Posts about: "Engine Failure (All)" [Posts: 489 Pages: 25]

Originally Posted by Mr Optimistic

From tdracer
However, TCMA is only active on the ground (unfamiliar with the 787/GEnx TCMA air/ground logic - on the 747-8 we used 5 sources of air/ground - three Radio Altimeters and two Weight on Wheels - at least one of each had to indicate ground to enable TCMA). TCMA will shutdown the engine via the N2 overspeed protection - nearly instantaneous. For this to be TCMA, it would require at least two major failures - improper air ground indication or logic, and improper TCMA activation logic (completely separate software paths in the FADEC). Like I said, very, very unlikely.

Originally Posted by SpaceQuality

Also a newcomer here, but an experienced private pilot, Software Engineer with a degree in Aerospace Computer Science and former Head of Quality for Satellites and Interplanetary Missions. We have already seen bad software solutions and the results thereof in the 737 MAX accidents, which makes me wonder, if the TCMA can reach a state, where unintended engine shutdown is possible.

There is one system implemented in the 787, that has the authority to shut down the engines, based on software subsystem decision. Interestingly - according to the description in the patent below - the same TCMA software package determines the shutdown decision, in both redundant subsystems.

Excerpt from the Patent:
"Malfunctions in aircraft power plant thrust control systems can result in uncontrollable high engine power levels that are potentially hazardous or catastrophic for aircraft operation. A particularly hazardous situation is when a thrust control system failure results in one of the aircraft's engines continuing to operate at a high power condition and not responding to a throttle command to reduce power during takeoff, approach or landing. Typically, when this failure mode occurs, the actual thrust either increases to a significantly higher than commanded thrust and/or remains at a high level when the thrust levers are set for low thrust....

In one preferred embodiment the present invention is directed to a system and method for detecting and correcting a thrust control malfunction in an aircraft engine. The system includes an electronic engine control (EEC) unit that includes a first processing subsystem and a second processing subsystem, and a thrust control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) circuit included in the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem. Additionally, the system includes a TCMA software package executed by the first processing subsystem and the second processing subsystem, thereby providing redundant execution of the TCMA software package.

The method of the present invention compares the engine's actual power level with a threshold contour defined by the TCMA software package. When the TCMA software package determines that a thrust control malfunction has occurred, based on the engine's power level exceeding the threshold contour, the engine is shut down by the TCMA circuit.
The present invention is still further directed to an electronic engine control (EEC) unit configured to detect and correct an aircraft engine thrust control malfunction using an active-active functionality. The EEC includes a first processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs, and a second processing subsystem for unilaterally monitoring engine operation and shutting down the engine when a thrust control malfunction occurs."

Just my 20 cents

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

I can't see how gear pins would stop you doing anything more than raising the gear. They don't cause engine failure, RAT extension, or uncommanded flap retraction.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

I did raise this earlier... FCOMs say that the bogies remain in the stowed tilt after a gravity drop, but I don't know if that's because the gear has springs to hold it that way without hydraulics, or just they close the valves on the hydraulics so it stays in the last commanded position without pressure.

Originally Posted by BugBear

Difficult!? Maybe not. If very late the flaps were tagged stowed, and there was a simultaneous gear up command, with FlapDown command, the overload could have failed a GCS. Then it becomes a switching exercise. (Automatics).

Alarms Warnings Impacted EICAS, ETC. it happened long ago, but we know what happens when an engine driven generator quits ..first it bangs for awhile, then it burns itself up, then ...

Originally Posted by MaybeItIs

Thanks for answering the question I hadn't yet asked but wanted to confirm!

I'm still sticking with "Major Electrical Fault" as my most likely cause, and this adds to my suspicions.

As I understand it, the landing gear is raised / retracted by electric motor-driven hydraulic pump (pumps?). This/these would create a significant electrical load.

