Posts about: "Engine Shutdown" [Posts: 132 Pages: 7]

It is very, very, very close:

Both engines failed: yup, both engines have failed.
Triple hydraulic pressure low: either you've been hit by a SAM/uncontained engine failure causing massive fluid leaks, or both engine driven pumps have failed (likely because the engines have failed) and all four electric pumps have failed (because the engines have failed).
Loss of all electric power to flight instruments both sides: total AC electric loss, and I think battery/static inverter too? Given four generators and four buses, either massive electrical failure (swimming pool in E&E bay) or engines have failed. Note failure of an individual contactor that can tie two buses together should not cause a quad-bus outage.
Loss of all four electric motor pumps: total AC failure, see above.

thanks for posting the conditions, while likely it deployed as a result of a simultaneous loss of both engines, not the only circumstances then.

TCMA is simply a bit of software in the FADECs, so it has the same separation as everything else. There's no inter-engine interaction when it comes to TCMA.

This is technically possible, but of course the FADECs would have the ability to shut down the engines anyway, even if TCMA didn't exist. If there's a software bug, it could involve TCMA but it could easily be somewhere else.

Like I mentioned above, there's no communication between engines wrt TCMA. Therefore a software bug is plausible, but any kind of transient hardware malfunction can be essentially ruled out.

TCMA can't be disabled electrically. It's just software, and all of the hardware involved serves other functions which are still needed while in the air. For example, the FADECs would command the HPSOV closed in case of N2 overspeed. That would have the exact same effect as TCMA.

Yes. I simplified. The point stands that the throttle needs to be pulled back, as it was in the ANA event, because that was a landing and not a take-off.

First, you posted a good summary. I'd have added "unanticipated hardware fault" and "unanticipated software fault" as generic causes.

Note that the thrust lever actuators are wired to the FADECs, and that the TCMA gets the T/L position from that. For TCMA to trigger, it has to determine that its FADEC (on that engine) failed to achieve a commanded reduction in thrust. So we're either looking at a weird, unprecedented edge case, or a FADEC failure, or both.

It has been mentioned before that this capability existed as part of the N2 overspeed protection: the FADEC would shut down a runaway engine by cutting its fuel before it disintegrates.
The thrust lever sensors are wired directly to the FADEC (and hence the TCMA). No data bus is involved with this item.

With a MCAS crash, it required a hardware problem with an AOA sensor, used as input to a correctly working MCAS, to cause the aircraft to behave erratically. With a correctly working TCMA, I believe it'd require two hardware problems to get TCMA to shut down the engine, as there'd have to be an implausible thrust lever reading, and a FADEC/engine failure to process it within the TCMA allowed range ("contour"?). On both engines, separately and simultaneously.

That leaves a software problem; it's not hard to imagine. The issue is, at this point it's just that: imagination. I could detail a possible software failure chain, but without examining the actual code, it's impossible to verify. We simply don't have the evidence.
I could just as well imagine a microwave gun frying the electronics on both engines. An escaped hamster under the floor peeing on important contacts. A timed device installed by a psychopathic mechanic. There's no evidence for that, either.

This process is a way to psychologically cope with the unexplained accident, but because it lacks evidence, it's not likely to identify the actual cause. We've run the evidence down to "most likely both engines failed or shut off close to rotation, and the cause for that is inside the aircraft". Since the take-off looked normal until that failure, we have no clues as to the cause hidden inside the aircraft. We need to rely on the official investigation to discover and analyse sufficient evidence. The post-crash fire is going to make that difficult.

"Both engines failed or shut off close to rotation" explains all of the evidence : it explains an unremarkable take-off roll, loss of lift, absence of pronounced yaw, loss of electrical power, loss of the ADS-B transponder, RAT deployment, the noise of the RAT banging into place and revving up, emergency signs lighting up, a possible mayday call reporting loss of thrust/power/lift, and a physically plausible glide from a little over 200 ft AAL to the crash site 50 feet (?) below aerodrome elevation .
It explains what we saw on the videos, what the witness reported, where the aircraft ended up, and the ensuing sudden catastrophe.

I don't believe we have evidence for anything else right now—I'd be happily corrected on that.

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Edit: the evidence of the crash photo with the open APU inlet door, and the main gear bogeys tilted forward, are also explained by the dual engine failure/shut off.

There is no inter-engine interaction. But if both FADECs are running the same software then they will potentially behave identically to some bug or external input / condition. That's why software redundancy isn't always redundancy.

I agree.

Thank you. So saying "TCMA would only trigger if WoW and RA have failed somehow" is incorrect? Those are simply inputs to software, which might itself fail badly for other reasons. See the FAA AD to replace FADEC software on certain P&W engines following a previous uncommanded dual engine shutdown.

