July 17, 2025, 07:46:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924194
I'm confident I'm far from alone. I do take objection to the connotations of your suggestion that my motivation is to "just to satisfy [my] curiosity". If you read what I wrote, my motivation has nothing to do with anything as trivial as satisfying my curiosity. But I'm assuming you meant no offence.
However, the 'bottom line' is that you're almost certainly correct and this investigation will carry on for however long the investigators choose to take, while choosing to reveal or withhold whatever they chose to reveal or withhold, and ICAO will continue to do the things that bureaucracies tend to do. In the meantime, the thousands of family members and friends of the deceased will be at the mercy of speculation and leaks of unknown origin.
However, the 'bottom line' is that you're almost certainly correct and this investigation will carry on for however long the investigators choose to take, while choosing to reveal or withhold whatever they chose to reveal or withhold, and ICAO will continue to do the things that bureaucracies tend to do. In the meantime, the thousands of family members and friends of the deceased will be at the mercy of speculation and leaks of unknown origin.
Early releases of unvetted data can not only cause unproductive public reactions, it can result in external pressures being applied to the investigative team that can adversely affect their ability to come to the correct cause. Furthermore, I cannot recall a single preliminary report that contained anything like an actual CVR transcript. Those are routinely included in the final report, but not preliminary reports. About the only time you'll see unvalidated information is when there is a suggestion that there is an imminent air safety threat - in which case appropriate emergency inspections are ordered (sometimes even aircraft groundings).
I have a pretty vivid memory: In the aftermath of the Chicago DC-10 crash when the engine ripped off the wing, a couple of days later some department head (I don't remember if he was FAA or NTSB) stood on the podium holding a broken bolt and pronounced that it was the reason the engine came off. Unvetted information that turned out to be complete BS - but resulted in massive outrage that 'the engine was held on by one bolt' - more BS. Fortunately it didn't derail the investigation - and even had a silver lining in that the order bolt inspections lead to the discovery of the actual pylon structural damage that had caused the engine mount to fail. Similarly, after the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster - I watched the clueless head of NASA stand in from of the TV cameras and state as fact that a piece of foam could never have punched a hole in the Columbia wing (obviously never studied that mass*velocity squared thing) - which of course we again know was complete BS.
I've been involved in a few fatal accident investigations - the big one being the Lauda 767, where I was called in early. I was one of the first people to see the FADEC NVM readout that made it painfully obvious that the T/R had deployed at 23,000 ft. - something that we didn't think could happen. We (Boeing) had missed something, and a lot of people had died as a result. It really bothered me (more than once during that investigation, when I got home from work, I just sat down and drank a large glass of Scotch). And not being able to discuss any of it with anyone not involved in the investigation just made it worse. But I knew the rules, understood why there where there, and I followed them.
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July 17, 2025, 08:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924206
This is a topic of actual research:
https://www.pmhc.org/research
Currently 12.6% of pilots meet the medical threshold for depression, with a slight but below average difference between males (12.8%) and females (11.4%), with 4.1% of all pilots experiencing recent suicidal thoughts. https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/...940-016-0200-6
It should be noted that the utilized test (PHQ-9) is considered insufficient to assess suicide risk. Depending on scoring these values could be about average, or significantly below average. Based on their wording I would expect the latter, because their methodology does not specify severity.*1 Results of 0-4 points suggest no intervention necessary, 5-9 (classified as mild) simply suggest retaking the test after a few weeks. Research shows that for the general public Major Depressive Episodes have a prevalence of ~5-10%, with the prevalence of minor depression being less studied but significantly higher than major depression. There is also significant symptomatic overlap of mild depression with stress related conditions such as "Burnout" (if you know, please don't, this conversation is already complex enough without bringing that in). Considering the prevalence of stress in the industry I am actually surprised the numbers here are not higher. The lesser delta between males and females could be indicative of just such an issue, meaning that based on the data available the number of pilots actually suffering from depression could be less than even the comparably low number reported here. The actual suicide risk is usually orders of magnitude below even that but not easily covered in this data context due to the test used.
