Posts about: "FCOM" [Posts: 42 Pages: 3]

Originally Posted by LGB

I am also thinking that Air India would follow Boeing procedures in that the left seat pilot will move their right hand away from the thrust levers at V1, and thus, at 400', the thrust levers are not guarded or monitored?

Originally Posted by LGB

Even if thrust levers were pushed forward, is there some kind of logic related to FMC and-or FADEC or other involved systems, which regardless of thrust lever position commands IDLE thrust to the engine?

Originally Posted by LGB

​​​​​​​ Remember that Airbus accident where the aircraft thought it was landing, while the pilots wanted full thrust, and they crashed into a small forest because some kind of idle is all they were afforded by the system?

Originally Posted by LGB

​​​​​​​ If the engines of this 787 thought it was in the rollout or final part of the flare, it might also command thrust levers to idle?

Originally Posted by syseng68K

I guess it depends on the model

Originally Posted by Shep69

As has been gone over before, the auththrottles normally stay in HOLD until 400 AGL at which point they engage in THR REF xxx VNAV SPD to whatever value was programmed in the RTOW.

BUT

Say the MCP is mis-set to 200\x92 or so. VNAV never engages and the expected mode (from others; I`ve never tried it) would be SPD xxx ALT.

The modes still engage regardless of whether or not the airplane is on autopilot; the autopilot itself just follows the flight director commands (and the PF certainly woudn`t follow the FD in this case). Autothrottles are independent of autopilot.

Originally Posted by nachtmusak

To be clear, are you stating categorically or guessing (or neither, and I'm misreading you and you mean something else) that the 787's autothrottle will come out of HOLD and into SPD mode below 400 feet by design in response to the altitude that's set in the mode control panel, entirely by itself, without the autopilot engaged? Not that this is the way it would behave in normal flight - that this is the way it is designed to behave while it's in HOLD mode for takeoff?

I am actually looking for an answer from a pilot (or at least someone with an FCOM who can share any relevant passages) because nothing I have been able to look up on my own suggests that this is the case. All secondary sources I can find just say that the autothrottle is inhibited under 400 feet on takeoff, with my impression being that the crew is expected to manage thrust manually during that phase of flight. The incidents I was able to turn up involving an aircraft attempting to capture a target altitude at takeoff specifically don't help either:

- G-ECOE: Flight was completely normal until the crew engaged the autopilot at 1350 feet, at which point the aircraft started diving to the target of 0 feet. However it involved a Dash 8 and not only is that not a Boeing aircraft, it doesn't have an autothrottle to begin with. Nothing to conclude from this.

- F-WWKH: Again automated deviation was triggered by the crew engaging the autopilot a few seconds after takeoff as part of a test flight. However again also not a Boeing aircraft (an A330) and the selected target altitude was 2000 feet so the autopilot tried to pitch up to capture it. Not sure if anything can be concluded from this.

- A6-EQI: The most relevant, being a Boeing 777, with wide speculation being that the selected altitude was left at 0 feet. However the preliminary report is very thin so there's little to go on in the way of factual information, but the problem seems to entirely have been that the pilot flying was following the flight directors without question. There's zero indication of any loss of thrust, in fact they seem to have nearly entered an overspeed condition partly due to the shallow climb angle implying that the engines were doing just fine. So it doesn't seem like the selected altitude caused the autothrottle to do anything.

I am sorry if it seems like I'm banging on about this autothrottle point a bit much but as an engineer it just seems completely backwards to me. What exactly is the point of the HOLD mode or of setting those specific gates (80 knots, 400 feet) if the autothrottle can so easily come out of it? The design might as well not have it at all and just leave the autothrottle in THR REF for takeoff then - what would be the difference?

Originally Posted by nachtmusak

I suppose an informed guess is the best answer I can get here, short of someone having access to an actual sim or a Boeing engineer chipping in. Though I am curious that you are guessing that it would engage, when in the example you give to point out the autothrottle being inhibited at low altitudes (the Asiana accident at SFO) the autothrottle didn't engage - not even to provide low speed protection, a potentially life-and-death matter. If that accident was my only datapoint my guess would be that if it's strict enough to not engage for stall protection, it's strict enough to not engage for altitude capture.

Also to be clear I do know that the autopilot and autothrottle are independent - I have been talking about the autopilot because as I listed, in the incidents I could find where the aircraft automatically tried to capture a target altitude on takeoff, the autopilot was first engaged. So my impression was that until then the aircraft might provide guidance (like in the Emirates case) but will not actually do anything to change the thrust, pitch, etc parameters that have been set.

Originally Posted by Icarus2001

Always possible, however since a pilot made a radio call there was some emergency leve l power available, which suggests the EAFR would be powered.

The Jeju recorders were okay if I recall correctly, they just had no input, was that the case?

Somoeone made a good point above about the German Wings FDR/CVR being available the next day after the aircraft was aimed at the ground like a missile. These things are built tough, as you know, this may be type specific but….