You're absolutely right, Musician! Your text in bold print is what happened! And you and I and many other pilots know what the most probale cause for that is. What evidence do we need?
The EAFR will tell the story, but the reason for the crash will always remain a "mystery" because the B787 was not equipped with EPTPR's! ( E nhanced P ilot's T hought P rocess R ecorders)

I think AI171 will go down in history with MSR990 an MH370.

Isn't "close to rotation" a little broad? "Close to" can be before or after. If before, and with about 4,000 feet of runway remaining, why did they take off at all? How did they take off, for that matter?

Can anyone do the Momentum / Energy calculations to work out how high the plane would have travelled at the normal climb gradient purely on the momentum it had at rotation? I'll try, see how far I get. A stone, fired into the air at an upward angle, begins to slow down and curve towards the earth the moment it leaves the catapult. It appears to me that the plane climbed at approximately a steady speed until about the 200 ft mark, so I submit that it had adequate climb thrust up to "about" that point.

Which, as confirmed in the earlier thread, is about where GEARUP is typically called. I say those two events are linked, led by GEARUP, but it could be coincidence. Though I don't think so. Coincidence usually refers to unrelated events and that would be very hard to say, here.

On that point, the gear, as far as I can establish (not openly published according to Google), weighs around 8-odd to 10 tonnes. Typically, retracts in about 10 seconds. I estimate it's no more than a 2 metre lift. As far as I can work out (using 3m to make the value higher), that requires about 30kW (rough estimate, budgetary figure, not accounting for it being a curved path, so it's probably higher closer to fully up), but whether wind pressure affects it, I have no idea. Anyway, 30kW isn't a huge (additional) load on a 225kVA alternator. Less than I'd imagined.

Now I'm wondering how big (power ratings) the hydraulic pump and motor are? No doubt, they're driven by a VSD. Can anyone comment, please?

I'd agree, without expert knowledge there would have to be big assumptions, but I expect that Aircraft Flight Engineers could do it. Probably already have.

Sure, actual data is usually more accurate than eyeballed stuff. But not always. In fact, it's often the eye that determines that something measured or calculated is "Off". How accurate is ADS-B data? I've seen FR24 tracks go way off course then suddenly get corrected / interpolated, frequently. The erroneous data seems to be "removed" by their algorithm, but where are the errors arising? Why this inaccuracy, and therefore, how accurate are the datagrams referred to? I know there were no datagrams received during the backtrack that I accept actually occurred, but that's completely different from receiving erroneous ADS-B data.

Sure, the CCTV footage I've seen is very poor, a video, moved about and zoomed, of the CCTV screen. Not easy to judge, but still useful and could be analysed frame-by-frame to compensate for all the extraneous input. Anyway, it's obvious to me that the rate of climb dropped abruptly just before the flight attained its apex, as if thrust was suddenly cut off. Knowing the momentum to altitude conversion, it might be possible to estimate whether that's true or not. The evident RAT deployment supports engine shutdown, not just engines to Idle, doesn't it? In that case, it would be useful to know at what altitude the engine shutdown took place.

Okay, didn't know that, I guess suggests means it's uncertain? Can you tell me from what height to what height it suggests this?

And why all the wrong figures for the height attained, quoted in previous thread? Can't all be the atmospheric conditions.

Haha! Even a stone (the right shape) can do that, and I'm not disputing that kinetic energy can be converted to altitude. Wings are useful for that... Just curious to get an idea of how much in this case.

To be honest, i believe that taking a lot of the evidence into consideration, it is possible to arrive at a limited number of scenarios for what is most likely to have happened.

One fact that alters things substantially is whether the survivor's impression is correct that possibly the engines started to spool up again just before impact. If that's the case then what does that do to the possibility or otherwise that the TMCA system caused a dual engine shutdown?

To me, since the world seems to be watching this forum, and we are getting no feedback from the authorities, what is posted here might be useful in helping the investigators look at things they might not have considered. Besides, as Icarus2001 has kindof suggested, it's probably a very good thing that there are clearly lots of keen eyes on this.

I perfectly understand that there is much talking about TCMA here.
There is no direct evidence of what caused the crash but several indirect evidences point towards a near simultaneous shutdown of both engines without any visual clue of a catastrophic mechanical mishap. This leads to suspecting near simultaneous fuel starvation of both engines.
As the purpose of TCMA is shutting down the High Pressure Shut-Off Valve (HPSOV) and thus the fuel feed of an engine, it's normal to collect information on TCMA, on how it works, and on what data feeds it.

