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B2N2
2025-06-14T06:49:00 permalink Post: 11901170 |
The Qatar incident in Miami is reminiscent. https://dohanews.co/report-qatar-airways-fires-pilots-involved-in-miami-takeoff-incident/ That plus a possibly inadvertent flap retraction which above 400\x92 will trigger a reduction to CLB thrust which is maybe the reason for the \x91thrust loss\x92 call. Some previous flights show a backtrack and some do not. Unknown how accurate that flight tracker data is. 1 user liked this post. |
Sisiphos
2025-06-14T06:53:00 permalink Post: 11901175 |
Speaking as a B787 Captain..... There is so much rubbish and stupid suggestion being written here.
This aircraft was airborne for a grand total of 22 seconds, half of which was climbing to no more than 150' aal. - No Flaps? Due to the setup of the ECL it is physically impossible to go down the runway without some sort of take-off flap set. The T/o config warning would have been singing it's head off. Despite assertions to the contrary I have seen no video clear enough to detect a lack of flaps. - RAT out? Almost impossible, I have seen no quality footage that definitively witnesses the RAT being out. Those who think they car hear a RAT type noise might be listening to a motorcycle passing or similar. It takes a triple hydraulic failure or a double engine failure to trigger RAT deploment. They happily went through V1 without a hint of rejected take off so as they rotated the aircraft was serviceable. These are big engines, they take a long time to wind down when you shut them down. I have never tried it however engine failure detection takes 30s or for the aircraft to react and they were not even airborne that long. - Flaps up instead of gear? The B787 flaps are slow both in and out. Given that the 'Positive rate' call is not made the second the wheels leave the ground, a mis-selection of flaps up would not cause any loss of lift for at least 20 seconds, by which time they had already crashed. I believe the gear remained down not because of mis-selection but because of a major distraction on rotate. Discounting the impossible, two hypotheses remain: 1. Invalid derate set through incorrect cross-checking. Trundling down the runway takes very little power to reach Vr. It is only when you rotate that you create more drag and discover that you do not have sufficient thrust vs. drag to sustain a climb. Or.... 2. Put 200' as the altitude target in the FCU. Immediate ALT capture and all the power comes off. PF is still hand flying trying to increase pitch but is already way behind the aircraft. It could be after this that Boeing are forced to review the B787 practice of exploring the very edges of the performance envelope. 1) The flap retraction would immediately result in progressive less lift, not only after full retraction . The time in the air could have been longer than your estimate, maybe enough time for full retraction 2) if 200 feet in MCP, why would that lead to a descent? Shouldn't that result in level flight? 3) wrong TOW / too low power setting sounds like a plausible event.Happened before. But with full power / TOGA set in the air ( which surely must have happened)I would expect at least a longer struggle rather than the constant descent. Just a gut feeling though, busdriver, no experience on 787. Maybe already in a power on stall. The only problem with this hypothesis is that it does not explain the gear down since there definitely was positive rate after rotation. 4) double engine failure too remote, no signs of flames etc. Forget it, agreed. My guess remains inadvertant flaps retraction for what it's worth. 1 user liked this post. |
MR8
2025-06-14T12:31:00 permalink Post: 11901444 |
Even though there is no point speculating about the cause of this accident, it is the nature of the beast to have questions. As pilots (most of us at least), we do have an inquiring mindset.
