentially a number of deferred items on the MEL, not the most outlandish possibility given some of the AI stories on here and elsewhere. But as you\x92ve said, a failure mode that goes from blocked pitots to a dual engine failure at takeoff sounds like the plot of a bad film
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SpaceQuality
2025-06-14T20:42:00 permalink Post: 11901816 |
Boeing TCMA Patent US6704630B2
Also a newcomer here, but an experienced private pilot, Software Engineer with a degree in Aerospace Computer Science and former Head of Quality for Satellites and Interplanetary Missions. We have already seen bad software solutions and the results thereof in the 737 MAX accidents, which makes me wonder, if the TCMA can reach a state, where unintended engine shutdown is possible.
There is one system implemented in the 787, that has the authority to shut down the engines, based on software subsystem decision. Interestingly - according to the description in the patent below - the same TCMA software package determines the shutdown decision, in both redundant subsystems. Excerpt from the Patent: "Malfunctions in aircraft power plant thrust control systems can result in uncontrollable high engine power levels that are potentially hazardous or catastrophic for aircraft operation. A particularly hazardous situation is when a thrust control system failure results in one of the aircraft's engines continuing to operate at a high power condition and not responding to a throttle command to reduce power during takeoff, approach or landing. Typically, when this failure mode occurs, the actual thrust either increases to a significantly higher than commanded thrust and/or remains at a high level when the thrust levers are set for low thrust.... In one preferred embodiment the present invention is directed to a system and method for detecting and correcting a thrust control malfunction in an aircraft engine. The system includes an electronic engine control (EEC) unit that includes a first processing subsystem and a second processing subsystem, and a thrust control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) circuit included in the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem. Additionally, the system includes a TCMA software package executed by the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem, thereby providing redundant execution of the TCMA software package. The method of the present invention compares the engine's actual power level with a threshold contour defined by the TCMA software package. When the TCMA software package determines that a thrust control malfunction has occurred, based on the engine's power level exceeding the threshold contour, the engine is shut down by the TCMA circuit. The present invention is still further directed to an electronic engine control (EEC) unit configured to detect and correct an aircraft engine thrust control malfunction using an active-active functionality. The EEC includes a first processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs, and a second processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs." Just my 20 cents 12 users liked this post. |
EDLB
2025-06-14T21:11:00 permalink Post: 11901834 |
Long story short. Something or someone disrupted the fuel supply on both engines simultaneously around rotation time. In a way that a line check captain could not correct it in 10+ seconds remaining flight time. Occam razor at this stage would say, that both fire handles were activated. Hope that the investigation comes up with something different.
7 users liked this post. |
BugBear
2025-06-14T21:19:00 permalink Post: 11901847 |
Which side of V1
Also a newcomer here, but an experienced private pilot, Software Engineer with a degree in Aerospace Computer Science and former Head of Quality for Satellites and Interplanetary Missions. We have already seen bad software solutions and the results thereof in the 737 MAX accidents, which makes me wonder, if the TCMA can reach a state, where unintended engine shutdown is possible.
There is one system implemented in the 787, that has the authority to shut down the engines, based on software subsystem decision. Interestingly - according to the description in the patent below - the same TCMA software package determines the shutdown decision, in both redundant subsystems. Excerpt from the Patent: "Malfunctions in aircraft power plant thrust control systems can result in uncontrollable high engine power levels that are potentially hazardous or catastrophic for aircraft operation. A particularly hazardous situation is when a thrust control system failure results in one of the aircraft's engines continuing to operate at a high power condition and not responding to a throttle command to reduce power during takeoff, approach or landing. Typically, when this failure mode occurs, the actual thrust either increases to a significantly higher than commanded thrust and/or remains at a high level when the thrust levers are set for low thrust.... In one preferred embodiment the present invention is directed to a system and method for detecting and correcting a thrust control malfunction in an aircraft engine. The system includes an electronic engine control (EEC) unit that includes a first processing subsystem and a second processing subsystem, and a thrust control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) circuit included in the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem. Additionally, the system includes a TCMA software package executed by the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem, thereby providing redundant execution of the TCMA software package. The method of the present invention compares the engine's actual power level with a threshold contour defined by the TCMA software package. When the TCMA software package determines that a thrust control malfunction has occurred, based on the engine's power level exceeding the threshold contour, the engine is shut down by the TCMA circuit. The present invention is still further directed to an electronic engine control (EEC) unit configured to detect and correct an aircraft engine thrust control malfunction using an active-active functionality. The EEC includes a first processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs, and a second processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs." Just my 20 cents 1 user liked this post. |
directsosij
2025-06-14T22:17:00 permalink Post: 11901896 |
Imaginations are running wild for some people here. Major electrical fault that leads to double engine failure at v2? Really? If that were the case the 787 fleet would be grounded by now given the black box has almost certainly been examined.
