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steamchicken
2025-06-18T07:26:00 permalink Post: 11904987 |
There has been a lot of discussion of the possibility that the crew shut down the wrong engine or misidentified some other problem as an engine failure, usually followed by an assertion that nobody would touch the engines before x feet. PPRuNe's own survey, at the top of this very subforum, found a really high base rate of wrong engine incidents:
Also, on the point about sitting on your hands to 400/1000 feet AAL, someone who has already deviated from a standard operating procedure is more likely to go on to make another mistake; that is why the procedure existed in the first place. As a memo item, here are the survey results: Q1. Have you ever shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 5.4% +0.9% No: 94.6% -0.9% Q2. Have you ever ALMOST shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 26% -1.0% No: 74% +1.0% Q3. Have you ever witnessed a colleague shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 16% +1.0% No: 84% -1.0% Q4. Have you ever witnessed a colleague ALMOST shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 45% +2.0% No: 55% -2.0% Link to original post Senior Pilot Last edited by Senior Pilot; 18th Jun 2025 at 07:35 . Reason: Add link 5 users liked this post. |
syseng68k
2025-06-18T11:58:00 permalink Post: 11905180 |
Lead Balloon:
The requirement for TCMA may have been specified by Boeing, but that doesn' t tell us who designed and built the solution in this case, though it must have been a collaborative effort between the two parties. Anyway, TCMA may be a red herring, since we still have not defined what, if any, other sources would have authority to issue an engine shutdown command 2 users liked this post. |
Lead Balloon
2025-06-18T12:25:00 permalink Post: 11905198 |
Lead Balloon:
The requirement for TCMA may have been specified by Boeing, but that doesn' t tell us who designed and built the solution in this case, though it must have been a collaborative effort between the two parties. Anyway, TCMA may be a red herring, since we still have not defined what, if any, other sources would have authority to issue an engine shutdown command I'm pretty sure it's clear what "sources", other than TCMA systems if any, have "authority to issue an engine shutdown command", though it does depend on what you mean by "engine shutdown". 1 user liked this post. |
syseng68k
2025-06-18T13:11:00 permalink Post: 11905233 |
Lead Balloon:
“The "requirement" for TCMA was "specified" by the FAA. Manufacturers seeking certification of aeronautical products subject to the requirements then had no choice but to design and instal systems that met the FAA's certification requirements”. I think that has already been established upthread. “I'm pretty sure it's clear what "sources", other than TCMA systems if any, have "authority to issue an engine shutdown command", though it does depend on what you mean by "engine shutdown".” I don’t think that is clear at all. The shutdown hypothesis, if true, both engines, makes it likely that they were commanded to do so. While the discussion has centered around the TCMA subsystem, if other subsystems have the ability to do that, they need to be defined and looked at as well. 1 user liked this post. |
mechpowi
2025-06-18T13:32:00 permalink Post: 11905254 |
Lead Balloon:
\x93The "requirement" for TCMA was "specified" by the FAA. Manufacturers seeking certification of aeronautical products subject to the requirements then had no choice but to design and instal systems that met the FAA's certification requirements\x94. I think that has already been established upthread. \x93I'm pretty sure it's clear what "sources", other than TCMA systems if any, have "authority to issue an engine shutdown command", though it does depend on what you mean by "engine shutdown".\x94 I don\x92t think that is clear at all. The shutdown hypothesis, if true, both engines, makes it likely that they were commanded to do so. While the discussion has centered around the TCMA subsystem, if other subsystems have the ability to do that, they need to be defined and looked at as well. |
Sailvi767
2025-06-18T15:00:00 permalink Post: 11905313 |
There has been a lot of discussion of the possibility that the crew shut down the wrong engine or misidentified some other problem as an engine failure, usually followed by an assertion that nobody would touch the engines before x feet. PPRuNe's own survey, at the top of this very subforum, found a really high base rate of wrong engine incidents:
Also, on the point about sitting on your hands to 400/1000 feet AAL, someone who has already deviated from a standard operating procedure is more likely to go on to make another mistake; that is why the procedure existed in the first place. As a memo item, here are the survey results: Q1. Have you ever shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 5.4% +0.9% No: 94.6% -0.9% Q2. Have you ever ALMOST shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 26% -1.0% No: 74% +1.0% Q3. Have you ever witnessed a colleague shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 16% +1.0% No: 84% -1.0% Q4. Have you ever witnessed a colleague ALMOST shut off the wrong engine in the sim? Yes: 45% +2.0% No: 55% -2.0% Link to original post Senior Pilot 2 users liked this post. |
Xeptu
2025-06-18T23:09:00 permalink Post: 11905607 |
I need to correct one of my previous posts, I was going down the path of a mismanaged engine failure after V1, however it's been demonstrated to me that this aircraft will fly away on one engine even with the gear down with better than minimum climb gradient requirement. Quite astonishing actually.