Cognitive impact is highly variable depending on the individual, actual symptoms and severity. It would be wrong to assess that 12.6% of pilots are a risk factor from this data. Quite the opposite, in fact. After the Germanwings crash the topic was discussed and has reached the awareness threshold for many. Mild cases usually require little to no intervention beyond raising awareness and helping the brain fix its chemistry through positive reinforcement. This can be as simple as taking PTO, reducing work hours, or focusing on social or physical activities. In the past 10 years these kinds of low impact measures have been made more readily available, most notably during the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting turmoil.
Further political activity has lead to some positive action as well. I already mentioned the recent success of the Pilot Mental Health Campaign getting legislation through Congress for improvements of the outdated FAA guidelines on mental health in an earlier post. Similar efforts are underway globally, be that internal review within regulatory bodies, or political movements.
Currently 12.6% of pilots meet the medical threshold for depression, with a slight but below average difference between males (12.8%) and females (11.4%), with 4.1% of all pilots experiencing recent suicidal thoughts. https://ehjournal.biomedcentral.com/...940-016-0200-6
It should be noted that the utilized test (PHQ-9) is considered insufficient to assess suicide risk. Depending on scoring these values could be about average, or significantly below average. Based on their wording I would expect the latter, because their methodology does not specify severity.*1 Results of 0-4 points suggest no intervention necessary, 5-9 (classified as mild) simply suggest retaking the test after a few weeks. Research shows that for the general public Major Depressive Episodes have a prevalence of ~5-10%, with the prevalence of minor depression being less studied but significantly higher than major depression. There is also significant symptomatic overlap of mild depression with stress related conditions such as "Burnout" (if you know, please don't, this conversation is already complex enough without bringing that in). Considering the prevalence of stress in the industry I am actually surprised the numbers here are not higher. The lesser delta between males and females could be indicative of just such an issue, meaning that based on the data available the number of pilots actually suffering from depression could be less than even the comparably low number reported here. The actual suicide risk is usually orders of magnitude below even that but not easily covered in this data context due to the test used.
Cognitive impact is highly variable depending on the individual, actual symptoms and severity. It would be wrong to assess that 12.6% of pilots are a risk factor from this data. Quite the opposite, in fact. After the Germanwings crash the topic was discussed and has reached the awareness threshold for many. Mild cases usually require little to no intervention beyond raising awareness and helping the brain fix its chemistry through positive reinforcement. This can be as simple as taking PTO, reducing work hours, or focusing on social or physical activities. In the past 10 years these kinds of low impact measures have been made more readily available, most notably during the Covid-19 pandemic and the resulting turmoil.
Further political activity has lead to some positive action as well. I already mentioned the recent success of the Pilot Mental Health Campaign getting legislation through Congress for improvements of the outdated FAA guidelines on mental health in an earlier post. Similar efforts are underway globally, be that internal review within regulatory bodies, or political movements.
I won't comment more on this thread I dont think about general trends and MH in pilots as it probably demands its own thread, but really interesting and thanks again.
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July 17, 2025, 12:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924353
Continued Airworthiness Notification to International Community (FAA - July 11, 2025)
Previously, I posted the content of a Reuters article about FAA (as well as Boeing) having issued notices to operators prompted by the reference in the AAIB Prelim Rpt w/r/t the SAIB about fuel switches in certain 737 aircraft (Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin No. NM-18-33, December 17, 2018).
Through a LinkedIn timeline I happened to discover the actual document the Reuters report was based on. It is entitled "Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community", issued by the FAA Aircraft Certification Service, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, dated July 11, 2025. As reported by Reuters, the FAA Notification document specifically references the fact that the AAIB Prelim Rpt made reference to the 2018 SAIB w/r/t the fuel switches.