My initial thoughts were an inadvertent flap retraction. But with the ‘evidence’ that has been presented over the last 48 hours, I think we can safely discard that option. What we think we know is: - RAT was deployed (highly possible) - Gear was selected up, but did not operate (bogey tilted, doors remained closed) - APU was ‘on’ (APU door open on after crash pictures) - Flight path Any of these observations, alone, would mean very little. However, in combination, they all point to a dual engine flameout just at/after the rotation. The aircaft has enough kinetic energy to reach roughly 150ft altitude, and then starts a shallow descent at ‘alpha max’ into the buildings ahead. The RAT deployed, APU attempted auto-start, gear was unable to retract. I only wonder why the engines spooled down. Bird strike seems to be out of the question, so that leaves us with only a very few options, which include a software bug or a suicidal pilot (not a popular option, I understand, but we have to take all options into account). What I don’t believe is incorrect FCU selections, since that would not explain the high AOA on impact. It also would not explain the RAT, no gear retraction or the APU inlet flap open. Another thing that is highly unlikely is any switching done by the pilots, especially RAT etc.. The airborne time is just too little, pilots usually don’t take any action below approximately 400ft, and these switches are so ‘underused’ that a pilot would not find them instantaneously in a high stress situation. For me, a dual engine flameout seems the only possible explanation, now we only have to wait for its cause. 16 users liked this post. |
OPENDOOR
2025-06-14T12:43:00 permalink Post: 11901451 |
Even though there is no point speculating about the cause of this accident, it is the nature of the beast to have questions. As pilots (most of us at least), we do have an inquiring mindset.
My initial thoughts were an inadvertent flap retraction. But with the ‘evidence’ that has been presented over the last 48 hours, I think we can safely discard that option. What we think we know is: - RAT was deployed (highly possible) - Gear was selected up, but did not operate (bogey tilted, doors remained closed) - APU was ‘on’ (APU door open on after crash pictures) - Flight path Any of these observations, alone, would mean very little. However, in combination, they all point to a dual engine flameout just at/after the rotation. The aircaft has enough kinetic energy to reach roughly 150ft altitude, end then starts a shallow descent at ‘alpha max’ into the buildings ahead. The RAT deployed, APU attempted auto-start, gear was unable to retract. I only wonder why the engines spooled down. Bird strike seems to be out of the question, so that leaves us with only a very few options, which include a software bug or a suicidal pilot (not a popular option, I understand, but we have to take all options into account). What I don’t believe is incorrect FCU selections, since that would not explain the high AOA on impact. It also would not explain the RAT, no gear retraction or the APU inlet flap open. Another thing that is highly unlikely is any switching done by the pilots, especially RAT etc.. These airborne time is just too little, pilots usually don’t take any action below approximately 400ft, and these switches are so ‘underused’ that a pilot would not find them instantaneously in a high stress situation. For me, a dual engine flameout seems the only possible explanation, now we only have to wait for its cause. ![]() Last edited by Senior Pilot; 14th Jun 2025 at 19:08 . Reason: Double posting of image |
aeo
2025-06-14T14:05:00 permalink Post: 11901513 |
I agree it is helpful to seek a consensus on some of these matters.
The most productive responses would be along the lines of:- (1) I too have read all previous posts and agree that your summary reflects the current consensus, (2) I too have read all previous posts and agree your summary reflects the consensus HOWEVER I challenge that consensus because... [ [i]EITHER (a) reference to previous post that merits greater credence, OR (b) new evidence supplied], (3) I too have read all previous posts but I do NOT agree your summary reflects the consensus [explanation required]. It is not necessary for everyone who thinks (1) to say it (although some initial feedback would be useful!). However, if any of the more experienced and informed PPRuNers are thinking either (2) or (3) then it would be instructive to hear that. FWIW, yours strikes me as a reasonable summary of the best consensus I have been able to discern (as of ~30 minutes ago). There are multiple caveats to each line item, but I presume you've deliberately left those out for the sake of readability, so I'll do the same! The only comments I would add are:- - It's a stretch to say the RAT is seen or heard "conclusively". Doubts have been expressed about the video quality and there are dissenting views regarding the audio. If a few more people were able to wade in on the audio point in particular, this could be very beneficial in moving the discussion forward