That just leaves deliberate act not necessarily intentional, fuel vapour lock and automatically commanded engine shutdown. I hope the rat is found soon so we know for sure if both engines were in fact lost. 3 users liked this post. |
bbofh
2025-06-19T01:30:00 permalink Post: 11905658 |
The 787-8 landing gear retraction is primarily hydraulic, using the center hydraulic system for the main operation. However, the alternate gear
extension
system utilizes a dedicated electric pump to pressurize fluid from the center hydraulic system for gear extension. Obviously due its size and weight and staged retraction, the effort required to raise and stow the gear greatly exceeds that required for extension.
The main gear retraction/extension is controlled by the center hydraulic system. It is apparent that the hydraulics failed when the engines shut down after breaking the down-locks and leaving the Main Landing gear bogeys in the tilt position, ready for a next step internal stowage and door closure (that was now never to happen). It is therefore apparent that the dual engine failure and consequent automated RAT extension was precipitated by this gear selection or retraction cycle and thus likely to be either WoW micro-switch or 5G Radar altimeter-effect associated. Due to accumulator depletion, the electric pump load would have spiked to replenish it. This may have precipitated the dual engine shutdown due to an unfiltered electrical surge affecting the Ground/Air microswitches (or a local 5G transmission affecting the RADALT) and resetting the TCMA. The RADALT? Another plausibility? Because of the furore over a spasticated frequency allocation by the US FCC, the US FAA had finally “bought in” and declared that individual nations and their airline operators were responsible for their own 5G frequency spectrum allocations and for taking essential steps to ensure mitigation of the interference effects upon aircraft automated landings and other critical systems caused by their own national approved 5G spectrum decisions. It was admittedly a situation calling for extensive modifications to (and shielding for) the three radar altimeters fitted for redundancy considerations to all modern airliners... for Category 3 ILS approach and landing in zero/zero visibility conditions. The RADALT also features in many air-ground sensing applications. (eg the 747-8). This was an unusual FAA “passing of the buck” to manufacturers such as Honeywell etc. (to sort out with client operators). But then again, it was not the US FCC’s right to dictate the specific 5G frequencies internationally. These spectrum allocations now vary over the wide selection of 5G phones available (and also nationally). 5G Radar Altimeters constitute a part of the ground/Air sensing that changes the TCMA from ground mode (able to fuel-chop engines) to the air mode (inhibited from doing so)... Ground activation is acceptable ...where fuel chopping of uncommanded thrust can prevent runway sideways excursions or runway length overruns. The question now becomes: “Is it more (or less) safe having an automated fuel-chopping capability on BOTH your left and right, rather than leaving it to the pilot to react via his center console fuel cut-off switches... in the unlikely event of a runaway engine after landing (or during an abandoned take-off)? 5G Frequency Variations The frequencies of 5G phones vary nationally based on the frequency bands allocated and used by different carriers in each country. In the United States, for example, carriers such as AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile, and others use a combination of low-band, mid-band, and high-band 5G frequencies. Low-band 5G frequencies typically range from 600 MHz to 1 GHz, mid-band 5G frequencies range from 1.7 GHz to 2.5 GHz, and high-band 5G (mmWave) frequencies start at 24 GHz and go up to 40 GHz . These frequencies are allocated by regulatory bodies such as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and can vary between countries based on spectrum availability and regulatory decisions. In other countries, the specific frequency bands used for 5G may differ, leading to variations in the frequencies supported by 5G phones. Additionally, the deployment of 5G networks can also influence the frequencies used, with some countries focusing more on sub-6 GHz bands while others prioritize mmWave technology. 5G interference? It may be an avenue worth exploring? 6 users liked this post. |
EDML
2025-06-19T10:22:00 permalink Post: 11905894 |
The evidence is the spoiler pair deflection behind the engines prior to impact.
See earlier post
. . That specific spoiler pairing is only controlled by electrical power (directly connected to pilot control column). We should see other flight control deflections if the RAT was powering hydraulics. In the final moments I would speculate the flight controls had only emergency electric power from the battery.