However, I hardly understand why there is no similar discussion about the spar valves and the systems that control their opening and closure.

I understand that the B787 spar valves are located in the MLG well, or at least are maintained from within that well.
If the engine shutdown happened when the gear retraction was commanded, that's a location commonality (although it's very unlikely that a mechanical problem happened in both wells at the same time).
Also I understand that there are several systems that command the opening or closing of the spar valves:
- opening: "Engine control panel switch" set to "START", or "Fuel control switch" set to "RUN"
- closing: "Engine fire handle" pulled out. (I wonder if "Fuel control switch" set to "CUTOFF" also closes the spar valve).
Are there direct wires running from these controls to the valves or is there a pair of control units receiving these signals and controlling the valve actuators?
If the latter is true, where are these control units? I guess that the likely location is the aft EE bay. Are they beside each other?

Thank you for your reply! There's a lot we agree on; unfortunately, I'll be cutting that from my response here.
Right. ADS-B is transmitted via radio, so reception can be patchy, or obstructed by someone else transmitting on the same frequency (e.g. other aircraft), so not every datagram that the aircraft sends gets received. When that happens, the live display of FR24 assumes the aircraft kept doing what it did, and when another datagram eventually comes in, it corrects the position. It also connects the locations of these datagrams, regardless of whether the aircraft actually went there. For example, in the AI171 there's a 4-minute gap between a datagram sent on the taxiway, and the next datagram sent when the aircraft was off the ground towards the departure end of the taxiway. FR24 then connected these points via the shortest route; but we know that the aircraft actually used the intervening 4 minutes to taxi to the approach end of the runway, where it then started its take-off run. So that was false. (Another source of errors is when different FR24 receivers don't have synchronised clocks, so a mixture of data from these can have weird artifacts as a result.)
However, the datagrams that FR24 actually received were correct. They contain the GPS position of AI171 and its unadjusted barometric altitude, as determined by its onboard instruments. This data is as reliable as the instruments themselves are. (An example here is that the NTSB wasn't sure that the altimeter on the Blackhawk that crashed at Washington-Reagan was accurate; if that is the case, the ADS-B data would also be affected.)

On their blog post at https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/f...rom-ahmedabad/ , FR24 have published the data that they actually received.

Have you ever seen a parabolic trajectory from "the short end"?
Yes.

It's uncertain because the 787 rounds all altitudes it sends to the nearest multiple of 25. The altitudes sent were from 575 ft to 625 ft., but that's MSL and not adjusted for the weather: low air pressure makes that number higher than the actual altitude. FR24 adjusted this to 21ft climbing to 71 ft, but it could've been 30 to 60 or maybe 10 to 80, as it's rounded. I think it's fairly close to 50 feet of climb, though.

1) people taking the MSL altitude literally (625 ft)
2) people adjusting for airport elevation (189 ft), but not for pressure: 437 ft
3) people adjusting for pressure, some adjusting for temperature, get 71 to ~100 feet for the last recorded altitude.
But while ADS-B reception was lost then (or the transmitter lost power), the aircraft continued climbing; examine the cctv video, knowing the wingspan is ~200 feet, we see that the aircraft reached 200 feet but not much more.

The survivor likened the sound to a car engine revving up. If you've listened to a good version of the phone video, you'll have noticed the "vroom" sound at the start that some likened to a motorcycle. That sound is the RAT in action, and you can imagine what that would sound like when it rapidly spins up: like a driver stepping on the throttle with their car engine in neutral. The RAT deploying is a consequence of a dual engine shutdown. It says nothing about whether the TMCA was involved.

[Now I just hope your post is still there as I post this. ]

Indeed, thanks to you for your most informative reply! Great to know we're much on the same page.

I'll strive for brevity here. [Fail, sorry!]

Aha! Very misleading by FR24! Maybe they can devise a way to show where data is missing.

Sorry, I got confused about this ^^^, when you wrote this:

but I'm assuming reliable within the 25ft granularity that the 787 creates, which mostly is neither here nor there, but in this case, not so helpful!