because the presence or otherwise of the RAT is significant to several competing theories. - On the subject of audio, I am surprised there has not been more discussion regarding engine noise. In the primary eye witness video the (alleged) RAT can be heard distinctly, as can the sounds of distant impact. If the engines were working as expected when overflying the camera and then flying directly away from it, do we really not think the engine noise would be more conclusive, i.e. louder (notwithstanding quiet engines and derated takeoffs)? Whichever way readers are leaning in the flaps versus power loss debate, surely these two points are pivotal, and we have actual evidence available to discuss? - Gear bogies: I'm not sure a consensus has yet been reached regarding the angle of the bogies. (I am not personally qualified to comment on this - I am purely saying I don't see a clear consensus just yet among those who are) - Mayday call: I don't recall seeing a confirmed source for the widely reported mayday. Others have brought this up in the thread but nobody appears to be able to confirm one way or the other. If accurate, its contents are informative. Am I right to presume that you have left it out of your summary due to a lack of confirmation? - The bogie could be explained by the Flap/Slat priority valve giving priority to the flaps if the PM suddenly realised his mistake and quickly put the flap lever back to the TO position and then selected the gear lever to UP. Those systems are both heavy hitters and would\x92ve sucked the life out of the CTR hydraulic system pumps. - There is no way loss of AC (alleged RAT deployment) could've caused a spool down of both engines. Think QF A380 incident in SIN - The entire #1 engine wiring harness in the wing was completely severed and yet it continued (by design) to run at its previous thrust setting. They had to shut it down using a fire truck! - History and design would dictate that a big 180 minutes ETOP\x92s twin such as the 787 having a dual engine failure or significant power loss at such a critical phase of flight would be a billion to one chance at best. Only the Airbus A400 had a software issue causing all 4 engine fuel shutoff valves to close causing it to crash killing the flight test crew - But this was during its development and flt testing. - Wide body twin\x92s delivering in the region of 60,000 to 115,000 lbs of thrust at TO rarely , if at all, flame out from multiple bird strike(s) like the baby Bus\x92s and Boeing\x92s. If anyone has seen the frozen chickens at TO power video would know what I\x92m talking about. And the Fan Blade being \x91blown off\x92 as well. In both cases the engine was was able to maintain full TOGA thrust for significantly longer than the AI aircraft. But it\x92s early days and anything could happen. And nothing surprises me anymore. 3 users liked this post. |
njc
2025-06-14T15:06:00 permalink Post: 11901555 |
- The bogie could be explained by the Flap/Slat priority valve giving priority to the flaps if the PM suddenly realised his mistake and quickly put the flap lever back to the TO position and then selected the gear lever to UP. Those systems are both heavy hitters and would’ve sucked the life out of the CTR hydraulic system pumps.
- There is no way loss of AC (alleged RAT deployment) could've caused a spool down of both engines. Think QF A380 incident in SIN - The entire #1 engine wiring harness in the wing was completely severed and yet it continued (by design) to run at its previous thrust setting. They had to shut it down using a fire truck! - History and design would dictate that a big 180 minutes ETOP’s twin such as the 787 having a dual engine failure or significant power loss at such a critical phase of flight would be a billion to one chance at best. Only the Airbus A400 had a software issue causing all 4 engine fuel shutoff valves to close causing it to crash killing the flight test crew - But this was during its development and flt testing. - Wide body twin’s delivering in the region of 60,000 to 115,000 lbs of thrust at TO rarely , if at all, flame out from multiple bird strike(s) like the baby Bus’s and Boeing’s. If anyone has seen the frozen chickens at TO power video would know what I’m talking about. And the Fan Blade being ‘blown off’ as well. In both cases the engine was was able to maintain full TOGA thrust for significantly longer than the AI aircraft. As for history and design making a dual-engine failure a billion to one chance: I'd be more inclined to agree that it's unlikely to be what happened if the actual manufacturing of planes (Boeings in particular) and the maintenance procedures were both carried out "by the book" at all times by the manufacturer and the airlines... This is clearly not the case though. Last edited by Saab Dastard; 14th Jun 2025 at 19:35 . Reason: reference to deleted posts removed |
Someone Somewhere
2025-06-14T17:35:00 permalink Post: 11901681 |
What concerns me a little bit is if indeed AC power is lost, would the suction feed inlets in the wing tanks provide enough fuel flow to maintain TO thrust?