The social media platform makes it difficult to transfer content off of it. Interested people may access the document in a LinkedIn post by former NTSB Chair Robert L. Sumwalt, NTSB Chair 2017-2014. (A search of the thread did not turn up the document; apologies if it's already here and I slipped up and missed it.)
Through a LinkedIn timeline I happened to discover the actual document the Reuters report was based on. It is entitled "Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community", issued by the FAA Aircraft Certification Service, Compliance and Airworthiness Division, dated July 11, 2025. As reported by Reuters, the FAA Notification document specifically references the fact that the AAIB Prelim Rpt made reference to the 2018 SAIB w/r/t the fuel switches.
The social media platform makes it difficult to transfer content off of it. Interested people may access the document in a LinkedIn post by former NTSB Chair Robert L. Sumwalt, NTSB Chair 2017-2014. (A search of the thread did not turn up the document; apologies if it's already here and I slipped up and missed it.)
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July 17, 2025, 17:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924527
The switches are crucial in the investigation. This is a crash with a lot of politics. See how India media is reporting. It is almost a India versus the West discussion. I guess the AAIB included the SAIB to keep all options open, keep parties involved in the investigation happy and prevent that the investigation could be seen as biased. Hence to use of words like ' transitioned'.
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July 17, 2025, 17:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924532
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July 17, 2025, 23:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924766
I thought that WillowRun was referring to a different article or an updated version of the one I read, because I do not, at all, see Homendy's quoted statement as a confirmation that "no such problem has been shown to exist" or as a "message, in effect, that the causal chain of this accident does not stem from an aircraft or engine problem implicating safety of flight." I don't think that understanding proceeds from the plain meaning of the words quoted. It appears to me to arise from inference and interpretation.
The NTSB spokesman said the Chair had reviewed everything. Her statement - on the not large assumption it was made after the Prelim Rpt was released (though the reporting doesn't say when) - refers to her, in her official role, wanting to determine quickly if any safety concerns had to be addressed immediately.
When no emergency ADs or other urgent safety messages were forthcoming in the first days after June 12 (other than the Air India inspection order) there was fairly extensive debate on-thread about whether the absence of such urgent safety bulletins could be taken to mean that neither the aircraft nor engines had been implicated as having caused the accident. Several posters pointed out that if there were an aircraft or engine problem there would already have been bulletins issued. Others argued, not necessarily, maybe it was too soon to tell.
Reading the WSJ reporting, and the words quoted from the Board Chair, now after the Prelim Rpt, and after the reporting by The Air Current prior to the Prelim Rpt release was proven accurate, I'm inferring her statement to communicate that, by now , if an aircraft or engine problem was present, it would have been discovered.... and Emergency ADs flying out of FAA etc.
Of course, it can be said that it's still too soon, but that's not how I see the pieces fitting together. And I apologize for allowing my earlier post to be read as if my inferential reasoning was instead part of Ms. Homendy's statement.
[ By the way, to za9ra22, as the head of the NTSB and the U.S. as the State of manufacture, she is hardly just some random federal official, as post 1411 implies. ]
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July 18, 2025, 03:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11924808
Yea DAR, it's time for another break. It's been days since anything really new has been posted - just hamster wheel arguments of the same theories, and even stuff that I thought had been thoroughly discredited, dead, and buried has come back to life (e.g. TCMA and the fuel condition switches both unilaterally changing state).
If something new comes up - then either reopen or someone can start a new one.
If something new comes up - then either reopen or someone can start a new one.
Spoiler
Last edited by T28B; 18th July 2025 at 13:32 . Reason: rant placed in the spoiler
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July 20, 2025, 18:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11925921
The full Flight Global article; those here who chose to put PPRuNe and themselves at risk of legal action by their accusations and emotive language may like to reflect and be more accurate in their contributions to this professional pilots forum in future.
US safety chief supports India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau in urging media to avoid ‘premature narratives’ about the 12 June disaster that killed 260 people
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash
The head of the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has criticised recent news stories about the 12 June crash of an Air India Boeing 787-8, aligning with a statement from India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB).