Furthermore: The small hydraulik pump of the RAT only powers some of the flight controls that are powered by the center hydraulic system. The ones powered by the engine driven pumps will not work once the engine(s) failed. 1 user liked this post. |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-19T10:54:00 permalink Post: 11905921 |
I still think that the small black area is the back of the engines visible through the small gap of the extended flaps.
Furthermore: The small hydraulik pump of the RAT only powers some of the flight controls that are powered by the center hydraulic system. The ones powered by the engine driven pumps will not work once the engine(s) failed. This doesn't apply if the pumps are depressurised by a fire handle, or to allow easier engine relight. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-19T10:58:00 permalink Post: 11905922 |
2 users liked this post. |
LGB
2025-06-19T11:18:00 permalink Post: 11905939 |
THR REF/VNAV SPD
Does a Boeing 787 go from HOLD TO/GA to THR REF/VNAV SPD at 400' AGL/AAE, like older versions of the Boeing?
If so, what if the WoW stayed in ground mode, for whatever reason, how would that affect 1) Retraction of the landing gear (it didn't retract, as obvious in videos released) 2) The transition from HOLD to THR/REF at 400' (they reached just barely over 400' AGL before leveling, then descending) I am also thinking that Air India would follow Boeing procedures in that the left seat pilot will move their right hand away from the thrust levers at V1, and thus, at 400', the thrust levers are not guarded or monitored? Even if thrust levers were pushed forward, is there some kind of logic related to FMC and-or FADEC or other involved systems, which regardless of thrust lever position commands IDLE thrust to the engine? Remember that Airbus accident where the aircraft thought it was landing, while the pilots wanted full thrust, and they crashed into a small forest because some kind of idle is all they were afforded by the system? If the engines of this 787 thought it was in the rollout or final part of the flare, it might also command thrust levers to idle? This does not explain the RAT, though, unless there is some weird combination of software working against each others logic. Had the engines failed by some really random, odd reason, like birds, fuel contamination-vapor-starvation or such, wouldn't there be at least a slight bit of roll or yaw visible? Even with TAC or whatever they have on the 787, I would think even a 1 second difference in thrust reduction between the engines, a hint of yaw or roll should be visible ... Thoughts, especially by someone who flies the 787? Last edited by LGB; 19th Jun 2025 at 11:36 . Reason: Updates and more thinking .. 1 user liked this post. |
syseng68k
2025-06-19T13:42:00 permalink Post: 11906029 |
Switch Problems
Dunno, the discussion around the switch as a failure point looks spurious to me. With that used to support the idea that a possible engine shutdown was due to the master fuel valve closing.
I don\x92t really buy that, since we don\x92t know at this stage whether the engines did in fact fully shutdown, or were commanded to spool down to idle, or other lower thrust setting, both of which would produce the same result. Thoughts ?. |
Surlybonds
2025-06-19T14:08:00 permalink Post: 11906052 |
Dunno, the discussion around the switch as a failure point looks spurious to me. With that used to support the idea that a possible engine shutdown was due to the master fuel valve closing.
I don\x92t really buy that, since we don\x92t know at this stage whether the engines did in fact fully shutdown, or were commanded to spool down to idle, or other lower thrust setting, both of which would produce the same result. Thoughts ?. 3 users liked this post. |
Aerospace101
2025-06-19T14:11:00 permalink Post: 11906054 |
It does not follow that MCAS malfunction is a software malfunction.
As far as I know, the software functioned exactly as it was specified/required to function. The problem did not lie in the quality of the software, as you suggest. It lay in the functional requirements for the function, and the hazard analysis of those requirements, and those are manufacturer tasks. In a total electrical failure, when the system switches to emergency battery power, how are input variables like rad alt and wow switches processed? (these were inputs someone mentioned on the 747-8, have the TCMA inputs been identified yet?) I speculate the gear truck forward tilt is a symptom of a C hydraulic failure caused by a total electrical failure around the time of VR. Once they got 10 deg nose up on the rotation, with a total electrical failure, could the FADEC receive erroneous rad alt or wow inputs, and how would TCMA handle these inputs in the transition from ground to air logic? What is baffling is the simultaneous nature of the suspected dual engine shutdown. There is no obvious asymmetry, with the flight path or rudder movements. If the engine fuel control switches had been manually cut one at a time, there should have been some visible flightpath change or flight control response. Something happened to both engines at exactly the same time. 2 users liked this post. |
CloudChasing
2025-06-19T16:10:00 permalink Post: 11906159 |
The only aircraft inputs to TCMA is air/ground and thrust lever positions - everything else is the FADEC and its sensors (primarily N1). Even if air/ground was compromised somehow, it would take other issues before TCMA could possibly be activated. Possible on one engine (although remote) - but two engines at the same time - almost literally imposssible (unless of course it's software error).