8 users liked this post. |
FullWings
2025-06-14T22:21:00 permalink Post: 11901900 |
I think it needs to be said again that pretty much anything can happen to the aircraft systems and the engines will carry on running - this is by design as they have independent FADEC and power supplies and at sea level fuel will get through without boost pumps. You could almost saw the wing off the fuselage and the engine would still produce thrust, TCMA notwithstanding.
We don\x92t know yet what actually triggered the RAT from the relatively short list but every item on it means there is a serious/critical failure(s). The flight path suggests that it was a double engine failure or shutdown (commanded or uncommanded) as anything else should have left the aeroplane in a poor state but able to climb away. 6 users liked this post. |
mechpowi
2025-06-14T22:39:00 permalink Post: 11901913 |
Almost all catastrophic accidents that are not deliberately initiated require multiple causes. It’s extremely unlikely that both engine condition switches or fire switches were accidentaly actuated during a routine rotation and initial climb. However it’s stil possible that the crew did actuate those switches (intentionally or unintentionally) in response to some anomaly experienced at that time. Thus it’s not impossible that electrical system malfunction was the first link in a sequence that led to removing the fuel supply to both engines. The most obvious one is that crew thought that they had dual engine failure due to lost of main electrical power and initiated a double engine restart bycling the engine condition levers.
The purpose of this post is not to promote the above as a possible cause of the accident, but to remaind people that a (proven) mechanical fault does not rule out pilot error and vice versa. |
Shep69
2025-06-14T22:45:00 permalink Post: 11901916 |
We`ll just have to wait a bit until some facts come out. Not ready to shelve the flap/RTOW probability quite yet. Or even deliberate (or inadvertent) actuation of the FCSs. Incapication, etc. 2 users liked this post. |
cncpc
2025-06-14T23:03:00 permalink Post: 11901937 |
Just to confirm.
The 787 is an aircraft which likes to, performance wise, use all of the available runway for takeoff. Sometimes you can be sat in the 787 and as you are rolling down the runway, you start wondering if Rotate has been called or not. It loves taking up all of the runway. Nevertheless, there are some interesting speculations over on X. One guy even claimed the Captain was in the lavatory during the accident... Many people have noted what appears to be the RAT deployed in the video footage suggesting dual engine failure. Possible wrong engine shutdown? But who diagnoses and actions an engine failure and shutdown below 400ft? |
LTC8K6
2025-06-14T23:04:00 permalink Post: 11901939 |
The 787 is far more heavily dependent on electrical power than previous Boeing designs. |
cncpc
2025-06-14T23:26:00 permalink Post: 11901953 |
2 users liked this post. |
benjyyy
2025-06-14T23:31:00 permalink Post: 11901957 |
There have been conflicting reports about the call to ATC. Original reports quoted the Captain saying "Mayday...no thrust, losing power, cannot lift". But I've seen reports today stating the call was simply "Mayday, Mayday" and then no further response.
Difficult to confirm so I wouldn't put too much weight behind it until something more official is released. 7 users liked this post. |
HarryMann
2025-06-14T23:38:00 permalink Post: 11901961 |
Can I just clarify: the 787 has FBW and certain flight envelope protections. If the pilots suffered a dual engine failure after takeoff, they would pull back to stretch the glide as the computers will not allow the aircraft to stall. This is effectively what Sully did when he kissed it into the Hudson like a pro.
In any other aircraft, if you lose thrust in all your engines, you would be pushing the nose down immediately! sully flared almost perfectly, nothing to do with \x91stretching\x92 the glide. 1 user liked this post. |
CriticalSoftware
2025-06-14T23:45:00 permalink Post: 11901966 |
Several hundred posts ago, a link to a PPrune thread re 787 RAT deployment was posted. I am sure everyone posting has at least seen if they have read the thread....