If the plane's multi-redundant electrical system has a fault which is intermittent (the worst kind of electrical issue to diagnose), and which causes the redundancy controls to go haywire (as there are, of course, electronic controls to detect failures and drive the switching over of primary and backup electrical supplies), then this fault could to triggered by a large load coming on-line. It could even be as simple as a high current cable lug not having been tightened when a part was being replaced at some stage. The relevant bolt might be only finger-tight. Enough to work 99.99% of the time between then and now... But a little bit more oxidation, and particularly, a bit more heat (it was a hot day), and suddenly, a fault.

Having worked in electronics for years, I know that semi-conductors (and lots of other components, especially capacitors [and batteries]) can also degrade instead of failing completely. Electro-static discharges are great for causing computer chips to die, or go meta-stable - meaning they can get all knotted up and cease working correctly - until they are powered off for a while. They can also degrade in a way that means they work normally a low temperatures, but don't above a certain temperature.

Anyway, there MUST be ways that the redundant power supplies can be brought down, simply because, to have a critical bus powered from a number of independent sources, there must be "controls" of some sort. I don't know how it's done in the 787, but that's where I'd be looking.

As there is a lot of discussion already about how the bogies are hanging the wrong way suggesting a started but failed retraction operation, and it's now confirmed that the retraction would normally have taken place at about the point where the flight went "pear shaped", I'm going to suggest that the two things are connected. More than that: I'll suggest that the Gear Up command triggered the fault that caused both engines to shut down in very short succession. Nothing the pilots did wrong, and no way they could have known and prevented it.

It's going to be difficult to prove though.

Originally Posted by ILS27LEFT

Best post until now in my view. We will find out very soon I think. Gear up command triggered the instant lack of fuel to both engines. I'm not sure on how the fuel flow is dependant on the power supplies on the 787 but I genuinely believe you are very very close to what might have happened here.

Originally Posted by MaybeItIs

Yes, thanks, I've seen a few comments to this effect, and I have to accept most of what you say. I understand that they have their own dedicated generators and local independent FADECs (or EECs), but I'm trying to use what I do know to attempt to figure this out. I know that there are Fuel Cutoff switches in the cockpit. Somehow, if switched to Off, these will cut off the fuel to the engines, "no matter what". Of course, even that's not true, as the Qantas A380 engine burst apparently (comment in this thread) showed.

Anyway, the thing I'm looking at is how the fuel cutoff switch function could have been activated in some other way. To me, it seems obvious that there are wires that run between the engine fuel shutoff valves and the cockpit / flight control panel (no doubt with relays etc in between). I don't know where those shutoff valves are located, but logic says they should be located in the fuselage, not out at the engines. I also don't know how those valves operate - are they solenoid valves or electro-mechanically driven? Nor do I know where the power to activate those valves comes from, but using my logic, if those valves close when powered off, such as solenoid valves typically do, then the power cannot exclusively come from the engine-dedicated generators. If it did, you'd never be able to start the engines so they could supply their own power to hold those valves open. So, there must be some power (appropriately) fed from the main aircraft control bus to activate those valves - if the rest of what I'm assuming is correct. Anyway, like I say, I don't know enough about the details at this point, but there are many more ways to activate or deactivate a circuit than by flicking a switch. Killing the relevant power supply, for example. A screwdriver across some contacts (for example), another. Shorting a wire to Chassis, maybe. Just trying to contribute what I can.

You raise another interesting point: "TCMA notwithstanding". Could you elaborate, please? What will happen if the TCMA system, which apparently also has some degree of engine control, loses power? The problem with interlinked circuits and systems is that sometimes, unexpected things can happen when events that were not considered actually happen. If one module, reporting to another, loses power or fails, sometimes it can "tell" the surviving module something that isn't true... My concern is where does the power to the Fuel Cutoff switches come from? Are there relays or solid-state switches (or what?) between the Panel Switches and the valves? If so, is the valve power derived from a different source, and if so, where? Are the valves solenoids, open when power applied, or something else? What is the logic involved, between switch and valve?