I know the system is designed to achieve this in a situation where all of the AC powered boost pumps are lost. But what about in a real situation... Could this cause a degradation of thrust? Even the slightest decrease..
I did read and search this thread, but I found nothing about ADS-B loss just before the end of the runway and at 71 ft high, according to FR24. ADS-B coverage is poor on the ground on the north-east part of the airfield (hence the fake news about taking off from the intersection) but I don't think it would be lost once airborne, except if it has been shut off... electrical failure ?
more precisely, loss of the two Main AC buses (ADS-B not powered by Standby AC) There's a list of equipment operable on battery/RAT here, but I'm not sure which (if any) is the transponder (26:10): If you had gear pins and an engine loss, I could maybe see climb rate being zero or slightly negative. Not the brick impression we see here.
There have been a couple comments regarding the tilt of the bogies not corresponding to the landing configuration which have taken this as an indicator for an attempted (but failed) retraction.
I don't think anybody has so far confirmed which of the two positions the bogie would have without hydraulic pressure, but I would strongly think it is the one used in the retraction/extension cycle and not the landing configuration, for the simple reason that otherwise the gravity drop would potentially not work (I assume it is tilted for the stowing because it would otherwise not fit). Maybe someone with concrete knowledge can confirm this? This would then only confirm that the bogies were unpressurized (likely because of loss of hydraulics, but of course could also still be a partial retraction that stopped for some reason) 2 users liked this post. |
Shep69
2025-06-14T19:26:00 permalink Post: 11901751 |
We're all shouting each other down with two main different theories on why the aircraft lost lift so shortly after takeoff.
1) Incorrect flap retraction causing the aircraft to lose lift and unable to recover the energy in time. (Not unheard of and plenty of reports where this has happened - albeit usually not to a crash). 2) Loss of engine thrust backed up two potential pieces of evidence that back up the RAT was deployed (apparent RAT sound, potential RAT seen on low res video). It is impossible to know which of these is the case. Considering this summary of memory items is there the potential for a combination of both theories to have taken place? Inadvertant flap retraction by PNF leading the PF to sense a sink and loss of lift. Pushes the thrust levers forward to the firewall and still the aircraft sinks. PF looking through the HUD and so very much 'outside focused' and doesn't realise that PNF has instead moved the flaps. PF defaults to memory items for loss of thrust on both engines before PNF can realise or communicate to PF what they've done, start switches are cut off which drops the RAT and from that point they're only heading one way. This would satisfy the strongly held belief that the RAT was extended, whilst also following the more likely initial cause of an action slip by PNF starting the sequence, rather than a dual engine failure. On a flap 5 takeoff the FMS could be programmed to select climb power at flaps 1 which would seem like an apparent loss of thrust. Same as for F15 to F5 or further. I`m not sure if they would have cycled the FCS switches or not. But the airplane certainly would have experienced a loss of lift would the flaps been inadvertently retracted. As well as perceived loss of thrust. OTOH any castastophic failure which left the gear down would have essentially left the flaps where they were. They are hydraulically activated with electrical backup but it`s wayyyyy slow. |
WITCHWAY550
2025-06-14T20:52:00 permalink Post: 11901823 |
Each time I look at the video it strikes me as a flap retraction below clean climb speed. It looks as if the rate of pitch change and extreme nose high occurred gradually and at a rate which could be the pilot input for deteriorating climb rate based on the corresponding change in wing lift coefficient. I would assume also he was not instantly aware the flaps had been reselected to zero and if he became aware it was only a few seconds from impact. As far as my theory goes I would assume either the Captain commanded "FLAPS UP" erroneously or if he commanded "GEAR UP" the F/O just brain glitched without taking normal care in the cockpit with things like that. A normal procedure but with the same consequences of dealing with an engine fire after V1 IF you misidentify the switch or handle. Thats my opinion. As far as the crew experience it can be recognized the F/O was the weakest link in experience. Nothing new or different than that unless his training show deficiencies managing that cockpit.