“Recent media reports on the Air India 171 crash are premature and speculative,” NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said on 18 July. “India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau just released its preliminary report. Investigations of this magnitude take time.”
Homendy does not specify which media reports she takes issue with.
In recent days, The Wall Street Journal and Reuters, citing unnamed sources familiar with US officials’ assessment of evidence, reported that audio from the crashed jet’s cockpit voice recorder indicates the captain had moved the fuel control switches to the “CUTOFF” position. The reports said that the first officer was the pilot who asked why the switches had been moved.
A source who is also familiar with aspects of the investigation confirms that information to FlightGlobal.
Investigators have not released information to support such a scenario.
NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy warns against “speculative” media reports
The 787-8 was operating flight 171 from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick airport. It crashed shortly after taking off, killing 241 of 242 people aboard and 19 people on the ground.
The AAIB’s 11 July preliminary report said that about 3s after taking off, the two cockpit fuel control switches – each controls fuel to one of the jet’s two GE Aerospace GEnx turbofans – were switched to the “CUTOFF” position. The switch for the left-side engine moved first, with the right-side switch moving within about 1s.
The turbofans then lost thrust. One of the two pilots – the report did not specify which – asked the other why he moved the switch; the other then denied doing so.
Starting 10s after the switches were set to “CUTOFF”, both were switched back to “RUN”, causing the turbofans to begin restarting, but not in time to prevent the jet from crashing.
The 787’s flight data recorder noted the moment the actual physical switch moved to the “CUTOFF” position and then when it moved back to the “RUN” position, a source tells FlightGlobal. Those moments were plotted on a graph showing engine thrust falling off after the switches were moved to “CUTOFF”, and then returning after they were moved to “RUN”.
Because that data reflects the physical movement of the switch, a loss of fuel caused by another problem elsewhere in the 787’s electrical system is unlikely, the source says.
The Federal Aviation Administration on 11 July issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC) saying that the AAIB’s “investigation to date has found no urgent safety concerns related to the engines or airplane systems of the Boeing Model 787-8”.
On 17 July, the AAIB issued an “Appeal”, saying, “It has come to our attention that certain sections of the international media are repeatedly attempting to draw conclusions through selective and unverified reporting”.
“Such actions are irresponsible… We urge both the public and the media to refrain from spreading premature narratives that risk undermining the integrity of the investigative process,” it adds. “The AAIB appeals to all concerned to await publication of the final investigation report.”
Citing that document, the NTSB’s Homendy said on 18 July, “We fully support the AAIB’s public appeal… and will continue to support its ongoing investigation”.
The AAIB’s preliminary report also notes that the FAA issued a Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin in December 2018 about a “locking feature” within fuel control switches on several Boeing models, including 787s. The locking feature is a safety device that requires the switches be lifted before being transitioned. It involves raised nubs that the switch must transition over.
A fuel control switch similar to that found on Boeing 787s, showing that the switch must transition over raised bumps
That 2018 bulletin warned about potential “disengagement” of the locking feature, which could allow the switches to “be moved between the two positions without lifting”, potentially causing “inadvertent” engine shutdown.
Though the FAA recommended inspections, its bulletin concluded that issue was “not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive”.
The FAA reiterated that position in its 11 July CANIC, saying the fuel control switch design does not pose “an unsafe condition”.
Though the AAIB’s report cited the issue, it drew no link between it and the crash
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July 24, 2025, 01:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11927536
Further update:
https://www.airindia.com/in/en/newsr...spections.html
and
http://https://www.flightglob...163888.article
https://www.airindia.com/in/en/newsr...spections.html
PRESS RELEASE
STATEMENT ON COMPLETION OF FUEL CONTROL SWITCH INSPECTIONS
JUL 22, 2025
ANNOUNCEMENTS. July 22, 13:20 hours
Air India has completed precautionary inspections on the locking mechanism of Fuel Control Switch (FCS) on all Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 aircraft in its fleet.