I apologise, if my thoughts have already been posted - please delete if this is the case, I cannot find them in the main thread though None of us know if there was no engine failure, single engine failure or double engine failure. If RAT was deployed, we do not yet know whether it was automatic or manually deployed by a very experienced captain because "We have no power. What harm can it do now?" (Electrical power, not thrust) Would the Captain also elect to start the APU in the few seconds he had? In the thread re 787 RAT deployment, some one states that a single engine failure, due to the small rudder size on 787-8, automatically throttles back the remaining engine as the rudder will not be able to correct the course. I am not clear about the guards around this - be they height restrictions, speed restrictions or % of power delivery. If there are any guards in the software. It may have been stated and I missed it or didn't understand. However, as someone involved with critical software design & development, if the generators were "playing up", which is highly possible given passenger observations on previous flights, could there be a window, if the aircraft experienced a problem with say no 1 engine ( suggested in video "analysis" despite the aircraft tracking right ) whereby the loss of electrical power triggered the software to "throttle back" No 2, and that again limiting any recovery of No 1, if the generators on 2 didn't perform/react as planned. Software always has holes. The primary flight deck screens have battery backup - but do they lose power when the main buses go offline - and/or again when the RAT delivers? Or is it seemless? Previous posts mention both scenarios but with no answer. Are there flickers, resets, reboots? All distracting at best and time limiting at worst. I think a pertinent point posted earlier, was that the problems seems to have begun with "gear up", a lot of load on the electrically driven, hydraulic pumps. Seemingly started, but obviously not completed. I believe the 2 guys sitting in row 0 dealing with this, were just passengers from the moment it left the gate - for whatever reason. The mayday call, by whichever pilot - although no transcript officially published - was probably a last ditch attempt to alert ATC asap to a situation with a clear outcome. Very sad. It is bad form to point the finger before any useful facts are confirmed. So, I suspect generator problems & a hole in the software and/or logic due to timing issues caused by generators appearing to be on/offline -maybe rapidly - restricting thrust by design.. 1 user liked this post. |
wokawoka
2025-06-15T00:38:00 permalink Post: 11901997 |
Sector Crewing
777 Driver for a legacy here.
This is a 10 hr ish sector. Would there not be a 3rd crew on this? There definitely is in my outfit for that length. I was of the belief of flap mis-selection as I have seen in the past. However, with video fly past noise, the sound spectral analysis, I am happy to be convinced that the RAT was out. There are only a few scenarios where this happens - electrical malfunction would not cause the engine to shutdown. However the engines shutting down would cause the electric malfucntion depowering the BUS' which activates the RAT. This is a billion to one chance. Can't see it happening. Last edited by Saab Dastard; 15th Jun 2025 at 20:41 . Reason: Removal of unwarranted speculation 4 users liked this post. |
BugBear
2025-06-15T00:50:00 permalink Post: 11902002 |
777 Driver for a legacy here.
This is a 10 hr ish sector. Would there not be a 3rd crew on this? There definitely is in my outfit for that length. I was of the belief of flap mis-selection as I have seen in the past. However, with video fly past noise, the sound spectral analysis, I am happy to be convinced that the RAT was out. There are only a few scenarios where this happens - electrical malfunction would not cause the engine to shutdown. However the engines shutting down would cause the electric malfucntion depowering the BUS' which activates the RAT. This is a billion to one chance. Can't see it happening. Does TCMA understand WoW prior to taxi!? Taxiing, accelerating? Rotation, Braking, Stowed? Does the software? Does the subset? Who designed it's Contours? |
galaxy flyer
2025-06-15T00:53:00 permalink Post: 11902007 |
1 user liked this post. |
MaybeItIs
2025-06-15T00:54:00 permalink Post: 11902008 |
I think it needs to be said again that pretty much anything can happen to the aircraft systems and the engines will carry on running - this is by design as they have independent FADEC and power supplies and at sea level fuel will get through without boost pumps. You could almost saw the wing off the fuselage and the engine would still produce thrust, TCMA notwithstanding.
Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can. You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve? Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so. ![]()
We don\x92t know yet what actually triggered the RAT from the relatively short list but every item on it means there is a serious/critical failure(s). The flight path suggests that it was a double engine failure or shutdown (commanded or uncommanded) as anything else should have left the aeroplane in a poor state but able to climb away.
1 user liked this post. |
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