Originally Posted by mh370rip

SLF Engineer (electrical - not aerospace) so no special knowledge

Perceived wisdom may be applicable in normal circumstances but not when all the holes line up.

For example I've seen it quoted many times that the engine FADECs are self powered
by the engines, the TCMAs-whether part of the FADEC or a separate unit, similarly self contained
within the engine. The perceived wisdom seems to be that there is no common single fault
which can take out both engines.

And yet we're also told that the TCMA function can only function in ground mode and receives ground-air
signals from a combination of inputs from Rad Alts and WOW sensors.
There is therefore a connection from the central EE bay to the engine.

Yes I'm sure the Rad/Alt and WOW sensor processing will use different sensors for each side and powered from different
low voltage buses.
However as an analogy, in your house your toaster in the kitchen may be on a separate circuit from the water heater in
the bathroom, each protected by a fuse at the main switchboard. In normal operation a fault in one cannot affect the other.
However a lightning strike outside the house can send much higher voltages than normal operation throughout the entire
system and trash every electrical appliance not physically disconnected at the time.

Now I'm not suggesting the aircraft was hit by lightning but FDR has proposed a single event, buildup from a water leak entering
one of the EE bays at rotate. It would be possible for one or more of the HV electrical buses to short so that all the low voltage
buses go high voltage. I have no knowledge of how the FADEC / TCMA systems connect to or process the Ground-Air signals but
there is a single fault mechanism whereby high voltage could be simultaneously and inappropriately applied to both engine control systems.
It would be unfortunate if this failure mechanism did cause power to be applied to drive the fuel shut off valve closed.

Since the likelihood is that we're looking at a low probability event then perceived wisdom about normal operations and fault modes
might not be applicable.

Originally Posted by island_airphoto

If rigorously applied, an "engine thrust balancer" would cause the good engine to fail if something happened to the other one. Surely there is some logic in there somewhere to give up and disconnect past a certain amount of adjustment??
* as for why not before, probably because it didn't happen that way or in Boeing's worst nightmare some weird corner case in the software that does this if certain parameters are in rare combination.

Originally Posted by Phantom4

Have the spring loaded Fuel Shut Off Valves been examined by GE on both engines???

Originally Posted by NSEU

The FCOM explains that the system only operates when there is a large thrust to weight ratio and will maintain the required climb performance. If applied during an engine out, it will provide directional control only when airspeed drops below normal operating speeds.

Originally Posted by Sailvi767

Both engines run from the center tank on takeoff if it has fuel in the tank which was the case on this flight.

Originally Posted by Megan

Switch over to the centre tank to feed all engines typically takes place at 10,000'

Originally Posted by megan

Hold your horses there Bloggs , I didn't say they did, I said centre tanks were typically turned on at that altitude (using a certain 737 operator as a guide). As the check list that you posted shows the centre pumps will automatically turn off because of load shedding once an engine is started.

Originally Posted by AerocatS2A

I have an up to date B787-9 FCOM and it agrees with Bloggs. Centre tank pumps are switched on prior to start. Load shedding is just until all electrics are available, ie until after engine start, then the centre tank pumps are operational as far as I can tell.

Originally Posted by adfad

I also don't see any evidence that engine driven fuel pumps alone must be able to handle this scenario: provide enough fuel flow for takeoff and climb, even while the pitch is rotating, even in a hot environment with significant weight, even while the gear is stuck down.
I also don't see any evidence that engine driven fuel pumps alone must be able to handle this scenario: provide enough fuel flow for takeoff and climb, even while the pitch is rotating, even in a hot environment with significant weight, even while the gear is stuck down.

Originally Posted by MaybeItIs

Sorry, you missed the point I was trying to make. \xa7 25.903(b) does say that the fuel system must be able to operate in an isolated, two-sided mode (for a twin engined jet), such that nothing on one side, such as bad fuel, will adversely affect the other engine. Of course, during Takeoff, both sides drawing fuel from a Centre Tank containing a lot of contaminants (e.g. Fuel Bug matter, water) is a scenario that could bring down the plane. We are all aware of that. But the point I was trying to make is that although \xa7 25.903(b) requires "at least one configuration" that separates both systems entirely (such as Left engine drawing from Left Main Tank, and Right from Right) which can be configured, the Rule doesn't appear to make that compulsory for Takeoff.

A lot of other posters here have stated that according to FCOM instructions, the normal, accepted 787 Takeoff configuration is "Both sides draw from centre" if the Centre tanks have enough fuel in them. I think (maybe wrongly) that this (prior few posts) is the first time this exact point has been raised. I hope I'm correct there. If not, my humble apologies.

The great thing about this forum and sadly, this tragic accident, is that it's drawing a few previously little-known worms out of the woodwork.

Originally Posted by "Capn Bloggs

So, we have a Memory Drill with a non-numbered thing you have to remember first, being sub-idle, and an FCTM that pumps the idea of getting those switches off and on ASAP, before the revs drop off too much, at any speed or altitude.

Great.