Boeing 737 aircraft are part of the fleet of Air India Express, Air India’s low cost subsidiary. With this, the two airlines have complied with the directives of the DGCA issued on July 14, 2025.
In the inspections, no issues were found with the said locking mechanism. Air India had started voluntary inspections on 12 July and completed them within the prescribed time limit set by the DGCA. The same has been communicated to the regulator.
Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members.
STATEMENT ON COMPLETION OF FUEL CONTROL SWITCH INSPECTIONS
JUL 22, 2025
ANNOUNCEMENTS. July 22, 13:20 hours
Air India has completed precautionary inspections on the locking mechanism of Fuel Control Switch (FCS) on all Boeing 787 and Boeing 737 aircraft in its fleet.
Boeing 737 aircraft are part of the fleet of Air India Express, Air India’s low cost subsidiary. With this, the two airlines have complied with the directives of the DGCA issued on July 14, 2025.
In the inspections, no issues were found with the said locking mechanism. Air India had started voluntary inspections on 12 July and completed them within the prescribed time limit set by the DGCA. The same has been communicated to the regulator.
Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members.
‘No issues’ found after fuel-switch lock checks on Air India 787 fleet
By David Kaminski-Morrow 23 July 2025
Air India states it has found no issues with the fuel-control switch locking mechanisms on its Boeing 787 fleet, after inspections prompted by the crash at Ahmedabad last month.Preliminary findings from the inquiry had noted a US Federal Aviation Administration safety bulletin from 2018 referring to the possibility that fuel-control switches had been installed on various models – including all 787 variants – with the locking feature disengaged.
This lock prevents the switches being inadvertently moved to the ‘cut-off’ position, which would halt the fuel-flow to the aircraft’s engines.
Given that the initial inquiry findings point to activation of both the left- and right-hand fuel switches, the status of the lock on the 787 involved in the 12 June accident has been a subject of uncertainty.
While investigators have yet to disclose details of the switch locks on the crashed aircraft, Air India has found “no issues” with the mechanism on remaining 787s – or the Boeing 737s of Air India Express – after completing precautionary inspections.
This reduces – although does not eliminate – the probability of inadvertent activation, as outlined in the FAA bulletin, given that it would require a highly-unusual slip on the only aircraft with a faulty switch.
The inspections mean the two carriers have complied with an Indian DGCA regulatory directive issued on 14 July.
“Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members,” says the airline.
Source: AirTeamImages
Air India initiated checks on its 787s and 737s after investigators highlighted a potential fuel-switch lock issue
The Federation of Indian Pilots has rejected the possibility of the crew’s involvement, insisting that transitioning both switches sequentially to the ‘cut-off’ position within 1s – as the inquiry states – would be “humanly impossible”.
“Attributing such a catastrophic engine shutdown sequence to deliberate pilot action, while ignoring manufacturer-documented vulnerabilities, is unwarranted and unjust in the absence of incontrovertible evidence,” said the federation’s president, CS Randhawa, in a 16 July communication to the Indian ministry of civil aviation.
It argues that a potential software fault or sensor anomaly could “simulate pilot action” and trigger an automated engine shutdown.
The federation refers to the 787’s thrust-control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) system, which is designed to prevent uncommanded high-thrust activation while on the ground by reducing engine power.
Although the federation uses an All Nippon Airways 787’s dual-engine shutdown after touchdown at Osaka to justify its concerns, the protective system is designed to activate only on the ground, under specific circumstances, with checks on air-ground status, engine speed and thrust-lever position.
The ANA aircraft was also fitted with Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines, while the Air India 787 had GE Aerospace GEnx-1B powerplants.
Boeing discovered a logic error in the GEnx-1B version of the TCMA system prior to the ANA occurrence, mentioned in an FAA document of September 2016. This stated that Boeing planned to address the error – limited to a “certain single failure” – by the end of 2018, implementing it into production aircraft and issuing retrofit instructions.