2 users liked this post. |
LTC8K6
2025-06-14T21:04:00 permalink Post: 11901829 |
Each time I look at the video it strikes me as a flap retraction below clean climb speed. It looks as if the rate of pitch change and extreme nose high occurred gradually and at a rate which could be the pilot input for deteriorating climb rate based on the corresponding change in wing lift coefficient. I would assume also he was not instantly aware the flaps had been reselected to zero and if he became aware it was only a few seconds from impact. As far as my theory goes I would assume either the Captain commanded "FLAPS UP" erroneously or if he commanded "GEAR UP" the F/O just brain glitched without taking normal care in the cockpit with things like that. A normal procedure but with the same consequences of dealing with an engine fire after V1 IF you misidentify the switch or handle. Thats my opinion. As far as the crew experience it can be recognized the F/O was the weakest link in experience. Nothing new or different than that unless his training show deficiencies managing that cockpit.
The gear and flap controls are not easily confused in the 787. They look nothing alike and are not near each other. |
bakutteh
2025-06-15T02:13:00 permalink Post: 11902053 |
![]()
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬 Last edited by bakutteh; 15th Jun 2025 at 09:18 . 11 users liked this post. |
Lifer01
2025-06-15T02:29:00 permalink Post: 11902059 |
This applies equally to a normal gear retraction: the centre hydraulic pumps must have stopped very early for the trucks to be in that position on an "interrupted" gear retraction, with the main gear doors still closed (and presumably locked). Seems unlikely.
I did raise this earlier... FCOMs say that the bogies remain in the stowed tilt after a gravity drop, but I don't know if that's because the gear has springs to hold it that way without hydraulics, or just they close the valves on the hydraulics so it stays in the last commanded position without pressure.
Alternate extension appears to rely on the truck positioner remaining in its previously "positioned" state - stowed - where it has been sitting cold, unloved and unpowered since the gear was previously retracted. Like other Boeing types, the wheel well has some bars to stop the truck moving while it's up and stowed. It's remotely possible the main gear priority valves may have prevented more gear movement in the absence of good hydraulic pressure - however this wouldn't stop the nose gear from operating, so not likely. Last edited by Lifer01; 15th Jun 2025 at 02:39 . 1 user liked this post. |
Compton3fox
2025-06-15T06:48:00 permalink Post: 11902156 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬 However, I think their reaction would likely be to apply more power. I know mine would be. But anything is possible! |
Chuck Canuck
2025-06-15T08:22:00 permalink Post: 11902223 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners’ imagination.😖🥴😬 This is a very plausible scenario. Above 400 ‘ AGL, memory items. 4 users liked this post. |
amsm01
2025-06-15T08:54:00 permalink Post: 11902253 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel switches to OFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬 Am slightly puzzled as to why if flap reduction triggering climb thrust is part of the standard logic (and presumably clean-up technique) then partial dual thrust loss wouldn\x92t be immediately recognised as the classic symptom of gear / flap retraction handling error? I presume Boeing pilots / air India are just as aware of this it as everyone else, strikes me as odd that one would immediately go into full dual EF mode. My instinctive reaction without knowing the Boeing would be to firewall both TLs, would this have worked in the early flap retraction logic scenario? Many thanks all |
Tu.114
2025-06-15T09:46:00 permalink Post: 11902300 |
Something rather relevant has not yet been shown on this thread: a performance calculation.