Yes, got it, but wasn't what I was meaning to ask, sorry. My bad. I'm about over this TMCA stuff because it sounds like it's Trade Secret so a lot of guesswork, but the question I was intending was:

If the TMCA did activate and shut off the fuel for whatever reason, what causes the TMCA/FADEC Hardware (and Software) to Reset, since it's independently powered off the engine-driven PMG after engine start? There is so much here that is just so unclear. I haven't seen anything about a Reset input anywhere, and since it's supposed to work only when on the ground, that's not really necessary, as the engine will eventually spool down. At some point before that, the PMG output voltage will go to low enough that the FADEC/TMCA should be forced into a Hardware Reset. That's all fine on the ground, but in the air, the engine will windmill, potentially until.... Is the PMG output fed through a switch/relay that cuts the FADEC/TMCA supply at low (i.e. windmill) RPM, so that a Pilot-activated Engine Off/On cycle can reconnect the Aircraft FADEC Supply link, thus Rebooting the FADEC so that it reopens the Fuel Shutoff valve(s)? It all seems so "awkward". And potentially fatal. Is this a scenario that the designers considered? (Who can answer that one? )

Just now, I realise that if this is roughly what happens, then maybe the engines did commence a restart just before impact, due to the plane being deliberately mushed/stalled to the ground as softly as possible, thereby reducing the windmill RPM. And maybe the engines restarting interfered with that planned landing.

Or maybe I've got this all wrong. I'm hoping someone will tell us all.

Thankfully, Yes. Hope this Reply gets through too.

That’s what got me headed down the low altitude capture route. While the mind does really strange things post traumatic event — and memory and recollection are greatly affected by it — if true it means that thrust was lost but the engines stayed lit.

There may have been other electrical and systems malfunctioning. But if whatever happened, let’s say the auto throttle simply pulled power to idle —or a low power setting—at a critical time. Perhaps on its own perhaps with other systems failures.

We like to think it basic that we’d slam the throttles forward. Right away.

But Asiana didn’t.

And neither did Air Florida years ago.

Disclaimer: the numbers I mention are from publicly available sources, namely Wiki (for the ZFW weight calculation) and a Boeing FCOM dated 2010, and my own estimations.

IMO, if those engines failed just after rotation, there is no way that jet would have got anywhere near 200ft, especially if the fuel was "cut off", as opposed to back to Idle.

At 420k lbs (310k lb ZFW+110k lb Fuel), the (takeoff) V2 Flap 5 is 157kts. The (landing) Vref for Flap 5 I estimate to be at least 160kts (the FCOM I have has no figures for Flap 5 landings; F20 Vref is 154; the manoeuvre speed for Flap 5 is 189). Typically, you'd probably be at V2+15 when you get established in the climb after rotation.

No. With a pitch attitude of around 15\xb0, that's quite a bit of weight being supported not only by the wings but by the engine thrust vector. Cut that and you stop going up very quickly. Note Sailvi's comment above.

ANY reduction in pitch attitude would cause the climb to cease immediately. These aircraft are going so slowly, relatively, and the drag is so high that any small change in pitch attitude will cause an increase in descent rate with very little increase in speed (or no lessening of deceleration).

Not IMO. Basically, the only reason this jet is flying is because of the whopping long thrust vector out the back. It's already almost back at minimum speed anyway for flap 5 so there is very speed to trade. In this case, I wouldn't be trading anything, because the speed reduction rate would be too fast.

My estimate is around 200ft (one wingspan) and I hypothesise the engines were producing plenty of thrust until about 7 seconds, before it stops climbing at around 12 seconds after liftoff.

@Brace , I think you're exaggerating the residual thrust effect at lower RPMs. Of course 70% would get you round the pattern but you're at a much lower drag config and you're going much faster, again less drag. And are improved-climb takeoffs in the 787-8 even a thing? I can't see a two-stage rotation.

I've made up a YT combo video:

GA guy who's been reading the thread from the beginning..

I'm assuming my question is moot because I don't believe it's been mentioned in the entire thread, however is there any possible maintenance issue that could affect two engines over time?

This is certainly happened before, I'm thinking of N334EA where all three engines were lost due to maintenance replacing all three chip detectors with defective detectors before the flight.

Of course it took 40 something minutes before the first engine oil was drained and the other two engines failed at different times after that.

So that pattern doesn't fit, but my question is are there other things that could be replaced on both engines that could theoretically take a relatively long time to fail but might do so under TOGA?

In other words are there any devices that could have been changed on both engines before the previous flight that were defective and didn't fail until full power on both engines on take off on the accident flight?

Obviously this is pure speculation, I don't claim to know anything and I'm just curious.

It\x92s a possibility (as is virtually anything that doesn\x92t break the laws of physics) but all the training, practicing and checking would have been to emphasise SOPs, which are to leave all the engine controls where they are until you have done a proper interactive diagnosis at a safe height with the flightpath assured.