While the Federation of Indian Pilots has offered little direct evidence that a software issue might have contributed to the Ahmedabad crash, it says the inquiry “must include all plausible failure paths” and avoid “premature attribution of motive or intent” until system malfunctions – including problems with the fuel-control switch locks – are “conclusively ruled out”.
By David Kaminski-Morrow 23 July 2025
Air India states it has found no issues with the fuel-control switch locking mechanisms on its Boeing 787 fleet, after inspections prompted by the crash at Ahmedabad last month.Preliminary findings from the inquiry had noted a US Federal Aviation Administration safety bulletin from 2018 referring to the possibility that fuel-control switches had been installed on various models – including all 787 variants – with the locking feature disengaged.
This lock prevents the switches being inadvertently moved to the ‘cut-off’ position, which would halt the fuel-flow to the aircraft’s engines.
Given that the initial inquiry findings point to activation of both the left- and right-hand fuel switches, the status of the lock on the 787 involved in the 12 June accident has been a subject of uncertainty.
While investigators have yet to disclose details of the switch locks on the crashed aircraft, Air India has found “no issues” with the mechanism on remaining 787s – or the Boeing 737s of Air India Express – after completing precautionary inspections.
This reduces – although does not eliminate – the probability of inadvertent activation, as outlined in the FAA bulletin, given that it would require a highly-unusual slip on the only aircraft with a faulty switch.
The inspections mean the two carriers have complied with an Indian DGCA regulatory directive issued on 14 July.
“Air India remains committed to the safety of passengers and crew members,” says the airline.
Source: AirTeamImages
Air India initiated checks on its 787s and 737s after investigators highlighted a potential fuel-switch lock issue
The Federation of Indian Pilots has rejected the possibility of the crew’s involvement, insisting that transitioning both switches sequentially to the ‘cut-off’ position within 1s – as the inquiry states – would be “humanly impossible”.
“Attributing such a catastrophic engine shutdown sequence to deliberate pilot action, while ignoring manufacturer-documented vulnerabilities, is unwarranted and unjust in the absence of incontrovertible evidence,” said the federation’s president, CS Randhawa, in a 16 July communication to the Indian ministry of civil aviation.
It argues that a potential software fault or sensor anomaly could “simulate pilot action” and trigger an automated engine shutdown.
The federation refers to the 787’s thrust-control malfunction accommodation (TCMA) system, which is designed to prevent uncommanded high-thrust activation while on the ground by reducing engine power.
Although the federation uses an All Nippon Airways 787’s dual-engine shutdown after touchdown at Osaka to justify its concerns, the protective system is designed to activate only on the ground, under specific circumstances, with checks on air-ground status, engine speed and thrust-lever position.
The ANA aircraft was also fitted with Rolls-Royce Trent 1000 engines, while the Air India 787 had GE Aerospace GEnx-1B powerplants.
Boeing discovered a logic error in the GEnx-1B version of the TCMA system prior to the ANA occurrence, mentioned in an FAA document of September 2016. This stated that Boeing planned to address the error – limited to a “certain single failure” – by the end of 2018, implementing it into production aircraft and issuing retrofit instructions.
While the Federation of Indian Pilots has offered little direct evidence that a software issue might have contributed to the Ahmedabad crash, it says the inquiry “must include all plausible failure paths” and avoid “premature attribution of motive or intent” until system malfunctions – including problems with the fuel-control switch locks – are “conclusively ruled out”.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 24th July 2025 at 01:04 . Reason: URLs again
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July 25, 2025, 04:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11928035
A report of the FAA Administrator saying that the fuel cutoff switches were not defective:
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/faa-ai...rash-1.7593295
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/faa-ai...rash-1.7593295
The head of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) said on Thursday the fatal crash last month of an Air India Boeing 787 jet does not appear to have been caused by a mechanical issue or inadvertent movement of the fuel control unit or switches.