Would you mind answering these questions so I can ponder it all further, please? If I'm wrong, I'll happily say so.

Originally Posted by lucille

What\x92s the usual time frame for the release of preliminary data and report from the FDR and CVR? Is it around 6 months?

I guess if no directives come from Boeing or the FAA in the next 2 weeks, it can be presumed that a systems failure from which recovery was impossible was unlikely.

Originally Posted by bakutteh

Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

Gear and flaps are both hydraulic, and the hydraulic pumps typically act as effective fault-containment - a hydraulic failure or excess load doesn't result in excess demand on the electric side; the pump just starts to run out of output flow/pressure.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

In addition, the 787 has four main generators and I believe the switching is segregated into at least two controllers, on top of the four separate generator control units.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

And again, electrical failure should not cause engine failure - consider QF32 where the wiring to the engine was mostly severed and they had to drown it with a fire truck.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

It's not. Boost pumps should be more-or-less unnecessary at sea level.

Originally Posted by Someone Somewhere

I believe the valves are almost all bi-stable power-open power-close. When not powered, they remain in the last commanded position.

The valves are located in the spar (hence being called 'spar valves'. The fuel tank is immediately above the engine so it is a very short pipe for suction feeding. Tail mount engines are potentially a different story...

Originally Posted by BrogulT

I keep reading this theory and I'm baffled. You think the PF is going to attempt a dual engine shutoff and relight during the initial climb based on a hunch that the engines have quit, all without even a sideways glance to see what N1 is or a short word with the PM?

Originally Posted by Icarus2001

No evidence of engine failure

No evidence of RAT deployment from a poor image.

No evidence of electrical failure.

The teams of lawyers in the UK representing 53 grieving families will be working over the weekend to sign up said families to a class action.

​​​​​​​This is going to get messy.
​​​​​​​

Originally Posted by Icarus2001

A thrust reduction is not an engine failure. Engine shutdown due to an action of crew (or inaction) is not a failure.

There is no evidence of an electrical failure. What evidence? A surviving passenger thought he saw flickering lights? Give me a break.

The word evidence in English has a very specific meaning.

Look for the simplest explanation here and then ask why the worldwide B787 fleet is still flying with no urgent inspection requirements from Boeing or GE. Think about that "evidence".

Originally Posted by bakutteh

Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:

PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.

There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬

Originally Posted by Icarus2001

No evidence of engine failure

No evidence of RAT deployment from a poor image.

No evidence of electrical failure.

The teams of lawyers in the UK representing 53 grieving families will be working over the weekend to sign up said families to a class action.

This is going to get messy.

Originally Posted by Icarus2001

Brilliant, now what is your point? Are you suggesting a double engine failure, a roll back to idle thrust or an incorrectly set AAI causing VNAV level off and a thrust reduction. You can only choose one.

For the team pointing to the RAT out as a failure indicator, it could have been deployed by the crew after the initial reduction in climb performance. I am not convinced it is deployed but it really does not make a convincing argument for any type of failure.

For the children on holiday, yes I fly transport category jets, current on two types.

Originally Posted by Icarus2001

Brilliant, now what is your point? Are you suggesting a double engine failure, a roll back to idle thrust or an incorrectly set AAI causing VNAV level off and a thrust reduction. You can only choose one.

For the team pointing to the RAT out as a failure indicator, it could have been deployed by the crew after the initial reduction in climb performance. I am not convinced it is deployed but it really does not make a convincing argument for any type of failure.

For the children on holiday, yes I fly transport category jets, current on two types.
​​​​​​​

Originally Posted by Icarus2001

Assuming GE receive data from these engines in flight, a massive failure would prompt a swift communication from GE. Or a massive electrical issue could put Boeing on edge and also prompt urgent inspections on their aircraft.

Originally Posted by bakutteh

Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:

PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.

There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬

Originally Posted by bakutteh

Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:

PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD.
PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT.

There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed!
The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