Could somebody with access to a 787 performance calculator please show realistic figures for this type out of Ahmedabads runway 23? Weather at the time of the accident: VAAH 120830Z 24003KT 6000 NSC 37/17 Q1000 NOSIG= VAAH 120800Z 25007KT 6000 NSC 37/16 Q1001 NOSIG= With 240 souls on board, a payload of 20-22 tons might be a ballpark figure, and a fuel load of about 50 tons was claimed as realistic in earlier posts. An appropriate flap setting, a flex temperature, V1, Vr, V2, flap retraction and green dot speed (or its Boeing equivalent), a climb gradient after departure, and some distances might be of interest, I\xb4d think. Last edited by Tu.114; 15th Jun 2025 at 10:50 . 1 user liked this post. |
sorvad
2025-06-15T09:56:00 permalink Post: 11902306 |
(Sorry, Airbus here and not familiar with Boeing) Flap 5 to 1 reduction on the Boeing triggers autothrust reduction, is that correct? If so, are there any other conditions that need to be met for this to happen like being in some kind of takeoff mode? Just thinking whether this would have potential otherwise in other regimes to cause issues, discontinued approach perhaps.
Am slightly puzzled as to why if flap reduction triggering climb thrust is part of the standard logic (and presumably clean-up technique) then partial dual thrust loss wouldn’t be immediately recognised as the classic symptom of gear / flap retraction handling error? I presume Boeing pilots / air India are just as aware of this it as everyone else, strikes me as odd that one would immediately go into full dual EF mode. My instinctive reaction without knowing the Boeing would be to firewall both TLs, would this have worked in the early flap retraction logic scenario? Many thanks all Last edited by sorvad; 15th Jun 2025 at 10:15 . 6 users liked this post. |
Shep69
2025-06-15T11:32:00 permalink Post: 11902384 |
So for those getting in the weeds with one in several trillion (or lower) probabilities of systems failures have you considered that that improper RTOW (with or without improper flap setting), flap retraction / climb thrust trigger, is of much higher probability and has actually happened ?
Anyway I think we’ll find out soon if a systems failure was involved. The FLCH Hold thing (Asiana) was never an issue and well known (at least on our line). And for a crew of 3 (or 4) to press a destabilized approach getting 40-ish knots too slow (!) isn’t a systems problem — it’s a breach of basic airmanship. Last edited by Senior Pilot; 15th Jun 2025 at 11:49 . Reason: Edit 3 users liked this post. |
sorvad
2025-06-15T12:39:00 permalink Post: 11902431 |
So for those getting in the weeds with one in several trillion (or lower) probabilities of systems failures have you considered that that improper RTOW (with or without improper flap setting), flap retraction / climb thrust trigger, is of much higher probability and has actually happened ?
Anyway I think we’ll find out soon if a systems failure was involved. The FLCH Hold thing (Asiana) was never an issue and well known (at least on our line). And for a crew of 3 (or 4) to press a destabilized approach getting 40-ish knots too slow (!) isn’t a systems problem — it’s a breach of basic airmanship. |
Captain Fishy
2025-06-15T21:56:00 permalink Post: 11902882 |
Do not discount the mistaken early flap retraction scenario too easily. Mull on this:
PF commanded gear up on attaining positive rate of climb, fixating on the HUD. PM mistakenly raise flap lever from 5 to Flap 1 gate. Thrust reduced to Climb Thrust. Landing gear remained deployed. Massive loss of lift misidentified as loss of thrust. If any one pilot just had a dual engine failure scenario on a recent sim ride, brain and muscle memory would jump to loss of thrust in dual engine, prompting them to accomplish the recall memory items which called for both engine fuel control switches to CUTOFF and then RUN, and physically deployed the RAT. There would be immediate loss of thrust with the engine taking time to recover , if at all, at such low airspeed! The rest is left for Ppruners\x92 imagination.😖🥴😬 A loss of lift AND thrust at this critical juncture could have had caused this awful disaster. I think the data recorders have already revealed the cause but If it's this, then I don't think we will hear much anytime soon. |