"We can say with a high level of confidence is it doesn't appear to be a mechanical issue with the Boeing fuel control unit," Bryan Bedford, the FAA's administrator, told reporters on the sidelines of an air show in Wisconsin.
He said FAA employees had taken the units out, tested them and had inspectors get on aircraft and review them. "We feel very comfortable that this isn't an issue with inadvertent manipulation of fuel control," he said.
The probe into the Air India crash, which killed 241 of the 242 people on board and 19 on the ground, is focused on the fuel control switches of the Boeing 787 jetliner.
Boeing and Air India did not immediately comment.
The switches control fuel flow to aircraft engines, allowing pilots to start or shut them down on the ground, or manually intervene during in-flight engine failures.
Air India said on Tuesday it has completed precautionary inspections of the fuel control switch locking mechanism on all 787 and 737 aircraft, with no issues detected.
A preliminary report from India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau earlier this month found the switches had almost simultaneously flipped from "run" to "cutoff" shortly after takeoff, causing the engines to lose power.
Reuters reported last week, citing a source, that the cockpit recording on the Air India flight from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick suggested the captain cut fuel to the engines.
Earlier this month, the FAA and Boeing privately issued notifications that the fuel switch locks on Boeing planes were safe.
"We can say with a high level of confidence is it doesn't appear to be a mechanical issue with the Boeing fuel control unit," Bryan Bedford, the FAA's administrator, told reporters on the sidelines of an air show in Wisconsin.
He said FAA employees had taken the units out, tested them and had inspectors get on aircraft and review them. "We feel very comfortable that this isn't an issue with inadvertent manipulation of fuel control," he said.
The probe into the Air India crash, which killed 241 of the 242 people on board and 19 on the ground, is focused on the fuel control switches of the Boeing 787 jetliner.
Boeing and Air India did not immediately comment.
The switches control fuel flow to aircraft engines, allowing pilots to start or shut them down on the ground, or manually intervene during in-flight engine failures.
Air India said on Tuesday it has completed precautionary inspections of the fuel control switch locking mechanism on all 787 and 737 aircraft, with no issues detected.
A preliminary report from India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau earlier this month found the switches had almost simultaneously flipped from "run" to "cutoff" shortly after takeoff, causing the engines to lose power.
Reuters reported last week, citing a source, that the cockpit recording on the Air India flight from Ahmedabad to London Gatwick suggested the captain cut fuel to the engines.
Earlier this month, the FAA and Boeing privately issued notifications that the fuel switch locks on Boeing planes were safe.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 25th July 2025 at 04:31 . Reason: Add quote
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July 25, 2025, 14:53:00 GMT
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From the article by Guy Norris of Aviation Week... Air India 787 Crash Being Investigated As ‘Criminal Act,’ Says Safety Expert
Guy Norris July 23, 2025
If / when we get confirmation that India is indeed going ahead with a criminal investigation, we'll re open this thread.
From the article by Guy Norris of Aviation Week... Air India 787 Crash Being Investigated As ‘Criminal Act,’ Says Safety Expert
Guy Norris July 23, 2025
LAS VEGAS—India’s Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) is now looking into the June 12 crash of an Air India
Boeing
787-8 as an intentional act, says
veteran safety consultant and former NTSB investigator Greg Feith
. The AAIB’s preliminary report on July 12 revealed that fuel cutoff switches for the 787’s two GE Aerospace GEnx-1B engines were transitioned from “run” to “cutoff” around three seconds after takeoff from Ahmedabad Airport. Although both fuel switches were turned back on within a further 14 sec., the aircraft was too low to recover and impacted trees and buildings, killing 241 of 242 occupants on the 787 and 19 on the ground.The AAIB has criticized subsequent western media reports as “irresponsible” for indicating the fuel cutoff switches were likely deliberately moved by one of the pilots.
However, Feith says: “It has become very apparent, especially now with information I know and what's come out about the cockpit voice recorder—where the question is heard ‘why did you cut off the fuel?’—[that] somebody had to have seen that action to make that statement. You just wouldn’t have a dual-engine failure.”