Where the meme has come from that jet pilots have to shut down engines as quickly as possible I don\x92t know but it is incorrect. If you left a failed engine without securing it for 5 minutes, little to no harm would come of it. Even if it was on fire (which is not necessarily flames, just higher than normal temperatures inside the nacelle) they are certified to be in this condition for some considerable time before it becomes a problem. Yes, I think the phrase \x93without undue delay\x94 could be used for a fire indication but that\x92s a minimum of 400\x92AGL in Boeings and does not absolve you of all the cross-checking and CRM that should happen with an engine shutdown. This is practiced/checked at the least every 6 months in EASA land and any attempt to rush a shutdown at low level would lead to a debrief and more training/checking.

To put it this way, control of the aeroplane and lateral/vertical navigation is far more important than doing stuff with a failed power plant. Something like an ET should be absolutely prioritised over engine drills.

There has been another incident of a TCMA equivalent function shutting down both engines. An airBaltic airbus a220 in July 2021 (YL- AAQ) had both PW1500 engines shut down by \x93TCM\x94 logic in the FADEC immediately upon landing.

This seems to have been caused by a mismatch between actual and commanded thrust caused by rapid throttle movement that was \x93saved up\x94 until TCM was subsequently activated by its air/ground logic.

A description can be found on flightglobal but I have too few posts to include a url - So google a220 revised software engine shutdown

My airline emphasized no crew action for engine failure or fire until 1000 feet. At 400 feet we could only declare an emergency, request an alternate departure if needed and start the APU. It’s far more important to fly the aircraft, get it properly trimmed and insure the proper engine out ground track is being flown. Only at 1000 feet would we begin the engine fire/failure checklist. Normally even that would come after the aircraft was cleaned up and stabilized. Best flying advice I ever got was in a severe emergency the first thing you should do is wind the clock!

Let me try and summarise one possible scenario and then link in some of the better posts provide evidence relating to it:

• In error, PF reduces power to idle and/or reverse at a speed after V1 (either deciding to reject, or for some unexplained reason e.g. the recent BA incident at LGW)
• Decision is changed to continue take-off, thrust levers moved to TOGA
• Let's say the thrust inputs are similar to NM985 and TCMA is triggered; and engines shut down around the time of rotation
• A/C rotates achieving a maximum speed in the region of 184kts

Relevant "ruling out" questions, with links to posts that add new information:

Q: Would the a/c have enough kinetic energy a 184kts to climb to 100-150ft agl and then reach its final position if the engines had failed at, or just, before rotation?
A: Theoretically possible - see calculation here . NB, the a/c actually flew 1.5km from the end of the runway and 2.3km from the likely point of rotation.

Q: Doesn't the forward position of the gear mean that power failed after the pilots had selected gear up?
A: Inconclusive - had hydraulic power had been lost prior to rotation, the gear could also be in this position - explanation here

Q: If the throttle levers were brought to idle during take-off, would the A/C have applied autobrake, reversers and speedbrake?
A: Yes, although there is a built in delay before reverser and speedbrake actually deploy - see here .

Q: Is the ADS-B data consistent with this scenario?
A: Yes, e.g. the Flightradar data shows the aircraft decelerating rapidly (12 knots in 4.2 seconds) from close to rotation. However, it's not clear how accurate this data is. For one, the altitude data is +/- 25 feet, second, while I was under the impression FR would have received airspeed data from the a/c sensors, this post suggests maybe not.

Q: Does TCMA activation require the thrust levers to be at idle or does it function when the thrust levels are above idle, but where the actual thrust is above that commanded?
A: No, the latter is true (i.e. idle is not required) - confirmed here - there are of course many protections against false activation

Q. Did AI171 have the same software version / logic paths as NH-985
A. Unknown. That a/c had Trent 1000s so to some extent the software is different, but we understand the TCMA logic is broadly the same regardless of engine. I have not seen a post clarifying whether the TCMA software has been updated /changed via SB since 2019 to account for this incident.

Be grateful if posters could refrain from speculative responses "e.g. I think this is unlikely because I feel x". I am not opining on how likely this sequence of events is, simply trying to summarise whether or not this theory has been ruled in or out.

I also recommend this post for a summary to read before posting. .

I'm sure this has been answered elsewhere and that I've just missed it by scrolling too fast through the backlog of (much appreciated) posts, but it's been buzzing round my mind and I wanted to try and get an answer if possible please.

Has it been confirmed that there was a dual engine shutdown and, if so, why weren't people commenting on this from the videos of the incident (if the audio was good enough to detect the RAT then surely it was good enough to tell whether the engines were running).

Thank you for your patience!

Not confirmed . What is apparent is a (substantial) loss of thrust. That's what one can say with some certainty.
That has already been discussed, and there has been abundant comment. Suggest you go back and review the original thread, and this one as well.
Thank you for your interest.