The 'good' news is that even a cursory check of the FDR will indicate if TCMA activated, so we'll soon know. In 2019 I think it was, an ANA 787 had a TMCA dual engine shutdown just after landing. There was also a bug that shut down all AC power on 787s powered on for 248+ days (integer overflow causing GCU failsafe) that was supposed to be remedied on 2019. Can\x92t find any information confirming that it was implemented on all 787s. These are just two examples of software bugs. There are placed of others, and it\x92s highly likely there are ones we don\x92t know about, either in the original software or in the updates. 2 users liked this post. |
Sailvi767
2025-06-19T18:28:00 permalink Post: 11906250 |
Software Engineer here. IMO software glitches are more likely than mechanical failures and pilot error, and I would say increasingly more so, particularly with Boeings. I have good reasons, experience and expertise for saying this that I\x92m not going to get into here because it\x92s too long winded and will no doubt upset some people who will mistake facts for rule and let it hurt their feelings.
In 2019 I think it was, an ANA 787 had a TMCA dual engine shutdown just after landing. There was also a bug that shut down all AC power on 787s powered on for 248+ days (integer overflow causing GCU failsafe) that was supposed to be remedied on 2019. Can\x92t find any information confirming that it was implemented on all 787s. These are just two examples of software bugs. There are placed of others, and it\x92s highly likely there are ones we don\x92t know about, either in the original software or in the updates. 3 users liked this post. |
Chiefttp
2025-06-19T19:02:00 permalink Post: 11906274 |
Galaxy flyer,
UPS had a triple engine shutdown on A RR Tay engined 727. The crew got one started in the nick of time and were able to land at KORD. I know the crewmemebers. An old post from 2004, ![]() 3 users liked this post. |
skwdenyer
2025-06-19T19:18:00 permalink Post: 11906289 |
In the history of jet transport aviation, both ETOPS and non-ETOPS operations, exactly how many simultaneous dual engine failures have there been, excluding pilot causal ones? I\x92d venture it\x92s zero. Even the old DC-9/Boeing 727 era had none. ETOPS is 40 years on and zero cases, to my knowledge. Modern twins are systematically divided into two separate and independent planes. My bet is all these neat theories based on arcane questions will boil down to some human causal event, excluding Boeing. They might contributory, as in the Delta 767 where the switch design contributed to pilot misaction, but design fault, vanishingly improbable.
ANA NH-985, a 787-8, suffered dual uncommanded engine shutdown just after air-ground transition. That was a TCMS "feature." Baltic BT-139 likewise, resulted in an FAA AD to upgrade FADEC software on a whole bunch of P&W engines. It isn't unheard of. It may not have been seen at rotation before. 1 user liked this post. |
skwdenyer
2025-06-20T00:36:00 permalink Post: 11906509 |
A good round-up of dominant themes, including this:
We know there has been a bug in the Generator Control Unit software (an overflowing counter) that could lead to simultaneous shut down of all generators and a total loss of all AC power (the 248 days bug). In the interests of completeness, we should perhaps also consider the possibility of some other previously-unknown software issue capable of creating an uncommanded dual engine shutdown. TCMS is the most likely candidate due to the deliberate separation of other systems from being able to achieve this outcome. The question then isn't whether there's some odd combination of input faults that would confuse TCMS into believing it were on the ground, but rather whether there's any way in which the software side could crash in such a way as to create an anomalous state within the system leading to engine failure. For instance, another overlooked software counter with an unwelcome failure mode. Or even just a "dirty power supply" (cf all the reports of dodgy passenger-side electrics on this a/c) leading to spurious inputs and unexpected consequences. Whatever is the cause will likely turn out to be have been a very low-probability event. But unless we have a TCMS expert who can state canonically that (say) the WoW sensor electrically disables TCMS when airborne (as opposed to merely being an input to the TCMS logic) then we cannot say with certainty that multiple inputs would have to have failed / been corrupted in order to reach the end state of this flight. 4 users liked this post. |