Speaking at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Aviation forum here in Las Vegas, Feith says: “Something had to prompt that type of comment. Now we get into the psychology part of it, and that's really where this investigation is going to go. “And oh, by the way, it's no longer an accident. It's investigated as a criminal event, just like EgyptAir, just like Germanwings, just like SilkAir. These are criminal events—intentional acts,” he adds, referring to three fatal crashes deemed to have been deliberately caused which occurred in 1999, 2015 and 1997 respectively.
Feith, who participated in the investigation into the SilkAir crash—where a Boeing 737-300 traveling from Jakarta to Singapore was downed—says other theories continue to persist in the face of contradictory evidence provided by the AAIB. “To this day, people are still talking about this as a dual-engine failure, despite the fact that the AAIB came out with a preliminary report which gave some initial findings. They said at this stage of the investigation, there are no recommended actions for the 787-8 or the engines. They just exonerated the airplane. They just exonerated the engines.”
“The junior investigators and the trolls are still making a big deal about engine failure, software issues, FADEC problems. They're not part of the process,” Feith continues. The AAIB “had a team of subject matter experts dissecting all of this in that 30-day period. You think they didn't look at that? It makes no logical sense,” he adds.
“The fact is that now we have people all spooled up looking at the wrong thing instead of looking at, 'is this an isolated problem or a systemic event?' It's the first major accident for a brand-new airplane [type]. This is the kind of controversy that gets stirred up and distracts us from really looking at where we need to be and what we need to be doing to enhance aviation safety,” Feith says.
Referencing the SilkAir accident, he says: “I've been down this road. I spent two years working on SilkAir in Palembang, Sumatra. I took a team of investigators over with me from Boeing and the engine manufacturer, the FAA and a variety of others, and we determined in concert with their National Transportation Safety Committee, that this was an intentional act.”
However, Feith says: “It has become very apparent, especially now with information I know and what's come out about the cockpit voice recorder—where the question is heard ‘why did you cut off the fuel?’—[that] somebody had to have seen that action to make that statement. You just wouldn’t have a dual-engine failure.”
Speaking at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics Aviation forum here in Las Vegas, Feith says: “Something had to prompt that type of comment. Now we get into the psychology part of it, and that's really where this investigation is going to go. “And oh, by the way, it's no longer an accident. It's investigated as a criminal event, just like EgyptAir, just like Germanwings, just like SilkAir. These are criminal events—intentional acts,” he adds, referring to three fatal crashes deemed to have been deliberately caused which occurred in 1999, 2015 and 1997 respectively.
Feith, who participated in the investigation into the SilkAir crash—where a Boeing 737-300 traveling from Jakarta to Singapore was downed—says other theories continue to persist in the face of contradictory evidence provided by the AAIB. “To this day, people are still talking about this as a dual-engine failure, despite the fact that the AAIB came out with a preliminary report which gave some initial findings. They said at this stage of the investigation, there are no recommended actions for the 787-8 or the engines. They just exonerated the airplane. They just exonerated the engines.”
“The junior investigators and the trolls are still making a big deal about engine failure, software issues, FADEC problems. They're not part of the process,” Feith continues. The AAIB “had a team of subject matter experts dissecting all of this in that 30-day period. You think they didn't look at that? It makes no logical sense,” he adds.
“The fact is that now we have people all spooled up looking at the wrong thing instead of looking at, 'is this an isolated problem or a systemic event?' It's the first major accident for a brand-new airplane [type]. This is the kind of controversy that gets stirred up and distracts us from really looking at where we need to be and what we need to be doing to enhance aviation safety,” Feith says.
Referencing the SilkAir accident, he says: “I've been down this road. I spent two years working on SilkAir in Palembang, Sumatra. I took a team of investigators over with me from Boeing and the engine manufacturer, the FAA and a variety of others, and we determined in concert with their National Transportation Safety Committee, that this was an intentional act.”
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